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Preface and  
acknowledgements
My wonderful wife, Georgina Murray, apart from being an excellent 
sociologist, is a great Leonard Cohen fan. So I get to hear his music a lot. 
Leonard Cohen wrote a song ‘Everybody Knows’, and so it seems that 
everybody knows about the future, or at least they pretend they know. 
But, in reality, nobody knows. In Dante’s Divine Comedy, written over 
eight centuries ago, the eighth ring of hell had a special place for ‘diviners, 
astrologists and musicians’ or, as a later illustration put it, ‘futurologists’. 
He was probably right.
So if you are reading this book hoping to be able to join the crowded ranks 
of those who boast ‘I know about the future’, you may be disappointed. 
But if you bought it (or at least downloaded it) to find out what others, 
who say they do know, don’t know, you may be more pleased. What I can 
claim I know a lot about is the realities of work at present, and how we 
have to understand those realities to enable informed views on the future 
to be made. And how we do have to think about the future, and that the 
choices we make now will shape the way the future turns out. Because if 
we get those choices wrong, the future could be looking pretty grim—
like in that longer song title of Neil Young’s: ‘Everybody Knows This 
is Nowhere’.
Dante isn’t the only literary figure to get a mention in this book, though 
he’s the most ancient. Littered throughout, but especially in Chapter 3, 
are references to books, movies (or, in this preface, songs) from popular 
or classical culture. That’s partly because one of the most interesting ways 
people have had of talking about the future is through literature rather 
than through scholarly work (or speculative writing dressed up as scholarly 
work). And it’s also because I happen to like some of those literary works 
and talking about them.
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This book could not have been produced without the contributions 
of a number of other people.
The genesis for this book was over 20 years ago, when I began teaching 
a course at Griffith University on ‘Workplace Industrial Relations’. 
Over time I produced notes for the students that morphed into weekly 
readings. At one stage, in the early 2000s, the course was taught externally 
and Cameron Allan and Keith Townsend helped turn the notes and 
readings into something more pedagogically oriented for students. 
They also shaped my thinking in several areas, with Keith, for example, 
providing a lot of material on consent and control by management that 
is reflected here, and later on about emotional labour when he updated 
the course. Cameron contributed useful material on culture, gender and 
disadvantage. Later on, Janis Bailey updated the course again, including 
on postmodernism and power. Keith is now a professor at Griffith but 
Cameron, after a late career in the public service, and Janis have both 
retired. I want to acknowledge all their contributions.
That course has now disappeared but quite a bit of the ‘realities’ part 
of this book originated with those earlier notes. Then Tony Dundon 
(without realising it at the time, and possibly without realising it until 
he reads this) sparked the specific idea for this book. After I’d started 
preparing a manuscript, Werner Nienhüser suggested the plural of the 
title (it was originally ‘reality and future’) and that made so much sense. 
He also developed my literary education by giving me a copy of Dave 
Eggers’s The  Circle.  My  ideas on the ‘futures’ side of this book were 
further developed through some talks I gave that were hosted by the T.J. 
Ryan Foundation and in various academic and practitioner conferences 
and sessions. 
The Graduate Center at the City University of New York (special 
thanks to Ruth Milkman, Kay Powell and Don Robotham) gave me a 
fellowship that enabled me to finish work on the book, including writing 
most of Chapter 11 (as well as starting work on another book), and 
Griffith University allowed me to come here (special thanks to Ruth 
McPhail). Gregor Murray’s Centre de recherche interuniversitaire sur la 
mondialisation et le travail, based in Québec, Canada, exposed me to 
many international ideas and helped me develop several of my own at its 
various events and conferences.
xi
PReFAce AnD AcknoWLeDgeMenTS
The quarterly Griffith Review kindly allowed me to use some material that 
I had published originally there—in Griffith Review 45 (‘The Choices 
We Make: A Sliding Doors Moment’) and Griffith Review 61 (‘Debt in 
Paradise: On the Ground with Wage Theft’)—as the basis for much of 
Chapter 1 and a smaller part of Chapter 10. Some more of the ideas in 
Chapter 10 arose from a report I did for the Queensland Parliament on 
the operation of the workers’ compensation system in that state (thanks, 
Grace Grace), while others arose from work I did with Paul Harpur some 
time after he had completed his PhD on international labour standards, 
and his work has also contributed to the ideas and text in parts of this book 
(thanks, Paul). A number of the ideas in several other chapters derived 
from work with Georgina Murray, but she can’t be blamed for what I got 
wrong because she doesn’t always agree with me anyway. Indeed, I wish 
I could blame others for any mistakes in the book but, sadly, I cannot 
(well, not so far).
Georgina Murray and Ron Kelly read through the complete manuscript 
and gave worthy feedback, as did two thorough anonymous referees for 
ANU Press. Frank Bongiorno, also from that university, gave useful advice, 
and John Mahony undertook some excellent copyediting. I’m also pleased 
that ANU Press (thanks, Emily Hazlewood and Elouise Ball) is willing to 
offer refereed academic books in an open-access format that is affordable 
and consistent with the spirit of open inquiry that is so important in this 
era of commodification. 
And finally, a reverse acknowledgement to the multinational corporation 
that now owns the copyright on lyrics for certain songs. It demanded 
a four-figure payment if I were to use a couple of lines from a deceased 
poet’s song in the final chapter in this open-access book, and thereby 
demonstrated one of my points about the power of large corporations—
in this case, the owner of rights to a tower of songs. Everybody knows 
I was waiting for a miracle, but it being a book about the future and 
democracy, in my secret life I thought I might be the man in Manhattan 
to cry out ‘Hallelujah!’. But when it came to closing time on the editing 
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The big trends, the big choices
15 June 2049: Pat shuffles into 
the homeless shelter. They’re hard 
to find and they’ve always been 
spartan places, but more so now 
than they ever were when she was 
a student and did some volunteer 
work here in 2019. 
Not that she has time to dwell 
on those memories much. She 
knew she never wanted to come 
here, but she’s finally given in. 
It’s just too dangerous outside. 
The bashings are getting harder to 
avoid, sometimes shootings by the 
gangs or the cops. And if they get 
you, there’s no point in going to 
a hospital. If you don’t have private 
insurance (‘whatever that is’, she 
mumbles, though she knows what 
it is) you pay an up-front fee that 
she has no chance of handing over. 
Or they don’t let you in.
15 June 2049: Pat has coffee with an 
old friend from her university days. 
She hasn’t seen her for a quarter of 
a century. They’ve both aged since 
then, but both like to think the 
other hasn’t. 
They sit inside the cafe, next to 
the main window. Across the road 
is a sparkling new medical clinic. 
Her friend looks closely at it, then 
recognition dawns.
‘Isn’t that where we both did 
volunteer work for our degrees, 
back in 2019?’
‘Yes, though of course the homeless 
shelter moved out long ago. 
They’ve much nicer premises now, 
but I hear it’s rarely full.’
‘You see quite a few homeless 
people sleeping out in the park. 
I guess there’s nothing much to 
bother them.’ She  pauses. ‘Ever 
used that clinic?’
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Same with GPs, though at least 
the charge isn’t so high there. 
It used to be called a ‘copayment’ 
when it was lower, but eventually, 
she remembers, the government 
just stopped paying anything to 
doctors. ‘Rightsizing government’, 
they said, or some other buzzword. 
She wonders if she recognises the 
face on the other side of the soup 
ladle from her student days, but 
she says nothing.
‘Where you from?’ he asks, trying 
to make conversation as he half-
fills a bowl.
‘Round here. I went away. Came 
back a few years ago.’
‘What brought you back?’
‘I had some work—well, from time 
to time anyway.’
‘Doing what?’
‘Oh, through the app I got work as 
a sessional tutor at the uni. Had my 
last contract there about eighteen 
months ago, a few years after I got 
my PhD.’
‘Couple of years ago, I had a cough, 
real bad. My chest hurt so much 
I  thought I  was having a heart 
attack. They hooked me up and 
ran all the expensive tests, figured 
it was just a cracked rib. Well, they 
weren’t expensive tests for me—
didn’t cost me anything, of course. 
But it was really good.’
‘And how’s the job going, Pat?’
‘Quite well. You know, it’s pretty 
secure. I’ve got my hat in the ring 
for a promotion.’
‘To senior lecturer?’
‘Yes. It’s a few years since I got 
my PhD, I’ve done my share of 
teaching and publishing. I think 
I’m about due. Is that app your 
baby crying?’
‘I’ll bring her in. I thought she 
might sleep better in the sunshine. 
Never mind.’
It’s the same Pat in each vignette. The focus of our attention, though, is 
not the choices Pat made. She had limited choice. It’s the choices we make. 
We, as a society, face choices that affect what we do, the way we work, the 
nature of work, who benefits, and who suffers from it. But it’s the choices 
that we make that make the difference to her—and to millions of others. 
The movie Sliding Doors, released in 1998, presented two very different, 
alternative scenarios, distinguished by whether the main character caught 
or missed an underground train. In that movie, the defining event was 
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essentially random (whether or not she got through the train’s sliding 
doors), but in this book it is not random events, it is conscious choices 
that make the difference to our futures.
This book will outline the potential futures we face and the choices we 
make that will affect those futures. But it does so very much in the context 
of the reality of work now. Many books about the future of work start 
by talking about the latest technology, and focus on how that is going to 
change the way we work. And there is no doubt that technology will have 
huge impacts. However, to really understand the direction in which work 
is going, and the impact that technology and other forces will have, we 
need to first understand where we are.1 
I wrote much of this book while based in Australia, and so some of the 
examples are Australian. But there are also examples from the USA, where 
I finished writing this book, and even from Scandinavia, where I spent 
a few months living quite some time ago. Those two areas—the USA and 
Scandinavia—represent the extremes of the industrialised world, from 
what would be called the archetypal liberal market economy, in which the 
state plays ostensibly a minimalist role and the market mostly rules, to the 
group of archetypal coordinated market economies in which the market 
is frequently subordinated to the demands of the state and civil society.2 
That range tells us something about the diversity of possibilities open to 
us all, and underlines one of the ideas in this book that there are, indeed, 
choices that can and will be made.
So where Australian examples have been used, they have been chosen with 
more than one eye on, and countless lessons from and for, the world at 
large. Australia also has many lessons for the rest of the industrialised world 
because, although Australian people have liked to think of themselves as 
egalitarian,3 it is a liberal market economy that has undergone some of the 
more substantial neo-liberal transformations over the past three decades, 
and is in some ways an indicator, short of the extremes of the USA, of 
1  Much of this chapter first appeared in Griffith Review in David Peetz, ‘The Choices We 
Make—a “Sliding Doors” Moment’. Griffith Review 45 (July 2014): 44–75.
2  The terms ‘liberal market’ and ‘coordinated market’ economies come from the ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ literature, centred around Peter A. Hall and David W. Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism: 
The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
3  Donald Horne, The Lucky Country: Australia in the Sixties (Ringwood, Vic.: Penguin, 1964).
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where other industrialised countries have been heading. So, before going 
further into the future, what’s the back-story? How did we get to where 
we are? And where, exactly, are we?
Through parts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, improved living 
standards were manifested first as increased health, and later as improved 
wages.4 Inequality rose in the later part of the nineteenth century and 
peaked in the ‘gilded age’ before World War I, but thereafter reduced. 
Through several decades after World War II, living standards improved, 
unemployment was low and workers’ slice of the cake gradually got more 
icing on it. Wages and benefits rose, annual leave got longer, working 
hours got shorter. Responding to pressures from numerous parts of civil 
society, fearful of the alternative (communism) and legitimated by the 
economic role the state had played in World War II, governments widened 
and deepened the range of services they provided. 
This changed through the 1980s, in many countries. Major shifts in 
economy and society were brought about by financialisation, described 
by Thomas I. Palley as ‘a process whereby financial markets, financial 
institutions, and financial elites gain greater influence over economic 
policy and economic outcomes’.5 Increasingly, financialisation prioritised 
the monetary over the real, the volatile over the stable, the immediate over 
the sustainable, and the rich over the poor. 
For many, financialisation in Australia was most symbolised in the 
decision by then treasurer Paul Keating and prime minister Bob Hawke to 
deregulate foreign exchange markets and substantially loosen regulation 
of financial markets in December 1983. For me, though, it was most 
symbolised by a meeting of the budgetary committee of the Labor Cabinet 
on 28 July 1986 when, fearing a run on the dollar in financial markets 
and possible intervention by the International Monetary Fund,6 ministers 
hastily reversed an earlier decision affecting taxation of capital flows and 
loosened foreign investment policy. 
4  Daniel Gallardo Albarrán, A Composite Perspective on British Living Standards during the 
Industrial Revolution (Groningen, NL: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, University of 
Groningen, 25 April 2016).
5  Thomas I. Palley, ‘Financialization: What It Is and Why It Matters’. Working Paper No. 525 
(Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: Levy Economics Institute, 2007), papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_ id=1077923.
6  Paul Kelly, The End of Certainty: The Story of the 1980s (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992), 207.
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Since then, finance capital has grown in strength. Governments around 
the world have been attracted to ‘market liberal’ policies (sometimes 
described as neo-liberalism).7 Unions have declined in coverage and 
influence in the face of increasingly hostile employers under pressure from 
financiers, indifferent or hostile governments, and their own ‘institutional 
sclerosis’, as Barbara Pocock described it:8 unions’ failure to make sufficient 
internal changes to accommodate the demands of the market liberal era. 
Globalisation has thus developed in an environment that has been most 
conducive to the interests of capital, and most antagonistic to the interests 
of labour.
The ‘sliding doors’ portraits of Pat illustrated two alternative visions 
of the future for workers. Which of these turns out to be true depends on 
the choices we make over coming years.
Management
In 1987, Wolfgang Streeck wrote of how the great ‘uncertainty of 
management’ was dealing with the ‘management of uncertainty’.9 
Managers have responded—to the volatility of the product markets in 
which they sell and the financial markets in which their equity and debt 
are nested—by a range of strategies, some consistent, many contradictory. 
Chief among the consistent strategies is the search for greater flexibility. 
We hear a lot about employers offering greater flexibility for employees—
more choice in their start or finish times, perhaps in their total hours. This 
can be in response to demands from employees themselves—more on that 
later. It might, however, be a different story when people actually try to 
use such flexibility, for which they may be penalised.10
The principal form of flexibility is the flexibility by employees that 
employers seek, to help employers manage—and shift—their own risk. 
Sometimes they seek ‘functional’ flexibility: getting employees to take 
on multiple and quite different tasks and hence skills. Sometimes they 
7  Erik Olin Wright, Understanding Class (London: Verso, 2015).
8  Barbara Pocock, ‘Institutional Sclerosis: Prospects for Trade Union Transformation’. Labour & 
Industry 9, no. 1 (1998): 17–33.
9  Wolfgang Streeck, ‘The Uncertainties of Management and the Management of Uncertainty’. 
Work, Employment and Society 1, no. 2 (1987): 281–308.
10  David Burkus, ‘Everyone Likes Flex Time, but We Punish Women Who Use It’. Harvard 
Business Review, 20 February 2017.
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seek ‘numerical’ flexibility, meaning that the number of workers, or the 
number of hours they work, or maybe even their pay rates, move up and 
down according to the needs of the enterprise.11 
For a long time, greater numerical flexibility was seen as an unequivocal 
plus, creating greater stability, or at least resilience, in labour markets. 
Governments were encouraged, including by bodies like the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), to make wages 
more variable, remove restrictions on hours and on hiring and firing, and 
attempt to emulate the most flexible of them all—the US labour market, 
where employers hire and fire ‘at will’.12 Then the global financial crisis 
came along, and, although Europe experienced a greater fall in economic 
activity than the USA, it was America that suffered the greater drop in 
employment. In its biggest test, the theory failed spectacularly.13 The 
OECD had been having misgivings even before then. After the crisis it 
recommended governments improve income support and unemployment 
insurance benefit systems,14 which it had previously said would 
decrease flexibility.
Alongside greater flexibility came the urge for control. But how? On the 
one hand, employees were demanding more voice at work and more 
control over their working lives. The decline of unions meant that, for 
many workers, an obvious mechanism for voice was no longer there. Some 
technologies inherently gave greater discretion to employees using those 
technologies. A case study by James R. Barker showed that employees 
were often more effective at exerting control over the behaviour of fellow 
employees, and extracting maximum effort, than were their supervisors.15 
So, many employers gave employees greater control over their work.
But it is hard for managers to ‘let go’. The urge for control is human. How 
could they justify the ‘big bucks’ if the workers themselves were in charge? 
Other technologies gave the opportunity to micromanage employees—
11  John Atkinson, Flexibility, Uncertainty and Manpower Management. IMS Report No. 89 
(Brighton, UK: Institute for Manpower Studies, 1985).
12  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The OECD Jobs Study: Facts, 
Analysis, Strategy (Paris: OECD, 1994).
13  David Peetz, Stephane Le Queux, and Ann Frost, ‘The Global Financial Crisis and Employment 
Relations’. In The Future of Employment Relations: New Paradigms, New Approaches, ed. Adrian 
Wilkinson and Keith Townsend (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 193–214.
14  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Employment Outlook (Paris: 
OECD, 2009).
15  James R. Barker, ‘Tightening the Iron Cage: Concertive Control in Self-Managing Teams’. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1993): 408–37.
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in particular, to dictate their time. Swipe cards could tell warehouse bosses 
just how long their workers were taking to move a pallet of cans from 
shelf to truck.16 Monitors could tell call centre bosses how many seconds 
‘customer service representatives’ were pausing between calls, or taking 
to go to the toilet.17 Barcode scanners could tell supermarket managers 
how long shop assistants took to process a trolley of groceries.18 All could 
be used to tell staff, ‘Work more! Work faster!’ So, many employers gave 
employees less control over their work.
Regardless of whether they gave employees greater or less individual 
control over their work, employers typically sought to reduce the collective 
discretion employees exercised. The sort of control employers were happy 
to let employees have was only contingent control—management could 
always take it back. For some, keeping out, or throwing out, unions 
became important. While decades of research had shown that employees 
could be, and commonly were, simultaneously committed to both 
union and employer,19 many employers could not stomach the idea of 
an alternative source of power. Sometimes through sophisticated human 
resource management policies that signalled ‘We’re all in this together’, 
sometimes through aggressive policies of exclusion, those employers often 
succeeded in obtaining unilateral control of the workforce, precluding 
collective bargaining in favour of individual contracting.20
These employers would often cloak individualistic rhetoric with 
a collective demand on their employees (though the term ‘employees’ was 
often replaced with ‘partners’, ‘members’ or, more commonly, ‘associates’). 
Corporate ‘culturism’, as it was described by Hugh Willmott,21 sought 
simultaneously to make employees feel as if they were treated as 
individuals but needed to subvert their individuality in pursuit of the 
collective, corporate goals. Those who failed to toe the corporate rhetoric 
16  Christopher Wright and John Lund, ‘Best Practice Taylorism: “Yankee Speed-up” in Australian 
Grocery Distribution’. Journal of Industrial Relations 38, no. 2 (1996): 196–212.
17  George Callaghan and Paul Thompson, ‘Edwards Revisited: Technical Control and Call 
Centres’. Economic and Industrial Democracy 22 (2001): 13–37.
18  Robin Price, ‘Controlling Routine Front Line Service Workers: An Australian Retail Supermarket 
Case’. Work, Employment and Society 30, no. 6 (2016): 915–31.
19  For example, D.G. Gallagher, ‘The Relationship between Organizational and Union 
Commitment among Federal Government Employees’. Academy of Management Proceedings (1984): 
319–23. More extensive references are in footnote 80 in Chapter 5.
20  David Peetz, ‘Decollectivist Strategies in Oceania’. Relations Industrielles 57, no. 2 (2002): 252–81.
21  Hugh Willmott, ‘Strength Is Ignorance; Slavery Is Freedom: Managing Culture in Modern 
Organizations’. The Journal of Management Studies 30, no. 4 (1993): 515–52.
The ReALITIeS AnD FuTuReS oF WoRk
8
line, as Diane Van den Broek found in her study of a telecommunications 
company, would be performance-managed out.22 It was reminiscent of 
the scene in Monty Python’s Life of Brian, in which Brian, facing an 
adoring but uncomprehending crowd, calls out ‘You’re all individuals!’ 
They respond, ‘Yes, we’re all individuals!’ He pleads, ‘You’re all different!’ 
‘Yes, we are all different!’ Then a little voice at the back pipes up: ‘I’m not!’
Willmott took a more sinister view of it all, likening ‘culturist’ strategies 
to Big Brother’s attempts at totalising control in George Orwell’s Nineteen 
Eighty-Four.23 Yet often these attempts failed because, unlike in Nineteen 
Eighty-Four’s Oceania, workers were exposed to all sorts of ideas outside 
the workplace. The HR Department could never be as softly persuasive 
as Orwell’s Ministry of Truth, or as violently persuasive as his Ministry 
of Love.24
Services
One of the biggest shifts in the location of work has been from the public 
to the private sector. In the public sector, ‘new public management’ became 
the rage from the 1980s.25 Some activities were totally privatised. Services 
were outsourced to the private sector, policy separated from delivery. 
But not all changes in work can be traced to market liberal policies or 
financialisation. Some simply emerged as part of the normal process of 
development in a trading world.
In all industrialised countries, manufacturing has, in relative terms, 
declined. Manufacturing instead provides the engine for rapidly growing 
Third World or transition economies, for dragging people out of poverty.26 
Still, government policies in industrialised countries influence how much 
manufacturing declines, and what it would look like. Most employment 
22  Diane Van den Broek, ‘Human Resource Management, Workforce Control and Union 
Avoidance: An Australian Case Study’. Journal of Industrial Relations 39, no. 3 (1997): 332–48.
23  George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four: A Novel (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1949, repr. 1976).
24  Willmott, ‘Strength Is Ignorance’.
25  Christopher Hood, ‘A Public Management for All Seasons’. Public Administration Review 69, 
no. 1 (1991): 3–19.
26  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Trade and Development Report: Capital 
Accumulation, Growth and Structural Change. UNCTAD/TDR/2003 (New York and Geneva: United 
Nations, 2003).
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growth now and in the future in developed countries is in ‘services’, 
a  term so broad it can mean ‘anything that isn’t primary production 
or manufacturing’. 
Much of the structural growth in new service sector jobs is in occupations 
that involve personal interactions. These jobs put demands on employees 
that were relatively unknown in manufacturing or mining: demands for 
the use of ‘emotional labour’. Employees are asked to evoke emotional 
reactions in clients or customers that bring about sales or at least make 
the targets feel more satisfied. From waitresses, bar attendants, sales 
assistants, and customer sales representatives in call centres to air stewards, 
aged care workers, and child carers, employees work with what Arlie 
Hochschild called the ‘managed heart’.27 They may be required to ‘put 
on a face’ to boost sales, stressfully pretending to feel something they 
do not (Hochschild calls this ‘surface acting’), like in a ‘smile’ campaign 
documented by Emmanuel Ogbonna28 but seen many times over by 
bewildered customers of numerous firms. Or employees may actually 
embody, deep down, the emotions that are needed, for example in care 
work (Hochschild calls this ‘deep acting’). Often these skills are associated 
with ‘women’s work’. Often they are seen as ‘attributes’ rather than ‘skills’. 
Often, therefore, the jobs undergo ‘undervaluation’ and the workers are 
poorly paid for what the work requires.29 
Other emerging jobs in the service sector, though, may be alienated from 
human interaction. The rise of internet sales has caught many storefront 
retailers off-guard, replacing shop visits with screen clicks. There are no 
book sales assistants in Amazon warehouses, where mobile technology 
monitors and directs workers to use the quickest route between two 
points: ‘You’re sort of like a robot, but in human form’, said one manager 
to the Financial Times.30 Not just emotionless labour, some jobs are 
thoughtless labour.
27  Arlie Russell Hochschild, The Managed Heart: The Commercialization of Human Feeling 
(Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983, repr. 2003).
28  Staff were instructed to smile at all customers. Emmanuel Ogbonna, ‘Organisation Culture 
and Human Resource Management: Dilemmas and Contradictions’. In Reassessing Human Resource 
Management, ed. P. Blyton and P. Turnbull (London: Sage, 1992), 74–96.
29  Sara Charlesworth and Fiona Macdonald, ‘Employment Regulation and Worker-Carers: 
Reproducing Gender Inequality in the Domestic and Market Spheres?’. In Women, Labor Segmentation 
and Regulation: Varieties of Gender Gaps, ed. David Peetz and Georgina Murray (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2017), 79–96.
30  Sarah O’Connor, ‘Amazon Unpacked’. Financial Times, 8 February 2013.
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The changes in economic structure had other implications. Manufacturing 
had long been a source of employment for migrant workers in many 
countries, and so its decline caused particular problems for that workforce. 
Manufacturing, once seen as the heartland of unionism, now accounts for 
only a small proportion of unionists. Unionism has become white collar, 
like the workforce.
Flexibility
One person’s flexibility is another person’s insecurity. The mythology 
of the ‘portfolio’ career, as if somehow workers like to be shunted from 
industry to industry over their lifetime, often hides the fact that workers 
are treated as more disposable than before. Some, of course, may prefer 
changes of career, but for others career changes are a euphemism that is 
forced upon them by the impermanency of work.
Particularly in English-speaking countries, employers have become 
less hesitant about downsizing, and less reluctant to make big cuts. 
Yet research by Wayne F. Cascio showed that downsizing often results 
in lower morale, lower productivity, and worse performance, in part 
due to ‘survivor syndrome’ among those left behind, and employer 
expectations that somehow those left will make up, at least in part, for 
those departed.31 It may be a contradictory strategy, but still a popular 
one. We’ve seen companies turning permanent jobs into casual jobs, 
shifting from direct employment into labour hire, converting employees 
to the status of dependent contractors, often to avoid union-negotiated 
pay and conditions.32 
For some workers, nonstandard employment of this type is a means of 
gaining some control over their working lives. Nurses, for example, might 
choose labour hire as an alternative to the grind of rotating daily shift 
work or to avoid night work.33 For other workers, though, it deepens 
31  Wayne F Cascio, ‘Downsizing: What Do We Know? What Have We Learned?’. Academy of 
Management Executive 7, no. 1 (1993): 95–104.
32  Max Chalmers, ‘Cooped up Workers and Mystery Contractors: Major Chicken Supplier 
Roasted for Labour Exploitation’. New Matilda, 18 June 2015; Josh Bornstein, ‘The Great Uber 
Fairness Fallacy: As a Driver, How Do You Bargain with an App?’. Guardian, 24 August 2015; Anna 
Patty, ‘Cold Storage Company Blocked from Locking Workers out of Bargaining’. Age, 19 June 2017.
33  Barbara Pocock, Rosslyn Prosser, and Ken Bridge, ‘Only a Casual…’: How Casual Work Affects 
Employees, Households and Communities in Australia (Adelaide: Labour Studies, School of Social 
Sciences, University of Adelaide, 2004), 91.
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risk and insecurity. Risk is passed on to workers, many of whom are no 
longer ‘employees’ but now responsible for their own sick leave and injury 
insurance. It may also be a means of weakening worker organisation. 
In Australia, it appears that there is a wage premium (a plus) for casuals 
on high incomes, but a wage penalty for casuals on low incomes, with 
most receiving less than what the ‘casual loading’ suggests they would 
have if they obtained equivalent rewards to other workers with similar 
characteristics.34
For workers in lower-skilled occupations, or at least those outside 
professional or managerial occupations, insecurity is likely to outweigh 
choice. But it is not only the low skilled who find themselves marginalised 
this way. Besides the food retailing and hospitality sector, it is in education 
where casualisation is greatest.35 We are not referring here to workers who 
left school early and can find no better work—we are talking about highly 
skilled workers with doctoral qualifications, who spend semester after 
semester doing ‘sessional’ or ‘adjunct’ tutoring, lecturing or administering 
of courses, some never quite sure when they will be paid, sometimes only 
knowing a week in advance that they will be teaching a semester but 
knowing with certainty they will get no holiday pay.
Maybe just like Pat. Those ‘sliding doors’ portraits at the beginning of 
this chapter were not extreme imaginations. The first was inspired by 
modern day USA. From there, reports have emerged in the Chronicle of 
Higher Education of adjunct (sessional) academic staff living in relatives’ 
basements or homeless shelters.36 The problems of the unaffordability 
of healthcare would be familiar to anyone who has spent time in the 
USA—a country whose health, education and minimum wage regimes 
seem to be admired by some countries’ present policy-makers. Health 
insurance is a work-related issue. In America, unions battle hard to obtain 
it for their members, employers see cutting it as a means to make major 
cost savings; Canadian employers regard national health insurance as 
34  Inga Laß and Mark Wooden, ‘The Structure of the Wage Gap for Temporary Workers: 
Evidence from Australian Panel Data’. British Journal of Industrial Relations (2019). doi.org/10.1111/
bjir.12458.
35  Robyn May, David Peetz, and Glenda Strachan, ‘The Casual Academic Workforce and Labour 
Market Segmentation in Australia’. Labour and Industry 23, no. 3 (2013): 258–75.
36  Isaac Sweeney, ‘Adjunct Emergency Fund’. The Chronicle of Higher Education, 2 August 2011, 
chronicle.com/blogs/onhiring/adjunct-emergency-fund/29317; Simone Pathe, ‘Homeless Professor 
Protests Conditions of Adjuncts’. PBS News Hour, 31 March 2014, www.pbs.org/newshour/making-
sense/homeless-professor-protests-conditions-adjuncts/.
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a competitive cost advantage that attracts businesses across the border; 
and Australian unions negotiated the reintroduction of national health 
insurance as part of their 1983 Accord with the federal Labor government.
The second portrait was inspired by my time in Norway, with its more 
socially engaged public sector in health and other areas, where university 
vice chancellors are elected by staff and students and resist state attempts 
to impose new public sector management techniques on universities,37 
and where mutual trust is so high that parents routinely leave prams with 
sleeping babies outside shops and cafes while they go inside. You can get 
arrested for that in the USA.38 
Time and resistance
As employment becomes more insecure, and as management strategy 
toughens, work also becomes harder. Through the twentieth century, 
workers gradually achieved shorter and shorter working weeks through 
various rounds of industrial action and advocacy.39 Yet in the 1980s this 
started to change. Working hours for full-time workers increased through 
the 1990s. Surveys showed large numbers of workers reporting increases 
in how hard they had to work and in the pressure they felt at work.40 They 
also showed increasing difficulties experienced by workers in balancing 
their work and family lives, and problems of work interfering in their 
personal lives.41
37  David Peetz, ‘Aim for Gains, Not Profits’. The Australian Higher Education Supplement, 
6 September 2006, 30; Tobias Schulze-Cleven and Jennifer R. Olson, ‘Worlds of Higher Education 
Transformed: Toward Varieties of Academic Capitalism’. Higher Education 73 (2017): 813–31.
38  Raquel Laneri, ‘I Went to Jail for Leaving My Baby Outside a Restaurant’. New York Post, 
25 November 2017, nypost.com/2017/11/25/i-went-to-jail-for-leaving-my-baby-outside-a-restaurant/; 
Reuters, ‘Swedish Woman Who Left Baby Outside Restaurant Investigated’, 16 August 2011. www.
reuters.com/article/us-restaurant-baby/swedish-woman-who-left-baby-outside-restaurant-investigated-
idUSTRE77E62O20110815.
39  Jeffrey Helgeson, ‘American Labor and Working-Class History, 1900–1945’. In 
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of American History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
oxfordre.com/americanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefore-
9780199329175-e-330.
40  Francis Green, ‘Why Has Work Effort Become More Intense?’. Industrial Relations: A Journal 
of Economy and Society 43, no. 4 (2004): 709–41; Department of Industrial Relations, Enterprise 
Bargaining in Australia: 1994 Annual Report (Canberra: AGPS, 1995); Griffith Work Time 
Project, Working Time Transformations and Effects (Brisbane: Queensland Department of Industrial 
Relations, 2003).
41  Department of Industrial Relations, Enterprise Bargaining Report 1994. Griffith Work Time 
Project, Working Time. 
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No small part of this reflected the changing regulation of working time. 
Hourly wages with premiums (extra payments) for unsocial hours and 
overtime became less common, and annualised salaries that ‘incorporated’ 
these things became more common. Employers no longer paid the full 
cost when employees worked extra hours. So, management could raise 
expectations, employees would absorb them, and the extra work would 
get done. Some universities, for example, regularly expected their staff 
to increase research outputs annually with 5 or 10 per cent compound 
growth.42 If wages and premiums stayed in place, then employers might 
push for the introduction of rotating 12-hour shifts. Alternatively, 
employers might push for the abolition of time-related premiums. 
But these are not processes that could continue indefinitely. Eventually, 
increases in work intensity or working hours become unsustainable in 
the face of organised and unorganised resistance by employees and the 
disappearance of goodwill by employees. So, too, resistance to increasing 
insecurity may grow, and be manifested in the same ways.
Inequality
In public debate, the rationale for the policy choices that have underpinned 
these changes in work has almost always been about improving economic 
wellbeing. You may not be made better off as a result of being more 
insecure, working harder or having less quality time with your family, 
it goes, but you’re better off through the higher productivity that is 
brought about. The trouble is, there has not been a productivity dividend 
from all this. 
Not all countries adopted the ‘liberal market’ model as enthusiastically as 
Australia or New Zealand. Generally speaking, it is the English-speaking 
countries that are most closely associated with the ‘liberal market’ model. 
But when we make long-run comparisons across OECD countries, we 
do not find evidence that productivity growth, or productivity levels, 
are consistently higher in market liberal economies than in ‘coordinated 
42  For example, Griffith University, Annual Report 2014 (Brisbane: Griffith University, 2014), 
126–39.
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market’ economies like Norway, Sweden, Germany or the Netherlands. 
(In fact, Norway has higher productivity levels than any of the English-
speaking countries.)43 
Where these economic models really make a difference is in the 
distribution of income, wealth and power. Inequality is higher in market 
liberal countries. Poverty is higher.44 The top 0.1 per cent typically gets 
more—though nowhere more than in the USA—and the bottom half 
usually get less. As documented by Georgina Murray, Bill Carroll and 
others, a small proportion of (mostly) men really do occupy increasingly 
powerful positions.45 In a 2006 interview in The New York Times, one 
of the world’s richest men, Warren Buffett, said, ‘There’s class warfare, 
all right, but it’s my class, the rich class, that’s making war, and we’re 
winning’.46 He said that with good reason. Measured income and wealth 
inequality declined in Australia and other countries through much of 
the twentieth century, but they have increased since the mid-1980s.47 
In addition, there has been growing outrage that the wealthiest in society 
have been minimising or avoiding tax through complex transnational 
accounting devices.48 
Other inequalities persist. The narrowing of the gender gap in earnings 
between men and women—it closed substantially between 1969 and 
the late 1980s—has slowed and, in some countries, reversed.49 Progress 
in achieving more positive attitudes among the populace at large and 
within  institutional settings seems to have been offset by a greater 
43  David Peetz, ‘Does Industrial Relations Policy Affect Productivity?’. Australian Bulletin of Labour 
38, no. 4 (2012): 268–92.
44  Ibid.
45  Georgina Murray, Capitalist Networks and Social Power in Australia and New Zealand (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2006); William Carroll, ‘The Corporate Elite and the Transformation of Finance Capital: 
A View from Canada’. Sociological Review 56, no. s1 (2008): 44–63.
46  Ben Stein, ‘In Class Warfare, Guess Which Class Is Winning’. New York Times, 26 November 
2006.
47  Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2014); Anthony B. Atkinson and Andrew Leigh, ‘The Distribution of Top Incomes in Australia’. 
Economic Record 83, no. 262 (2007): 247–61.
48  Oxfam Australia, The Hidden Billions: How Tax Havens Impact Lives at Home and Abroad 
(Oxfam, 2016); Javier Garcia-Bernardo et al., ‘Uncovering Offshore Financial Centers: Conduits and 
Sinks in the Global Corporate Ownership Network’. Scientific Reports 7, no. 6246 (2017).
49  House of Representatives Standing Committee on Employment and Workplace Relations, 
Making It Fair: Pay Equity and Associated Issues Related to Increasing Female Participation in the 
Workforce (Canberra: House of Representatives, 2009); Workplace Gender Equality Agency, Gender 
Pay Gap Statistics (Sydney: WGEA, 2013); Gillian Whitehouse, ‘A Cross-National Comparison of 
Gender Gaps’. In Women, Labor Segmentation and Regulation: Varieties of Gender Gaps, ed. David 
Peetz and Georgina Murray (New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
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distancing between working women and the regulation that protects 
their interests.50 Women continue to be undervalued when in female-
dominated occupations, discriminated against when in male-dominated 
occupations, and excluded from the top echelons of business.51 Recent 
migrants often find their skills and qualifications undervalued and end up 
in jobs that underutilise their skills. People with disabilities continue to 
encounter career barriers.
It is not as if the period before market liberalism was one without 
difficulties, and not just those associated with gender and other forms 
of segmentation. In the 1970s and early 1980s, a key problem was 
competition for economic surpluses—what economists like to call ‘rents’. 
In an economy with many areas where product markets were poorly 
competitive, especially in relation to overseas-produced goods, there were 
opportunities for parts of both labour and capital to extract surpluses. This 
competition for surpluses became a spiral that heightened the problems 
of  simultaneous unemployment and inflation. That is what prompted 
incomes policies in a number of countries, including Australia.
These days surpluses are still being extracted, but by different groups—
essentially extremely high income earners, the chief executive officers, 
directors, and managers of top firms, parts of the finance sector, and the 
like.52 The old problem of general inflation (and of responding to it) has 
been superseded by the narrower inflation of executive remuneration and 
of the incomes and wealth of the rich (especially the top 0.1 per cent), 
including through asset price bubbles.53 Market liberal ‘reforms’ have not 
solved our economic problems or delivered an acceleration of our growth 
in wellbeing. They have just changed the problems, and in doing so made 
life more difficult for many workers.
50  Gillian Whitehouse, ‘Unequal Pay: A Comparative Study of Australia, Canada, Sweden and the 
U.K’. Labour & Industry 3, no. 2–3 (1990): 354–71.
51  See Chapter 8.
52  David Peetz, ‘An Institutional Analysis of the Growth of Executive Remuneration’. Journal of 
Industrial Relations 57, no. 5 (2015): 707–25.
53  Charles M. Elson and Craig K. Ferrere, ‘Executive Superstars, Peer Groups and Overcompensation: 
Cause, Effect and Solution’. Journal of Corporate Law 38 (2013): 497–8.
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Globalisation and the mega-trends
You may have noticed that I have barely used the term ‘globalisation’ in 
this chapter to describe the forces at work. It is easy to blame problems 
in the way we work on globalisation, as if some external, inevitable force is 
at work and nothing can be done about it. After all, globalisation is a major 
force. But globalisation—if we mean increasing trade and international 
communications—is neither good nor bad in itself. Its effects are complex 
and contradictory. 
On the one hand, for example, increased trade through globalisation helps 
Third World countries industrialise and grow wages, employment and 
living standards.54 On the other hand, globalisation increases uncertainty 
and puts increased pressure on companies to find new flexibilities with 
the associated pressure on security and wages that this implies.55 The net 
effect of these two tendencies is not set in stone. It depends on the policy 
choices taken by states and the mobilisations by employers, unions and 
other parts of civil society that determine the conditions under which 
globalisation proceeds.
The rhetoric of ‘free trade’ is used by multinational corporations to 
pressure governments to relinquish powers to regulate environmental or 
workplace behaviour, through special clauses in ‘free trade agreements’. 
Yet governments do not need to do that. It is a choice they make. Norway, 
for example, is more ‘globalised’ than Australia—trade is 49 per cent of 
Norway’s GDP, compared to 34 per cent of Australia’s56—but Norway 
places more emphasis on ‘job quality’ or what the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) calls ‘decent work’ than is shown in Australia, and its 
sovereign wealth fund refuses to invest in multinational companies that 
breach certain ethical standards.57 
54  Ann Harrison, Globalization and Poverty. NBER Working Paper 12347 (Cambridge, MA: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006).
55  Streeck, ‘Uncertainties of Management’.
56  World Bank, ‘Merchandise Trade (% of GDP)’ (Databank, World Bank, 2014). data.worldbank.
org/indicator/TG.VAL.TOTL.GD.ZS.
57  Andreas Bieler, ‘Small Nordic Countries and Globalization: Analysing Norwegian 
Exceptionalism’. Competition & Change 16, no. 3 (2012): 224–42; Mikael Holter, ‘Norway’s 
$860 Billion Fund Drops 52 Companies Linked to Coal’. Bloomberg, 14 April 2016; Norges Bank 
Investment Management, NBIM Quarterly Performance Report; First Quarter 2008 (Oslo: Norges 
Bank, 23 May 2008).
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Globalisation is one of four ‘mega-drivers of change’ identified by the ILO 
that it says will shape the future of work. The other three are technology, 
demographics and climate change. Each of these is, in its own right, 
important enough to warrant that epithet of ‘mega’. We will cover each 
of these through the book, but it is worth expanding on each, just a little, 
here.
Technological change is what everybody seems to focus on when they 
write about the future of work. There is no doubt that it will have a huge 
impact. Much of the discussion focuses on the numbers of jobs lost by 
technological change: Will my job be one of those gone? Will there be 
anything else available for me? What will I have to do? Will I have to 
become a freelancer or ‘gig’ worker, or follow a ‘portfolio career’? These 
are all legitimate questions, but sometimes the discussion of the future 
of work descends to its being only about these things, and there being an 
inevitability about them. Sometimes this is for political purposes: jobs 
will go, so you must be flexible, and forget about all those unnecessary 
protections and rigidities associated with the old ways. But one of the 
themes of this book is that there are choices to be made, including about 
those things like flexibility and protections. Technology is part of the 
future, but it is not the whole of the future.
A second ‘mega-driver of change’ is demographics. Western countries, in 
particular, are ‘ageing’ as birthrates drop and life expectancies increase. 
Women have entered the workforce in substantial numbers since the 
1960s. In most countries, participation by women is still less than by men 
and, perhaps surprisingly, the ILO does not expect the gender gap in labour 
force participation to narrow substantially over the coming 15 years across 
the globe, with small improvements in the Arab states and northern Africa 
(where the gap is huge) almost offset by small deteriorations in eastern 
Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (where the gap is already much smaller) and 
little change in OECD countries.58 Migration can be expected to continue 
and, if anything, intensify—though it may face rising political barriers 
from the growth of nationalistic or ethnocentric political sentiment.59 
The political conflict that this may engender has the potential to shape 
58  International Labour Organization, ‘Gender Gap in Participation Rates Is Not Expected to 
Improve over the Coming 15 Years’ (ILO, 2017). www.ilo.org/global/topics/future-of-work/trends/
WCMS_ 545630/lang--en/index.htm.
59  International Labour Organization, ‘Migration Is Likely to Intensify in the Future as Decent 
Work Deficits Remain Widespread’ (ILO, 2017).
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the policy response to rising inequalities at work, much as the emergence 
of Trumpism in the USA has strengthened the hand of capital against 
labour in that country.
The final ‘mega-driver of change’, and one of the principal reasons behind 
the intensification of migrant flows, is climate change. In Bangladesh 
alone, 27 million people live on land at risk from sea-level rise by 2050, 
and 10,000 hectares is lost each year to riverbank erosion.60 Globally, 
‘300  to 650 million people live on land that will be submerged or 
exposed to chronic flooding, by 2100, under current emission trends’.61 
Aside from the effects on migration and political tension, even if abated, 
climate change will affect productivity, work organisation and the nature 
of technology.62 
The rest of this book
The rest of this book explores these issues in more depth, giving at least 
as much attention to the reality of work now as to the future of work. 
The next chapter (Chapter 2) examines globalisation, financialisation, 
neo-liberalism and power. What is globalisation? Has it peaked? Is it 
still happening? How does it affect work—what are the contingencies 
involved and how do they relate to work? How do we distinguish between 
it, financialisation and neo-liberalism? The chapter also discusses the key 
theories of power and how they relate to work, and asks: what are the 
trends and prospects in power and inequality at work? 
The third chapter looks at past and current visions of the future and what 
they have said about work. The chapter, in part, examines how accurate 
or otherwise earlier popular predictions of the future have proved to be. 
What happened to all those predictions of increased leisure and short 
working weeks? Have trends on working hours and work intensification 
60  Tribune Desk, ‘Report: 27m Bangladeshis at Risk of Sea-Level Rise by 2050’. Dhaka Tribune, 
27 August 2017, www.dhakatribune.com/climate-change/2017/08/27/report-27m-bangladeshis-
risk-sea-level-rise-2050/.
61  Climate Central, ‘New Analysis Shows Global Exposure to Sea Level Rise’ (Climate Central, 
2017). www.climatecentral.org/news/new-analysis-global-exposure-to-sea-level-rise-flooding-18066.
62  For example, Charis Palmer and Sunanda Creagh, ‘Climate Change Linked to Declines in 
Labour Productivity’. The Conversation, 25 February 2013, theconversation.com/climate-change-
linked-to-declines-in-labour-productivity-12407; John P. Dunne, Ronald J. Stouffer, and Jasmin G. 
John, ‘Reductions in Labour Capacity from Heat Stress under Climate Warming’. Nature Climate 
Change 3 (2013): 563–6.
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continued? What explains recent developments in these areas? What is 
the future of, and what are the influences on, work–life balance? And 
what does this tell us about how the choices that affect the future of 
work will be made? Many visions of the future have been seen in books, 
movies and songs. A TV series, The Worst Jobs in History, told us of some 
of the work people did in earlier centuries, John Steinbeck’s The Grapes of 
Wrath told us about working life in the Great Depression, but how has 
literature treated work in the future? One classic futuristic scenario is that 
in George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four. As a dystopian vision, Margaret 
Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale had some similarities to Orwell’s book: 
showing how power was maintained through ideology and violence, but it 
also emphasised the use of rewards and divisions among the subordinated 
in maintaining power, and placed a greater emphasis on gender and its 
interactions with class. Dave Eggers’s The Circle depicts the dystopian 
reality within a seemingly utopian workplace. Those last three are the 
focus of much of that chapter.
Chapter 4 considers trends in employment and how they will be affected 
by two of the ‘mega-drivers of change’ mentioned earlier—technological 
change through digitalisation, and demographic change—though with 
most emphasis on the former rather than the latter. On the supply 
side, it looks at things like the ageing and so-called ‘feminisation’ of the 
workforce. On the demand side, it looks at the sorts of jobs that will be 
created and destroyed by digital change. It will look at the veracity of 
competing claims about the future numbers of jobs. Will over 40 per cent 
of present jobs not exist, as estimated in a study by Oxford University?63 
Will robots eat your job? Is the job you’re aiming for going to be obsolete? 
Or will the scenario be more like the 8 per cent of jobs estimated by the 
OECD as being lost to technological change?64 What sorts of skills, if any, 
will be demanded? What will be the areas of growth and decline in the 
industries and occupations of employment? 
Chapter 5 examines trends in management and effects on employees. 
It asks: What models of management strategy exist? What types of 
management strategy are growing or declining into the future? What 
illusions affect managers and how can managers respond? The chapter 
63  Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs 
to Computerisation? (Oxford: Department of Engineering Science, University of Oxford, 2013).
64  Melanie Arntz, Terry Gregory, and Ulrich Zierahn, The Risk of Automation for Jobs in OECD 
Countries: A Comparative Analysis. OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers 
No. 189 (Paris: OECD, 2016).
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will then turn to issues of control, previously raised in Chapter 3 and 
the discussion of Orwell. How is technology used to tighten or loosen 
control—in areas such as logistics, warehousing, retail and call centres? 
Hugh Willmott discussed modern corporate cultural control and 
monoculturism, treating Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four as analogous 
to management in the 1990s.65 The 1960s psychology experiments by 
Milgram and Zimbardo showed the dangers of monoculturism, and Joel 
Bakan’s The Corporation applied this to modern organisations.66 How have 
views on corporate culture and culturism changed, and where are they 
heading? What is the role of dissent in organisations? Are the mistakes of 
the past being repeated now and will they be in the future?
Chapter 6 looks at how these intersect—that is, it looks at trends in 
work, taking account of changing management structures and strategies. 
It considers the forms of flexibility that are sought by employers, their 
origins and their effects on employees—for example, through their impact 
on security and insecurity. It looks at ‘precaritisation’ of work through the 
push for flexibility. It asks what aspects of digital change are affecting, 
and likely to affect, work and workplace relations? Are digital platforms 
fundamentally changing or destroying the employment relationship? Are 
we moving to a world of freelancers or the ‘gig economy’ (‘Uberisation’)? 
The chapter analyses these questions through the lens of ‘not there’ 
employment (the attempts by core capital to centralise profits and 
minimise costs and accountability, through such devices as contracting out, 
franchising and the use of digital platforms) and the seemingly surprising 
persistence of the employment relationship. It therefore examines the 
reasons, in the logic of capitalism, for employment’s resilience. 
The seventh chapter investigates employee responses and actions in 
the face of these strategies and changes. Management often seeks to 
reduce employee resistance and harness the inputs of employees by 
expanding employee voice, and there may be broader social objectives 
for enhancing voice. So, what are the differences between formal and 
informal forms of employee voice, between direct and indirect forms, 
and between management-constrained (conditional) and employee-
controlled (independent) forms—and why do these matter? What are 
65  Willmott, ‘Strength Is Ignorance’; Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four.
66  Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (New York: Harper & Row, 1974); Philip Zimbardo, 
‘Stanford Prison Experiment: A Simulation Study of the Psychology of Imprisonment’. 2005. www.
prisonexp.org; Joel Bakan, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (London: 
Constable & Robertson, 2004).
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the patterns and trends in different forms of employee voice? How are 
ideas about collectivism changing? What does this mean for the future of 
collectivism? What have unions done in response to their own decline? 
How does the ‘gig’ economy affect cooperative and collective action and 
trade union futures?
The eighth chapter examines the reality and future of women and 
segmentation at work. It will interrogate the situation of women in 
employment and whether and how it has altered. What is the segmentation 
of work into male and female jobs? What causes it? Has it broken down 
or solidified? What are so-called ‘male’ and ‘female’ jobs? What are the 
links to science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) 
work (especially in information and communications technology)? 
How does gender relate to harassment, career exits and apparent labour 
shortages? What explains patterns and trends in gender gaps? Why is 
there an increasing emphasis on emotional labour, and how do patterns 
and trends in emotional labour relate to gender? What is the concept 
of ‘intersectionality’ and how does it relate to gender, ethnicity, age and 
other forms of disadvantage? What are the futures of gender gaps and of 
women at work? 
Chapter 9 looks at ethics, sustainability and work. It will ask about the 
meanings of ethics and sustainability, their relationships to each other and 
the role of externalities in those concepts. It considers that final ‘mega-
drivers of change’ in the world of work: climate change. What are the future 
effects of climate change on work and productivity? What are the barriers 
to sustainability? What is a ‘just transition’? What are the future demands 
for sustainability and responses to climate change? How are they affecting, 
and will they affect, employees?
Chapter 10 discusses regulatory responses to changes in the world of work, 
particularly those arising from the shift towards ‘not there’ employment 
discussed in Chapter 6. Three angles on this are discussed. The first is 
the regulation of ‘not there’ employment. The second is the problem of 
noncompliance (sometimes referred to as ‘wages theft’), the factors that 
promote it and the changing methods used in enforcement of labour 
standards. The third is the maintenance of labour standards in global value 
chains or global production networks. The chapter looks at the purpose 
of regulation, the different forms of regulation by the state, innovation in 
regulation, and the potential and limitations on those innovations, drawing 
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on, for example, the response to the Rana Plaza collapse in Bangladesh. 
How can and will organisations respond to increasing pressures for codes 
of conduct and corporate social responsibility?
The final chapter talks about what this all means for society as a whole: 
What are the options available to us, and the choices that will be made, at 
the social level that will affect and be affected by the workplace? Will the 
future be one of neo-democracy, neo-liberalism or neo-totalitarianism? 
What choices will determine which of those it becomes? What policy 
decisions are necessary in an agenda for a liveable future?
Through this book, we identify the policy implications of the patterns 
and trends that are discussed. This chapter began with a ‘sliding doors’ 
moment that showed the stark differences in outcomes that may arise 
from critical decisions still to be taken. We will also consider what those 
decisions are, and what directions need to be taken. There are choices that 
need to be made about the directions of economic policy; and there are 





In the mid-1980s, I spent time as a ministerial adviser in Old Parliament 
House in Canberra, the capital of Australia. One day, the Expenditure 
Review Committee (ERC) of Cabinet (it determined the Budget) broke 
for lunch, and my boss, a member of that committee, asked me to walk 
with him through the Parliamentary Rose Garden. A few weeks earlier, 
the government had announced some seemingly esoteric and somewhat 
symbolic changes to the treatment of international capital flows.1 These 
would have closed off some exemptions to interest-withholding tax (a tax 
payable on behalf of overseas lenders to Australian firms or residents, based 
on the interest paid on the loan); these were relevant to the then debate 
about takeover activity but somewhat symbolic in that Treasury saw them 
as the least bad way of dealing with the issue. After the announcement, 
the Australian dollar had slid on global financial markets, not just for 
a day but for several weeks—from US$67.8 on 1 July to US$57.3 when 
the ERC broke for lunch on 28 July.2 
It was not the first time the Australian dollar had dropped over the 
preceding year—falling commodity prices had already taken their toll. 
However, some ministers now feared potential intervention by the 
International Monetary Fund.3 There was clearly a sense of panic and it 
1  Paul Keating, ‘Interest Withholding Tax Exemptions’. News release, Canberra, 1 July 1986.
2  Jim Killaly, ‘Fair Game: Is Australia Vulnerable or Getting Its Fair Share?’. Journal of Australian 
Taxation 19, no. 3 (2017): 1–194.
3  Paul Kelly, The End of Certainty: The Story of the 1980s (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992), 207; 
Milton Cockburn, ‘Beware Those IMF Minders: Walsh’. Sydney Morning Herald, 13 August 1986.
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came through in that walk. ERC ministers had seen what the ‘Reuters 
screen jockeys’ (as the Treasurer called them) had done to the dollar in 
the morning, and felt powerless. The meeting resumed. At 3 pm that day, 
the Treasurer announced not only the reversal of the earlier withholding 
tax decision, but also a series of other measures aimed at liberalising 
investment flows.4 
The announcement was universally applauded by press and financial 
commentators.5 The dollar recovered. The deterioration in the exchange 
rate had owed more to inexperience with the floating exchange rate 
regime than to market fundamentals,6 but there were to be no more 
attempts at tightening rules on investment flows. Instead, the government 
buckled down to the task of reducing the Budget deficit beyond market 
‘expectations’, and any residual ideas of an expansionary fiscal policy 
were, for two decades, erased. This not only set the scene for economic 
policy and the erasure of barriers to neo-liberalism, it also set the scene for 
workplace policy over the next decade. Perhaps more than any other, this 
was the day improvements in the ‘social wage’—government spending 
on health, education, housing and welfare that directly boosted workers’ 
living standards—fell off the government priority list. Under the Accord 
with trade unions, the social wage had been near the top of that priority 
list,7 but no more. Through the remainder of the 1980s savings were made 
to social wage programs, product markets were deregulated, ‘competition 
policy’ reforms were introduced, and public assets were privatised.8 It all 
said a lot about financialisation, globalisation and power.
To explain developments in work and workplaces, and indeed in 
economies, since the 1980s, reference is often made to these concepts. 
The relationships between globalisation, financialisation and neo-liberalism 
are so strong that sometimes the concepts get conflated. Sometimes one 
gets the blame for what is rightly the responsibility of another. Sometimes 
the concepts end up as buzzwords or just thrown around as objects of 
4  Paul Keating, ‘Foreign Investment Policy Relaxations’. News release, Canberra, 28 July 1986.
5  Christopher James Pokarier, ‘Politics of Foreign Direct Investment in Australia 1960–96’ (PhD 
diss., The Australian National University, 2000), 205.
6  David Gruen, Brian Gray, and Glenn Stevens, ‘Australia’. In East Asia in Crisis: From Being 
a Miracle to Needing One?, ed. Ross H. McLeod and Ross Garnaut (London and New York: Routledge, 
1998), 207–23, cited in Pokarier, ‘Politics of Foreign Direct Investment’.
7  Gwynneth Singleton, ‘Corporatism or Labourism?: The Australian Labour Movement in Accord’. 
Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 28, no. 2 (1990): 162–82.
8  John Quiggin, ‘Social Democracy and Market Reform in Australia and New Zealand’. Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy 14, no. 1 (1998): 76–95.
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abuse. So in this chapter we look at what these concepts each mean, and 
what they explain. But before we do that, we look at power—what power 
is, how we observe it, and how it relates to these three concepts. We do 
this because, in the end, these three concepts are critical in shaping the 
power of workers and employers in the world of work.
Power
‘Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.’ So said 
Lord Acton.9 Acton was not just making stuff up. Experiments have shown 
that, compared with the powerless, the powerful condemn other people’s 
cheating more, but also cheat more themselves; and that the powerful are 
more strict in judging other people’s moral transgressions than in judging 
their own transgressions.10 Even illusions of power make a difference: other 
experiments showed that environments that increase the space people 
command (such as larger desks) can inadvertently lead people to feel more 
powerful, and these feelings of power can cause dishonest behaviour such 
as stealing money, cheating on a test or committing traffic violations.11 
However, power is not important simply because it induces bad behaviour. 
Power is an important object of study in understanding work. Power 
shapes who has resources and who goes without. Workers want more of 
it, management wants to keep what it has to and expand it. Power is an 
important part of what happens in the workplace. 
How power is exercised: The faces of power
Power has been written about in several ways. Some authors have focused 
on the origins of power, and talk about ‘power resources’. Some have 
looked at the way power is exercised as a way of identifying who has 
power. Thus, discussions about ‘reputations’ concerning power were 
succeeded by discussion about the ‘faces’ of power and what they tell us 
9  Technically, he was John Emerich Edward Dalberg Acton, first Baron Acton (1834–1902).
10  Joris Lammers, Diederik A. Stapel, and Adam D. Galinsky, ‘Power Increases Hypocrisy: 
Moralizing in Reasoning, Immorality in Behavior’. Psychological Science 21, no. 5 (2010): 737–44.
11  A Yap et al., ‘The Ergonomics of Dishonesty: The Effect of Incidental Posture on Stealing, 
Cheating, and Traffic Violations’. Psychological Science 24, no. 11 (2013): 2281–89.
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about who has power. Others have written about the effects of power. We 
refer to that in the latter half of this chapter, but before that we focus on 
the sources and manifestations of power. 
The first face of power and decisions
Over half a century ago, Robert Dahl wrote Who Governs?, based upon 
a study of New Haven in Connecticut, USA.12 He was inspired to conduct 
this research in response to two earlier books: C. Wright Mills’s study of 
the power of people in key positions in the USA and a study by another 
‘elitist’ theorist, Floyd Hunter, about reputations of power within a local 
community.13 Dahl argued that one could not measure power on the basis 
of whether somebody was in a particular position, or had a reputation for 
power. Instead, the only way power was measurable was if the researcher 
examined actual decisions, to see whether the preferences of the ruling 
elite were expressed in the outcome of decisions. To test the theory, Dahl 
had constructed an important definition of power:
A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something 
that B would not otherwise do.14
A and B could be individuals, groups or organisations.15 It owed much 
to Max Weber’s original definition, which, by one translation, was ‘the 
possibility of imposing one’s will upon the behaviour of another person’.16 
Dahl’s was a simple, theoretically coherent approach that satisfied 
‘Occam’s razor’,17 but it had substantial limitations. For example, looking 
at workplace relations, assessing a simple thing like who ‘won’ a strike 
is actually quite hard, especially in Australia as strikes have been used 
to ‘signal’ power. This occurred through ‘unconditional’ strikes whose 
duration was predetermined at the commencement of action (and hence 
12  Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. Yale Studies in Political 
Science, 4 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).
13  C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); Floyd Hunter, 
Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1953).
14  Robert A. Dahl, ‘The Concept of Power’. Behavioral Science 2 (1957): 201–15.
15  The use of ‘he’ in this and subsequent quotes reflects the gender ideologies of the time.
16  Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (New York: Anchor Books, 1962), quoted 
in Isidor Wallimann, Nicholas Tatsis, and George V. Zito, ‘On Max Weber’s Definition of Power’. 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology 13, no. 3 (1977): 231–35. There are a number of 
different translations of Weber’s original (German) definition, discussed in the paper by Walliman et al.
17  Occam’s razor holds that, other things being equal, the simplest explanation to something should 
be preferred (as it is most easily tested). Attributed to the fourteenth-century English Franciscan friar 
William of Ockham.
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it was never expected that the employer would immediately capitulate 
before  the end of the strike).18 The Bureau of Census and Statistics in 
Australia once attempted to identify the result of each strike in terms 
of whether the employer or workers won (its data suggested that the 
employer won the great majority of disputes) but it abandoned this in 
1951, the findings not aligning with common perceptions of the outcomes 
of conflict or union power.19 Ambit claims have historically played such 
a significant role in industrial relations in Australia that it is important to 
be able to look into the motivations of the parties, not just what is laid 
on the table. And any analysis of power cannot just look at a small part or 
snapshot of the decision-making process.
The second face of power and nondecisions
Dahl’s definition of power was rigorous but inadequate. As Bachrach and 
Baratz noted,20 Dahl had uncovered one face of power, but a second face 
of power was exercised when: 
A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and 
political values and institutional practices that limit the scope 
of … consideration of only those issues which are comparatively 
innocuous to A.21
The first face of power is observed decision-making. The second face 
of power, nondecision-making, is sometimes referred to as ‘controlling 
the agenda’. Nondecision-making is not about deciding not to act, or 
deciding not to decide. Procrastination is not nondecision-making. 
Nondecision-making is a process of creating a ‘nondecision’—that is, 
of suppressing or thwarting a challenge to the values or interest of the 
decision maker that would arise if a particular matter came onto the 
agenda for decision-making. It may do this through ‘suffocating’ demands 
18  David Peetz, ‘Industrial Conflict with Awards, Choices and Fairness’. In Rediscovering Collective 
Bargaining: Australia’s Fair Work Act in International Perspective, ed. Anthony Forsyth and Breen 
Creighton (New York: Routledge, 2012), 159–81.
19  Australian Bureau of Statistics data consistently suggested that employers won almost all 
disputes. Yet in published opinion polls in the second half of the twentieth century a plurality or, more 
commonly, a majority of Australians considered that unions had too much power. Commonwealth 
Bureau of Census and Statistics, Labour Report (Melbourne: various years). David Peetz, ‘Sympathy 
for the Devil? Attitudes to Australian Unions’. Australian Journal of Political Science 37, no. 1 (2002): 
57–80.
20  Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1970).
21  Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, ‘Two Faces of Power’. American Political Science Review 
56, no. 4947–952 (1962).
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for change before they are voiced, or preventing them from gaining 
access to the decision-making arena, or maiming or destroying them 
in the implementation phase.22 Bachrach and Baratz identified several 
forms of nondecision-making, including using a norm, precedent, rule 
or procedure to squelch a threatening demand; using sanctions, force or 
violence to prevent demands from entering the political process (such as 
threats against activists); ‘co-opting’ critics (such as promoting activists up 
the ranks); or reinforcing or establishing additional procedures or barriers 
(‘mobilising bias’).23
The third face of power, unrecognised interests 
and hegemony
A few years later, Stephen Lukes sought to specify a third face of power.24 
He provided a much broader definition: 
A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary 
to B’s interests.25
It followed that a third face of power existed. That involved the shaping 
of people’s preferences so that neither overt nor covert conflicts exist; 
conflict is only latent. This placed a focus on analysing efforts to create 
particular attitudes or ideologies that maintain the position of those in 
power. Lukes asked: 
Is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to 
prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by 
shaping their perceptions … and preferences in such a way that 
they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because 
they can see or imagine no alternative … or because they see it 
as natural … or … divinely ordained and beneficial. To assume 
that the absence of a grievance equals genuine consensus is simply 
to rule out the possibility of false or manipulated consensus by 
definitional fiat.26
22  Bachrach and Baratz, Power and Poverty, 44.
23  Ibid.
24  Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan, 1974). 
25  Ibid., 27.
26  Ibid., 28.
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This radical approach was closely related to the concepts of ‘false 
consciousness’ elucidated by Marx and of ‘hegemony’ discussed in more 
detail by Gramsci and, later, by Connell.27 Lukes criticised the term ‘false 
consciousness’ as it ‘sounds patronizing’ but, really, it is talking about 
much the same thing as Lukes. Lukes conceded it was useful to refer to ‘the 
power to mislead’, and that Marx and his successors highlighted the third 
dimension of power by pointing to ‘the capacity to secure compliance 
to domination through the shaping of beliefs and desires, by imposing 
internal constraints under historically changing circumstances’.28 Gramsci 
used ‘hegemony’ to encompass influence, leadership and consent, 
as opposed to violent domination.29 The state, to him, is force plus 
hegemony (which covers most of the ground of the three faces of power 
discussed here). 
The problem with Lukes’s approach was the difficulty in identifying the 
real interests as opposed to the expressed preferences of people.30 In a 
second, much-expanded edition of his book, Lukes modified some of 
his positions, arguing, for example, that his initial analysis focused on 
the exercise of power, whereas power was a dispositional characteristic 
identifying an ability or capacity, which may or may not be exercised, and 
that it also needed to consider multiple and conflicting interests people 
may have.31 He also commented that:
Power’s third dimension is always focused on particular domains 
of experience and is never, except in fictional dystopias, more than 
partially effective. It would be simplistic to suppose that ‘willing’ 
and ‘unwilling’ compliance to domination are mutually exclusive: 
one can consent to power and resent the mode of its exercise.32 
Another writer on power—and much else—was Michel Foucault, a key 
figure in the ‘postmodern’ paradigm. He spoke of how power was not 
something possessed or able to be willingly used by particular individuals 
or classes, but rather refers to complex patterns of domination and 
27  Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971); 
Raewyn Connell, Ruling Class, Ruling Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
28  Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 2nd ed. (London: Palgrave, 2005), 49, 143–5.
29  Anne Showstack Sassoon, ed., Approaches to Gramsci (London: Writers and Readers Publishing 
Cooperative Society, 1982), 13.
30  A discussion of how these three different faces of power can be applied to understanding individual 
contracting and collective bargaining is contained in David Peetz, Brave New Workplace: How Individual 
Contracts Are Changing Our Jobs (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2006), 75–80 (and also 87, 114).
31  Lukes, Power.
32  Ibid., 150.
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subordination that exist whenever social relations exist. To him, power 
produced subjects, ‘normalising’ them and forming their character. Norms 
become the ‘soul’. The person who is the subject of power is ‘constituted’ 
through their subjection to power, power is ubiquitous and so everyone 
is in some way formed by the effects of power. It was not possible to be 
free of power, nor to judge between ways of life, and each society imposes 
its own ‘regime of truth’.33 For Lukes, Foucault posed no ‘analysis of the 
extent to which the various modern forms of power he identified actually 
succeed, or fail, in securing the compliance of those subject to it’.34 Others 
are less kind. The famous linguist Noam Chomsky hasn’t ‘a  clue’ what 
Foucault and other postmodernists mean in their writings.35 Christina 
Cregan criticises postmodernists for producing a bourgeois ideology 
that is a ‘critique of neo-liberalism for the purpose of preserving it … 
[I]ts concern is for cultural forms with no reference to an underlying 
infrastructure’.36 In my view, there is some merit to these arguments but 
the potential relevance of postmodernism to genuinely understanding the 
realities and futures of work lies not in what it says about power, but in 
helping provide insights into aspects of language and discourse at work, 
for example through writers such as David Knights and Hugh Willmott,37 
some of which are discussed in Chapter 3.
Power, dependence and power resources
Other writers have focused on the sources of power, and this affects how 
they define it. For example, Keenoy and Kelly (1998) define power as ‘the 
capacity to get someone or some people to do something they otherwise 
would not do’ (very close to Dahl’s definition) but they refer to ‘power 
resources’ that go beyond Dahl’s focus and emphasise power in social 
relations rather than merely in decisions.38 Their work should be seen 
in the context of resource dependency theory and power dependency 
33  Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–77 (Brighton: 
Harvester, 1980), cited in Lukes, Power.
34  Lukes, Power, 98.
35  Chomsky cited in David N. Gibbs, ‘Is There Room for the Real World in the Postmodernist 
Universe?’. In Beyond the Area Studies Wars: Toward a New International Studies, ed. Neil L. Waters 
(Hanover: Middlebury College Press, 2000): 11–28.
36  Christina Cregan, ‘Book Review: Understanding Work and Employment: Industrial Relations’. 
Journal of Industrial Relations 46, no. 1 (2004): 137–40.
37  David Knights and Hugh Willmott, Management Lives: Power and Identity in Work Organizations 
(London: Sage, 1999); Hugh Willmott, ‘Strength Is Ignorance; Slavery Is Freedom: Managing 
Culture in Modern Organizations’. The Journal of Management Studies 30, no. 4 (1993): 515–52.
38  Tom Keenoy and Di Kelly, The Employment Relationship in Australia, 2nd ed. (Sydney: Harcourt, 
1998).
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theory.39 The core idea of this body of thought is that whoever controls 
resources has power over those who need access to those resources, such 
that (as explained by Nienhüser): 
the greater the dependency of actor B upon actor A, the more 
power actor A has over B; and the dependence of an actor B upon 
actor A is (1) directly proportional to B’s amount of motivational 
investments in goals mediated by A and (2) inversely proportional 
to the availability of those goals to B outside the A–B relation.40
Thus workers in strategic positions in an industry (e.g. those holding 
specialist technical skills or a central role in a production process) have 
more bargaining power if they strike than low-skilled workers, because 
the company is more dependent upon their resources. This idea has been 
applied in theorisation about power in industrial relations.41 You will 
often hear of particular workers possessing, or not possessing, ‘labour 
market power’. Those who possess it have skills or knowledge that an 
organisation may need. Sometimes it might be ‘external’ labour market 
power—their skills are in high demand from many employers but in short 
supply. Many have extensive ‘specific’ knowledge—‘corporate history’—
that the employer they work for values and is dependent upon, even if 
other employers may not feel the same way. They possess ‘internal’ labour 
market power. Either way, whether they negotiate individually or bargain 
collectively, those with high labour market power will be in a better 
position to extract gains from their employer. 
39  Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik, The External Control of Organizations. A Resource Dependence 
Perspective (New York: Harper & Row, 1978); Richard M. Emerson, ‘Power-Dependence Relations’. 
American Sociological Review 27 (1962); Werner Nienhüser, ‘Resource Dependence Theory—How Well 
Does It Explain Behavior of Organizations?’. Management Revue 19, no. 1–2 (2008): 9–32.
40  Nienhüser, ‘Resource Dependence Theory’; Emerson, ‘Power-Dependence Relations’, 32, as 
explained in Nienhüser, ‘Resource Dependence Theory’, 13. Careful readers of the original texts will 
have noted a bit of letter switching here: powerless A in the original has now become powerful A, and 
vice versa with B, the opposite of their use in the original source. This is to maintain continuity with 
previous definitions in this chapter. My apologies to Professor Nienhüser for swapping the letters.
41  Mick Marchington, ‘Shop-Floor Control and Industrial Relations’. In The Control of Work, ed. 
John Purcell and Robin Smith (London: Macmillan, 1979); see also Adrian Wilkinson et al., ‘Total 
Quality Management and Employee Involvement’. Human Resource Management Journal 2, no. 4 
(1992): 1–20; Jeffrey Pfeffer, Power in Organizations (Pitman, 1981); Beverly J. Silver, Forces of Labor: 
Workers’ Movements and Globalization since 1870 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
The notion of power resources has been usefully deployed (with different elements) in the analysis of 
union power in Christian Levesque and Gregor Murray, ‘Local Versus Global: Activating Local Union 
Power in the Global Economy’. Labor Studies Journal 27, no. 3 (2002): 39–65, and to the analysis of 
women’s access to power within unions in Geraldine Healy and Gill Kirton, ‘Women, Power and Trade 
Union Government in the UK’. British Journal of Industrial Relations 38, no. 3 (2000): 343–60.
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The concept of power resource dependency is most closely related to the 
first and second faces of power discussed earlier: A can make decisions 
disliked by B, or prevent matters B wants from being determined, by 
using resources that B is dependent upon. The application to the third 
face of power is less obvious but still valid: if B is dependent on A (or on 
those who act in A’s interests) for the resources that provide information, 
education or beliefs, then A clearly has power over B. 
For Keenoy and Kelly, power resources are ‘any means through which 
one actor can influence the attitude and behaviour of another’. These 
include state power resources (having influence or control over or 
through government, the judiciary or other state agencies); economic 
power resources (ownership of capital, land, skills in short supply, 
etc.); associational power resources (the ability to combine and exercise 
collective power—so collective bargaining is an attempt to turn low 
resource dependency by the other side into high resource dependency); 
and ideological power resources (the ability to successfully promote 
a  set of ideas or values, to shape policy, strategy and social practice).42 
The  last of these is closely linked to Lukes’s third dimension of power 
and Gramsci’s ‘hegemony’; in effect, it identifies the resources used to 
exercise hegemony. 
So, while the ‘faces of power’ approach looks at how power is exercised, the 
‘resources’ approach looks at what it is that gives power to A or B in the 
first place. There are advantages from using both approaches, as one can 
tell you things that the other might not. For example, if an employer or 
union wins a dispute over an enterprise agreement, you know that is the 
first face of power but you still want to know which resources both sides 
used to produce that outcome. Another example: if a worker suddenly 
abandons a claim for restitution of some type, it might not be surprising 
in light of the employer’s larger resources, but looking at Bachrach and 
Baratz’s theorising on the second face of power may shine more light on: 
What happened? (Was the worker co-opted? Were they threatened? Were 
the rules changed? and so on.) Our interest in the rest of this chapter, 
however, is broader, as it concerns the big forces at work that have shaped, 
or at least allegedly shaped, power at work and its future.
42  Keenoy and Kelly, Employment Relationship.
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The meanings of globalisation, 
neo‑liberalism and financialisation
We now turn to the other key concepts of interest, beginning with three 
basic definitions.
Globalisation is the process by which an increasing proportion of economic 
activity has been occurring between or across nation-states, rather than 
within them. It is the trend towards increasing integration of trade and 
investment flows between nations. So, economic activity is often thought 
of in terms of trade in goods or services, but it is also conceived in terms 
of capital flows (i.e. flows of money between countries). It may also be 
thought of in terms of human flows—increased international passenger 
transport, for work or tourism purposes, or temporary or permanent 
migration, often for work purposes—but inevitably the flow of capital is 
much freer than that of labour.
Neo-liberalism is a term used, often pejoratively, to describe a set of public 
policy settings that prioritise participants in private markets over individual 
workers or citizens. The most common manifestations of it are policies for 
privatisation of public services or assets, deregulation of product or labour 
markets, and the running of public sector agencies along ‘corporate’ lines 
that promote financially expressed objectives or ‘competition’. While it is 
normally seen as promoting free market solutions to economic problems 
in any circumstance, this interpretation is contested and we return to 
it shortly.43
Financialisation is the process by which increasing command over 
economic activity is taken by the financial sector—banks, insurance 
companies, hedge funds and other financial institutions. The preferences 
and decisions of these organisations play an increasingly important role in 
shaping the behaviour of the other economic actors in society.
Neo-liberalism is thus a policy process, while globalisation and 
financialisation are economic processes. Globalisation and financialisation, 
are both often seen as resulting from the policy decisions of neo-liberalism. 
43  Because of its pejorative implications, writers like Quiggin had avoided the term ‘neo-liberalism’, 
instead preferring ‘market liberalism’. But I (somewhat reluctantly) use ‘neo-liberalism’ because, as 
discussed later, it goes beyond ‘market liberalism’ into policies that are not necessarily ‘market liberal’. 
So ‘market liberalism’ is a subset of ‘neo-liberalism’.
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Alternatively, and perhaps more often, neo-liberal policies are portrayed 
as being driven by the economic imperatives of globalisation (‘If we 
don’t do X, then globalised markets will force us to’) along TINA-esque 
lines (‘There Is No Alternative’, being a line made popular by Margaret 
Thatcher of the UK in the 1980s).44 However, the reality is a bit more 
complex than either of these depictions. 
Globalisation and contingency
Globalisation has been the buzzword since the 1970s or 1980s. It has 
been used to provide justification for many policy moves, mostly aimed at 
liberalising markets in one way or another, or in providing more favourable 
terms for foreign investment. It has also been highly controversial—partly 
because of those policy justifications I mentioned, and partly because 
some people have questioned it as a concept.
For example, some note (persuasively) that globalisation has been going 
on since the major European powers established empires across the globe 
and shipped massive amounts of primary commodities from the colonies to 
the home country (and secondary manufactures in the other direction).45 
The Hanseatic League of the sixteenth century can be seen as an early 
example of cross-border governance of trade.46 It is only technological 
developments, greatly increasing the velocity and hence potential volume 
of financial transactions since the 1980s, that have enabled globalisation 
to ‘step up a gear’. Some argue that globalisation has passed its peak, 
and the trend to ever-greater global integration has slowed down. For 
example, renowned Canadian philosopher John Ralston Saul authored 
a book as long ago as 2005 called The Collapse of Globalism.47 Since then, 
others have seen the global financial crisis, the ‘Brexit’ vote or the election 
of Donald Trump as signifying a reversal of the trend to globalisation.48
44  Claire Berlinski, There Is No Alternative: Why Margaret Thatcher Matters (New York: Basic Books, 
2008).
45  Jeffrey A. Frankel, ‘Globalization of the Economy’. In Governance in a Globalizing World, ed. 
Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 45–71.
46  Ingo Take, ‘The Hanseatic League as an Early Example of Cross-Border Governance?’. Journal of 
European Integration History 23, no. 1 (2017): 71–96.
47  John Ralston Saul, The Collapse of Globalism: And the Reinvention of the World (London: Atlantic, 
2005).
48  John Rennie Short, ‘Globalization and Its Discontents: Why There’s a Backlash and How It 
Needs to Change’. The Conversation, 29 November 2016.
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Some people see the effects of globalisation as overwhelmingly good.49 
Some see them as overwhelmingly bad. Some (like Tony Blair) see 
globalisation as ‘a force of nature’ and ‘a fact’.50 The key point is: the 
effects are contradictory and contingent. Take, first, a pathway through 
the impact of globalisation on industrialisation. For many Third World 
countries, particularly in Asia, globalisation has enabled them to expand 
manufactured exports and thereby build up a manufacturing base. That 
is, globalisation has promoted industrialisation. Industrialisation has, in 
turn, promoted economic development and, as a result, growth in real 
wages, reductions in poverty and greater job security.51
Then, look at another pathway, through the impact of globalisation 
on competition. Globalisation leads to greater competition between 
international and domestic firms. Increased competition in turn puts 
pressure on firms to reduce wages and reduce the stability of jobs and 
thereby makes poverty alleviation harder. This is an opposite tendency 
to the one that I mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Regarding 
the impact on wages, job security and poverty, then, globalisation has 
contradictory effects.
But wait, there’s more. Higher wages from that first pathway (through 
industrialisation) may lead firms to seek ways of offsetting their higher 
labour costs by getting more flexibility in how they deploy their labour. 
At the same time, increased competition (the second pathway) leads 
to considerable pressure for firms to find greater flexibility in how they 
deploy their labour. And so, on that point, both pathways are leading to 
the same outcome: a greater search for flexibility. And then the push for 
higher flexibility will lead firms to find ways of reducing wage costs and 
job security. So that reinforces the effects via competition, but moderates 
the effects via industrialisation, on those things.
Whether the net effect is that globalisation improves or worsens real wages, 
poverty and job security is an empirical question. But it is not one that 
is decided in isolation. This is because its effects are contingent on what 
49  For example, Mark Vaile, ‘The Practical Benefits of Globalisation and the New Economy’. Trade 
Minister’s Luncheon, Business Club Australia, Darling Harbour, 22 September 2000. trademinister.
gov.au/speeches/2000/000922_globalisation.html.
50  Blair, quoted in Ryan Bourne, ‘Tony Blair Is Right—Globalisation Is a Fact Not a Choice’. CATO 
Institute, 1 March 2019, www.cato.org/publications/commentary/tony-blair-right-globalisation-fact-
not-choice.
51  Though Harrison points to conditionality here. Ann Harrison, Globalization and Poverty. NBER 
Working Paper 12347 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006).
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parties do. For example, how much globalisation leads to industrialisation 
in any particular country will depend on the policies taken by the state 
in that country to encourage that outcome. How much industrialisation 
in turn leads to higher wages also depends on the policies of the state—if 
policies prohibit or inhibit active trade unionism, then higher real wages 
are much less likely to flow from globalisation, or at least they will flow 
more weakly. 
Similarly, the actions of unions themselves influence how much 
industrialisation leads to higher wages (compliant or weakly organised 
unions would be less successful in obtaining wage increases for members 
than widely organised, activist unions). The state, even a totalitarian 
one, cannot ignore unions: the maintenance of hegemony requires that 
it makes ‘certain compromises with them in order to gain their consent 
for its leadership in society as a whole’,52 though these compromises, as 
Gramsci points out, ‘cannot touch the essential’.53 
How much increased competition leads to pressure for more flexibility, 
and for lower wages, will also depend on the actions of governments 
and unions. It will also depend on the historically shaped ‘culture’ of 
a country, as ‘culture’ influences laws and corporate behaviour: in East 
Asian countries such as Korea and Malaysia, workers were less easily laid 
off during the Asian financial crisis, or given greater redundancy pay when 
they were laid off, than workers in many industrialised countries.54 Indeed, 
at just about every step along the pathway, the link between globalisation 
and a particular outcome is contingent upon some third factor or factors. 
So, globalisation has contradictory pressures on wages, unionism and 
poverty. It creates competitive pressures on employers for increased 
flexibility, but whether and how this is translated into practice is 
contingent on local factors, including the state, labour and cultural 
factors. ‘Culture’ limits globalisation’s push for flexibility (e.g. in much of 
Asia, notions of hierarchy, paternalism and security promote resistance to 
increased flexibility). The effects of globalisation on employment relations 
are contingent, and the net effect depends on the interplay of a number 
of forces. Worker organisation influences resistance, as well as state and 
52  Sassoon, Approaches to Gramsci, 13.
53  Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 161.
54  David Peetz and Trish Todd, Globalisation and Employment Relations in Malaysia (Bangkok: 
International Labour Office, 2000), www98.griffith.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/10072/ 7320/1/ 13955 
_1.pdf.
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employer strategies. State strategies are also influenced by domestic 
considerations: the state relies increasingly on international capital, but it 
is constrained by the need for domestic legitimacy and stability, and even 
unions help shape that legitimacy. This is an example of the point made 
in the previous chapter: that the outcomes of the forces acting upon our 
futures are not things entirely outside our control, but instead depend on 
decisions that we, as societies, make.
Globalisation also has complex impacts on income distribution and 
inequality. Increased trade does not always lead to wider inequality, 
for example. Economic growth in Taiwan, Japan and Korea during the 
1960s and 1970s was associated with reduced inequality, as it improved 
prospects for low-income individuals.55 More recently, however, the 
trend within most countries (especially the USA, but also many others) 
has been for widening inequality.56 At the same time, though, inequality 
between nations has, overall, reduced, mainly because of higher growth in 
low-income countries such as China and India than in the high-income 
countries of the OECD (though poor growth in Africa weakens the 
average performance of low-income countries). Hence the net pattern of 
changing inequality over the past two decades has been complicated. 
Some of the best work on this has been done by Branko Milanovic, 
whose famous ‘elephant chart’ (so named because mapping income 
growth by income percentile resembled the shape of an elephant lifting 
its trunk) using over 500 income surveys showed that, since the 1980s, 
income growth has been highest for the middle and upper classes of Asia, 
especially China, and for the very highest income groups in Western 
countries, especially the USA; these groups occupy the middle and the 
top of the global income distribution.57 Income growth is weakest for 
denizens of many African countries, who occupy the bottom end of the 
global income distribution, and for the Western working classes, again 
especially in the USA, who occupy around the 70th or 80th percentiles of 
the global income distribution. Thus trends in global income inequality 
55  Wang Feng, The End of ‘Growth with Equity’? Economic Growth and Income Inequality in East 
Asia. Asia Pacific Issues, 101 (Honolulu: East-West Center, June 2011).
56  Ibid.; Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2014); Georgina Murray and David Peetz, ‘Plutonomy and the One Per Cent’. In Challenging 
the Orthodoxy: Reflections on Frank Stilwell’s Contribution to Political Economy, ed. Susan Schroeder 
and Lynne Chester (Sydney: Springer, 2013), 129–48.
57  Branko Milanovic, Global Income Inequality by the Numbers: In History and Now. Policy Research 
Working Paper 6259 (Washington DC: Development Research Group, World Bank, 2012).
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are more complex and less adverse than trends in income inequality 
within individual nations, and this again reflects the complex and 
contingent nature of the effects of globalisation. It appears that the effects 
of globalisation on inequality are often ‘overstated’, as ‘globalisation is 
simply the international manifestation of the swing towards neo-liberal 
policies of market-oriented reform that has taken place throughout the 
world since 1970. Increased inequality is the result of the neo-liberal 
reform program as a whole’.58
That said, survey data have limitations, not the least being the way in 
which very high incomes are reported in ‘grouped’ data, leading to 
a potential understatement of incomes at the top. The work of Thomas 
Piketty, whose book Capital in the Twenty-first Century reignited debate 
about inequality of both income and wealth, relied more on administrative 
data (mostly from tax returns), which did not suffer the ‘grouped’ data 
problem.59 Analysis of administrative data across a large number of 
nations by several of his colleagues in the World Inequality Report 2018 
showed a different picture of trends in global inequality since 1980: still 
a greater rise for those in the middle—workers in ‘emerging’ countries—
than for those in the 70th or 80th percentiles—working class people in 
advanced countries—but with all of these eclipsed by spectacular rises 
for the highest 0.01 per cent and especially the top 0.001 per cent.60 The 
top 1 per cent captured 27 per cent of income growth over the period, 
while the bottom 50 per cent captured just 12 per cent. The resultant 
chart mapping income growth by income percentile was described by one 
person as more closely resembling the shape of the Loch Ness monster 
than an elephant.61 
It is possible that this method also understates inequality, if the wealthy 
are able to lie to tax authorities by a greater amount than the less 
wealthy.  Likewise, wealth inequality is understated by the use of tax 
‘shelters’.62 So if the opportunities for doing so have increased, then the 
58  John Quiggin, ‘Globalisation, Neoliberalism and Inequality in Australia’. Economic and Labour 
Relations Review 10, no. 2 (1999): 240–59.
59  Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century.
60  Facundo Alvaredo et al., World Inequality Report 2018 (World Inequality Lab/WID.world, 
2018); Dylan Matthews, ‘The Global Top 1 Percent Earned Twice as Much as the Bottom 50 Percent 
in Recent Years’. Vox, 2 February 2018. www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/2/2/16868838/
elephant-graph-chart-global-inequality-economic-growth.
61  Matthews, ‘The Global Top 1 Percent’.
62  This increased usage of shelters appears to have happened in several countries. Alvaredo et al., 
World Inequality Report 2018.
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rise in inequality is understated. Changing inequality, then, has a complex 
pattern, with redistribution within the global working and middle 
classes but the starkest element being strong redistribution towards 
a  very small, wealthy elite. Even if globalisation has been responsible 
for the redistribution within the global working and middle classes, the 
redistribution towards a very small, wealthy elite appears to reflect much 
more the effects of financialisation (and perhaps, as discussed below, neo-
liberal policy).
Complexity is also seen in the writing, in 1986, of prominent industrial 
sociologist Steve Frenkel, who made five key points about workplace 
relations.63 First, he said, contemporary workplace relations are reproduced 
and changed in the context of a set of constraining factors that only 
rarely permit these relations to be newly created from scratch. Second, 
three principal factors tend to shape dominant patterns of workplace 
relations: large enterprises, the labour movement and the state. Third, 
the basic pattern of workplace relations is mostly inscribed at critical 
historical junctures. Fourth, arising from such crises and consequential 
action by major collectives, there is a process of institutional change in 
the regulation of industrial conflict—the new accommodation structures 
are an important influence on the character of workplace relations. Fifth, 
across countries, there will be differences in the way the major collectives 
institutionalise conflict and workplace relations, but there are common 
threads in the experience arising from the rise of the large corporation, 
state intervention, and the tendency towards greater integration in the 
world economy. Those factors that shape workplace relations shape 
the reality and future of work.
The importance of large, rather than small, enterprises, as highlighted 
by Frenkel, is one reason why this book spends more time discussing 
developments and futures in large rather than small enterprises. 
The former are much more important in influencing policy-makers, and 
their own demands often affect the practices of smaller enterprises. The 
behaviour of a few owners or managers of large corporations could have 
reverberations throughout the economy; the behaviour of a few owners 
or managers of small businesses will likely disappear without trace in 
national economic affairs.
63  Stephen J. Frenkel, ‘Industrial Sociology and Workplace Relations in Advanced Capitalist 
Societies’. International Journal of Comparative Sociology 27, no. 1–2 (1986): 69–86.
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The growing unpopularity of globalisation has even been recognised by 
the OECD.64 Globalisation is seen as increasing the power of capital and 
reducing the power of labour, but this is not always true. Sometimes the 
rhetoric of globalisation, and the TINA idea, shift power in that direction. 
But the real effects of globalisation are complex and vary between groups. 
It may, for example, reduce the power of the working class in the developed 
West, but increase it for the working class in developing countries, by 
virtue of changes in trade and employment patterns. 
If somebody says ‘X happened at the workplace because of globalisation’, 
that is usually just part of the story—because globalisation has complex, 
contradictory and contingent effects on workplace relations. The state, 
unions, large employers and their agents all shape how globalisation 
affects workplace relations, work and inequality.
Neo-liberalism
At the core of economic policy in many countries since the 1980s 
has been neo-liberalism, which has also been described as ‘economic 
rationalism’, ‘economic fundamentalism’, ‘economic liberalism’ and 
‘market liberalism’.65 
While neo-liberalism emerged as a dominant philosophy among elites 
in the late twentieth century, it is not a philosophy that ever attained 
widespread acceptance in the community at large.66 For example, opinion 
polls have typically shown the majority of Australian voters support 
64  Angel Gurria, ‘Globalisation: Don’t Patch It up—Shake It Up’. News release, Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, 6 June, 2017; Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, Making Globalisation Work: Better Lives for All. Key Issues Paper, 
Meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial Level (Paris: OECD, 7–8 June 2017).
65  Michael Pusey, Economic Rationalism in Canberra: A Nation-Building State Changes Its 
Mind (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Fred Argy, ‘Beware of Economic 
Fundamentalism (or What Makes a Good Policy Adviser?)’. Australian Review of Public Affairs Digest 
(31 March 2003), www.australianreview.net/digest/2003/03/argy.html; Frank Stilwell, Political 
Economy: The Contest of Economic Ideas (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2002); John Quiggin, 
Zombie Economics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010). In specific national contexts, terms 
like ‘Rogernomics’ (New Zealand), ‘Thatcherism’ (UK) and ‘Reaganism’ (USA) have been used along 
with, internationally, the ‘Washington Consensus’.
66  Michael Pusey and Nick Turnbull, ‘Have Australians Embraced Economic Reform?’. 
In Australian Social Attitudes: The First Report, ed. Shaun Wilson et al. (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2005): 
161–81; Shaun Wilson, Gabrielle Meagher, and Trevor Breusch, ‘Where to for the Welfare State’. 
In Australian Social Attitudes: The First Report, ed. Shaun Wilson et al. (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2005): 
101–21.
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import quotas and oppose privatisation.67 In the realm of industrial 
relations, sympathy towards unions has increased over the past three 
decades (despite major falls in union membership) and voters consistently 
opposed the ‘WorkChoices’ reforms of Australia’s Howard government.68 
Neo-liberal policies often involve replacing state regulation with markets, 
and these can be described as ‘market neo-liberalism’. But this is not always 
the case. Sometimes state intervention merely changes or even increases. 
An example is the Australian WorkChoices legislation of 2006. It increased 
restrictions and penalties on unions undertaking industrial action, 
imposed major limitations on union officials’ right to enter workplaces, 
took away many remaining powers of the independent tribunals, sought 
to make state jurisdictions redundant, abolished protection against unfair 
dismissal for the majority of workers, and enabled individual contracts to 
undercut most minimum provisions in awards without compensation. 
While on the one hand espousing the rhetoric of enabling employers and 
employees to determine enterprise-level outcomes for themselves absent 
of third-party intervention, its 1,388 pages of legislation, 414 pages of 
regulations, and 890 pages of explanatory memoranda—2,692 pages in 
total—sought to intervene in microlevel relations in a partisan fashion 
to an unprecedented degree. If an agreement contained provisions that 
the federal minister found objectionable—for example, provisions for 
unfair dismissal protections or union training—the parties were liable to 
heavy fines. 
One corporate lobbyist likened it to the ‘old Soviet system of command 
and control, where every economic decision has to go back to some 
central authority and get ticked off’.69 Hence this variant can be described 
as ‘Stalinist neo-liberalism’, in stark contrast to ‘market neo-liberalism’. 
There are many variants in between.70 The common theme is not laissez-
faire markets, but the rewriting of rules (market or otherwise) in favour of 
67  Georgina Murray and David Peetz, ‘Ideology Down Under and the Shifting Sands of 
Individualism’. In Labour and Employment in a Globalising World: Autonomy, Collectives and Political 
Dilemmas, ed. Christian Azais (Brussels: PEI Peter Lang, 2010); David Peetz, ‘Are Collective Identity 
and Action Being Squashed by Individualism?’. In Work and Identity: Contemporary Perspectives on 
Workplace Diversity, ed. Shalene Werth and Charlotte Brownlow (New York: Palgrave, 2018).
68  Murray and Peetz, ‘Ideology Down Under’. 
69  Quoted in ‘IR Laws like “Soviet-style command”’, Sydney Morning Herald, 27 March 2006.
70  For some examples in Australian industrial relations, see David Peetz and Janis Bailey, ‘Neoliberal 
Evolution and Union Responses in Australia’. In International Handbook on Labour Unions: Responses to 
Neo-Liberalism, ed. G. Gall, A. Wilkinson, and R. Hurd (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 62–81.
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capital. So it is that even think-tanks that describe themselves as advocates 
of free market policies end up supporting interventionist policies that 
favour capital or conservative political parties.71
The class-based nature of neo-liberalism was most effectively articulated 
by geographer David Harvey, who described ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’—a series of ways (other than through the exploitation 
of labour) in which value was taken from ordinary people under neo-
liberalism and given to the wealthy owners of capital.72 These included 
privatisation of public assets; laws that facilitated mergers and acquisitions, 
Ponzi schemes, foreclosures and other financial rorts; the creation and 
manipulation of crises to impose emergency ‘structural adjustment 
programs’ of the International Monetary Fund or the like (what Naomi 
Klein calls ‘disaster capitalism’ or ‘shock therapy’);73 and redistribution 
through taxes and public expenditures. Harvey drew similarities between 
‘accumulation by dispossession’ and what Marx had referred to as ‘the so-
called primitive accumulation’ by which peasants had been dispossessed 
of their land and property prior to the full emergence of capitalism.74
Another meaning that is given to ‘neo-liberalism’ is more about ideas than 
policies—what Bloom and Rhodes call ‘the extension of market-based 
values to all dimensions of human endeavour’.75 Thus neo-liberalism 
promotes ‘managerialism’, meaning that ‘the management of market-
based organisations is the preferred way to manage all other types of 
organisations’.76 As a belief system, according to these authors, neo-
liberalism has two major tenets: market efficiency and individualism.77 
71  For example, in Australia the Institute of Public Affairs, the most prominent neo-liberal 
think-tank, has supported government intervention on industry superannuation fund boards to 
make them less competitive with bank-owned funds, warned that ‘Gay Marriage Could Reduce 
Freedom’, supported a subsidised ‘special economic zone’ in part of Australia, pushed for culturally 
conservative policies on issues such as ‘race’ and crime, supported Brexit, lamented ‘If Only Trump 
Were Australian’ and that the government ‘Must Learn From Breitbart’, though most extensively 
it has advocated climate change denial, including by promoting brown coal and nuclear energy, 
opposing carbon trading schemes and criticising private banks for not lending to possible new coal 
mines. See various entries at www.ipa.org.au. Further information on think-tanks in various countries 
is in A. Salas-Porras and G. Murray, eds, Think Tanks and Global Politics: Key Spaces in the Structure of 
Power (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
72  David Harvey, ‘The “New” Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession’, Socialist Register 40 
(2004): 63–87. David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
73  Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (Toronto: Knopf, 2007).
74  Karl Marx, Capital: Volume 1 (London: The Electric Book Company, 1887, repr. 1998), 
Chapters XXVI–XXXII.
75  Peter Bloom and Carl Rhodes, CEO Society: The Corporate Takeover of Everyday Life (London: 
Zed, 2018), 19.
76  Ibid.
77  Ibid., 20.
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On the surface, this meaning seems quite at odds to the policy regime 
described above, which can also encompass some non-market, authoritarian 
policy tendencies in the interests of capital. But shortly after, Bloom and 
Rhodes expand the meaning to encompass ‘corporate values associated 
with authoritarianism, self-determinism and rationality’.78 
Perhaps, though, this is not an expansion of meaning. Deferring to the 
logic of markets essentially involves deferring to the logic of power. 
Neo-classical economics (the theoretical foundation for neo-liberal policy 
ideas) has no way of accounting for power in market transactions: it 
allows for the potential that ‘rents’ (surpluses) might be extracted through 
monopoly positions, and uses this to justify the need for government 
monopoly services to be privatised, but has no formal role for power in 
private markets. So the outcomes of all market transactions become the 
neutral outcomes of the laws of supply and demand, which, while very 
important, do not tell the whole story of markets, and do not tell the role 
of power in explaining why, for example, workers in some industries might 
be victims of ‘wage theft’, and of why CEOs end up overpaid, according to 
a consensus across many countries.79 There is, after all, nothing especially 
democratic about markets: while democracy is based (in theory at least) 
on ‘one vote one value’, in markets power increases proportionately with 
financial resources, and, in at least one telling, ‘politics and democracy are 
simply a hindrance on the way to efficiency and competitive advantages’.80 
What Bloom and Rhodes are talking about, then, is the ideology that 
supports the policy practices described here. The main reason for using 
the term in this book to describe a set of policies is simply that it is not 
an ideology that commands, or has ever commanded, majority support 
among citizens. While some aspects of it have had widespread support, 
others, as mentioned, have not, even while as a belief system it has been 
widely adopted by senior policy cadres in many governments81—though 
even then it battles against political realities. It is because neo-liberalism is 
more often manifest in policy behaviour than as popular ideology—and 
its role in policy behaviour is what has shaped the realities of work—that 
the former meaning is given to it here. 
78  Ibid., 39.
79  David Peetz, ‘An Institutional Analysis of the Growth of Executive Remuneration’. Journal of 
Industrial Relations 57, no. 5 (2015): 707–25.
80  Thomas Klikauer, ‘What Is Managerialism?’. Critical Sociology 41, no. 7–8 (2015).
81  Pusey, Economic Rationalism.
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Public policy in most countries, including but not only most developed 
countries, has been heavily influenced by neo-liberal ideas since the 1980s. 
However, the take-up of neo-liberal ideas has varied between countries. 
Even before the 1980s, there were major differences in the broad policy 
approaches that countries took, ranging from the very market-dominated 
USA to the interventionist states in Scandinavian countries. One way 
of characterising the differences in approaches has been the ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ literature.82 The key writers on this topic, Hall and Soskice, 
originally suggested two key varieties: countries with a higher commitment 
to equality (‘coordinated market economies’, such as Germany, Sweden 
and Japan, with a stronger welfare net, higher protections for workers and 
a more unionised labour force) and countries with a higher commitment 
to the market—‘liberal market economies’, such as the USA and UK, 
with relatively low protections for workers and a low welfare safety net. 
Others have argued there is more of a continuum, with many nuances.83 
The precise origins of neo-liberalism are debated, but the US Reagan 
government and the UK Thatcher government, which dominated the 
1980s in their countries, are seen as driving forces. As important as 
real-world actions were, credit must also be given to developments in 
the economics profession itself, with Keynesian economics falling out 
of favour and monetarist economics, spearheaded by Milton Friedman, 
coming to dominate economics thinking and teaching at universities. 
In that sense, it may be better to date the origins of neo-liberalism to 
the collapse of the Bretton-Woods international currency agreement in 
1971 or the OPEC oil price rise of 1973 and the subsequent widespread 
phenomenon of ‘stagflation’ (simultaneous high unemployment and 
inflation), as these undermined the credibility of Keynesian economics. 
Although monetarism as a serious body of theory has long disappeared 
(something of that name is no longer commonly taught), for a long time 
free-market theorising dominated economic thinking, as its mathematical 
elegance (regardless of real-world applicability) made for ready 
publications and the comforting belief that economists were studying a 
hard ‘science’ with simple rules that meant it could be treated as a serious 
academic discipline.84 Dating its origins to the early 1970s also makes it 
82  Peter A. Hall and David W. Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
83  Colin Crouch, Capitalist Diversity and Change: Recombinant Governance and Institutional 
Entrepreneurs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
84  Quiggin, Zombie Economics.
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easier to recognise that the violent coup in Chile, on 11 September 1973, 
was the beginning of the first nationally imposed neo-liberal regime. As 
a project in which, as Connell points out, global market relations aim to 
penetrate every sphere and become the dominant rationality of life, it 
also has major implications for the global South as a new development 
strategy, involving, as she also says, reshaping of class relations within the 
South and a reconstruction of global trade.85 Neo-liberalism only gained 
ascendancy in the global North, however, with the Thatcher and Reagan 
governments of the 1980s. 
Its solutions were found wanting, and it was totally discredited with the 
global financial crisis (the ‘great recession’) of the late 2000s, when financial 
markets, operating in the closest thing yet to a ‘perfect’ market with 
‘perfect information’, entirely failed to predict the collapse of key financial 
products and indeed largely created the crisis themselves. As nothing rose 
to take the place of neo-liberalism, however, ideas discredited by the global 
financial crisis—such as the efficient markets hypothesis, the benefits of 
privatisation, and ‘trickle down’ notions—still underpin the thinking of 
many policy-makers. The ideas are, as John Quiggin argues, like zombies: 
‘neither alive nor dead’.86 
To some extent, the rise of ‘behavioural economics’ (which seeks to 
integrate some of the lessons from psychology about irrational behaviour 
into economic modelling) has been a response, albeit only partial, to the 
gap between theory and reality. Yet, despite the fatal flaws, neo-liberal 
beliefs persist, zombie-like, in economic theorising and, more importantly, 
in public policy-making, evident especially in the strength of ‘austerity’ 
politics in Europe. This suggests that the endurance of neo-liberal ideas is 
not so much a result of their merit but of the groups in whose interests it 
is that these ideas persist.
This is not to deny that some market liberal policies have benefited labour 
by tackling the high transfer of income to parts of capital through former 
protectionist policies (e.g. reductions in tariffs on highly protected imports 
used by working-class consumers benefited them—this was a policy 
85  Raewyn Connell, ‘Understanding Neoliberalism’. In Neoliberalism and Everyday Life, ed. Susan 
Braedley and Meg Luxton (Montreal, QC, & Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2010): 22–36; Raewyn Connell and Nour Dados, ‘Where in the World Does Neoliberalism Come 
From? The Market Agenda in Southern Perspective’. Theory and Society: Renewal and Critique in 
Social Theory 43, no. 2 (2014): 117–38.
86  Quiggin, Zombie Economics.
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initiated in Australia by the Whitlam government, well before the onset 
of neo-liberal policy dominance).87 It would indeed be surprising if every 
market liberal policy from the 1980s onwards unambiguously favoured 
capital—this outcome would rely upon every policy initiative before the 
1980s being to the advantage of labour, an unlikely outcome in the light 
of labour’s inability to seize total control of the state apparatus through 
the post–World War II era. And some market neo-liberal policies that, in 
relative terms, favour labour (such as, in Australia, the 1985 introduction 
of capital gains tax and abolition of deductions for entertainment 
expenses) may even be seen as the concessions that capital must make, 
without touching ‘the essential’, to maintain hegemony.88 Other liberal 
market policies that would benefit workers and society generally (such 
as a carbon price) may be strenuously resisted by parts of capital. More 
often than not, though, market liberal policies favoured capital and thus 
the neo-liberal project embraced the market agenda, except where that 
agenda produced the ‘wrong’ results. 
Financialisation
Financialisation has been described by Palley as ‘a process whereby 
financial markets, financial institutions and financial elites gain greater 
influence over economic policy and economic outcomes’ such that 
financialisation ‘transforms the functioning of economic systems at both 
the macro and micro levels’.89 Financialisation did not create globalisation, 
but it ensured that the globalisation would operate in a particular way, 
enhancing the mobility and mobilising power of capital but restraining 
that of labour, leading to a structural shift in income distribution away 
from wages towards profits and executive remuneration.90 As, globally, 
‘patient capital’ was replaced by ‘agile capital’, the focus of share markets 
became increasingly short term and corporate managers increasingly 
focused on achieving short-term profit goals, growth through acquisitions 
87  David Peetz, ‘Protection and the Labour Movement’. Journal of Australian Political Economy 
12/13 (1982): 62–73.
88  Sassoon, Approaches to Gramsci, 13; Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 161.
89  Thomas I. Palley, ‘Financialization: What It Is and Why It Matters’. Working Paper No. 525 
(Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: Levy Economics Institute, 2007), papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?a 
bstract_id=1077923.
90  Frank Stilwell and Kirrily Jordan, Who Gets What? Analysing Economic Inequality in Australia 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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and mergers, and the booms in executive remuneration thereby brought.91 
The logic of financialisation was that ‘perpetual restructuring’ becomes 
the norm ‘as firms seek ways of cutting costs and managing assets to meet 
capital market requirements’.92 
Financialisation may be thought of as being mainly seen in the rising share 
of the finance sector in the economy.93 However, it is often specifically 
about the rising share of finance capital income in the economy. It is often 
only financial capital, not workers in the finance sector, that has benefited 
from financialisation, and this has contributed to rising inequality.94 The 
labour time (as measured by relative employment) taken up by the finance 
sector has changed little.95 The widely recognised shift in income from 
labour to capital can be predominantly a shift in income to finance capital.
Greater emphasis on maximising short-term financial returns makes 
managers in industrial capital more focused on minimising costs, including 
by cutting labour costs such as wages and money spent on training or 
worker development. The more that opportunities were provided for 
profits by what Harvey called ‘accumulation through dispossession’—
that is, the more money could be made by mergers and acquisitions, 
privatisation or numerous other such devices—then the more pressure 
would in turn be placed on corporate managers to go further and faster 
down this cost-cutting path in the race for competitive short-term returns.
Financialisation and power
Not only is financialisation important for understanding trends in 
inequality, it is also important in understanding trends in the forces that 
shape work. I will first illustrate how resource dependency is central to 
the reproduction of power, then canvass trends in the power of labour 
and capital.
91  William Carroll, The Making of a Transnational Capitalist Class (London: Zed Books, 2010).
92  Paul Thompson, ‘The Capitalist Labour Process: Concepts and Connections’. Capital and Class 
100 (2010): 7–14.
93  Richard B. Freeman, ‘It’s Financialization!’. International Labour Review 149, no. 2 (2010): 
163–83.
94  David Peetz, ‘The Labour Share, Power and Financialisation’. Journal of Australian Political 
Economy 81 (2018): 33–51.
95  Ibid.
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Power resources and credibility
A good approach to looking at the ways in which power is produced 
and reproduced is to ask how it is that some (but not all) discredited 
institutions maintain power. The financial ratings agencies—which 
assess the creditworthiness (likelihood of default) of various financial 
products or organisations offering them—made huge and repeated errors 
in the lead-up to the global financial crisis, consistently overestimating 
the creditworthiness of numerous securities, such as collateralised debt 
obligations. If any part of finance capital was to lose its position of power 
after the financial crisis, it would be the ratings agencies. In effect, ratings 
agencies were paid by bond issuers to give them a good rating.96 One 
agency’s defence, when sued, was that their assertions (that they used 
‘transparent and independent decision-making’ to produce ‘independent 
and objective analysis’) were ‘mere commercial puffery’.97 Yet no one in 
the ratings agencies went to gaol for their role in the global financial 
collapse and their ratings continue to be influential—even among those 
who should know better.
Objectively, one would expect such institutions to have lost their 
influence. After all, if a government agency makes a major blunder, or 
an organisation that is accountable to government does so, their loss of 
credibility may be followed by their being seriously restructured or even 
abolished. Yet here we have an example of institutions that have survived 
with little damage despite being discredited. The ratings agencies operate 
in a market context, so we cannot blame the lack of market exposure for 
the problem.
A feature of such resilient organisations is that they control resources that 
others are dependent on and that others cannot get through alternative 
means. As part of this, they are not dependent on coordinated others 
(unlike, say, government agencies who destroy their own credibility, but 
who are accountable to a coordinated entity—the government). The 
ratings agencies could be subverted and replaced if governments and 
investors were internationally coordinated, but the latter lack the will 
or capacity to do so. Absent international coordination, governments 
96  Jesse Westbrook, ‘SEC Ratings Probe Reveals Conflicts in Grading Debt’. Bloomberg, 8 July 
2008; Matt Stoller, ‘S&P—“Our Ratings in the Mortgage-Backed Securities Area Were Not Venal”’. 
Naked Capitalism, 12 August 2011.
97  Kevin Drum, ‘S&P Admits in Court That Its Ratings Are Ridiculous and No One Should Ever 
Take Them Seriously’. Mother Jones, 8 July 2013. 
49
2 . gLobALISATIon, FInAncIALISATIon AnD PoWeR
(and investors) rely on the informational and reputational resources 
controlled by ratings agencies, as flawed as they may be. This power can 
also be likened to Bachrach and Baratz’s second face of power: the idea of 
replacing the ratings agencies is not on the agenda of any decision-making 
process, due to the reliance of decision makers on the resources possessed 
by those agencies and the lack of an institutional process (coordination) 
that could address it.
Power and workers
Two different trends can be seen in employees’ ability to have more say at 
work. Both are influenced by financialisation. The first is the decline in 
union membership over the past three decades. It has fallen from around 
30 per cent of employees across the OECD in 1985 to 17 per cent in 2015, 
and fell in all but three OECD countries over that time.98 Unions were the 
workers’ ‘voice’ at work. At times they forced managers to take account 
of, even accede to, what workers wanted. Lower union membership and 
lower union power mean less worker say at work. Internationally, high 
rates of union membership had been linked to lower inequality, and better 
gender equity.99
The second trend affecting employees’ ability to have a say at work concerns 
how managers handle employees. It is about the appearance of power. 
Some managers are seen by employees as tightening their grip over them. 
Barcode measurement of warehouse task times, scan rates in supermarkets 
and timing of gaps between calls in a call centre are all illustrations of that. 
But some managers are seen as giving workers more say. It is hard to tell, 
but the latter group seems to outnumber the former. Quality circles,100 
open-door policies, consultative committees and the like promote that 
perception. Sometimes it is for real. Sometimes employers do it in order 
to discourage workers from joining a union. Often, though, it is a mirage, 
98  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Employment Outlook (Paris: 
OECD, 2017).
99  Ünal Töngür  and Adem Yavuz Elveren, ‘Deunionization and Pay Inequality in OECD 
Countries: A Panel Granger Causality Approach’. Economic Modelling 38 (2014): 417–25; Jonas 
Pontusson, ‘Unionization, Inequality and Redistribution’. British Journal of Industrial Relations 51, 
no. 4 (2013): 797–825; Bruce Western and Jake Rosenfeld, ‘Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. 
Wage Inequality’. American Sociological Review 76, no. 4 (August 2011): 513–37.
100  A quality circle is a group of employees (typically 6 to 12 from the same work area) that meets 
regularly to solve problems affecting its work area. Edward E. Lawler III and Susan A. Mohrman, 
‘Quality Circles after the Fad’, Harvard Business Review, January 1985, hbr.org/1985/01/quality-
circles-after-the-fad.
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and only lasts until the next round of redundancies. Starbucks called 
its employees ‘partners’ until it sacked 685 of them.101 Walmart calls its 
employees ‘associates’ unless they start using words like ‘grievance’ or 
‘seniority’—that could make them ex-‘associates’.102 We’ll see more about 
this in Chapters 4 and 7. One can try to stop employees thinking about 
their rights as employees by calling them ‘members’ or something else, 
but that does not make much difference when the pink slips103 go around. 
And therein lies the problem with management-driven initiatives to give 
employees more say at work. What the boss giveth, the boss can take away. 
The problem goes deeper than this, in fact. Within the workplace, there 
are major concerns about working hours, work intensity, work–life 
balance, pressures on women, ‘overemployment’ and underemployment, 
demands on employees for flexibility, insecurity, micromanagement of 
time and managerial efforts to control ‘culture’. Most would likely not 
be happening if power was shifting towards workers. Another sign of low 
worker power is the low rate of wages growth, along with the fall in the 
labour share of national income that is evident in around three-quarters 
of OECD countries for which data are available.104 Whatever employers 
have voluntarily done about employee say, there is little doubt that 
the underlying trend is for less worker power in the workplace. But, as 
mentioned, internal and external labour market power available to some 
individual employees, and the associational power available to workers 
who collectively organise, mean that the power of labour is unevenly 
distributed: some still have considerable power, even if most have very 
little. The combined negative effects of financialisation on workers’ 
power in turn would help explain an observed correlation between 
financialisation and inequality in the USA since 1970 and across the 
OECD since 1990.105
101  David Emerson, ‘Starbucks Axes 61 Stores and 685 Jobs’. Sydney Morning Herald, 29 July 2008.
102  Militantcentrist, ‘Union-Busting & You: Wal-Mart’s Handy Guide to Preventing Union 
Organization’. Daily Kos, 25 September 2012. www.dailykos.com/stories/2012/9/25/1136113/-
Union-Busting-You-Wal-Mart-s-Handy-Guideto-Preventing-Union-Organization.
103  Redundancy notices.
104  Jim Stanford, ‘The Declining Labour Share in Australia: Definition, Measurement, and 
International Comparisons’. Journal of Australian Political Economy 81 (2018): 11–32.
105  Oscar C. Soons, ‘Inequality and Financialization’. Senior Honors Projects. Paper 492, University 
of Rhode Island, 2016. digitalcommons.uri.edu/srhonorsprog/492?utm_source=digitalcommons. 
uri.edu%2Fsrhonorsprog%2F492&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages. Pasquale 
Tridico, ‘The determinants of income inequality in OECD countries’. Cambridge Journal of Economics 
42, no. 4 (2018): 1009–42.
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Power and capital
Before the global financial crisis, members of the financial elite openly 
spoke of the rise of ‘plutonomy’, an economy ‘powered by the wealthy’.106 
This illustrated clearly how much more capital had prospered than labour. 
Yet, while over the past three decades labour has become weaker, it does 
not follow that employers everywhere have become more powerful. The 
actions of corporations now are increasingly driven by the movements in 
stock or share prices, and their results are assessed on quarterly results, 
making planning over longer time periods increasingly precarious and 
responding to social considerations more difficult. Hence firms with 
higher volatility in share prices are less likely, for example, to commit 
to mechanisms associated with action on climate change.107 The main 
owners of stocks (especially in the USA, but also globally, including in 
Australia) are now finance capital.108 So the decisions of finance capital 
to buy and sell shares shape corporate behaviour. Finance capital is 
increasingly becoming the ‘core’ of capital, into which a growing amount 
of profit is being funnelled. Much of capital outside of the finance sector 
is ‘peripheral’ to this activity.
This does not mean, however, that all capital outside finance (call it 
‘industrial capital’)109 is peripheral. Within most industries, the trend 
over the past three decades has been towards increasing concentration of 
power, with a higher proportion of sales accounted for by a small number 
of corporations.110 It is not only due to financialisation. We see a tendency 
for some parts of capital (finance capital and large firms dominating 
industries) to experience a growth in power, while other parts of capital, 
106  Ajay Kapur, Niall Macleod, and Narendra Singh, ‘Plutonomy: Buying Luxury, Explaining Global 
Imbalances’. Citigroup Equity Strategy Industry Note (Citigroup Capital Markets, 2005), 16 October; 
Ajay Kapur, Niall Macleod, and Narendra Singh, ‘Revisiting Plutonomy: The Rich Getting Richer’. 
Citigroup Equity Strategy Industry Note (Citigroup Capital Markets, 2006), 5 March.
107  David Peetz and Georgina Murray, ‘Financialization of Corporate Ownership and Implications 
for the Potential for Climate Action’. In Institutional Investors’ Power to Change Corporate Behavior: 
International Perspectives, Critical Studies on Corporate Responsibility, Governance and Sustainability, 
ed. Suzanne Young and Stephen Gates (Bingley, UK: Emerald, 2013), 99–125.
108  G. Murray and D. Peetz, ‘The Financialisation of Global Corporate Ownership’. In Financial Elites 
and Transnational Business: Who Rules the World?, ed. G. Murray and J. Scott (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2012); Georgina Murray and David Peetz, ‘Restructuring of Corporate Ownership in Australia 
through the Global Financial Crisis’. Journal of Australian Political Economy 71 (2013): 76–105.
109  ‘Industrial’ is the term used in the stockmarket for non-finance firms.
110  Murray and Peetz, ‘Financialisation of Ownership’; Murray and Peetz, ‘Restructuring Corporate 
Ownership’. 
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acting in response to the demands of those with growing power, exhibit 
less power—and often place pressure on labour in an attempt to maintain 
profitability in some form.
Just as there are divisions within industrial capital, so too there are divisions 
within finance capital. For example, some parts have an increasingly 
short-term orientation; others need to maintain or even increase their 
long-term orientation.111 We will look more closely at this in Chapter 9, 
in the context of responses to climate change, but the purpose in raising 
it here is to point out that financialisation is also a nuanced phenomenon. 
Finance capital is also quite unlike labour in that it is not interested in 
collective action. Even on matters of common concern—like the future of 
the planet—climate-interested investors may sign statements demanding 
action from governments, but they will not act in unity to invest in, or 
divest from, anything.112 To do so would be both unnecessary (finance 
capital does not need associational power) and inconsistent with the 
competitive ideology that permeates finance capital. However, finance 
capital following a common logic sometimes gives the false appearance of 
conscious collective behaviour.
One more point about financialisation needs to be made in this chapter, 
and it concerns the link to neo-liberalism. The greatest beneficiary of 
neo-liberal policies has been finance capital. Privatisation has principally 
enriched the investors (financiers) who were able to purchase the 
organisations or licences for running previous government services. Cuts 
in wages and conditions have benefited share prices and shareholders, who 
are predominantly finance capital. It is the interests of finance capital, not 
the external validity of any findings, that maintain the primacy of neo-
liberal policy. The economics profession itself is suffering from a hostile 
takeover by the finance sector: academic commentators who appeared 
on the media in the 1970s to comment on economic news have long 
since been replaced by professional economists on the payroll of financial 
corporations; enrolments in university economics courses are in decline, 
subverted by ‘management’, ‘business’ and ‘finance’ studies; and the 
profession is reeling from criticism of its treatment of gender issues and 
111  David Peetz and Georgina Murray, ‘Conflicts within Transnational Finance Capital and the 
Motivations of Climate-Interested Investors’. In Globalization and Transnational Capitalism in Asia 
and Oceania, ed. Jeb Sprague (Routledge, 2015), 163–79.
112  Ibid.
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female economists.113 Several prominent studies by economists used to 
justify neo-liberal policies have been subsequently found to be on weak 
or even erroneous foundations, their publication seemingly reflecting 
‘confirmation bias’ among editors and/or reviewers.114 
The theoretical logic of market solutions is more threadbare than ever in 
the light of policy failings, but finance capital itself was not weakened by 
the financial crisis it created; if anything, centralisation within finance 
capital increased, at least right at the top.115 The reproduction of that 
power has, itself, facilitated the continuing importance of neo-liberal 
policies. Hence, for example, European finance capital played a crucial 
role in the perpetuation of ‘austerity’ policy in that continent after the 
global financial crisis, despite the illogic of market solutions. This in turn 
had implications for pay and conditions in many European countries, 
particularly those near the Mediterranean. Neo-liberal policy ideas are 
important for maintaining the power of finance capital, and the power of 
finance capital helps explain why neo-liberalism remains important.
In the garden
Finally, let’s go back to that walk in the Parliamentary Rose Garden. 
The issues that prompted it tell us a lot about what shaped the next three 
decades of policy and may shape it for years to come. Globalisation was 
the backdrop for what happened, but not the driving force. Finance 
capital had gained new power through the deregulation of financial 
markets over two years earlier. It intimidated a Labor government, 
perhaps unwittingly—we should not assume a conspiracy to undermine 
the dollar, and the erratic nature of financial markets probably owed more 
to inexperience than anything else. However, it created the illusion of 
collective punishment by finance that heightened the insecurity of those 
in Cabinet. The government responded by strengthening neo-liberalism 
113  Justin Wolfers, ‘Even Famous Female Economists Get No Respect’. New York Times, 
11 November 2015; Alice H. Wu, ‘Gender Stereotyping in Academia: Evidence from 
Economics Job Market Rumors Forum’. SSRN, August 2017. pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5eb3/
f36b34a9d6379a4de6923ceed99a9bc22a77.pdf?_ga=2.156327803.1957153287.1567424486-
1023833107.1567424486.
114  Servaas Storm, Labor Laws and Manufacturing Performance in India: How Priors Trump Evidence 
and Progress Gets Stalled. Working Paper No. 90 (New York: Institute for New Economic Thinking, 
January 2019), www.ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/WP_90-Storm-Labor-Laws.pdf.
115  Murray and Peetz, ‘Financialisation of Ownership’.
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almost each year thereafter (for which it was later rewarded by the media 
and conservatives through being retrospectively called a great ‘reforming 
government’).116 There was a sense of powerlessness in the government 
in the face of financial markets—as if it had no alternative. Whether 
there was a viable alternative to the announcements of late July 1986 is 
a moot point. But for many of the policies that followed there were almost 
certainly viable alternatives. No two governments follow the same policy 
paths, each makes decisions that affects how it responds to globalisation 
and financialisation. The future, too, will be shaped by those responses. 
The future of globalisation, and indeed of capitalism around the world, 
is unclear. Several scenarios suggest themselves, including further market 
liberal policies, strengthening the role of markets and the hand of capital; 
more authoritarian policies favouring capital, possibly weakening the 
role of markets but strengthening the hand of capital; or a shift in power 
towards labour. In the rest of this book we will consider factors shaping 
the current realities of work and the choices that will be made from now, 
and that determine which of the potential futures becomes a reality—and 
revisit these scenarios in the final chapter.
116  Laurie Oakes, ‘An Overlooked Hero of Reform’. Daily Telegraph, 20 June 2014; Troy Bramston, 
‘Hawke Model Could Serve as a Pick-Me-up for Next-Gen Labor’. Australian, 4 March 2013.
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Visions of the future
As a child, I saw Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey at the cinema. 
I was captivated by so many aspects of it—the moon base, the idea of 
life from other planets, the self-aware computer HAL, the cryptic scene 
at the end—and the magnificent technology. In 33 years time we would 
commute to a space station, in a Pan American passenger craft, and then 
on to the moon. Well, 2001 has come and gone, Pan American went 
bankrupt, and we are almost no closer to commuting to the moon now 
than we were four years after 2001 was released, when NASA finished 
its Apollo program. Like many movies about the future, some of the 
predictions have been illuminating but many have been way out. 
If there was one area where technology has failed miserably to live up to 
its promise, it is in that area of transport. The Concorde, a supersonic 
passenger plane that first flew in 1969, a year after 2001 was released 
(and  one that bore some visual resemblance to the imagined Pan Am 
Orion III spacecraft in 2001) has not been bettered in speed; indeed, 
the Concorde stopped flying altogether in 2003. In 1969, the Boeing 
747 ‘jumbo jet’ was also launched, and it looked like planes would get 
bigger and bigger, not just faster and faster. They did not. The only other 
‘jumbo-sized’ plane to come into production was the Airbus A380 in 
2005, and the future of jumbo-sized planes is now in doubt in the face 
of weak demand, possibly killed off by the economics of air transport 
(though the need for low-emissions flight might, ironically, lead one day 
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to a resurgence of larger planes).1 Indeed, economics has been at least as 
big a barrier as technology against the translation of grand transport ideas 
into something experienced by consumers. 
On the other hand, the dark, ultimately malevolent onboard computer, 
HAL, continues to fascinate. We may have been slower than 2001 
predicted in getting to artificial intelligence (AI) with HAL’s capabilities, 
but Google, Amazon and Siri are bringing that spaceship’s AI capabilities 
to your home now—and, soon, to your workplace. The favourable 
economics of digital change make further developments here almost 
inevitable.
2001 said a lot about the future—not just technology, but also humanity’s 
relationship with other species. It said very little about future society 
(aside  from the commercialisation of space travel). In this chapter, we 
want to look at some earlier visions of the future, but we want to focus 
on what they say about society and what that suggests about work. Many 
of these visions have been seen in books, movies and songs. From the 
fiction side, we will focus on three main literary works, all of which have 
been adapted for the screen. There are many stories written about futures, 
and we cannot cover them all. All involve predictions of technology and 
society, varying in their emphasis on each. The ones I have chosen are 
all relevant to issues of control, class and oppression. They are not all 
directly about work, but through their views on society we can see things 
about work. 
The first is George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, widely considered one 
of the best novels of the twentieth century, and first published in 1948.2 
The second is Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale, written over three 
decades after Orwell’s book.3 Both books were dystopian—they predicted 
nightmare futures as models that we should do everything to avoid. 
Nineteen Eighty-Four was turned into a movie three times, including 
a film starring John Hurt and Richard Burton, released in 1984 itself, that 
1  Karl Kruszelnicki, ‘Road Trip to Future Travel’. Great Moments in Science, Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation, 29 May 2018, www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/greatmomentsinscience/lessons-
from-first-road-trip/9795122. Hydrogen fuel would produce zero carbon emissions, but requires 
large storage volumes in planes, so some passenger space would need to make way for fuel space. 
On the demise of the A380 see Jasper Jolly, ‘A380: Airbus to Stop Making Superjumbo as Orders 
Dry  Up’. Guardian, 14 February 2019, www.theguardian.com/business/2019/feb/14/a380-airbus-
to-end-production-of-superjumbo.
2  George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four: A Novel (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1949; repr., 1976).
3  Margaret Atwood, The Handmaid’s Tale (London: Vintage, 1986).
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was faithful to the book. There were also numerous stage productions. 
The  Handmaid’s Tale was turned into a widely watched TV series 
released in 2017, similar but not identical to the book. Three decades 
after Atwood wrote The Handmaid’s Tale, Dave Eggers wrote The Circle, 
a very different book, about a large tech company that could almost be 
considered utopian  by many of its employees.4 It, too, was made into 
a  movie, released in 2017, which followed closely the first half of the 
book but diverged widely in the second, such that the ending was almost 
the opposite of that in the book. While Eggers’s book subtly highlighted 
the sinister side of this utopia, and had a suitably dark ending, the movie 
ended on a bizarrely positive note that somewhat missed the point. It was 
not a great box-office success. 
Of course, predictions are made not just in fiction but in nonfiction as 
well, and in a chapter about visions of the future we must also consider 
these. We will also examine how accurate or otherwise earlier popular 
predictions of the future, by politicians, writers and futurists, have 
proved to be, particularly in relation to work. What happened to all those 
predictions of increased leisure and short working weeks? Have trends 
on working hours and work intensification continued? What explains 
recent developments in these areas? What is the future of, and what are 
the influences on, work–life balance? And what does this tell us about 
how the choices that affect the future of work will be made? We will start 
with these, and then move on to more literary futures.
Futures of work and leisure
If ever there was a need, in studies of work, for the somewhat hard-to-
source maxim, ‘It’s dangerous to make predictions, especially about the 
future’,5 it is in relation to working time and leisure. John Maynard 
Keynes was not alone in predicting that increased productivity would see 
the average working week drop to 15 hours or so.6 A series of academic 
or professional predictions issued in the 1960s and 1970s foresaw that 
4  Dave Eggers, The Circle (New York: Vintage, 2013).
5  Although it has been attributed to people ranging from Neils Bohr to Samuel Goldwyn and 
even Yogi Berra, it appears to have originated from an unknown Dane, probably a parliamentarian, in 
the 1840s. Garson O’Toole, ‘It’s Difficult to Make Predictions, Especially About the Future’. Quote 
Investigator, 20 October 2013. quoteinvestigator.com/2013/10/20/no-predict/.
6  John Maynard Keynes, ‘Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren’. In Essays in Persuasion 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1930; repr., 2010).
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working time would consistently drop, and a number predicted a working 
week of between 20 and 30 hours by the year 2000.7 In the same era, 
some authors wrote of a forthcoming ‘age of leisure’, though they did not 
necessarily refer to quantitative forecasts of working hours to do so.8 Such 
claims occasionally, but less commonly, resurface in the context of current 
technological projections.9
Hours of work
Needless to say, the working week did not shorten in the huge way 
anticipated by some of those predictions. In countries where average 
total working hours reduced, it arose from the growth of (mostly female-
dominated) part-time employment, unrelated to technology effects. 
Reductions in average hours for full-time workers were harder to come 
by. Australia was one of those countries in the industrialised world that 
experienced increased working hours for full-time workers at the end 
of last century.10 Part of this trend was an increase in the proportion of 
employees working unpaid overtime. An important feature of Australian 
work-time practice is the high proportion of employees working extended 
or long hours. Based on a comparison of nine OECD countries, Jacobs 
and Gerson found that Australia had the highest proportion of workforce 
working more than 50 hours per week.11 A number of countries regulated 
maximum actual hours of work, but Australia did not. The trend was 
most marked in the 1990s. By the beginning of the next decade, mild-
mannered researchers were pondering ‘with the growing levels of stress 
and distress that are associated with the changes to labour utilisation that 
are favoured by employers, we have to wonder whether these trends are 
7  Mary A. Holman, ‘A National Time-Budget for the Year 2000’. Sociology and Social Research 46, 
no. 1 (1961); Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on 
the Next Thirty-Three Years (New York: Macmillan, 1967); Michael Dower, ‘The Fourth Wave: The 
Challenge of Leisure’. The Architect’s Journal (1965): 123–90; J. Fourastié, Les 40,000 Heures (Paris: 
Editions Gonthier, 1965); M. Kaplan, Leisure: Theory and Policy (New York: Wiley, 1975). All cited in 
Anthony James Veal, ‘The Leisure Society I: Myths and Misconceptions, 1960–1979’. World Leisure 
Journal 53, no. 3 (2011): 206–27.
8  Veal, ‘Leisure Society’.
9  Matt Novak, ‘Bullshit Article About Bullshit Automation Promises Bullshit Life of Leisure’. 
Gizmodo, 16 October 2017, paleofuture.gizmodo.com/bullshit-article-about-bullshit-automation-
promises-bul-1819515685.
10  Iain Campbell, ‘Extended Working Hours in Australia’. Labour and Industry 13, no. 1 (2002): 
91–110.
11  Jerry A. Jacobs and Kathleen Gerson, ‘Overworked Individuals or Overworked Families?’. Work 
and Occupations 28, no. 1 (2001): 40–63.
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sustainable’.12 Since then, Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) data on 
average hours worked by full-time employees have suggested that 
the trend stabilised or partially reversed over the subsequent decade. 
The  average full-time working week rose from 44.5 hours in February 
1979 to 46.5 hours in February 1998 in Australia, but gradually eased to 
45.1 hours by February 2014.
Perhaps society approached a ‘saturation point’ regarding how many hours 
full-time employees can work in the context of their other responsibilities; 
perhaps this was also a result of a relative stabilisation, for a while, in 
union membership (after a long period of decline) and hence power 
relations in the workplace. Resistance grows, both organised—through 
unions and industrial action—and unorganised, through absenteeism, 
quitting, losses in loyalty, problems in quality of output, even possibly 
sabotage. The employee goodwill or ‘organisational citizenship’ that firms 
come to expect and indeed rely upon (often without realising it) may 
disappear. It’s in this context that employee demands for greater flexibility 
in behaviour by employers (flexibility for employees) have expanded. 
Some workers have the labour market power to achieve this; many do not.
One interesting aspect, found in a study of employees in 13 Queensland 
organisations undertaken in 2002 by the Griffith Work Time Project, 
was that increasing hours were disproportionately concentrated among 
employees who were not compensated for them.13 Thus increased hours 
were reported by 39 per cent of employees who never received overtime 
rates of pay for working extra hours, but by just 25 per cent of employees 
who received overtime rates at least some of the time. Long hours were 
also associated with other forms of weak regulation of working hours 
(absence of time off, absence of rostered days off or ‘penalty rates’) and 
management-driven workplace cultures that promoted long hours.14
12  David Peetz, Cameron Allan, and Michael O’Donnell, ‘Are Australians Really Unhappier with 
Their Bosses Because They’re Working Harder? Perspiration and Persuasion in Modern Work’ (paper 
presented at Rethinking Institutions for Work and Employment, Selected Papers from the XXXVIII 
Annual CIRA Conference, Quebec, 26–28 May 2001).
13  Griffith Work Time Project, Working Time Transformations and Effects (Brisbane: Queensland 
Department of Industrial Relations, 2003).
14  Ibid.; David Peetz et al., ‘Race against Time: Extended Hours in Australia’. Australian Bulletin 
of Labour 29, no. 2 (2003): 126–42.
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The pattern of increasing hours was associated with simultaneous 
overemployment and underemployment. Many full-time workers still 
want fewer hours, while many part-time workers (especially casuals) want 
more hours, and many people without work seek employment. The first 
group (want fewer hours) outnumber the second group (want more hours) 
in aggregate, in both sexes, and among employees working 40 or more 
hours per week.15 Over the years, though, the proportion of all workers 
wanting more hours has increased as the incidence of part-time work has 
increased (i.e. an increasing number of people are put into part-time work 
when what they wanted was full-time work). The ABS now publishes 
a time series on underemployment but not yet on overemployment.16
Instead of having more leisure time, working hours are increasingly 
interfering in traditional leisure days (Saturdays and Sundays), especially 
(but by no means exclusively) in the retail and hospitality industries. 
Public policy has facilitated this development, most recently in Australia 
with a reduction in ‘penalty rates’ (an addition to minimum hourly pay 
arising from the fact that an employee is working unsocial hours) for 
weekend and holiday workers in those two industries, commencing in 
2017.17 On the question of whether Sundays were worse for workers than 
Saturdays, the authors of a study from the Centre for Work + Life (CWL), 
using Australian Work and Life Index (AWALI) data, concluded: ‘Those 
who work on Saturday and particularly Sunday have worse work life [sic] 
interference—an issue that is relevant to the current debate about penalty 
rates in Australia.’18 Other Australian studies also showed that Sunday 
remained a day for family and civic activities, more so than Saturday or 
any weekday.19
15  Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Employment Arrangements and Superannuation’. Canberra, 
6361.0.
16  In Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Labour Force, Australia’. Canberra, 6202.0.
17  Fair Work Commission, ‘4 Yearly Review of Modern Awards—Penalty Rates’. ([2017] FWCFB 
1001, 2017), 23 February.
18  Natalie Skinner and Barbara Pocock, The Persistent Challenge: Living, Working and Caring in 
Australia in 2014. The Australian Work and Life Index 2014 (Adelaide: Centre for Work + Life, 
University of South Australia, September 2014), 1.
19  Lyn Craig and Judith E. Brown, ‘Weekend Work and Leisure Time with Family and Friends: 
Who Misses Out?’. Journal of Marriage and Family 76, no. 4 (2014): 710–27; Michael Bittman, 
‘Sunday Working and Family Time’. Labour and Industry 16, no. 1 (2005): 59–81; David Peetz, 
Scott Bruynius, and Georgina Murray, ‘Choice and the Impact of Changes to Sunday Premiums 
in the Australian Retail and Hospitality Industries’. Journal of Industrial Relations (2019), doi.org/ 
10.1177/0022185618814578.
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In some industries, particularly mining, there has been a move away 
from eight-hour work days back to standardised, rotating 12-hour shifts 
with a resultant working week of well over 38 hours.20 Unused machines 
‘represent during the time they lie fallow, a useless advance of capital’ 
and so using labour ‘during all the 24 hours of the day’ is, therefore, an 
‘inherent tendency of capitalist production’.21 In countries with penalty 
rates and overtime to be taken into account, rotating 12-hour shifts pay 
well. However, a qualitative study showed they were associated with 
fatigue; irregular sleep; interruptions to family life; an increasing burden 
put on the (mainly female) non–shift working partner, especially where 
there are children in a family; increased stress on family relationships; 
pressure on community and sporting life in mining towns; and the growth 
of contractor-based fly-in fly-out ‘long distance commute’ workforces.22 
A study of over 2,000 mine and energy workers (mostly coal miners) 
found that half were working more hours than they would prefer, even 
after taking into account how that would affect their income and other 
activities, while 39 per cent were working the number of hours they 
would prefer and just 11 per cent were working fewer hours than they 
wanted.23 The Griffith Work Time Project also illustrated both the role 
of tighter control and how employees internalised pressure on working 
hours. Among employees who reported no change in their say over how 
many hours they worked, only 23 per cent reported increased hours. But 
increased hours were reported by 51 per cent of those who said that their 
say in how many hours they worked had gone down—and by 58 per cent 
of those who reported that their say over how many hours they worked 
had gone up!24 
20  Kathryn Heiler and Richard Rickersgill, ‘Shiftwork and Rostering Arrangements in the Australian 
Mining Industry: An Overview of Key Trends’. Australian Bulletin of Labour 27 (2001): 20–42.
21  Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 1 (London: The Electric Book Company, 1887; repr., 1998), 369.
22  Georgina Murray and David Peetz, Women of the Coal Rushes (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2010).
23  David Peetz, Georgina Murray, and Olav Muurlink, Work and Hours Amongst Mining and 
Energy Workers (Brisbane: Centre for Work, Organisation and Wellbeing, Griffith University, 2012).
24  Griffith Work Time Project, Working Time, 24.
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Thus there were, in effect, two paths to increased hours: one involving 
tighter direct control over employees’ hours, and one involving 
a loosening of direct control and replacing it with internalisation of the 
need to work longer hours to ‘get the job done’.25 Employees internalised 
pressure to work long hours, often for reasons associated with ‘long hours’ 
organisational cultures, and the hegemonic power of ideas associated with 
‘working hard to get ahead’ (or even to retain one’s job!) so employees with 
higher say in their working hours paradoxically tended to work more, not 
fewer, hours. This is consistent with evidence from an earlier survey, which 
showed that work intensification could be achieved either by tightening 
managerial prerogative or by increasing employee control,26 and with 
a qualitative study by Barker of work intensity in ‘concertive’ firms.27 That 
is, the two paths to work intensification involve either stricter managerial 
direct control or less direct managerial control in order to achieve greater 
indirect managerial control.
Work intensity and work–life interference
Evidence for work intensification has indeed been found in many studies 
in multiple countries over several decades.28 Work intensification can be a 
way that firms can adjust their labour inputs.29 It may accompany greater 
functional flexibility30 or numerical flexibility31—indeed, these forms of 
flexibility (both discussed in Chapter 6) may cause work intensification. 
It can be achieved through such simple mechanisms as speed-up of the 
production line, an increase in the target number of ‘swipes’ expected 
25  Ibid.; Peetz et al., ‘Race against Time’.
26  Peetz, Allan, and O’Donnell, ‘Are Australians Really Unhappier’.
27  James R. Barker, ‘Tightening the Iron Cage: Concertive Control in Self-Managing Teams’. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1993): 408–37.
28  Francis Green, ‘Why Has Work Effort Become More Intense?’. Industrial Relations: A Journal 
of Economy and Society 43, no. 4 (2004): 709–41; Brigid van Wanrooy et al., Australia at Work: In a 
Changing World (Sydney: Workplace Research Centre, University of Sydney, November 2009).
29  Cameron Allan, Michael O’Donnell, and David Peetz, ‘More Tasks, Less Secure, Working 
Harder: Three Dimensions of Labour Utilisation’. Journal of Industrial Relations 41, no. 4 (1999): 
519–35.
30  Anna Pollert, ed. Farewell to Flexibility (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991); Michael O’Donnell, 
‘Empowerment or Enslavement? Lean Production, Immigrant Women and Service Work in Public 
Hospitals’. Labour and Industry 6, no. 3 (1995): 73–94.
31  Gareth Rees and Sarah Fielder, ‘The Services Economy, Subcontracting and the New Employment 
Relations: Contract Catering and Cleaning’. Work, Employment and Society 6, no. 3 (1992): 73–94.
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from a checkout operator,32 ‘downsizing’ of an existing workforce33 or 
computer-based monitoring of employees.34 Increasingly, digitalisation is 
seen as driving work intensification.35 
Working hours and work intensification have implications for what 
Skinner and Pocock call ‘work–life interference’—inviting us to turn the 
well-rehearsed concept of work–life balance on its head.36 Barbara Pocock 
is one of the leading writers on work–life issues and for some time headed 
the Centre for Work + Life (CWL) at the University of South Australia.37 
With Natalie Skinner she examined, in Australia, the Fair Work Act’s ‘right 
to request’ (RTR) that was introduced in January 2010. This enabled 
certain employees to request changed working arrangements (to help 
them care for their child). These arrangements could include different 
start and/or finish times, shorter hours and a changed location of work. 
But it was merely a ‘right to request’, not a ‘right to have’. Employers 
were able to refuse requests on undefined ‘reasonable business grounds’. 
There was no appeal from the employer’s decision. The right in itself was 
a step forward in promoting employee-centred flexibility and work–life 
balance, and echoed legislation in various European countries, especially 
the Nordic countries. 
The Australian legislation, however, was ‘generally weaker’ than that in 
other countries,38 restricting eligibility to a small group, and making 
it easy for employers to refuse a request. Employers appeared to reject 
32  Ern Reeder, ‘The Fast Food Industry’. In Technology and the Labour Process, ed. Evan Willis 
(Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1988), 150–1.
33  Wayne F. Cascio, ‘Downsizing: What Do We Know? What Have We Learned?’. Academy of 
Management Executive 7, no. 1 (1993): 95–104.
34  Christopher Wright and John Lund, ‘Best Practice Taylorism: “Yankee Speed-up” in Australian 
Grocery Distribution’. Journal of Industrial Relations 38, no. 2 (1996): 196–212.
35  See Michael Bittman, Judith E. Brown, and Judy Wajcman, ‘The Mobile Phone, Perpetual 
Contact and Time Pressure’. Work Employment and Society 23, no. 4 (2009): 673–91; and Judy 
Wajcman, ‘Life in the Fast Lane? Towards a Sociology of Technology and Time’. British Journal of 
Sociology 59, no. 1 (2008): 59–77, which discuss the ethics of this trend, and some of the theoretical 
issues of the time/technology/work intensification nexus.
36  Natalie Skinner and Barbara Pocock, ‘Flexibility and Work–Life Interference in Australia’. 
Journal of Industrial Relations 53, no. 1 (2011): 65–82.
37  Barbara Pocock, The Work–Life Collision (Sydney: Federation Press, 2003); Barbara Pocock, 
The Labour Market Ate My Babies (Sydney: Federation Press, 2006); Barbara Pocock, Sara Charlesworth, 
and Janine Chapman, ‘Work–Family and Work–Life Pressures in Australia: Advancing Gender Equality 
in “Good Times”?’. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 33, no. 9/10 (2013): 594–612; 
Barbara Pocock and Natalie Skinner, The Australian Work and Life Index (AWALI) (Adelaide: Centre for 
Work + Life, University of South Australia, 2009).
38  Sara Charlesworth and Iain Campbell, ‘Right to Request Regulation: Two New Australian 
Models’. Australian Journal of Labour Law 21, no. 2 (2008): 1–14.
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applications for flexible work by men more often than by women, which 
might seem good for women at first glance but it reinforces traditional 
notions of the domestic division of labour and traditional notions of 
who should be demonstrating the flexibility.39 More broadly, institutional 
arrangements and employing organisations make it difficult, especially 
for women, to make transitions between work and care,40 and most 
organisations make a cost–benefit analysis of the value to the employer of 
providing family-friendly working conditions.41
Overall, the promise of increased leisure in the face of new technology 
has not been realised. One factor behind that failure was simply that 
productivity growth did not proceed as expected. Globally and in Australia, 
productivity growth has slowed since the introduction of market liberal 
reforms in most countries in the 1980s and beyond. But the bigger factor 
has been that social forces have panned out differently to what those 
making the projections appeared to anticipate. Workers have not had the 
collective power to ensure that higher productivity is translated into greater 
leisure. Indeed, worker organisation has declined. Moreover, regulation 
has tended to soften, again reducing the need for higher productivity 
to be translated into fewer working hours. Management has not sought 
to reduce the number of hours worked by full-time employees, instead 
finding advantage in increasing them (it saves on recruitment costs), while 
flexibly deploying casual, part-time labour. An increased supply of part-
time labour (particularly from women with children (re-)entering the 
workforce) has made this easier for employers to do.
This tells us that accurately anticipating social forces and social trends 
will be at least as important in envisaging the future of work as will be 
accurately anticipating the broad types of technology to be introduced or 
their productivity effects. So, as we move to that part of this chapter that is 
based on literary sources, our focus is not really on those works that make 
39  Natalie Skinner, Claire Hutchinson, and Barbara Pocock, The Big Squeeze: Australian Work and 
Life Index 2012 (Adelaide: Centre for Work + Life, University of South Australia, 2012), 37; Glenda 
Strachan et al., Work and Careers in Australian Universities: Report on Employee Survey (Brisbane: 
Centre for Work, Organisation and Wellbeing, Griffith University, October 2012), 27, www.
griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0024/88125/Work-and-Career-Report-on-Employee-Survey_
Final-v2.pdf; Georgina Murray, David Peetz, and Olav Muurlink, Women and Work in Australian 
Mining (Brisbane: Centre for Work, Organisation and Wellbeing, Griffith University, 2012), 5.
40  Barbara Pocock, ‘Work/Care Regimes: Institutions, Culture and Behaviour and the Australian 
Case’. Gender, Work & Organization 12, no. 1 (2005): 32–49.
41  Belinda H. Reeve et al., ‘Regulation, Managerial Discretion and Family-Friendliness in Australia’s 
Changing Industrial Relations Environment’. Journal of Industrial Relations 54, no. 1 (2012): 57–74.
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predictions or comments about technology and productivity. Instead, we 
want to focus on those that comment on social forces—and these need 
not even be explicitly about work.
Lessons from literature
Turning to fictional literature is something we do not do just for the 
fun of it. It is not merely about the rights and wrongs of imaginaries. It 
allows us to speculate on possible outcomes from our current conditions 
through several mechanisms. We can see contemporary commentaries on 
social, economic and other realities, placed in a futuristic context. We see 
scrutiny and satire about the human condition. We see ideas about our 
ongoing social struggles to maintain individual integrity and kindness in 
work in the face of economic struggles for power and control. We are 
invited to free our creative thinking to look at alternative futures. We 
might hear a message of alarm about the dangers at work. ‘Predictions’ 
from literature might be warnings of what is to be avoided, rather than 
expectations of what is to come.
There is also a healthy precedent for this approach. One of the most 
interesting reads on management is David Knights and Hugh Willmott’s 
Management Lives,42 which takes as its foundation four very different 
novels that illustrate the role of identity, insecurity, power and inequality 
in the management experience. The novels: are David Lodge’s Nice Work; 
Kazuo Ishiguru’s The Remains of the Day; Tom Woolfe’s The Bonfire of 
the Vanities; and Milan Kundera’s The Unbearable Lightness of Being. 
Like those we focus on here, all were subsequently transformed into 
movies or TV series. Knights and Willmott chose this approach because 
novels illustrated the issues they wanted to focus on, and are valued by 
readers because of the relevance they have to their own lives, potentially 
demonstrating the connection between theoretical concepts and personal 
experience.43 None of the four were centrally about ‘management’, though 
Lodge’s Nice Work probably came closest, while Ishiguru’s The Remains of 
42  David Knights and Hugh Willmott, Management Lives: Power and Identity in Work Organizations 
(London: Sage, 1999).
43  Alessia Contu and Hugh Willmott, ‘The Docudrama: A Situated Learning Experience’. 
In Innovations in Teaching Business and Management, ed. Christine Hockings and Ian Moore 
(Birmingham: SEDA Publications, Staff Educational and Development Association, 2001), 95–109.
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the Day and Kundera’s The Unbearable Lightness of Being are on seemingly 
unrelated topics, but used to illustrate the issues of identity and insecurity 
that were relevant to understanding management.
But first a spoiler alert: if you do not want to find out what happens in 
Nineteen Eighty-Four, The Handmaid’s Tale and The Circle here, put this 
down and first read those books instead.
Nineteen Eighty-Four
One classic futuristic scenario is that found in Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-
Four. Written in 1948, the book tells the story of Winston Smith, a minor 
functionary in the totalitarian one-party state that is Oceania, one of 
only three countries in the world. The first part of the book concerns 
Smith’s daily life in the Party and the state (he rewrites old news stories 
to make them consistent with the Party line), his writing a diary (which 
is itself ‘thoughtcrime’), and meeting and having an affair with a woman 
from the Party, culminating in their capture. The second part describes 
his internment and torture by the ‘Ministry of Love’ until he finally 
relents and comes to love ‘Big Brother’, the head (if he exists) of the Party 
and state.
You have probably heard from time to time the adjective ‘Orwellian’ 
applied to something, usually undesirable—such as excessive surveillance 
or monitoring of people, or attempts by governments or corporations 
to exercise control over people’s thinking. That adjective is used because 
Orwell described (very critically) his futuristic vision of what surveillance 
and control may come to look like. The activities of the National Security 
Agency (NSA), for example, are often described as ‘Orwellian’. I am not 
sure that he would really appreciate his name being used that way, but that 
is the way that language has evolved. Some people would describe the use 
of cameras in every imaginable location in the house in the TV franchise 
Big Brother as being ‘Orwellian’ and they would be correct—the title for 
the franchise coming directly from the chief autocrat in Nineteen Eighty-
Four. I doubt that Orwell would have approved of the Big Brother series.44
44  There was another British TV show, from 1970, also called Big Brother. This mini-series of 
six one-off plays, created by Wilfred Greatorex, drew a number of scenarios that were intentionally 
dystopian. IMDb, ‘Big Brother’. Movies, TV & Showtimes. www.imdb.com/title/tt1236228/.
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Although the book was not written explicitly about work—Orwell 
was warning against the dangers of totalitarian tendencies in society as 
a whole—in 1993 British academic Hugh Willmott wrote a seminal article 
that compared modern corporate culturism to the techniques used by the 
ruling party in Nineteen Eighty-Four.45 To understand this argument, we 
first need some context about what culture is. We can think of it as ‘a way 
of seeing things that is common to many people’46 or, more precisely, 
‘the set of shared, taken-for-granted implicit assumptions that a  group 
holds and that determines how it perceives, thinks about and reacts to its 
various environments’.47 These definitions—from organisational studies—
highlight that culture involves ideas and assumptions that influence how 
we see situations, think about them and react to them. The three main 
elements of any culture are: the basic assumptions that it embodies (about 
what is), the values (regarding what ought to be), and the culture’s artefacts 
and creations (such as stories, myths, rituals, ceremonies, symbols, 
language and behavioural norms).48 Despite what some managers say 
(and, at times, want), most organisations are not ‘monocultural’. In other 
words, there is not just one culture at the workplace. There are various 
subcultures within organisations. Schein, for example, argued for three 
subcultures: ‘operators’, ‘engineers’ and ‘executives’.49 It may be an 
overgeneralisation but it is fair comment in as much as it draws attention 
to diversity of culture within organisations.
So culturism is the attempt by management to create specific organisational 
cultures reflecting management’s objectives. When we discuss ‘culturism’, 
we are talking about attempts by management to shape employee beliefs. 
In recent decades senior managers have often consciously attempted to 
create a particular type of culture at the workplace. Some scholars are 
highly critical of management attempts to introduce cultural change. For 
instance, Mabey and Salaman argued that ‘the focus on “cultural change” 
… is often an attempt to impose a consensual, unitarist conception of 
the organisation on all employees, and thus to gain their commitment’.50 
45  Hugh Willmott, ‘Strength Is Ignorance; Slavery Is Freedom: Managing Culture in Modern 
Organizations’. The Journal of Management Studies 30, no. 4 (1993): 515–52.
46  Diana C. Pheysey, Organisational Cultures: Types and Transformations (London: Routledge, 1993).
47  Edgar H. Schein, ‘Culture: The Missing Concept in Organization Studies’. Administrative 
Science Quarterly 41, no. 2 (1996): 229–40): 236.
48  Edgar H. Schein, Organisational Culture and Leadership (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1986).
49  Schein, ‘Culture: The Missing Concept in Organization Studies’, 236.
50  Christopher Mabey and Graeme Salaman, Strategic Human Resource Management (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1995), 290.
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Jaynes studied the New Zealand division of a multinational bank. He found 
that the deliberate creation of a sales culture reflected ‘a strong unitarist 
approach in which the goals of management and employees are viewed 
as shared. This disguised management’s vested power structure in a veil 
of neutrality and cohesion’.51 The changes brought about were ‘largely 
effective in achieving the desired transition of the workplace culture 
toward a sales and customer focus’. Employees were seen to ‘internalise 
the culture change, unaware of their objectification and subjugation by 
management’.52 Culture was thus a form of employee control.
The central element of Willmott’s article was the comparisons he drew 
between the practices of culturism and the notions of ‘newspeak’ and 
‘doublethink’ expounded in Nineteen Eighty-Four. Hence the main title 
of his article was ‘Strength is Ignorance; Slavery is Freedom’, inverting 
two of  the three slogans of Nineteen Eighty-Four’s Ministry of Truth 
(responsible for propaganda). He argued:
In the ideal-typical bureaucratic, rule-governed organisation, 
employees are at least permitted to think what they like so long 
as they act in a technically competent manner … in organisations 
with a strong corporate culture, such ‘disloyal’ communication is 
at best strictly coded if it is not entirely tabooed. 
He then quoted early management gurus Peters and Waterman: ‘you either 
buy into their norms or you get out’.53 According to Willmott, the ‘guiding 
aim and abiding concern of corporate culturism is to win the “hearts and 
minds” of employees, to define their purpose by managing what they 
think and feel, and not just how they behave’.54 In this way, Willmott 
considered culturism was a ‘totalising’ management attempt to design 
the normative framework of work.55 Management seeks to develop and 
sustain this culture by careful recruitment and promotion of employees 
who accept the core values of the organisation.56 
51  Stephen Jaynes, ‘The Control of Workplace Culture: A Critical Perspective’. Paper presented at 
Current Research in Industrial Relations conference, Brisbane, 1997, 182–9. 
52  Ibid., 188–9. 
53  Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, In Search of Excellence (New York: Harper & Row, 
1982), quoted in Willmott, ‘Strength Is Ignorance’, 528.
54  Willmott, ‘Strength Is Ignorance’, 516.
55  Ibid., 524.
56  Ibid., 534.
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Willmott made repeated allusions to the world of Orwell’s Nineteen 
Eighty-Four: ‘Like the party member in Oceania, the well-socialised 
… corporate employee “is expected to have no private emotions and 
no respites from enthusiasm … the speculations which might possibly 
induce a sceptical or rebellious attitude are killed in advance by his … 
inner discipline”’.57 He drew parallels between practices of culturism and 
several concepts in Orwell’s book. One was the relevance of newspeak, the 
official language of Oceania, designed to help shape thought in particular 
ways. We see the relevance of newspeak in how some corporations seek 
to exclude particular messages from entering employee consciousness. 
In Walmart, if ‘associates’ (their newspeak term for employees) are ‘using 
union terms such as arbitration, grievance and seniority’, managers are 
under instruction to ring the ‘Union Hotline’.58 
Language is therefore important in all this. Euphemisms like ‘associate’, 
‘member’ and ‘partner’ in place of ‘employee’ help ensure, as Syme 
(the newspeak documenter in Nineteen Eighty-Four) would say, that ‘the 
range of consciousness [becomes] always a little smaller’.59 Syme observed, 
‘it’s a beautiful thing, the destruction of words’, and later Orwell remarked 
that the Party aimed to ‘diminish the range of thought … by cutting the 
choice of words down to a minimum’.60 The use of the term ‘associates’ 
by Walmart, ‘Servo’ (a pseudonym for another corporation)61 and several 
other corporations (or, in the case of the term ‘partners’, Starbucks)62 for 
what are, at law, employees is intended to shape thinking and expectations 
towards a framework with its own internal logic—away from one in which 
workers might seek to obtain the rights that come with being an employee 
and join a collective organisation for employees. 
Another relevant concept is that of doublethink—the power of holding 
two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting 
both of them.63 According to Willmott, ‘culturism endeavours to secure 
control by managing the impression of respecting the distinctiveness and 
individuality of each employee … enabl[ing] an idea—such as autonomy—
57  Ibid., 541, citing Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, 220.
58  Wal-Mart Stores Inc., ‘A Manager’s Toolbox to Remaining Union Free’ (unpublished company 
document, 1997).
59  Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, 45.
60  Ibid., 242.
61  Diane Van den Broek, ‘Human Resource Management, Workforce Control and Union 
Avoidance: An Australian Case Study’. Journal of Industrial Relations 39, no. 3 (1997): 332–48.
62  David Emerson, ‘Starbucks Axes 61 Stores and 685 Jobs’. Sydney Morning Herald, 29 July 2008.
63  As discussed in Chapter 11, this is very close to the concept of cognitive dissonance.
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to be repudiated while simultaneously laying claim to its reality’.64 This 
phenomenon is manifested in many organisations that proclaim how they 
treat all employees ‘as individuals’ while simultaneously insisting they ‘fit’ 
with the culture of the organisation and pursue its collective, corporate 
wellbeing.65 (You may have also encountered the concept ‘doublespeak’ 
and wondered if it came from Nineteen Eighty-Four. Although it combines 
those two previous concepts, it was actually coined some time later by 
William Lutz to refer to ‘language that pretends to communicate but 
really doesn’t … that makes the bad seem good … that avoids or shifts 
responsibility … that conceals or prevents thought’.)66
Willmott also refers to crimestop—‘the faculty of stopping short as though 
by instinct at the threshold of any heretical thought’.67 He separately 
adds that ‘the sense of certainty associated with the cultural “uniformity” 
required by Big Brother can be highly appealing … [as providing] 
freedom from insecurity … Managers, no less than their subordinates, 
may welcome the absence or removal of ideas, people and situations that 
challenge or disrupt the immersion of self in corporate identity’.68
So, how well has Nineteen Eighty-Four predicted our future, or indeed 
the future of work? Such books are meant as warnings, not predictions, 
and their ‘failure’ to come true might reflect the success of the author’s 
warnings. As it is, the real world in the year 1984 did not match, in detail, 
the world depicted in the book of that title, and neither does the world 
of today. That said, the emergence of electronic surveillance, including by 
state bodies such as the NSA and various state and private organisations 
in China,69 has turned out to be at least as effective, perhaps more so, than 
that portrayed in Orwell’s book. As to the workplace, the pervasiveness and 
violence of Nineteen Eighty-Four’s Ministry of Love cannot be compared 
with the control exercised in decollectivising firms. The relevance is 
64  Willmott, ‘Strength Is Ignorance’, 526.
65  David Peetz, Brave New Workplace: How Individual Contracts Are Changing Our Jobs (Sydney: 
Allen & Unwin, 2006).
66  William Lutz, ‘The World of Doublespeak’. USA Today 119, no. 2544 (1990): 34–36, which 
reproduced part of William Lutz, Doublespeak, 1st ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1989).
67  Willmott, ‘Strength Is Ignorance’, 526. 
68  Ibid., 536.
69  Matthew Carney, ‘Leave No Dark Corner’. ABC News, 18 September 2018, www.abc.net.au/
news/2018-09-18/china-social-credit-a-model-citizen-in-a-digital-dictatorship/10200278. These trials 
are leading to a national system of ‘social credit’ rating by 2020. René Raphael and Ling Xi, ‘Discipline 
and Punish: The Birth of China’s Social-Credit System’, Nation, 23 January 2019, www.thenation.com/
article/china-social-credit-system.
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more in that, as Willmott points out, modern culturism focuses not so 
much on what employees do (the focus of rule-governed bureaucratic 
organisations) as on what employees think. One of the biggest constraints 
is that ‘unlike the fictional world of Oceania, corporate employees are 
exposed to, and constituted by, other relations and discourses’70 as they 
have a life outside the organisation. So we should examine closely the 
directions that corporate control of people’s lives is taking. For that, we 
will look at Dave Eggers’s book, The Circle, but before that we turn to 
a more gendered dystopia in The Handmaid’s Tale.
The Handmaid’s Tale
Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale tells the story of a woman, 
Offred, in a dystopian society (formerly the USA, but now known as 
Gilead following a violent takeover by a group of armed fundamentalist 
males). It had been brought to crisis by a plummeting birth rate and 
disappearing fertility due, presumably, to an environmental crisis. Offred, 
being fertile, is part of a subjugated class of women (‘handmaids’) that 
are ritually violated for the purpose of making them pregnant, in order 
to deliver a baby for a high-status male. These males have infertile ‘wives’ 
who have higher status than the handmaids but must participate as 
effective bystanders in the ‘ceremonies’ in which their husbands attempt 
to impregnate the handmaids. The handmaids are depersonalised, their 
names simply reflecting which male owns them at a particular time (hence 
Offred is ‘of Fred’). They wear uniforms very reminiscent of a nun’s habit, 
but red and white. Their sole purpose is to have babies. Those women who 
are neither wives nor handmaids (nor performing some other essential 
role, such as the ‘Aunts’ who control the handmaids, much like matrons in 
a boarding school) are declared to be ‘unwomen’ and banished to work and 
possibly starve to death in toxic and fatal distant lands (the Colonies).71 
Written in the first person, the story shifts back and forth between the 
present travails and the previous life of Offred (we are not told her real 
name) with her husband, presumed murdered while they attempted to 
70  Willmott, ‘Strength Is Ignorance’, 535.
71  Atwood, Handmaid’s Tale, 20.
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escape to Canada, and her child, long since taken from her. The story 
ends inconclusively, with Offred about to enter a space in which she either 
would escape or be captured, tortured and killed.72
After the end of the first-person story, however, Atwood adds an epilogue, 
set in an academic convention decades later, during which it is apparent 
that Gilead had fallen and some semblance of sense has returned. In that 
respect, The Handmaid’s Tale can be considered to be a more optimistic 
book than Nineteen Eighty-Four, as there is some end to the misery, though 
even then we do not find out what happened to Offred. (This epilogue 
is not part of the TV series, which had to find a different means to bring 
about a form of ambivalent optimism.)
There are many similarities to Nineteen Eighty-Four. Power is maintained 
through the combined use of ideological force and violence. There 
are hangings of dissidents at ‘the Wall’,73 just as traitors are hanged in 
Nineteen Eighty-Four, though in Gilead many hangings occur as a result 
of violations of fundamentalist norms about women’s roles (particularly 
by abortionists) that may have occurred even before Gilead was created: 
‘it’s no excuse that what they did was legal at the time: their crimes are 
retroactive’.74 However, Atwood also emphasised the use of rewards and 
divisions among the subordinated in the techniques used by the powerful 
to maintain power. For example, every so often there is a ‘particicution 
ceremony’, in which handmaids are allowed (or required) to execute, 
usually by stoning, a male found to have broken a law that would also 
evoke the emotions of the handmaids. It is reminiscent of the ‘two minutes 
hate’ at the beginning of Nineteen Eighty-Four, but more focused on 
generating release of frustration and vicarious revenge for the participants, 
and so more hands-on. Conformity to the system is encouraged by little 
rewards that are given to the most compliant of the handmaids. Clever 
exploitation of divisions and a lack of solidarity between oppressed groups 
enable Gilead’s ruling elite to win. Those divisions persist (e.g. between 
the handmaids and the Aunts) and help perpetuate the system.
72  A second series of the TV version takes off from here. Its storyline goes beyond that in the book, 
but Atwood was heavily consulted in this and its production. In this second series we find out Offred’s 
real name, the fate of her husband, and her story after the last scene in the book.
73  Atwood, Handmaid’s Tale, 42.
74  Ibid., 43.
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As in Nineteen Eighty-Four, there is a network of spies and informers, in 
Gilead called ‘Eyes’. Offred cannot be sure who is an Eye, and even at the 
end we are left wondering whether her lover, Nick, is an Eye who will 
arrest and torture her, or a dissident who will enable her to escape. In both 
books, continuing war is a theme. Oceania is constantly at war with one 
of the other two countries, Eastasia or Eurasia, and always in alliance 
with the other. The fight against the enemy is a rallying cry for patriotic 
servitude to the state and party. There is also the constant battle against 
the internal enemy, Goldstein, whose existence is dubious. In Gilead ‘the 
war is going well’,75 but it appears to be mainly an internal war against 
insurgents and heretics, though it features heavily on the news.
Also similar to Nineteen Eighty-Four is the role of ideology and conformity. 
Much of what Willmott wrote about work and cultural control could 
be applied to The Handmaid’s Tale as well as to Nineteen Eighty-Four. 
The culture in Nineteen Eighty-Four is strongly shaped by support for 
the ruling party, and for the wars being prosecuted against external and 
internal enemies. In The Handmaid’s Tale that ideology is dominated by 
support for the ideals—that women exist to procreate (the handmaids) 
or to enhance the status of men (the wives and occasional babies), that 
women must adhere to very strict rules concerning who they talk to, 
what they talk about and do in public, and so on. Support for these ideas 
forms the basis of support for the system in Gilead. In some ways it might 
be seen as more viable than the dominant ideology in Oceania, but the 
suffering and humiliation of the handmaids makes the contradiction 
between ideology and practice very apparent, not least because many of 
the handmaids had a memory of what life was like before the overthrow of 
the US government, when they had jobs, among other things. A potential 
resistance network, though shadowy and obscure to Offred, is given 
more prominence in Atwood’s world than in Orwell’s. If Willmott were 
to write about Atwood’s book, the contradiction between ideology and 
lived experience in Gilead, though more extreme than that faced by 
modern corporate workers, could better encapsulate the role of culture 
than analogy with Orwell’s. In Gilead, workers are indeed ‘exposed to, 
and constituted by, other relations and discourses’,76 as they had a life 
not outside but before the existing regime—and they are more exposed 
to alternatives by such mechanisms as visiting tourists or rumours of 
75  Ibid., 29.
76  Willmott, ‘Strength Is Ignorance’, 535. 
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life in Canada. This is a better analogy with corporate culturism than 
provided by Nineteen Eighty-Four (though, again, the violence in Gilead 
has nothing comparable in modern culturism).
Unlike Nineteen Eighty-Four, The Handmaid’s Tale has an obviously strong 
orientation towards gender—though it also looks at its interactions with 
class. In some ways, The Handmaid’s Tale could be seen as a feminist 
version of Nineteen Eighty-Four. That, however, would downplay its 
separate significance. Certainly, Nineteen Eighty-Four paid no regard to 
gender issues, while The Handmaid’s Tale placed them front and centre.
What is particularly striking about the storyline is the portrayed reversal 
of gains that had been made by women through the twentieth century 
(when the book was written). Atwood contrasts the victories many 
women had in the 1960s and 1970s with their fate in Gilead. The point 
is really to demonstrate that the successes achieved by women in the 
move closer towards equality are fragile, and could be undone as long as 
women remain excluded from centres of power. The lessons for work are 
not just about women. They suggest that any apparent gains that do not 
result in a major shift in power are also susceptible to reversal. Thus while 
many managers encourage participation by employees in decision-making 
(discussed in Chapters 2 and 7), this remains in place entirely at the whim 
of management, and can be easily taken away. 
Atwood’s book probably also has a more nuanced view of class than 
Orwell’s. In Nineteen Eighty-Four the ‘proles’, as they are described, are 
barely discussed. Winston Smith ruminates that they are the only hope 
for the future, but gives no hint as to how or why any change might come 
from them. It seems the only glimmer of light in Oceania as, for the inner 
and outer circles of Party officials (Smith is part of the outer circle), Party 
control is complete. So it is also a bit of a puzzle as to why the Party gives 
so little focus to the proles (or why Orwell does likewise). Atwood goes 
into considerable detail as to the roles of different classes. While women 
of all classes are clearly oppressed by the theocracy that rules, the majority 
of men are also oppressed by the social order, and are subject to the same 
potentially violent control and punishment as the women are. 
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The Circle 
Dave Egger’s The Circle is probably the most important book written 
about a (fictional) workplace since the turn of the century. Set in the near 
future, it tells the story of Mae, a young woman working at a large ‘tech’ 
company, called The Circle, that occupies the market space presently 
occupied by Google and Facebook. She has the appearance of being in the 
dream job—in ‘the hottest company on the planet’77—but, as the reader, 
we know it is not as it seems. Part of the brilliance of Eggers is not to write 
the book, as so easily could have been done, as a story of Mae’s gradual 
growing horror at the reality of her situation and the evil managers she 
encounters in her bid to escape. Rather, he depicts Mae as someone who, 
while initially disturbed by some of the things she encounters, gradually 
embraces the corporation and everything it stands for. Indeed, she is 
eventually repulsed by the warnings of corporate excesses proffered by one 
of the firm’s three founders, and finally betrays him. Along the way she 
also alienates herself from her parents and inadvertently causes the death 
of her ex-husband, though she blames that, in effect, on his antisocial 
rejection of all the good that The Circle offers. 
The Circle has several important themes. One is monopolisation. 
The corporation is depicted as having 90 per cent of the search market, 
88 per cent of email and 92 per cent of text servicing.78 It grows ever 
stronger. A second theme is performance management. As soon as Mae 
starts her job in Customer Engagement, she is measured by the ratings 
customers give her, remarkably high benchmarks are set and expected of 
her, and she obsesses about achieving them. Later, she is told of the need 
to achieve a high ‘conversion’ rate (how many people buy products she 
mentions) and ‘retail raw’ (the value of consumer purchases of products 
she mentions).79 Eventually, Mae offers the view that ‘humans can measure 
all things’.80 She comes to dislike life off-campus, with its homeless people, 
unnecessary problems that were correctable through ‘simple enough 
algorithms’, and the attendant ‘chaos of an orderless world’.81
77  Eggers, The Circle, 73. 
78  Ibid., 174.
79  Ibid., 249–52.
80  Ibid., 338.
81  Ibid., 373.
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We also see the role of cultural control, especially through social activities. 
Mae is counselled early for not participating enough in social 
activities  sponsored by the corporation, and the HR managers ask if it 
is because she does not like working there, or suggest she is being selfish. 
An algorithm generates an indicator of social participation, the PartiRank, 
which is taken seriously and Mae spends late nights trying to improve her 
PartiRank. It measures attendance at the parties, brunches or other events 
organised by The Circle or ‘Circlers’ (employees), but also interactions via 
social media. Two pages of Eggers’s book detail the many performance 
indicators Mae tries to influence in order to improve her PartiRank.82 
Social media engagement helps drive monetisation of the Circlers’ work, 
and is one of the main sources of work intensification, judging by how 
many screens it adds to Mae’s desk.83 The Circle makes no mention of 
Orwell’s ‘doublethink’, but it is in effect what Mae practises when she 
objects to invasions of her privacy—especially over sexual matters84—
arising from the policies of The Circle (‘we don’t delete here’),85 yet she 
increasingly endorses the objectives of the corporation. 
Another theme is the contradiction in the rhetoric of ‘transparency’ 
and its use in ensuring surveillance. Each new technology and process 
of the corporation leads to greater surveillance, either of employees or of 
citizens more generally. Participants are pressured to participate in the 
interests of transparency: ‘If you aren’t transparent, what are you hiding?’86 





In The Circle, Eggers presents three slogans that arise from an onstage 
interview Mae performs, in the same format as Orwell’s, and, in the 




82  Ibid., 194–5.
83  Ibid., 96, 252.
84  Ibid., 204–6.
85  Ibid., 206. 
86  Ibid., 241. 
87  Ibid., 305.
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They are not all paradoxes in the same way as Orwell’s, but rather plausible 
in the context, even if objectively false. They are also explicitly focused on 
issues of ‘transparency’. The rhetoric of transparency becomes the basis for 
a totalitarian, corporate-controlled workplace and society.
Indeed, each transgression of personal liberty through heightened 
surveillance is brought about by a technology that plans to improve the 
lives of people: protecting children from deviants, protecting adults from 
crime, advancing human rights or democracy, enhancing the lives of 
disabled people, or even making it easier to decide which beach to go 
to. The mechanisms in place or proposed include cameras located almost 
ubiquitously, in locations or even on people; chips implanted under the 
skin, even in bones; sensors in communities to detect and locate ‘strangers’ 
in houses; even sensors in houses to detect sudden, ‘violent’ movements.
The book ends with Mae wondering what her friend, Annie, hospitalised 
and in a coma, is thinking—and considering it an affront and a deprivation 
that neither she nor anyone else could know. ‘The world deserved nothing 
less’ than to know her thoughts ‘and would not wait’.88 
Another idea is the importance of information. On the one hand, ‘to 
know we must share’;89 on the other, says one of the founders, ‘if you can 
control the flow of information, you control everything’.90 This is linked 
to a key theme: the great power of large corporations in such sectors 
(‘How can anyone rise up against the Circle if they [The Circle] control all 
information and access to it?’). This power is also shown by what happens 
to dissent. A Senator seeks to break up The Circle, but she is later under 
investigation for ‘all kinds of weird stuff’ after things were ‘found on her 
computer’.91 One of the company’s founders later tells Mae that this is 
‘about the hundredth person’ the company has done that to.92 Eventually 
all politicians succumb to pressure to become ‘transparent’—to have a 
body camera attached to them to track their every move and broadcast it 
live via The Circle to the world. The rhetoric of democratisation disguises 
increased centralisation of power in the hands of corporate leaders. 
88  Ibid., 497.
89  Ibid., 151.
90  Ibid., 487.
91  Ibid., 207.
92  Ibid., 488.
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The ‘completion of the Circle’ turns out to be the prospect of The Circle 
taking over the voting process for elections, such that one company chief 
says ‘it might even eliminate Congress’.93 Another warns Mae, to no avail, 
of a ‘totalitarian nightmare’.94 One of the last scenes is in the aquarium on 
the company’s campus, in which tuna, a rare octopus, scarce and beautiful 
seahorses and a shark, all from the Marianas Trench, are brought together 
(‘reunited’) in a single tank, ‘so they can coexist and create a more natural 
picture’.95 In a metaphor for the corporation, the shark eats everything 
else. To emphasise the metaphor, one of the founders refers to The Circle 
as the ‘shark that eats the world’.96
Eggers also emphasises the absence of evil in driving the descent into 
totalitarianism. While O’Brien, the chief torturer in Nineteen Eighty-
Four, is clearly an evil character, most people in The Circle are not, with 
the possible exception of one of the firm’s founders (Stenton, who is 
probably greedy for money and power). There is certainly not the overtly 
oppressive bureaucratic apparatus of Nineteen Eighty-Four. Instead, the 
second founder was just ‘trying to make the web more civil’, while the 
third is like ‘an eccentric adjunct professor somewhere’ with naive views 
about openness.97 Winston Smith in Nineteen Eighty-Four was tortured 
into submission, but Mae is gradually captured by the ideology that flows 
almost inevitably from the nature of the company. She is horrified by 
the thought that 3 per cent of Circlers voted no to the question ‘Is Mae 
Holland awesome or what?’, showing tendencies towards authoritarian, 
vengeful behaviour herself but eventually concluding she has to ‘win them 
over’.98 In placing less reliance on overt and pervasive authoritarianism to 
tell its story, The Circle is more persuasive than Nineteen Eighty-Four, and 
less subject to the criticism that no corporation is as ubiquitous, persuasive 
or violent as Orwell’s Ministry of Love.
The technology discussed in The Circle is not surprising. It all seems 
plausible given current developments. Some companies are already 
inserting chips into employee bodies,99 and the US military is working 
93  Ibid., 395.
94  Ibid., 486. 
95  Ibid., 474. 
96  Ibid., 484.
97  Ibid., 485, 489. 
98  Ibid., 408–19.
99  Maggie Astor, ‘Microchip Implants for Employees? One Company Says Yes’. New York Times, 25 
July 2017; Rory Cellan-Jones, ‘Office Puts Chips under Staff’s Skin’. BBC News, 29 January 2015.
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on an implant to allow humans to directly interface with computers—
that is, to benefit people with aural and visual disabilities.100 Even the 
closing sequence, in which Mae demands to know her friend’s thoughts, 
anticipates developments likely to arise in neural link technology.101 
If anything, the book understates the capacity for technological change 
to be used for surveillance purposes. A founder makes the comment that 
one of their problems is that ‘even when there are cameras everywhere, not 
everyone can watch everything’,102 but soon artificial intelligence (AI) will 
make it possible for thousands of cameras to be monitored effectively by 
a single bot. If there is a criticism to be made of Eggers’s view of the future, 
it is that it ironically makes future technology seem too limited by human 
frailties and takes not enough account of the power of algorithms and AI.
In the world of dystopian fiction, The Circle has fewer evil characters, 
less overt suppression and less malevolence than the other works featured 
here and indeed almost all other dystopian works—so much so that the 
Hollywood treatment of it gives the movie a happy ending (in which Mae 
chooses to reveal to a huge audience the dark secrets of the company’s 
founders, leading the Tom Hanks character to say ‘we are so f—ked’). 
Yet, as a book, The Circle is also the most realistic of the dystopian genre, 
especially in its musings about the future of work. It is therefore perhaps 
the scariest of them all. That said, it points to the importance of critical 
choices in shaping the future. Mae’s decision to ignore the urgings of one 
of the company’s founders, including to publicise a document on ‘The 
Rights of Humans in a Digital Age’, was crucial in enabling The Circle to 
continue along its shark-emulating path. Perhaps the Hollywood ending 
points to what outcomes could have been if the more difficult choices, 
those that move us away from path dependency, had been taken. 
100  Ryan Browne, ‘U.S. Military Spending Millions to Make Cyborgs a Reality’. CNN, 7 March 2016.
101  Eggers, The Circle, 497. Guardian, ‘Elon Musk Wants to Connect Brains to Computers with 
New Company’. Guardian, 28 March 2017. See also Antonio Regalado, ‘With Neuralink, Elon 
Musk Promises Human-to-Human Telepathy. Don’t Believe It’. MIT Technology Review, 22 April 
2017. Annalee Newitz, ‘Scientists Just Invented the Neural Lace’. Gizmodo, 17 June 2015, www.
gizmodo.com.au/2015/06/scientists-just-invented-the-neural-lace/; Jia Liu et al., ‘Syringe-Injectable 
Electronics’. Nature Nanotechnology 10 (2015): 629–36; Bryan Johnson, ‘Kernel’s Quest to Enhance 
Human Intelligence’. Medium, 20 October 2016, medium.com/@bryan_johnson/kernels-quest-to-
enhance-human-intelligence-7da5e16fa16c.
102  Eggers, The Circle, 426–7.
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Conclusions
We have looked at two broad issues here relating to work—working hours 
and culturism—as well as some others, but we have done so through 
quite different predictive lenses: the forecasts made up to half a century 
ago about the direction working time would take, and the storylines of 
authors of fiction that both pre- and post-dated those forecasts, about 
cultural management and control. In doing so, we also touched on such 
issues as gender, performance management and, of course, power. All of 
this constitutes ‘visions of the future’. Some of those visions border on the 
idyllic (how else would one describe a world of extreme leisure), others 
are more like nightmares—and some that look idyllic on the surface 
(such as the workplace in The Circle) turn out to be nightmares, though 
not necessarily in the way we expected. To use a Gramscian typology, 
the powerful in all three books used hegemony to maintain control, but 
in Nineteen Eighty-Four and The Handmaid’s Tale force was also heavily 
relied upon, while The Circle was ultimately a story of hegemonic control 
without even an evil mastermind behind it all.
Those different fictions, we must also acknowledge, say very different 
things about choice and agency. In Nineteen Eighty-Four choice is virtually 
futile, as the Party will always win—at least, as far as the experience of 
the protagonists indicates. In The Handmaid’s Tale, choice operates at 
an individual level, and Offred’s individual act of rebellion, facilitated 
through a collective resistance network, might just liberate her. We don’t 
know whether it does, but we do know that, in the end, Gilead falls. 
In The Circle, choice is central, and there are critical junctures—‘this is 
the moment where history pivots’103—where decisions by the players 
have a monumental effect not only on themselves but on others as well. 
In effect, these are policy decisions that affect the future, not just decisions 
about their own welfare. The movie is less plausible than the book, but the 
two combined are still useful in showing the nature and effect of choices. 
The two together are a bit of a ‘sliding doors’ experience, like that in 
Chapter 1. 
103  Ibid., 403.
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The problem with many of those forecasts of working time and leisure, 
mentioned in the early part of this chapter, was that they did not, or 
could not, take account of society’s choices that would be made and the 
social forces that would emerge. The prognosticators assumed one set of 
doors would open, but it turned out very different ones opened, leading 
down a very different track. In the rest of this book, we will see how social 
choices and social forces interact with technology and markets to produce 




Digitalisation and the jobs 
of the future
Mae’s eventual job in The Circle was essentially to monetise the influence 
she had through her social media platform. We presently call this an 
‘influencer’.1 It was a job that really did not exist a few decades ago. 
The  closest thing may have been how sports stars and TV celebrities 
made large amounts of money by endorsements of products—they were 
a kind of ‘influencer’, but their main job was something else. Over years, 
technological changes had enabled the creation of this job.
We saw in Chapter 3 the potential role of technology, through both 
Nineteen Eighty-Four and The Circle. The authors of both books tried to 
imagine technologies of the future and how they would be used, but in 
neither case wrote beyond the realms of possibility. In all probability, the 
technologies seemed all too real in each of the three books featured in that 
chapter. Importantly, it was the social order that shaped how technology 
would affect people’s lives.
Popular interest in the future of work, however, often centres around how 
technological change will affect the types of jobs we do. So let us look 
at that. In this chapter, we look at trends in employment and how they 
will be affected by two of the ‘mega-drivers of change’ mentioned earlier: 
technological change through digitalisation, and demographic change. 
On the supply side, we consider the ‘ageing’ and so-called ‘feminisation’ of 
1  Though some prefer ‘content creator’. Ben Bryant and Moya Lothian-McLean, ‘How “Influencer” 
Became a Dirty Word’. BBC, 23 February 2019, www.bbc.co.uk/bbcthree/article/61d019b6-fd08-
4da5-aaf8-b28faf17e616.
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the workforce. We will see that demographic changes affecting workplaces 
include workforce ageing and growing female labour force participation. 
On the demand side, we look at the sorts of jobs that will be created and 
destroyed by technical change. We also consider the veracity of competing 
claims about the future numbers of jobs. Will over 40 per cent of present 
jobs not exist, as allegedly estimated in a study at Oxford University?2 
We look at the areas of growth and decline in the industries and occupations 
of employment, and the levels of skills, if any, that will be demanded. 
There are major industrial changes (such as the decline of manufacturing) 
and occupational changes (the shift to ‘white collar’ work, including 
professional employment). We also mention six ‘disruptive technologies’ 
identified by the International Labour Organization (ILO) as affecting 
the world of work. So, the demand side dominates this chapter. We finish 
with a discussion on the implications for trends in inequality and ethics.
External forces for change in the workplace
The ILO, in one of its publications, identified four major forces for 
change in the workplace: demographic change; technological change; 
globalisation; and climate change.3 To these might be added another matter 
frequently raised by the ILO: changes in the employment relationship,4 
which we cover in Chapter 6. 
We discussed globalisation in Chapter 2, and we will discuss climate change 
in Chapter 9. Demographic change refers to changes in the characteristics 
of workers themselves. Technological change may affect what employers 
produce (their industries), what employees do (their occupations), and 
the organisation of work including the employment relationship itself. 
So we will cover demographic changes first.
2  Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs 
to Computerisation? (Oxford: Department of Engineering Science, University of Oxford, 2013).
3  International Labour Office, Future of Work. Inception Report for the Global Commission on Work 
(Geneva: ILO, 2017).
4  International Labour Office, A Challenging Future for the Employment Relationship: Time for 
Affirmation of Alternatives? Future of Work Centenary Initiative, Issue Note Series No. 3 (Geneva: 
ILO, 2017).
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Demographic changes
On the supply side, there are two important forces to consider: an ageing 
and maybe a ‘feminising’ workforce.
An ‘ageing’ population
We are all getting older, of course (well, you are, anyway). But this 
term refers to the tendency for the workforce’s share occupied by young 
workers to decline, while the share of older workers increases. The former 
phenomenon is due to gradually declining birth rates, and the latter 
phenomenon reflects a trend for workers to retire later (particularly since 
the mid-1990s) and for women workers, in particular, to return to the 
workforce in growing numbers after their children have gone to school, or 
left home. So the average ‘age’ of the workforce, arithmetically, increases.
This trend is expected to continue, across all developed nations, though it 
is less a phenomenon in Australia than in most other advanced developed 
nations (in no small part due to immigration and a higher birth rate).
This creates some dilemmas for policy-makers. For a long time, 
governments were encouraging early retirement, on the rationale that 
retiring early would create ‘room’ for younger people entering the 
workforce. Now they worry about the implications for public finances, 
and how the workforce would be able to pay for aged care without raising 
taxes (as if taxation levels were set at some constant, which rather ignores 
the great cross-national variations in tax rates).
A common response is to lift retirement ages. At a number of levels this 
makes sense. Fewer jobs are manual. But what about those workers who 
have spent their lives in manual jobs? Increasing life expectancy reflects 
falling deaths from disease and accidents in working-age people, but 
it does not make postponing retirement any easier for workers whose 
bodies are, for work-related purposes, worn out by the time they hit their 
mid-60s. Some have been in low paid jobs. This makes an argument for 
easier access to disability pensions, but the trend has been in the opposite 
direction, in order to reduce public spending. Those with low capacity 
are being asked to pay for demographic changes from which they have 
not benefited.
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Governments urge employees to work longer, but have so far found no 
effective antidote to employer discrimination against older workers. Age 
discrimination in employment is widespread, evident in data on post-
redundancy experiences, for example, and very difficult to detect.5 The 
problem may not be an insufficient number of prime-age workers but an 
insufficient number of workers that employers are willing to accept.
Changing female participation
I have already mentioned that women in developed countries are 
returning to the workforce in growing numbers after their children have 
gone to school, or left home. So it is in the 35-and-above age groups 
that increases in women’s labour force participation over the last two or 
three decades have been greatest. But women are also increasing their 
participation amongst some lower age groups as well, when children are 
younger (or not yet born).
Much, but not all, of this supply of female labour has been people looking 
for part-time hours, as the domestic division of labour means that it is 
women, rather than men, who are expected to provide primary care for 
children, including after-school hours.
But while the ‘ageing’ of the population is expected to continue, across 
all developed countries, the projections for female participation are less 
uniform. The ILO commented:
the global gap in participation rates between women and men 
stood at more than 26 percentage points in 2016—a figure which 
is close to or exceeding 50 percentage points in Arab States, 
Southern Asia and Northern Africa. Looking ahead to 2030, 
based on current trends, there is little or no improvement expected 
in the gender gap at the global level.6
5  Mark Wooden, ‘The Impact of Redundancy on Subsequent Labour Market Experience’. Journal 
of Industrial Relations 30, no. 1 (1988): 3–31; Linda Walley, Margaret Steinberg, and David Warner, 
The Mature Age Labour Force. Workforce Strategy Unit, Employment Taskforce, Monograph series 
No. 2 (Brisbane: Department of Employment, Training and Industrial Relations, May 1999); Chris 
Kossen and Cec Pedersen, ‘Older Workers in Australia: The Myths, the Realities and the Battle over 
Workforce “Flexibility”’. Journal of Management & Organization 14 (2008): 73–84.
6  International Labour Organization, ‘Gender Gap in Participation Rates Is Not Expected to 
Improve over the Coming 15 Years’. ILO, 2017, www.ilo.org/global/topics/future-of-work/trends/
WCMS_545630/lang--en/index.htm.
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Female labour force participation is high in very poor countries. It is lower 
in middle-income countries, and higher again in high-income countries.7 
A very stylised way of explaining this would be to say that, in very 
poor countries, most women work since household incomes are so low. 
As incomes rise, for example through industrialisation, women can leave 
the workforce and focus on childcare, and it may seem rational in a sense 
to do so as men typically receive higher pay (hence, for example, female 
labour force participation in China has been declining for at least two 
decades).8 As national incomes rise, and institutions supporting women 
in the workforce improve (e.g. state-subsidised childcare or maternity 
leave entitlements), women re-enter the workforce and participation 
rises again.9 
It is an overly simplistic story because there are very large divergences 
in female labour-force participation among countries with similar levels 
of economic development, reflecting such matters as the availability and 
acceptance of education for women (which reduces participation among 
the young, but increases it among older women by increasing incomes) 
and dominant norms about working women. Educational norms help us 
understand, for example, the very high gender gaps in labour participation 
in some of the regions mentioned above.
Industrial changes
Over the past four decades, manufacturing has been in relative decline 
in developed countries. Between 1970 and 2013, manufacturing jobs’ 
share in total employment fell from 24.3 per cent to 11.9 per cent across 
the OECD.10 The ‘services’ sector—a term used to describe anything 
that isn’t primary (agriculture, forestry, fishing or mining) or secondary 
(manufacturing) industry, so it is not all that useful—has increased its 
share of employment.11 Within the services sector, health, community 
and aged care has grown substantially and is now the largest employer. 
By 2030, ‘healthcare and social assistance’ is likely to be close to 15 per cent 
7  Sher Verick, ‘Female Labor Force Participation in Developing Countries’. IZA World of Labor 
87 (2014): 1–10.
8  Statista, ‘Female Labor Participation Rate in China from 2007 to 2017’. Statista, 2019, www.
statista.com/statistics/252721/female-labor-force-participation-rate-in-china/.
9  Verick, ‘Female Labor Force Participation’.
10  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Knowledge Economies: Trends and 
Features. OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2015 (Paris: OECD, 2015).
11  Ibid.
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of Australian employment, and manufacturing, accounting for a quarter 
of the workforce in the 1960s, will be less than 5 per cent.12 The trend 
may be less pronounced, but it will be in the same direction, in most 
industrialised countries.13
Occupational changes
There has been a long-term decline in ‘blue collar’ or ‘manual’ work, 
mirrored by an equivalent increase in ‘white collar’ or ‘non-manual’ work. 
For example, in Britain, the blue collar share of jobs fell from 62 per cent 
in 1961 to 41 per cent in 1991 and a mere 29 per cent in 2006.14 This is 
despite the fact that some jobs classified as being in the ‘services’ sector are 
‘blue collar’ jobs in construction or utilities. Among ‘white collar’ work, 
professional occupations have particularly grown, including medical 
professions such as doctors, nurses and associated health professionals. 
The emphasis has been more on jobs requiring higher level or creative 
skills. So in 1996, Australian employment of photographers and, on 
the other hand, photographic designers and printers, were both around 
8,000; by 2014 the former group was more like 12,000, the latter group 
almost disappeared. In 2001 there were almost 30,000 graphic designers 
and almost 30,000 printers and graphic press workers; by 2014 there were 
close to 50,000 of the first group and 20,000 of the second.
Between 2003 and 2012 the greatest increase in employment was in the 
jobs requiring the highest skill levels (employment in occupations with 
‘skill-level 1’ grew by 38 per cent, and ‘skill-level 2’ grew by 32 per cent, 
compared to 10 per cent, 18 per cent and 6 per cent respectively amongst 
skill levels 3, 4 and 5).15 
12  Katherine Barnes and Peter Spearritt, eds, Drivers of Change for the Australian Labour Market to 
2030 (Canberra: Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, 2014).
13  Even in Germany, the OECD’s largest manufacturer, the share of manufacturing in employment 
fell from 33 per cent in 1970 to 18 per cent in 2013. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Chapter 1. Knowledge Economies: Trends and Features.
14  Learning and Skills Council, Skills in England 2007 Volume 2: Research Report (Coventry: LSC, 
2007); Mike Savage, ‘Individuality and Class: The Rise and Fall of the Gentlemanly Social Contract 
in Britain’. In Social Contracts under Stress: The Middle Classes of America, Europe, and Japan at the Turn 
of the Century, ed. Olivier Zunz, Leonard James Schoppa, and Nobuhiro Hiwatari (New York: Russell 
Sage, 2002): 47–65.
15  Kirsten Woyzbun, Susan Beitz, and Katherine Barnes, ‘Industry Transformation’. In Drivers of 
Change for the Australian Labour Market to 2030, ed. Katherine Barnes and Peter Spearritt (Canberra: 
Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, 2014), 17–34.
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CSIRO researchers analysed employment patterns of occupations since 
the 1980s and found that jobs involving ‘people skills’ grew most rapidly, 
jobs working with machines or doing manual work declined the most 
in numbers, and knowledge and service occupations grew about average 
(though, within knowledge occupations, those involving the highest 
skills grew most rapidly, while those involving the lowest skills grew least 
rapidly).16 
Global value chains
A major phenomenon, by which firms have incorporated changes in 
technology and management systems into their production structures, has 
been the growth of global value chains (also referred to as ‘global supply 
chains’ or even ‘global value networks’). For example, Woyzbun, Beitz 
and Barnes showed the many countries involved in the construction of 
a Boeing 787 Dreamliner, including:
• the engines from Rolls-Royce in Derby, UK, and GE in Evendale, 
Ohio, USA
 – but the engine covers (‘nacelles’) from Goodrich in Chula Vista, 
California, USA
• the wing from several countries including:
 – the main part of the wing from Mitsubishi in Nagoya, Japan
 – the wing tips and flap support fairings from KAL-ASD in Busan, 
Korea
 – the leading edge from Spirit in Tulsa, Oklahoma, USA
 – the fixed trailing edge from Kawasaki in Nagoya, Japan
 – the moveable trailing edge from Boeing in Melbourne, Australia
 – the centre wing box from Fuji in Nagoya, Japan
• the fuselage also from several countries:
 – the forward fuselage from Spirit in Wichita, Kansas, USA
 – the mid-forward fuselage from Kawasaki in Nagoya, Japan
 – the centre fuselage from Alenia in Grottaglie, Italy
16  Stefan Hajkowicz et al., Tomorrow’s Digitally Enabled Workforce: Megatrends and Scenarios for Jobs 
and Employment in Australia over the Coming Twenty Years (Brisbane: CSIRO, 2016).
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 – the aft fuselage from Boeing in Charleston, South Carolina, USA 
and from KAL-ASD in Busan, Korea
 – the passenger doors from Latecoere in Toulouse, France
 – the cargo access doors from Saab in Linkoeping, Sweden
• as for the tail:
 – the horizontal stabiliser from Alenia in Foggia, Italy
 – the tail fin and tail cone from Boeing in Frederickson and Auburn, 
respectively, both in Washington, USA
• and when you land:
 – the main landing gear well from Kawasaki in Nagoya, Japan
 – the landing gear doors from Boeing in Winnipeg, Canada
 – the landing gear from Messier-Dowty in Gloucester, UK.17
In the manufacture of mobile phones and other digital devices, Apple 
only employs a small fraction of the more than 700,000 people who are 
part of its global value chain.18 
Global value chains are the most efficient way for a major corporation 
to maximise profits. Especially when production is undertaken in less 
developed countries, they provide low costs while still enabling the 
corporations to maintain control over the production process but avoid 
accountability for poor behaviour (low wages, bad or hazardous working 
conditions) overseen by managers within that production process. It is 
thus both controversial and accepted as the normal way of doing things. 
We look again at global value chains (and the broader employment model 
of which it is a part, referred to as ‘not there’ employment) in Chapter 6. 
Global (‘transnational’) corporations are, in turn, commonly owned 
by clusters of international financial institutions. A global corporation 
must have a formal headquarters in a physical location somewhere, and 
its managers and directors all have some geographical home, but chains 
of command and ownership rely less and less on geographic ties. Hence 
researchers increasingly talk of a transnational capitalist class19 and of 
17  Woyzbun, Beitz, and Barnes, ‘Industry’.
18  International Labour Office, ‘Changing Nature of Work in the 21st Century: Technology at 
Work’ (Geneva: ILO, 2017).
19  William I. Robinson and Jerry Harris, ‘Towards a Global Ruling Class? Globalisation and the 
Transnational Capitalist Class’. Science and Society 64, no. 1 (2000): 11; Georgina Murray and John Scott, 
Financial Elites and Transnational Business: Who Rules the World? (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012).
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individual beneficiaries’ minimal contributions to any state revenues, due 
to the use of tax havens to avoid what were once considered to be civic 
responsibilities.20
The future of employment growth
What are the jobs of the future? There are short-term trends to consider—
for which the recent path is a reasonable guide—and there are longer-term 
trends, which are necessarily harder to pick and dependent on a range of 
technological, social and economic developments. So we look first at the 
short term, before considering new technology and what that might mean 
for the longer term.
Employment growth in the near future
A reasonably representative indication of industrialised countries 
generally  might be found in the employment projections of Australia’s 
Department of Jobs and Small Business. It projects employment growth 
five years ahead, based on fairly sophisticated extrapolations from the 
recent past and information at hand about likely developments, and in 
2017 it projected that, by 2022, the fastest employment growth was 
expected to occur in the healthcare and social assistance industry (with 
16  per  cent total growth in employment) followed by professional, 
scientific and technical services (13 per cent), and education and training 
(12 per cent). Industries expected to show an absolute fall were electricity, 
gas, water and waste services (by 7 per cent); manufacturing (4 per cent); 
and agriculture, forestry and fishing (1 per cent). The biggest contribution 
to employment growth was also expected to come from the healthcare and 
social assistance industry, which was expected to add a bit over a quarter 
of net new jobs. Essentially, this reflects expectations that lots of people 
are going to get old over the next few years.
20  Anthony Van Fossen, ‘Money Laundering, Global Financial Instability, and Tax Havens in the 
Pacific Islands’. The Contemporary Pacific 15, no. 2 (2003): 237–75; Oxfam Australia, The Hidden 
Billions: How Tax Havens Impact Lives at Home and Abroad (Oxfam, 2016); Javier Garcia-Bernardo et 
al., ‘Uncovering Offshore Financial Centers: Conduits and Sinks in the Global Corporate Ownership 
Network’. Scientific Reports 7 (2017); Facundo Alvaredo et al., World Inequality Report 2018 (World 
Inequality Lab/WID.world, 2018).
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The occupational group with the largest growth rate was expected to be 
community and personal service workers (19 per cent), while the worst 
job prospects were for clerical and administrative workers (just 2 per cent 
growth). That said, these were averages only, and within each of these 
occupational groups there was lots of variation. For example, among 
professionals, the fastest growing profession at the more disaggregated 
level (audiologists and speech pathologists or therapists) had projected 
employment growth of 32.6 per cent, while at the other end the 
worst (surprisingly, ICT sales professionals) was projected to face an 
employment fall of 11 per cent. The fastest growing occupation at this 
level of disaggregation was aged and disabled carers (47 per cent), who 
would also provide the biggest contributions to projected employment 
growth, while other major contributions were expected to come from 
registered nurses, child carers and general sales assistants. At the other 
end of the scale, it looked like there could be a lot of displaced secretaries, 
farmers, accounting clerks, bookkeepers, checkout operators, technical 
sales representatives and people in several manufacturing occupations.
And what about skill levels? Generally speaking, in the past technological 
change has tended to have greater impacts on low-skilled than high-
skilled jobs, but is that what is projected over the next five years? Those 
same Australian projections indicated that the fastest employment growth 
rate, and the greatest contribution to employment, was still expected 
to be made by the highest skill-level group (skill-level 1). The next 
highest growth rate is among skill-level 2. But, interestingly, skill-level 4 
(the second lowest) is projected to have considerably faster growth than 
skill-level 3 (the middle skill-level, which was expected to be the worst of 
all five groups). The biggest factor in the expected growth of skill-level 4 
is the growth in aged and disabled carers, which, in Australia, will be 
promoted by the National Disability Insurance Scheme but is really an 
integral feature of most industrialised countries’ employment futures. So 
it is not a uniform picture. That said, there was tremendous variation 
between the occupations that make up each skill level. European data 
also suggests that employment growth will, on average, be strongest in 
the high-skilled occupations but that, as some jobs requiring high skills 
are at risk of being automated, highly educated workers might also face 
increased competition on the labour market.21 In short, with some caveats, 
21  Cornelia Suta, Luca Barbieri, and Mike May-Gillings, ‘Future Employment and Automation’. 
Quaderni Fondazione G. Brodolini: Studi e Ricerche 61 (2018): 17–43.
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future employment prospects were not so much a question of ‘how skilled 
you are likely to be’ but ‘in what area you have (or you can obtain) skills’. 
The European target strategy target of 25 per cent of people ‘engaging 
in learning throughout their lives by 2025’ may be insufficient.22 The 
variability of experiences over time also tells us that adaptability is going 
to be very important as well, perhaps more important than the specific 
area in which people have skills. 
Recent developments in technology
Over the past half-century, several developments in technology have 
significantly affected the workplace. These include computer chips; 
word processing, spreadsheets and personal computing; communication 
technology (mobile phones); automation and robots; the internet; and 
barcodes and scanning. In recent years, there has been considerable 
excitement about the role of technology in the future of work, including 
whether or not this will lead to a net loss of jobs and, if so, by how 
many; and, to a lesser extent, what impact it will have on the way work 
is organised. 
The ILO has identified six ‘disruptive’ technologies.23 These are:
• the ‘internet of things’—a network of physical objects that have an 
IP address and internet connectivity and communication;
• ‘big data’—a massive volume of structured or unstructured data, 
sometimes derived from commercial or personal transactions to 
predict behaviour or drive complex algorithms for such functions as 
language translation;
• ‘cloud computing’—a network of remote servers to store, manage and 
process data, used instead of local computers;
• robotics—goods- or service-producing computers that, mechanically, 
behave in some way like humans would; by 2018 an estimate is that 
there will be 1.3 million robots in factories (though few of those look 
remotely human);
22  Ibid., 40.
23  Kai Hsin Hung, ‘Tech@Work: Top 6 Disruptive Technologies You Should Know’. ITCILO, 
International Labour Office, 25 July 2016.
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• 3D printers—creating three-dimensional objects based on computer 
programs;
• machine learning—giving computers the ability to learn autonomously, 
without being explicitly programmed (creating what is known as 
artificial intelligence).
The last three of these in particular have the potential to make many jobs, 
perhaps even industries such as manufacturing, obsolete. The ‘internet 
of things’, ‘big data’ and ‘cloud computing’ will affect how we work, but 
robotics, 3D printing and machine learning will affect both how we do 
our work and how many jobs there will be. Some alarmist predictions 
have been made, including one discussed below that 47 per cent of US 
jobs would be rendered obsolete by technical change. Regardless of any 
exaggeration, artificial intelligence means that it is no longer just routine 
jobs that are threatened by new technology. 
How many jobs in the longer term?
Each year many new jobs are created, while many others are destroyed 
as firms downsize or close. The figures you see in the news each month, 
about how many jobs were ‘created’ (or ‘lost’) in the economy, are just net 
figures, disguising some large gross movements in both directions. 
Some jobs will be easy to replace with machines, once artificial intelligence 
(AI) is more developed. Some jobs, particularly many involving emotional 
labour or creativity, will be much harder to replace. There are two 
main estimates that have been made of the number of jobs that will be 
eliminated by new technologies, AI and automation. The first one, which 
received a lot of publicity, came from two Oxford researchers, Frey and 
Osborne,24 and was published in 2013. It found that ‘around 47 per cent 
of total US employment is in the high risk category’. Their method was 
essentially to get an expert panel to look at 70 occupations, assign them 
into the ‘automatable’ (their term) or ‘not automatable’ categories, look 
at the characteristics or tasks of those jobs and, using US data, estimate 
the probability of automation of the other 632 US occupations for which 
they could get data. 
24  Frey and Osborne, Future of Employment.
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The alternative view, put by three German researchers writing a study 
for the OECD25 and published in 2016, looked at data about individual 
jobs, not whole occupations, and concluded that ‘on average across the 
21 OECD countries, 9 per cent of jobs are automatable’, and the figure 
was the same for the US. In effect, they took as their starting point Frey 
and Osborne’s estimates for occupations but then applied those data to 
what individual employees said about their own work in another survey. 
My own view is that Frey and Osborne’s very large numbers do not tell 
us anything about how many jobs are going to be displaced, because 
occupation is too broad a category. The OECD researchers are probably 
a little closer to the mark, but substantial gross job losses seem likely. 
Neither, however, really tells us about how much unemployment will be 
created by technological change, for two main reasons. 
The first is that these estimates do not (and usually cannot) take account 
of the cost of new technology. New technology has meant a proliferation 
of automatic car washes, but many car washes are still labour-intensive, 
because those machines are very expensive, and often people are cheaper. 
A while ago I came across a cartoon featuring two nurses and a robot 
‘nurse’: one human nurse turns to the other and says ‘He’s being returned 
to the supplier. It turns out that his running costs are higher than our 
wages’.26 That is before even taking account of the capital costs of new 
technology. We have the technology for commercial supersonic aircraft 
that would take us to the other side of the world in less than half a day. 
It would push workers in many airlines out of a job. We have had it for 
half a century. We do not do it because it is just too expensive to do what 
we would need to do. 
The second reason, why those studies do not tell us how much 
unemployment will be created by technological change, is that they 
do not attempt to take account of how many new jobs will be created. 
Suppose technological change means a robot can now produce a toaster 
for half the price of one made previously. Most of those people previously 
making toasters would not be employed any more—or at least when 
they leave they would not be replaced. But because the toaster is cheaper, 
we as consumers now have money to spend on something else, not just 
25  Melanie Arntz, Terry Gregory, and Ulrich Zierahn, The Risk of Automation for Jobs in OECD 
Countries: A Comparative Analysis. OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper 
No. 189 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016).
26  View the cartoon at agedcaresite.wordpress.com/2015/01/27/aged-care-terminators/.
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a toaster, that we did not have before. This ‘new consumption’ effect in 
turn will create more jobs. It is a more important effect than that arising 
from the fact that some people will be used to make the new machines. 
New technology results in the loss of some (perhaps many) jobs, and their 
partial, perhaps complete, replacement with other jobs, the net effect 
being on average less repetitive work requiring more skill—that is, the 
liberation of many workers from ‘drudgery’. New jobs are created largely 
because people have more money to spend on consumption and buy 
things they did not buy before.
That said, some newly created jobs (empirically, a minority) involve less 
skill than previously (so there is no ‘liberation’ there); and some workers are 
not employed in the new jobs—they lack the ‘skills’ or location necessary 
for such employment, creating what is called ‘structural unemployment’. 
The net effects of all this on the number of jobs is a bit uncertain. 
In particular, it depends on who saves money as a result of technological 
change—a point I will come back to shortly.
Bursts of technological change since the beginning of the industrial 
revolution over two centuries ago are not what has not led, in itself, to 
mass unemployment and depression. We certainly have experienced 
periods of mass unemployment, but these were not due to technology; 
they were due to the cycles and crises of capitalism and the failures of 
government macroeconomic management.27 Whether an economy ends 
up with ‘full employment’ after a period of technological change depends 
much more on whether the state can ensure adequate demand (including 
through fiscal and monetary policy, and through enabling the benefits 
from productivity improvements to feed into consumer demand) and on 
whether the state can ensure retraining and re-employment of structurally 
affected workers than it does on the rate of technological change. Periods 
of structural unemployment also tell us that governments need to be active 
in training and retraining displaced workers for future skills, because the 
market will not do it, left to itself. 
It is common to think of the rate of technological change as being 
unusually high at the moment, and to suggest, by that logic, that the past 
pattern (of new jobs replacing old ones) would not be repeated. However, 
to quantify the effects of technological change you look at productivity 
27  John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (Macmillan: 
London, 1936); Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism (London: New Left Books, 1972).
97
4 . DIgITALISATIon AnD The jobS oF The FuTuRe
growth—and productivity growth in most OECD countries peaked in 
the postwar era of full employment. It has declined each decade since 
the 1970s—that is, the pace (or at least the effect on labour demand) of 
technological change has been in medium-term decline.28 
There is not much point in predicting in great detail what we will spend 
our extra money on and so what jobs will be created. History is littered 
with unfulfilled predictions about future technologies and jobs; though 
I suspect we can be confident that projections that the biggest employment 
growth will be among health professionals, followed by carers and aides, 
and business, human resource and marketing professionals, are roughly 
on the mark.29
But still, many people are interested in the jobs likely to disappear, even 
if others will likely be created in their place. Structural unemployment 
will almost certainly occur, affecting individuals and regions. That is 
because the jobs that are lost will involve different skills to the jobs that 
are created, and the people who lose jobs may not have, or live in an area 
where they can obtain, the skills that are needed to occupy the new jobs 
that are created.30 The more people lack, and cannot obtain, those skills, 
the fewer new jobs will be created, because inflation will start to increase 
at a lower level of economic activity and governments will be reluctant to 
allow the economy to expand at a rate that permits inflation to expand 
above some desirable level. 
So the first big constraint on economies’ ability to create new jobs in 
response to technology’s destruction of other jobs will be where the 
public money goes—that is, the willingness and ability of governments 
to spend money on effective structural adjustment programs. These are 
programs that retrain people who lose, or never get, jobs as a result of 
new technology, and help establish new enterprises, often new industries, 
in regions where those people live. The problem is that one of the tenets 
of neo-liberalism has been to reduce public spending, a tenet that runs 
counter to this need for structural adjustment expenditure. 
28  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘OECD Productivity Database’ 
(spreadsheet) (Paris: OECD, 2006).
29  Department of Jobs and Small Business, ‘2018 Employment Projections’. Department of Jobs 
and Small Business, 2018, lmip.gov.au/default.aspx?LMIP/EmploymentProjections.
30  Sarah O’Connor, ‘Robot Shock Threatens the Most Vulnerable Communities’. Financial Times, 
19 September 2017.
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A number of governments in industrialised countries have put resources 
into ‘active labour market policies’ that go part way in this direction. 
One of these was Denmark, from where the term ‘flexicurity’ emerged to 
describe programs that combined ‘flexibility’ (for employers—it was easy 
to lay off workers) and ‘security’ (i.e. displaced workers had easy access 
to income support and retraining programs), an approach that earned 
the enthusiastic support of the OECD. But, over time, there was more 
emphasis placed on the ‘flexi’ part, and spending on those programs that 
promoted ‘security’ was cut back. Now the term ‘flexicurity’ is associated 
in many minds with the promotion of greater flexibility and insecurity. 
There are many examples of creative approaches that have been taken in 
the past to adjust to the structural loss of jobs,31 but it will take a radical 
change in approach by many governments to adequately respond to the 
digital changes that lie ahead.
The second big constraint on economies’ ability to create new jobs in 
response to technology’s destruction of other jobs will be where the private 
money goes—that is, who saves money as a result of technological change. 
For much of the postwar period in the twentieth century, the gains from 
productivity growth were fairly evenly shared between capital and labour, 
so no major change in the distribution of income happened. In recent 
years, though, as a result of the changing balance of power, the gains 
from productivity growth—that is, the gains from new technology—
have been absorbed mostly by capital, by high-income earners. This 
has been most evident in the USA, where since the 1980s productivity 
has grown substantially, but real median wages have been stagnant, so 
profits have soared and income has been redistributed to the wealthy: 
most of the increase in inequality has been due to a rising share of the top 
0.1 per cent.32
That rather fortunate scenario I painted earlier, about what happens 
when a robot starts making toasters, depends on what happens to the 
price of the toaster after the robot has made it. If the full benefit of that 
productivity gain is passed on as lower prices, then all those savings will be 
available to be recycled in continuing demand. Alternatively, if wages for 
the remaining toaster workers go up by a significant amount, then again 
maybe all those productivity gains can be recycled in continuing demand. 
31  John Buchanan et al., Facing Retrenchments: Strategies and Alternatives for Enterprises (Canberra: 
Department of Education, Employment and Training/AGPS, 1992).
32  Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘A Rigged Economy’. Scientific American, 1 November 2018.
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But what happens if the corporation increases its share of income as 
a result of this change? Prices might go down, but not all the way; wages 
might even go up a bit, but not enough to account for all the productivity 
gain; and the capitalist then pockets the rest. Maybe it will be reinvested, 
or maybe paid out as dividends. If the latter, the new demand might not 
be enough to offset the loss of jobs.
The problem for job creation is that the wealthy are less likely than lower 
income earners to spend their money in a way that will create jobs—they 
have what economists call a considerably lower marginal propensity to 
consume. They are more likely to save additional money they receive by 
putting it into financial assets, perhaps as savings in a Cayman Islands 
account, or status goods such as artworks,33 of which the increase in value 
leads to no new jobs being created. By contrast, lower income earners 
are more likely to spend additional money on consumption items, the 
production of which leads to other people being employed. In the extreme 
case, if all the income generated by new technology were to be spent on 
artworks, then almost no jobs would be created to offset the gross loss of 
jobs. In reality, not all money flowing to the rich is lost in this way—some 
‘conspicuous consumption’ creates some jobs—but if the benefits of digital 
change flow much more to the rich, then insufficient jobs will be created 
to offset those lost by new digital technology. When Citigroup economists 
sought to explain the growth of income inequality in favour of the group 
they called the ‘plutonomists’ or the ‘uber-rich’, the first of the six drivers 
they listed was ‘an ongoing technology/biotechnology revolution’.34 Their 
emphasis, unfortunately, was on the benefits to investors of buying shares 
in the companies that produced conspicuous-consumption goods. 
A solution sometimes offered to this conundrum is to create a universal 
basic income (UBI). This is discussed more in Chapter 11; here we just 
observe that it would not stop the high growth in incomes and expenditures 
of the wealthy alluded to by the Citibank economists, though it may have 
other effects. 
33  Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions. (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1925; repr., 1970).
34  Ajay Kapur, Niall Macleod, and Narendra Singh, ‘The Plutonomy Symposium—Rising Tides 
Lifting Yachts’. Citigroup Equity Strategy Industry Note (Citigroup Capital Markets, 29 September 
2006), 7; Ajay Kapur, Niall Macleod, and Narendra Singh, ‘Plutonomy—Buying Luxury, Explaining 
Global Imbalances. Citigroup Equity Strategy Industry Note (Citigroup Capital Markets, 16 October 
2005), 9.
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Much of the debate about the number of jobs displaced by new technology 
misses what else we could be focused on, particularly when examining 
work. Technological change has often been used to increase managerial 
or owner control (e.g. through barcodes, computer timing in call centres 
or apps in the ‘gig economy’). This has often also enabled management 
to increase its control over the timing of labour—and more casual or 
labour hire employment—but there is little new, historically, about this. 
It harks back to the way labour was used, including through piece rates 
and contract labour, in the early parts of the industrial revolution or even 
in the nineteenth century.35 And some technologies may have reverse 
effects (e.g. social media may have facilitated collective action).
Technological change in itself is neither malevolent nor benign. What 
matters is the social context within which it exists and the use to which 
it is put. The application of Einstein’s theories of special and general 
relativity led to many lives being saved through new medical diagnostic 
and treatment procedures, but hundreds of thousands dying in Japan. The 
geospatial tracking that this theory made possible also makes it easier for 
us to find our way to the location of bookstores, but easier for trucking 
companies to monitor and control their workers—though also easier 
for the European Commission to enforce safe driving practices by truck 
drivers. Computers have made aspects of the lives of academics like me 
better, in as much as they enable research that could not be done in the 
past, but they have also led to surveillance and work intensification for 
workers in many industries like warehousing, call centres and even higher 
education. So the issues about technology and the future of work are 
more about the implications for power, control and equality or inequality. 
We will look at this issue in more detail in chapters to come. But first, we 
look more closely at the jobs that indeed might be under threat.
Which jobs?
The best publicly available data on jobs at risk from technological change 
come from the Frey and Osborne (2013) study mentioned earlier. 
So  Table 4.1 lists the expected ‘automatability’ of occupations, using 
the US occupational classification system,36 for the 20 least susceptible 
and (below them) the 20 most susceptible to automation among those 
35  Simon Deakin, The Comparative Evolution of the Employment Relationship. Centre for Business 
Research, Working Paper No. 317 (Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge, December 2005).
36  This classification system is not the same as that used in Australia.
101
4 . DIgITALISATIon AnD The jobS oF The FuTuRe
300 occupations large enough to have their size estimated by gender in the 
US regular common population survey. It also shows the estimated size 
of employment of that occupation, based on data from the US Current 
Population Survey (CPS).37 







First-line supervisors of mechanics, installers and repairers 253 0 .3%
Occupational therapists 122 0 .4%
Lodging managers 156 0 .4%
Dieticians and nutritionists 114 0 .4%
Physicians and surgeons 1,079 0 .4%
Psychologists 187 0 .4%
elementary and middle-school teachers 3,268 0 .4%
Dentists 159 0 .4%
First-line supervisors of police and detectives 95 0 .4%
Medical scientists 161 0 .5%
counsellors 853 0 .5%
human resources managers 327 0 .6%
Recreation and fitness workers 480 0 .6%
Training and development managers 63 0 .6%
Speech/language pathologists 141 0 .6%
Computer systems analysts 554 0 .7%
Social and community service managers 390 0 .7%
Medical and health services managers 671 0 .7%
Preschool and kindergarten teachers 712 0 .7%
Secondary school teachers 1,039 0 .8%
High risk
File clerks 182 97%
Payroll and timekeeping clerks 129 97%
counter and rental clerks 109 97%
Crushing, grinding, polishing, mixing and blending workers 72 97%
37  Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPS Tables, Table 11: Employed persons by detailed occupation, sex, 
race, and Hispanic or Latino ethnicity (Washington DC: BLS, 2019).






credit authorisers, checkers and clerks 55 97%
Driver/sales workers and truck drivers 3,506 98%
Bookkeeping, accounting and auditing clerks 1,089 98%
Inspectors, testers, sorters, samplers and weighers 793 98%
Shipping, receiving and traffic clerks 623 98%
Claims adjusters, appraisers, examiners and investigators 350 98%
Tellers 306 98%
Packaging and filling machine operators and tenders 292 98%
Insurance claims and policy processing clerks 237 98%
Parts salespersons 130 98%
order clerks 107 98%
Models, demonstrators and product promoters 61 98%
Data entry keyers 267 99%
Tax preparers 107 99%
Insurance underwriters 104 99%
Telemarketers 58 99%
Source: Frey and osborne (2013) and uS cPS Table 11 .
In brief, it shows that several health-related professions, some types of 
managers or supervisors and even HR managers, appear pretty immune 
from replacement by machines. On the other hand, telemarketers, 
insurance underwriters, tax preparers and data entry keyers look, on this 
method, pretty doomed.
Despite the size threshold, the list contains many small occupations. So if 
we want to work out what sorts of workers are most likely to need to take-up 
resources for retraining, we could consider the data another way. Table 4.2 
does that, by linking the danger of automatability to CPS employment 
estimates. The last column of Table 4.2 multiplies those numbers together, 
to give the expected ‘employment risk’ of an occupation, which can be 
thought of as the statistically expected number of people in an occupation 
displaced by technology, following the methodology of Frey and Osborne. 
The important thing is not the absolute value of the ‘employment risk’ 
since, as I mentioned, I think Frey and Osborne have overestimated the 
probability of automation. Rather, it is more useful to approach the last 
column in the table as indicating something about the relative numbers of 
workers at risk in an occupation. Even then, we should be very cautious 
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in interpreting these numbers, as they fail to account for any differences 
in the costs of automation between occupations. So it is a rough guide, 
at best. Moreover, the risk of automation takes no account of the likely 
growth or decline in employment in a particular occupation due to other 
demand-related factors operating in product markets, especially the 
changing consumer behaviour as more consumption is freed by cheaper 
goods arising from new technology—an effect that is almost impossible 
to try to estimate with any certainty for all but a very short period ahead. 










Driver/sales workers and truck drivers 3,506 0 .98 3,436
cashiers 3,253 0 .97 3,155
Retail salespersons 3,235 0 .92 2,976
Secretaries and administrative assistants 2,769 0 .96 2,658
Waiters and waitresses 2,016 0 .94 1,895
cooks 2,079 0 .83 1,726
construction labourers 1,946 0 .88 1,712
Accountants and auditors 1,804 0 .94 1,696
Labourers and freight, stock and material 
movers, by hand
1,930 0 .85 1,641
janitors and building cleaners 2,307 0 .66 1,523
Customer service representatives 2,494 0 .55 1,372
Office clerks, general 1,271 0 .96 1,220
Receptionists and information clerks 1,267 0 .96 1,216
Managers, all other 4,398 0 .25 1,100
Sales representatives, wholesale and 
manufacturing
1,264 0 .85 1,074
Bookkeeping, accounting and auditing 
clerks
1,089 0 .98 1,067
Maids and housekeeping cleaners 1,527 0 .69 1,054
Personal care aides 1,365 0 .74 1,010
Stock clerks and order fillers 1,525 0 .64 976
Carpenters 1,351 0 .72 973
Source: calculated from Frey and osborne (2013) and uS cPS Table 11 . column 4 
is column 2 multiplied by column 3.
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Still, it is noteworthy that drivers (including truck drivers) are at the top 
of the list, due both to the large number in the occupation and the high 
risk of automation, followed by cashiers, retail salespersons, secretaries 
and administrative assistants, and then waiters and cooks.
What does this all mean for the future of jobs 
and careers?
There are a couple of ways that this sort of information may be used by 
people to predict the future. One is to extrapolate from existing trends. 
The second is to use your imagination. 
There is a logic to the first. What can we know about other than what 
we know about? And for short to medium term trends, it’s not a bad 
way to go. In effect, that is what government bureaucrats do in making 
projections, often in a rather sophisticated way and taking a little account 
of things that may make them think the current direction may be disrupted 
in some way. But even this can be difficult. Circumstances can change 
rapidly. For example, Ibis World in 2015 forecast 9 per cent growth in 
employment in black coal over the period from 2015–16 to 2020–21. 
By April 2016, Ibis World had revised its 2020–21 employment forecast 
downwards by 5.5 per cent, to growth of just 2.8 per cent.38 Around this 
time, forecasts by the Australian Department of Employment were for 
a 20 per cent decline in employment in the coal industry by 2020.39 Two 
years later and the five-year forecast by that department was for a decline 
of just 7.6 per cent. While the long-term prospects for coal mining are 
pretty clear (i.e. there aren’t any), in the short to medium term they are 
very volatile, dependent in no small part on coal prices and on who does 
the numbers.
The further you look ahead, the less useful the present is as a guide to 
the future. This is especially the case in employment because technology 
is hard to predict and changing consumption patterns are even harder 
to predict. Some factors are evidently important, such as the ageing 
population and the increasing demands that will be put onto care workers. 
38  IBIS World, ‘Competitive Landscape’. Australia Industry Reports: Black Coal Mining, 2015; 
IBIS World, Black Coal Mining in Australia. IBISWorld Industry Report B0601 (Melbourne: IBIS 
World, 2016).
39  Department of Employment, ‘Employment Projections’, Canberra, lmip.gov.au/default.
aspx?LMIP/EmploymentProjections.
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In the short to medium term, it is very clear this will be a major area of 
growth. But in the long term? Robots are being developed to provide 
care in various forms for older people. Will people want these? Will they 
be economic? Will models of funding encourage or discourage providers 
from deploying them? 
On the other hand, what about jobs in new technology—like computer 
designers and programmers? If technological change is going to be so rapid 
and important, would not that be the place to be? Maybe, but remember 
that ICT sales professionals had one of the greatest employment declines 
projected to 2022. Computer systems analysts may be hard to replace 
with machines, but some people argue that computer programming will 
eventually be done by other computers, once AI becomes more advanced. 
Computer industries and occupations are likely to become strategically 
important, but they need not be numerically important to do that. It is 
probably true to say that caring occupations will be very important in the 
long term, but how important is harder to estimate. 
One of the major projects looking at the future of employment has 
been undertaken by Australia’s Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial 
Research Organisation (CSIRO) which, although specifically about that 
country, had implications for many other developed countries.40 Going 
more on imagination than extrapolating trends in numbers, CSIRO 
speculated about six new jobs that may emerge, which they described as: 
• bigger big-data analysts;
• complex decision support analysts (reflecting a move from ‘big data’ to 
‘big decisions’ and ‘an explosion of choice’);
• remote-controlled vehicle operators (for drones, trucks, boats, etc.);
• customer experience officers (for mostly virtual shoppers);
• personalised preventative-health helpers (like personal trainers but in 
preventative health); 
• online chaperones (in cybersecurity, management of online identities, 
responding to online bullying etc.).41
40  Hajkowicz et al., Tomorrow’s Digitally Enabled Workforce.
41  Ibid., 76–82.
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Interestingly, despite it being a scientific organisation, the CSIRO’s 
report did not overly emphasise the growth of work related to scientific, 
technological, engineering or mathematical (STEM) fields in the future. 
While arguing that STEM skills would ‘certainly be in demand’, the 
report asserted that:
our aging population means that the healthcare and aged care 
sectors will be the largest employers and thus most workers will 
need some hybrid of technical, business, creative and interpersonal 
skills. Although development of ‘soft’ skills in students is on the 
agenda of some tertiary education providers today, development 
and integration of specific programs in collaboration with 
employers might still be needed to ensure graduates are prepared 
for future workplace needs.42
A lot of scary or at least overblown stories are written about future jobs, 
with  authors sometimes breathlessly exclaiming that 50 per cent of 
jobs studied for at university will disappear by some date (I have not been 
able to track down the original source, but if it is the Frey and Osborne 
research it is a misrepresentation of their findings) or that the top in-demand 
jobs now did not exist in the early 2000s (Really? No aged care workers?). 
Still, when you peel away the overblown rhetoric, there are sometimes useful 
indications, at least on the type of skills that will be in demand (not the 
specific skills themselves) and the implications these have for educational 
curricula and what some call ‘employability’. These appear likely to be skills 
(or perhaps better expressed, competencies) relating to creativity, problem-
solving, collaboration, cooperation, resilience, communication, complex 
reasoning, social interaction and emotional intelligence. They include 
empathy-related competencies such as compassion, tolerance, intercultural 
understanding, pro-social behaviour and even social responsibility.43 Some 
of these are what universities used to call ‘critical thinking’, but there are 
also many social skills as well on that list. While ICT skills are likely to be 
important, they are unlikely to be sufficient on their own.
One other point about education is worth making. Education serves 
multiple purposes. It serves as a creator of skills and knowledge (human 
capital). It also serves, though, as a signalling device for employers.44 
42  Ibid., 88.
43  Phil Lambert, ‘The Future of Work and Skills’. Professional Educator 17, no. 2–3 (2017): 15–17; 
Hajkowicz et al., Tomorrow’s Digitally Enabled Workforce.
44  Luisa Rosti, Chikara Yamaguchi, and Carolina Castagnetti, ‘Educational Performance as 
Signalling Device: Evidence from Italy’. Economics Bulletin 9, no. 4 (2005): 1–7.
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There are many jobs people obtain for which their university education 
has not really provided prerequisite knowledge; they learn on the job how 
to do it or attend short, tailored courses. But the holding of a university 
degree signals to the employer that the successful applicant is capable of 
learning and (if highly credentialed) is more capable or suitable than other 
applicants.45 In India, for example, a degree is a standard requirement for 
a call centre worker, not because the work requires a degree, but because 
of what possession of a degree signals. 
Employers might raise or lower their demands of applicants, depending 
on how tight or loose the labour market is: one year they might demand 
a postgraduate qualification for a job, the next year (when labour is in 
shorter supply) they might be happy with an undergraduate degree. All 
the while this job might not really require a degree, just someone who is 
capable of learning how to do it. This process is called credentialism and, as 
the proportion of people in the workforce with degrees increases, is likely 
to lead over time to the bars on jobs being raised incrementally higher. 
So  even if middle-skill jobs are in declining demand, the credentials 
required to get a job at that or even lower levels might increase over time. 
In that sense, choosing exactly the right field for a degree may be less 
important than simply doing one. As complexity of work increases and 
skill demands rise, employers will demand a more educated workforce 
(and continue to complain that it is not ‘work ready’) regardless of the 
desirability or ability of any education system to anticipate the skill needs 
of the future.46 
Technological change, inequality and ethics
How has past and current technological change related to inequality? 
In the long run, new technology leads to higher living standards via higher 
incomes, which can be fought over by capital and labour. To what extent 
wage increases have occurred has depended on the relative bargaining 
power of labour and capital, which was approximately balanced in the 
immediate postwar era (in that the benefits of productivity growth were 
roughly evenly shared between labour and capital in that period). More 
45  This point is also made with regard to trade qualifications by Phillip Toner, ‘Long Run Shifts 
in the Industry and Workforce Structure of the Australian Construction Industry: Implications for 
a Sustainable Labour Supply’. Paper presented at Reworking Work: AIRAANZ 2005, Sydney, 503–9.
46  See also John Quiggin, ‘In Praise of Credentialism’. Inside Story, 27 February 2017.
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recently, the low rate of wages growth,47 despite a fairly average rate of 
productivity growth, suggests that the balance of power has favoured 
capital since the 1980s. This is most obviously the case in the USA, where 
real median wages have been virtually frozen since the mid-1980s,48 but 
is true to a lesser extent in many OECD countries, which have seen a 
decline in the labour share of national income.49 Hence the rise of what 
is often called ‘neo-liberalism’ has been associated with a decoupling of 
wages and productivity.50
So, if the rate of technological change accelerates, then there could be more 
opportunities to depress wages, because there will be more opportunities 
to replace existing workers with machines and low bargaining power for 
workers in seeking to capture the productivity gains from that technology. 
Moreover, if capital captures most of the gains from job-displacing 
technology and spends it on conspicuous consumption goods or ‘saves’ 
it, maybe in an offshore tax haven,51 then most likely insufficient new 
jobs will be created to offset job losses. If the state is unwilling (perhaps 
under pressure from capital) to devote the resources necessary to respond 
to the geographic and occupational structural issues, then structural 
unemployment will likely rise. However, technological change itself does 
not drive widening (or narrowing) inequality. Technological change has 
been going on for over two centuries.52 There seems little new about it 
and, as shown in the productivity data, there has been no acceleration of 
it since the 1980s. If now the benefits of technological change are being 
disproportionately distributed to capital, we need to consider why that is 
happening and what has changed in recent decades.
47  Jim Stanford, ‘The Declining Labour Share in Australia: Definition, Measurement, and 
International Comparisons’. Journal of Australian Political Economy 81 (2018): 11–32.
48  Frank J. Lysy, ‘Why Wages Have Stagnated While GDP Has Grown: The Proximate Factors’. An 
Economic Sense, 13 February 2015, aneconomicsense.org/2015/02/13/why-wages-have-stagnated-
while-gdp-has-grown-the-proximate-factors/.
49  Luci Ellis and Kathryn Smith, The Global Upward Trend in the Profit Share. BIS Working Paper 
No. 231 (Basel: Bank for International Settlements, July 2007); Damien Cahill, The End of Laissez 
Faire? On the Durability of Embedded Neoliberalism (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014).
50  Matt Cowgill, A Shrinking Slice of the Pie (Melbourne: Australian Council of Trade Unions, 
March 2013); Joe Isaac, ‘Why Are Australian Wages Lagging and What Can Be Done About It?’. 
Australian Economic Review 51, no. 2 (2018): 175–90.
51  Facundo Alvaredo et al., World Inequality Report 2018 (World Inequality Lab/WID.world, 2018); 
Thomas Piketty, ‘Panama Papers: Act Now. Don’t Wait for Another Crisis’. Guardian, 10 April 2016.
52  For example, Ruth Schwartz Cowan, A Social History of American Technology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997); Joel Mokyr, ‘Long-Term Economic Growth and the History of Technology’. 
In Handbook of Economic Growth, ed. Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 
2005), 1113–80.
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It does not follow, though, that technology plays no role. Probably the 
way in which this issue has been highlighted most has been through the 
emergence of the so-called ‘gig economy’. It refers to the use of technological 
platforms, created by companies like Uber, Airtasker, Deliveroo and so 
on, to arrange for the hiring of workers to do one-off tasks or, as they have 
been called for ages in the music industry, ‘gigs’. Ostensibly these jobs 
are mostly performed not by employees but by independent contractors. 
By  doing this, these organisations are able to pay these workers less 
than their entitlements as employees. But here the technology enables 
a particular form of work organisation to be reinforced. We will look at 
this in more detail in Chapter 6.
Technology and ethics
The preceding discussion raises many ethical issues. Should technological 
advances be permitted or encouraged if they lead to people losing jobs, 
even if the rest of society benefits through higher living standards? What 
obligations does society have to people who are displaced, and how much 
should it contribute to their retraining or welfare? 
The ethical implications for work itself are wider. Computers enable the 
use of complex algorithms to facilitate decisions, on matters ranging from 
identifying the best person for the job or a promotion or a position in an 
educational institution, to the best performer in the job, to who should 
be targeted for counselling or dismissal. Yet algorithms are not neutral or 
unbiased: there are many examples of discrimination being unexpectedly 
built in to decision-making processes through the use of algorithms, 
as documented in Cathy O’Neill’s aptly named book Weapons of Math 
Destruction.53 
AI utilises the most complex algorithms—algorithms that ‘learn’ through 
experience and so change their behaviour. Universities are trialling an 
AI  bot (at Griffith University it is called ‘Sam’) to deal with student 
queries. As it has more interactions with students, it will learn how to deal 
with more and more complex issues without the need to refer them on 
to a human. The more complex the algorithm, the harder it is to identify 
a source of discrimination, or even to identify its existence. Sometimes 
discrimination becomes too obvious. ‘Tay’, Microsoft’s chatbot, had to be 
53  Cathy O’Neill, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens 
Democracy (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2016).
The ReALITIeS AnD FuTuReS oF WoRk
110
shut down within a day after it started volunteering racist rants that it had 
‘learned’ from other Twitter users. There were some major ethical issues 
there.54 While Tay’s adventure off the rails amused some, it demonstrated 
the potential damage that could arise when AI has significant control 
over something but lacks ethical guidance. More concerning still may be 
AI tools in the hands of individuals or organisations actively seeking to 
enrich themselves in ways that have little concern for the rights or privacy 
of individual workers, consumers or citizens.
Accordingly, some have sought to promote international standards on 
robotics and AI, for example through an international code of ethics. In 
2010 a group of the world’s leading AI and robotics researchers drafted a 
set of ‘Principles of robotics: Regulating robots in the real world’.55 It was 
more wide-ranging than Isaac Asimov’s three fictional ‘laws for robots’,56 
but driven by the same need to find a resolution to the complex ethical 
issues arising from AI. There have been special editions of journals looking 
at the question of how to build ethical design into AI systems: if you cannot 
be certain of being able to push the ‘big red button’ (the switch that enables 
you to turn off an AI device before it becomes maliciously self-aware), 
then is it possible to design ethical programming into an integrated part 
of the AI system, without the system knowing about it?57 Most recently, 
there has been work done by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (IEEE) and the IEEE Standards Association, working towards 
an ISO standard that would incorporate ethical principles in the design 
of AI. But how would that work? How could it be made foolproof? How 
could ordinary citizens be given the capability to control the use by others 
of their personal information, histories or behaviours? And what would 
happen if not everyone incorporated such design principles into their 
AI systems? What of the ‘biohackers’ who eschew hospitals, universities 
and regulatory institutions, using backyard workshops and linking with 
54  Elle Hunt, ‘Tay, Microsoft’s AI Chatbot, Gets a Crash Course in Racism from Twitter’. Guardian, 
24 March 2016, www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar/24/tay-microsofts-ai-chatbot-gets-a-
crash-course-in-racism-from-twitter.
55  It was initially released in 2011 then published as a journal piece as Margaret Boden et al., 
‘Principles of Robotics: Regulating Robots in the Real World’. Connection Science 29, no. 2 (2017): 
124–29.
56  Isaac Asimov, I, Robot (New York: Gnome Press, 1950).
57  Thomas Arnold and Matthais Scheutz, ‘The “Big Red Button” Is Too Late: An Alternative 
Model for the Ethical Evaluation of AI Systems’. Ethics and Information Technology 20, no. 1 (2018): 
59–69; Iyad Rahwan, ‘Society-in-the-Loop: Programming the Algorithmic Social Contract’. Ethics 
and Information Technology 20, no. 1 (2018): 5–14; Peter Vamplew et al., ‘Human-Aligned Artificial 
Intelligence Is a Multiobjective Problem’. Ethics and Information Technology 20, no. 1 (2018): 27–40.
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body piercers to implant forms of computer technology into their own 
bodies?58 What of rogue states or corporations who failed to follow the 
ethical guidelines? As Moshe Vardi pointed out, the dramatic reductions 
in automobile deaths over the last century arose from regulation, not 
ethical design of cars. Regulation should be determined by ethics, but not 
vacate the field in favour of it.59 But how would such regulation operate? 
Vardi proposes, as first steps, some simple regulations promoting things 
like transparency of code,60 but there are big issues that require a lot of 
thought and action. 
And so there is also the question of the ethics of human interaction 
with AI. Suppose the key ethical issues are not in how the algorithms 
are designed but in how humans use them—especially when, as seems 
inevitable, digital technology is integrated with human biology.61 We will 
not just have to consider AI machines that can be programmed to kill, or 
with the side-effect of killing, but also humans who, equipped with AI, 
can do those things.
These are real ‘sliding doors’ issues. The life-and-death matter of machines 
that can kill is just an extreme example of the outcomes of choices to be 
made. In the face of these, the choices we make about what courses to 
study or what careers to pursue might seem minor—but they are not. 
Organisations face real ethical issues that must be addressed. What of 
the use of predictive technology that can anticipate whether a person will 
‘work out’ in a job? Is it ethical to hire or not hire someone on the basis 
of such predictions, bearing in mind that many such predictions may 
contain gender- or race-based biases?62 What if that technology can ‘learn’ 
58  Lauren M. Britton and Bryan Semaan, ‘Manifesting the Cyborg Via Techno Body Modification: 
From Human–Computer Interaction to Integration’. Paper presented at CHI 2017—Proceedings 
of the 2017 ACM SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, Denver, 2017, 
2499–510.
59  Moshe Y. Vardi, ‘Cars Are Regulated for Safety—Why Not Information Technology?’. 
The Conversation, 22 March 2019, theconversation.com/cars-are-regulated-for-safety-why-not-
information-technology-111415.
60  Ibid.
61  Guardian, ‘Elon Musk Wants to Connect Brains to Computers with New Company’. Guardian, 
28 March 2017; Antonio Regalado, ‘With Neuralink, Elon Musk Promises Human-to-Human 
Telepathy. Don’t Believe It’. MIT Technology Review, 22 April 2017. See also Annalee Newitz, 
‘Scientists Just Invented the Neural Lace’. Gizmodo, 17 June 2015, www.gizmodo.com.au/2015/ 
06/ scientists-just-invented-the-neural-lace/. Jia Liu et al., ‘Syringe-Injectable Electronics’. Nature 
Nanotechnology 10 (2015): 629–36; Bryan Johnson, ‘Kernel’s Quest to Enhance Human Intelligence’. 
Medium, 20 October 2016. medium.com/@bryan_johnson/kernels-quest-to-enhance-human-
intelligence-7da5e16fa16c.
62  O’Neill, Weapons of Math Destruction.
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as a person spends more time at work (as it will), and the employee does 
something that changes the prediction from ‘will work out’ to ‘will not 
work out’? Is it ethical to fire them? What if that prediction is based on 
a new expression of social or political views that are out of step with those 
of the management? If corporations won’t make ethical decisions, who 
should, and how? In the next chapter, we will see how some of these issues 





In the 1990s I was a senior executive in the Australian public service. 
One evening, at a dinner at a departmental ‘retreat’ for senior managers, 
I sat next to the man who had just been the keynote speaker. He was the 
human resource manager for a large, new company that was operating 
at the cutting edge of technology. He did not know me or my job, 
just that I was a senior executive. My departmental job had involved, 
among many things, overseeing a survey on collective bargaining (there 
had just been major policy reforms) sent to over a thousand randomly 
selected companies. His company was one of the few at the time with 
a nonunion collective agreement, and the response rate among them was 
much lower than among other companies. Without prompting, he told 
me he had received a survey from my department. (‘Oh, really?’) Yes, 
but he could not allow it to be distributed among the associates—his 
word for employees. (‘Why was that?’) It contained the word ‘bargaining’, 
something that implied conflict, and that wasn’t really an idea he wanted 
his associates exposed to.
It was an intriguing conversation from an otherwise tedious evening, 
one that told me more than so many studies that had been done with 
management’s permission. Understanding what was behind that helps 
us understand the managerial forces shaping the direction that future 
work will take. The previous chapter told us about the types of jobs that 
have been growing, and declining, in recent times, how technology is 
affecting many jobs and how many are likely to be partly or fully replaced 
by automation. But by extrapolating from current information about jobs 
and technology, we only get part of the picture of the future of work. 
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We also saw that the future depends on future technologies, about which 
our current knowledge is largely inadequate, and on future consumption 
patterns, about which we know very little. It also depends on future 
management behaviours about whether to invest in certain technologies 
(and we spoke quite a bit in the previous chapter about the economics 
of technology, which shape such investments) and how to use the 
technologies that they possess or purchase. Before we understand about 
management behaviours in the future, we need to know about the realities 
of management behaviour now.
There are many realities, many different ways in which management 
behaves. We must understand the importance of the function of control 
to management, and some of the key developments in the exercise 
of managerial control. In doing so, we must refer back to the concept of 
culturism that featured in interpretations of some of the visions of the 
future discussed in Chapter 3.
Different elements of management strategy 
or style
In studying the current realities of work, we need to consider the main 
ways of managing employees. How this is undertaken is referred to as 
management style or management strategy. Both terms are used almost 
interchangeably in the literature.
Views on the meaning of strategy range from ‘rational conscious planning’ 
to what Mintzberg referred to as something best ‘seen as a pattern in 
a stream of decisions’.1 To Bray and Littler, strategy referred to ‘the modus 
operandi of managing labour’ and was ‘a useful method of modelling 
organisational processes irrespective of the coherence, or otherwise, of the 
managing director’s consciousness’.2 
1  Henry Mintzberg, ‘Strategy Formulation as a Historical Process’. International Studies of 
Management & Organization 7, no. 2 (1977): 28–40. See also Margaret Gardner and Gillian Palmer, 
Employment Relations: Industrial Relations and Human Resource Management (Melbourne: Macmillan, 
1992).
2  Mark Bray and Craig R. Littler, ‘The Labour Process and Industrial Relations: Review of the 
Literature’. Labour & Industry 1, no. 3 (1988): 551–87.
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So ‘management style’ is probably a more accurate term than ‘management 
strategy’ as, for many, strategy implies a plan or coherent pattern of 
action. It is often difficult to discern that there is a clear strategy shaping 
management behaviour, even in retrospect. Implicit strategy may be 
inferred from actions rather than explicitly specified in a plan. The term 
‘management style’ denotes a pattern or approach to labour management 
without implying a conscious or unconscious plan. That said, as 
mentioned, we use the terms interchangeably as we follow the lead of 
Mintzberg and of Bray and Littler in not requiring explicit coherence in 
a strategy. 
It appears that there are three dimensions, which we discuss in turn, into 
which management style can be categorised:
• high trust versus low trust styles;
• collective versus individualising styles; 
• structured versus unstructured styles.
Other dimensions, referred to in some of the literature, mostly fit into one 
of the three above.
1. High-trust and low-trust approaches
One of the most common dimensions of management style is the degree 
of ‘trust’ exhibited by management towards employees.
Chris Wright identifies low-trust and high-trust approaches to labour 
management.3 The coercive, ‘low-trust’ approach is characterised by low 
worker autonomy, close supervision and strong discipline such that workers 
are treated as a commodity and are forced to comply with management 
commands. For example, staff at a Tesco warehouse had to wear digital 
armband devices that constantly monitored their performance, and some 
Irish warehouse workers said they got lower scores on a rating system 
if they keyed in that they went to the toilet or took a break.4
3  Christopher Wright, The Management of Labour: A History of Australian Employers. Australian 
Studies in Labour Relations 4 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1995).
4  Anne-Marie Walsh, ‘Tesco Staff Forced to Wear Arm Monitors That Track Work Rate’. Irish 
Independent, 11 February 2013, www.independent.ie/irish-news/tesco-staff-forced-to-wear-arm-
monitors-that-track-work-rate-29060257.html.
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The consensual, ‘high-trust’ approach occurs where there is mutual 
trust between the parties, and workers are treated by management as 
a ‘resource’, not a commodity (so, yes, being treated like a ‘resource’ in 
this context is a relatively good thing). Management aims to develop and 
nurture employee talent by giving workers autonomy at work to make 
decisions and fully use their skills and abilities. 
Christopher Wright examined high- versus low-trust management style 
in three areas of the employee–employer relationship: 5 
• ‘employment relations’—e.g. human resource (HR) arrangements 
such as recruitment, training, rewards; 
• ‘work relations’—how management organises the technical and social 
aspects of work; 
• ‘industrial relations’—how employers manage organised labour, and 
deal with unions and with bargaining (though this last one is better 
located under our second dimension, discussed below).
Wright noted that it was difficult to discern a common pattern of 
Australian employer behaviour. He also found that there was no single 
management style among Australian employers. Instead, there were 
inconsistent patterns of management style, not only between firms 
but even within firms. Wright argued that employers’ approaches to 
the management of labour have been complex and contradictory at 
times: ‘Australian employers have adopted elements of both high-trust 
and low-trust strategies simultaneously within the same organisation, 
and sometimes in relation to the same groups of employees.’6 At some 
points in history, employers have tended to favour elements of the high-
trust approach, only to abandon them later. Also, for some groups of 
employees, employers adopt elements of both the high and the low-trust 
approach to labour management. (More recently, Wright and colleagues 
have looked at the role of management consultants in spreading key ideas 
through managerial ranks across businesses—and the gradual demise 
of this group, as managers themselves internalise many of the ideas and 
methods propagated by management consultants and take on some of the 
characteristics of what the researchers call ‘management as consultancy’.)7 
5  Wright, Management of Labour, 6.
6  Ibid.
7  Andrew Sturdy, Christopher Wright, and Nick Wylie, Management as Consultancy: Neo-Bureaucracy 
and the Consultant Manager (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
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The management literature suggests that, to some extent, there may have 
been a net shift in emphasis from lower trust to higher trust management 
styles, often associated with the word ‘empowerment’, although there are 
many counter-examples.8
Other analysts have developed comparable typologies of management 
strategies or styles. Although these typologies differ in their precise 
content and definition, they all establish some form of ‘black hat’/‘white 
hat’ contrast that relates in part at least to high trust and low trust. 
Andrew Friedman, for example, distinguished between ‘direct control’ 
(management try to reduce the responsibility of individual workers 
by close supervision and by setting out in advance and in great detail 
the specific tasks allocated to each worker) and ‘responsible autonomy’ 
(managers try to emphasise the positive aspects of labour capacity, namely 
its malleability, so that workers are granted responsibility and status, 
supervision is restricted, loyalty is rewarded etc.). The choice taken was 
seen as depending on the degree of competition in labour markets and 
product markets.9
Michael Burawoy, one of the major living sociologists, created a three-way 
classification, involving ‘despotic control’ (direct control), ‘hegemonic 
control’ (more sophisticated methods relating to bureaucratic control)10 
and ‘hegemonic despotism’. The last meant the fear of being fired 
was replaced by the fear of capital flight, plant closure, the transfer of 
operations and disinvestment—enhanced power of capital was associated 
with new management practices such as ‘quality of working life’ programs 
and quality circles that attempt to mobilise consent for increased 
productivity.11
In Australia, authors such as Curtain and Mathews, and Boreham, Hall 
and Harley identified two types of workplace reform strategies available 
to organisations to enhance profit in the context of change.12 The first 
8  Rosabeth Moss Kanter, ‘Leadership and the Psychology of Turnarounds’. Harvard Business 
Review (June 2003).
9  Andrew L. Friedman, Industry and Labour (London: Macmillan, 1977).
10  Bureaucratic control is discussed in the next section, on ‘Conflict over control’.
11  Michael Burawoy, Manufacturing Consent (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); 
Michael Burawoy, ‘Between the Labor Process and the State: Changing Face of Factory Regimes 
under Capitalism’. American Sociological Review 48 (1983): 587–605.
12  Richard Curtain and John Mathews, ‘Two Models of Award Restructuring in Australia’. Labour 
and Industry 3, no. 1 (1990): 58–75; Paul Boreham, Richard Hall, and William Harley, ‘Two Paths to 
Prosperity? Work Organisation and Industrial Relations’. Work, Employment and Society 10 (19886): 
449–68.
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was a ‘cost minimisation’ approach, focused on achieving numerical 
flexibility in labour costs or employee numbers. The second was 
a ‘productivity enhancement’ approach, focused on improving functional 
flexibility of labour—emphasising skills acquisition, multiskilling, 
flexibility in work assignments, quality and devolution of authority. Cost 
minimisation reflected the logic of managerialism, with emphases on 
auditing, casualisation, managerial control and work intensification.13 
It was a type of ‘low-trust’ approach. Productivity enhancement, on the 
other hand, included quality enhancement, investment in training and 
the creation of ‘high performance work systems’.14 It was a more ‘high-
trust’ approach. The literature often highlights the contradictory nature 
of these two paradigms. These two strategies, pursued properly, would 
seem to be mutually exclusive.15 Each represents one of the two opposite 
paths to longer hours or work intensification.16 Nonetheless, a number 
of firms attempt to pursue both strategies, and so might be called ‘mixed 
strategists’.17 You may have experienced this yourself. While management 
may apply different strategies to different parts of its workforce (which is 
not so surprising), it sometimes also tries to apply different, contradictory 
strategies to the same workers. 
In these various dichotomies we see the dual nature of, and tensions in, 
the control relationship. The first is tension for management: between 
treating labour as a commodity and as a continuing social relationship. 
The second is tension for labour: between resistance to subordination and 
exploitation, and the maintenance of economic relationships including, 
critically, the viability of the employer.18
13  For an example, see Oliver Wright, ‘Join Ryanair! See the World! But We’ll Only Pay You 
for Nine Months a Year’. Independent, 16 May 2013, www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/
join-ryanair-see-the-world-but-well-only-pay-you-for-nine-months-a-year-8619897.html.
14  Bill Harley, Belinda C. Allen, and Leisa D. Sargent, ‘High Performance Work Systems and 
Employee Experience of Work in the Service Sector’. British Journal of Industrial Relations 45, no. 3 
(2007): 607–33.
15  Richard E. Walton, ‘From Control to Commitment in the Workplace’. Harvard Business Review 
85, no. 2 (1985): 77–84.
16  See, for example, Chapter 3.
17  David Peetz et al., ‘Workplace Bargaining in New Zealand: Radical Change at Work’. In Workplace 
Bargaining in the International Context, ed. David Peetz, Alison Preston, and Jim Docherty, Workplace 
Bargaining Research Project (Canberra: Department of Industrial Relations and Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1993). See also Peter Boxall and Peter Haynes, ‘Unions and Non-Union Bargaining 
Agents under the Employment Contracts Act 1991: An Assessment after 12 Months’. New Zealand 
Journal of Industrial Relations 17, no. 2 (1992).
18  Peter Cressey and John MacInnes, ‘Voting for Ford: Industrial Democracy and the Control 
of Labour’. Capital and Class 11 (1980): 5–33.
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Within management that tension between treating labour as 
a  commodity  and as a continuing social relationship often leads to 
managers saying they want a continuing social relationship but behaving 
in a manner consistent with its treating labour as a commodity. That is, 
a large gap between rhetoric and reality emerges. Some organisations 
portray themselves as based on ‘high trust’ or ‘commitment’ but behave 
otherwise. Some organisations, aiming to promote commitment and 
loyalty at the same time, take a hard line against dissent,19 especially in 
seeking to exclude unionism. Certain managements will try to resolve 
this contradiction by trying to engage in some form of ‘cultural’ control, 
whereby substantial effort is put into ensuring employees have the ‘mindset’ 
that enables them to be persuaded that the workplace really is a high-trust 
environment, while simultaneously exercising considerable control over 
those employees. This is particularly common where management adopts 
particular positions on the two other dimensions of management strategy. 
So we will discuss those first before returning to this issue of attempted 
cultural control or ‘culturism’.
Changing technology itself has potentially mixed effects. On the one 
hand, it makes communication easier, which may facilitate higher trust 
approaches, as it makes it easier in principle for the wishes of employees 
to be known to managers, and for groups of workers to autonomously and 
coherently make decisions. It may be easier to work from home, enabling 
employees to better juggle work–life balance issues and for managers to 
be less obsessive about attendance. On the other hand, if it is easier for 
people to work from home it is easier to give them extra things to do at 
home (or in the park, on the beach, etc.). It makes it easier for managers 
to monitor what workers are saying to each other. It makes it easier to 
count things, and the metrification of work is one of the major tools of 
the low-trust manager. 
In The Circle, the work environment seemed very high trust on the 
surface but the ability of managers to count almost everything Mae did, 
and to quantify each aspect of her worth, turned it into a very low-trust 
environment in reality. This dual capability of technology is mirrored in 
the dual directions that management trust appears to be taking, though 
19  Diane Van den Broek, ‘Human Resource Management, Workforce Control and Union Avoidance: 
An Australian Case Study’. Journal of Industrial Relations 39, no. 3 (1997): 332–48; David Peetz, Brave 
New Workplace: How Individual Contracts Are Changing Our Jobs (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2006); 
Dennis Tourish, David Collinson, and James R. Barker, ‘Manufacturing Conformity: Leadership 
through Coercive Persuasion in Business Organisations’. M@n@gement 12, no. 5 (2009): 360–83.
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for many, as in The Circle, the appearance of higher trust may actually be 
deceptive. By contrast, the environments in both Nineteen Eighty-Four 
and The Handmaid’s Tale both appeared very low trust from early on.
2. Collective and individualising approaches 
to employee management
A second way of categorising management style is the extent to which 
management adopts ‘collective’ or ‘individualising’ approaches to dealings 
with employees. We can think of this dimension as a single scale with 
both ‘collective’ and ‘individualising’ denoting each end of the scale.
Organisations that adopt an ‘individualising’ approach are commonly 
antiunion. By our definition, they are the opposite of collectivist (where 
managers respect the rights of employees to be represented by unions). 
Individualising managers often endeavour to exclude unions from the 
workplace so that management can maintain a direct relationship with 
workers. Managers that adopt this approach could be said to have 
a unitarist view of work. Managers with a pluralist perspective, by contrast, 
will more likely support or at least tolerate a collectivist approach.
Not all pluralist managers will work in collectivist workplaces. This is 
because, for collectivism to exist, employees must have some organisation. 
A workplace or organisation may be too small for this to happen, or the 
union itself may be absent or not well enough organised, or the industry 
too difficult to organise. Some small firms might end up adopting what 
appear to be nonunion, low-wage or exploitative strategies because of their 
dependence on larger organisations and subordination to a competitive 
environment.20 Most small businesses are not unionised, regardless of the 
philosophies of their owners. We should not infer, from the discussion 
here, that all managers are malevolent and opposed to employees 
organising themselves collectively.
Individualising strategies can be used with either low-trust or high-
trust strategies. Earlier changes to industrial relations law, particularly 
under the New Zealand Employment Contracts legislation or the 2005 
Australian ‘WorkChoices’ legislation (both now repealed), appeared to 
encourage the use of formalised individual contracting to reduce labour 
20  Tony Dundon, Irena Grugulis, and Adrian Wilkinson, ‘Looking out of the Black Hole: Non-
Union Relations in an SME’. Employee Relations 21 (1999): 251–66.
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costs and wages (i.e. the low-trust path). Individualisation through 
individual contracting often leads to inferior pay and conditions. 
However, individual  contracting does not inevitably lead to this. Some 
employees will receive higher incomes under individualisation strategies, 
because of a nonunion premium offered by some employers to purchase 
a transfer of power and, sometimes, increasing productivity as a result.21 
Nonetheless, it appears that data showing poorer pay and conditions for 
workers on individual contracts such as Australian Workplace Agreements 
(AWAs)22 reflect the inherently lower bargaining power of employees, by 
comparison to management, on individual contracts.23
It is very important to note that the term ‘individualism’ is often (mis)used to 
describe many different things, and in that context might imply a different 
meaning to the one I use here. For example, ‘individualism’ can mean to 
some the ‘differentiation’ of individual employees’ employment contracts.24 
This is what Willie Brown and his colleagues refer to as ‘substantive 
individualisation’, but it is not what we are talking about here. Brown and 
friends were talking about significant differences between employees in a 
corpora tion with reference to their pay and other terms and conditions 
of employment. Substantive individualisation does not need to go with 
‘procedural individualisation’—that is, with individual contracting—as 
all individual contracts offered by a firm might be mostly identical.25
21  David Peetz and Alison Preston, ‘Individual Contracting, Collective Bargaining and Wages in 
Australia’. Industrial Relations Journal 40, no. 5 (2009): 444–61.
22  Ellen Dannin, Working Free: The Origins and Impact of New Zealand’s Employment Contracts Act 
(Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1997); Richard Mitchell and Joel Fetter, ‘Human Resource 
Management and Individualisation in Australian Law’. Journal of Industrial Relations 45, no. 3 
(2003): 292–325; Sarah Oxenbridge, ‘The Individualisation of Employment Relations in New 
Zealand: Trends and Outcomes’. In Employment Relations: Individualisation and Union Exclusion—
an International Study, ed. Stephen Deery and Richard Mitchell (Sydney: Federation Press, 1999), 
227–50; Peetz and Preston, ‘Individual Contracting’; E. Rasmussen and J. Deeks, ‘Contested 
Outcomes: Assessing the Impacts of the Employment Contracts Act’. California Western International 
Law Journal 28 (1997): 275–96; Kristin Van Barneveld, ‘Under the Covers: Negotiating Australian 
Workplace Agreements: Two Cases’. Paper presented at the Current Research in Industrial Relations 
conference, AIRAANZ, Adelaide, 4–6 February 1999.
23  For more on power under individual contracting, see Peetz, Brave New Workplace, 75–80, 
Chapter 4.
24  William Brown et al., The Individualisation of Employment Contracts in Britain. Employment 
Relations Research Series No. 4 (London: Department of Trade and Industry, 1998).
25  Ibid.
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Other people may ascribe quite different meanings to the term. For 
instance, John Purcell used individualism to refer to the ‘extent to which 
personnel policies are focused on the rights and capabilities of individ ual 
workers’. That is more like the high-trust/low-trust dimension. He saw this 
as a different dimension of management style to collectivism, which could 
coexist with individualism.26 Finally, some researchers in social psychology 
treat individualism and collectivism as different but not diametrically 
opposed concepts, and use different survey questions to measure them.27 
For us, though, individualism and collectivism in employment relations 
are opposing points on a single continuum.28
Artificial intelligence and technology facilitate the surveillance of 
employees that makes it easier to thwart the collective organisation of 
employees, in much the same way as it makes it easier for dictatorial 
governments to maintain control over potentially dissident populations.29 
Workers in The Circle are increasingly monitored for their performance, 
in order to control them. Digital technologies also make it easier to 
fragment workforces (e.g. in ‘platform economy’ work), thereby making 
it harder for workers to collectively organise. On the other hand, similar 
technologies may provide the tools that unions themselves can use to 
facilitate collective organisation (discussed in Chapter 7). So the net effect 
of technological change on this second dimension depends on the choices 
that both sides make.
26  John Purcell, ‘Mapping Management Styles in Employee Relations’. Journal of Management 
Studies. (1987): 205–23.
27  Carolina Gomez, ‘The Relationship between Acculturation, Individualism/Collectivism and Job 
Attribute Preferences for Hispanic MBAs’. Journal of Management Studies 40, no. 5 (2003): 1089–
105; Hatty C. Triandis and Theodore M. Singelis, ‘Training to Recognize Individual Differences in 
Collectivism and Individualism within Culture’. International Journal of Intercultural Relations 22, no. 1 
(1998): 35–47.
28  Peetz, Brave New Workplace, 10–11.
29  Troy Henderson, Tom Swann, and Jim Stanford, Under the Employer’s Eye: Electronic Monitoring 
and Surveillance in Australian Workplaces (Canberra: Centre for Future Work, Australia Institute, 
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3. Structure in management: A third dimension 
of labour management
A third way of categorising management is the degree of formalisation 
or structure in management procedures at the workplace. Formalisation 
or structured management refers to the extent to which management has 
developed systematic written policies and procedures for dealing with 
labour management issues. The opposite of a formalised system would 
be unstructured management where there are few set rules and managers 
deal with most matters on an ad hoc and informal basis.30 
Structured management could involve some of: a formal grievance 
procedure; a formal disciplinary procedure; a performance management 
system; developed formal training system; occupational health and 
safety (OHS) committees; joint consultative committees; quality circles; 
and/or well developed policies on equal employment opportunity (EEO) 
and/or gender equity. 
Overall, structured management is becoming more common. Part of 
this is due to the impact of regulatory changes in a number of countries 
such as unfair dismissal laws (that create a need for consistent disciplinary 
procedures); antidiscrimination and EEO laws (that create a need to 
manage equity at work); in some countries, changes in bargaining practices 
(e.g. in Australia the shift to enterprise bargaining, supported by laws, in 
turn generating a need for formal bargaining committees); and OHS law 
(in turn creating a need for OHS committees). Even beyond this legal 
pressure, management in many organisations is also gradually increasing 
other areas of structured management such as training, employee 
monitoring and grievance procedures. Technological change increases the 
potential for structure in management by increasing the opportunity for 
computerised record-keeping and counting and formalising things that 
previously may have been undocumented, for example in performance 
appraisals. This was seen very clearly in the burdensome performance 
metrics required in The Circle. So the trend towards more structure in 
management is likely to continue.
30  Ron Callus et al., Industrial Relations at Work: The Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 
(Canberra: AGPS, 1991).
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That said, low formalisation or low structure in management is common 
in small business, as these frequently do not have the resources for the 
specialist functions associated with formal structures. The industrial 
relations practices in small business are often quite distinctive.31 While 
technological changes may facilitate the introduction of some more 
structure into small business management, it is hard to believe the gap 
between large and small businesses in the degree of structure would 
disappear. The opposite might be equally possible.
Conflict over control
Negotiations over new collective agreements may centre on wage increases 
or benefits—that is, resources. But they may also centre on procedural 
issues of managerial prerogative or control. As we know from Chapter 2, 
resources are an important influence on control. But conflict in the 
workplace may often be specifically about control itself. 
In small organisations, the capitalist can directly supervise employment 
and payment; for Richard Edwards, this was ‘simple control’.32 Yet in some 
small organisations, as Andrew Friedman pointed out, workers can still 
have substantial levels of autonomy.33 Regardless, as organisations grow in 
size, management’s personal ties with workers are weakened and worker 
resistance may be more organised and more successful. 
31  Phil Beaumont and Ian Rennie, ‘Organisational Culture and Non-Union Status of Small 
Businesses’. Industrial Relations Journal 17, no. 3 (1986): 214–24; Ron Callus, Jim Kitay, and Paul 
Sutcliffe, ‘Industrial Relations at Small Business Workplaces’. Small Business Review 7 (1992): 106–
45; Joe Isaac, Small Business and Industrial Relations: Some Policy Implications. Industrial Relations 
Research Series No. 8 (Canberra: Department of Industrial Relations, 1993); Joe Isaac et al., A Survey 
of Small Business and Industrial Relations. Industrial Relations Research Series No. 7 (Canberra: 
Department of Industrial Relations, May 1993); Alison Morehead et al., Changes at Work: The 
1995 Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (South Melbourne: Longman, 1997); Rowena 
Barrett and Al Rainnie, ‘What’s So Special About Small Firms?’. Work, Employment & Society 16, 
no. 3 (2002): 415; Monder Ram and Paul K. Edwards, ‘Praising Caesar Not Burying Him: What 
We Know About Employment Relations in Small Firms’. Work, Employment and Society 17, no. 4 
(2003): 719–30; Adrian Wilkinson and Tony Dundon, ‘Employment Relations in Smaller Firms’. 
In Handbook of Employment Relations, Law and Practice (4th ed.), ed. B. Towers (London: Kogan 
Page, 2003): 288–307; Grant Cairncross and Jeremy Buultjens, ‘Enterprise Bargaining under the 
Workplace Relations Act 1996 in Construction and Hospitality Small Businesses: A Comparative 
Study’. Journal of Industrial Relations 48, no. 4 (2006): 475–88.
32  Richard C. Edwards, Contested Terrain (London: Heinemann, 1979).
33  Friedman, Industry and Labour. 
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Over time, according to Edwards, larger organisations have become able to 
develop technological and bureaucratic control—that is, to use technology 
and rule-making as structural forms of control. Internal labour markets, 
rules governing job specifications, and work practices are examples of 
bureaucratic controls.34 Technology allows the employer to control the 
processes of work and the pace of work. One mechanism by which these 
two control processes were merged was through the spread of Taylorism, 
a management system developed early in the twentieth century, focusing 
on narrowing the division of labour and timing each step of the production 
process, and picked up most famously in Henry Ford’s mass production 
factories.35 Friedman described Taylorism and other unilateral forms of 
managerial control as direct control. However, labour is too difficult to 
control through consistently simple methods, and no ‘single form’ of 
control is adequate for all circumstances.36 Various management tactics 
lead to matching employee responses, establishing a ‘frontier of control’ 
or an area of ‘contested terrain’ between labour and management.37 They 
‘push back’ against each other, and so the frontier of control can shift 
depending on the power resources of the parties. For example, managers 
may decide to introduce a system of incentive pay; employees may resist 
and press for specific rules to be emplaced; management may try to 
amend rules to achieve their prior objective; employees may ‘work to rule’ 
to maximise their incentive payment but undermine other management 
objectives; and so on.
Conflict ‘arises over a range of issues including the organisation of work, 
the pace of work, defining the rights and responsibilities of each party, 
and how employees are to be incorporated into the labour process’.38 
Hence, ‘the workplace becomes a battle ground, as employers attempt to 
extract the maximum effort from workers and workers necessarily resist 
their bosses’ impositions’.39 Management aims to reduce uncertainty by 
gaining optimal control of labour power in order to generate profit.40
34  Keith Townsend, ‘Teams, Control, Cooperation and Resistance in New Workplaces’ (PhD diss., 
Department of Industrial Relations, Griffith University, 2005), 14.
35  Taylorism was named after Frederick Winslow Taylor, the most famous proponent of what was 
called ‘Scientific Management’. Unsurprisingly, the spread of systems of mass production with little 
or no variation became known as Fordism. Frederick Winslow Taylor, The Principles of Scientific 
Management (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1911).
36  Paul Thompson, The Nature of Work: An Introduction to Debates on the Labour Process (Hampshire: 
Macmillan, 1989), 133 (my emphasis).
37  Carter L. Goodrich, The Frontier of Control: A Study in British Workshop Politics (London: G. Bell 
and Sons, 1920); Edwards, Contested Terrain.
38  Townsend, ‘Teams, Control’, 14.
39  Edwards, Contested Terrain, 13.
40  Burawoy, ‘Between Labor Process’.
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What does the future hold for this mutual ‘push back’? Since the 1980s, 
manufacturing and large retailing firms in particular have moved towards 
‘just in time’ (JIT) production systems that minimise use of inventories 
and hence costs, but render large systems open to disruption by a small 
interruption. JIT has been facilitated by modern technologies including 
computer systems and barcodes. Digital technology gives both high-
trust and low-trust approaches additional ammunition. It provides the 
means for greater future collaboration if that is wanted, but perhaps that 
is not what many managements will want. They may prefer to exercise 
greater control and supervision. Just as employees seek to exercise 
control over their work—the importance of job control is a recurring 
theme of organisational psychology41—so too do managers, and they are 
increasingly held accountable for what their subordinates do. That makes 
it pretty difficult for individual managers to resist the urge to control. 
JIT systems reduce cost but increase risk, and so managers seek to increase 
control to counter risk. 
We should not underestimate the potential impact of artificial intelligence 
on human resource management. Increasingly, firms are using algorithms 
to help in recruitment, with potentially discriminatory results.42 Some 
are, or will, use AI for terminations. A Californian software engineer 
was sacked, without sense or explanation, by a computer algorithm; the 
firm acknowledged the error but made him recommence employment at 
the cost of three weeks’ lost pay, and the trust from his fellow workers.43 
The trusted, informal discretion of managers will defer to the structured, 
sometimes flawed logic of the algorithm. The danger of technological 
job-loss is overall less significant to workers as a whole than the threat 
posed by increased use of algorithmic management for decision-making, 
surveillance and control, and also (as we shall see in Chapter 6) the 
potential for greater use of ‘not there’ employment.44
41  For example, Deborah J. Terry and Nerina L. Jimmieson, ‘Work Control and Employee Well-
Being: A Decade Review’. In International Review of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, ed. 
Cary L. Cooper and Ivan T. Robertson (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1999). 
42  Cathy O’Neill, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens 
Democracy (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2016).
43  Monique Ross and Damien Carrick, ‘A Robot Didn’t Take Ibrahim’s Job, but It Did Fire Him’. 
ABC News, 16 August 2018, www.abc.net.au/news/2018-08-14/ibrahim-diallo-man-who-was-fired-
by-a-machine-law-ai/10083194.
44  Brishen Rogers, Beyond Automation: The Law & Political Economy of Workplace Technological 
Change (SSRN, 4 February 2019), doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3327608.
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The other important factor in take-up of technology is its cost. Businesses 
will usually not introduce technology that enables greater monitoring 
and control unless the investment is expected to pay off, and for small 
businesses in particular that means that it needs to be very cheap or have 
a high and obvious payoff. A technology would likely require very wide 
penetration across larger businesses before it became acceptable in small 
and medium enterprises because of the cost implications. It becomes hard 
to predict which will be adopted first across businesses: technology that 
facilitates cooperation, or technology that facilitates control. The cost of 
accompanying hardware may be critical. So will the cost of resistance, 
which would be higher for technology that facilitates managerial control. 
If unemployment or underemployment are high or it is otherwise easy to 
replace labour (there is a substantial ‘reserve army’ of labour),45 resistance 
will be lower and the conditions will favour technology that facilitates 
managerial control.
Much of this debate about workplace control developed after Harry 
Braverman (formerly an American factory worker) published Labor and 
Monopoly Capital in 1974.46 Developing a Marxist framework, he argued 
that Taylorism or Scientific Management comprised a form of managerial 
control that was aimed at reducing worker control and that, among other 
things, it led to the deskilling of workers. The focus in Braverman’s work 
was on factory work, although manufacturing declined thereafter, but 
the influence Taylorism had spread well beyond manufacturing into areas 
such as vocational education.47 
Braverman was criticised for not giving enough attention to how 
employees responded to managerial attempts at control.48 The labour 
process is rarely characterised by unrestrained hostility and usually has 
at least some component of consent.49 To some extent management and 
labour must adjust to each other’s preferences and expectations. So when 
it comes to issues like the pace at which the work will be performed, 
the amount of work that will be performed, who performs particular 
45  Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 2 (London: The Electric Book Company, 1998), 427.
46  Harry Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth 
Century (New York & London: Monthly Review Press, 1974).
47  Lucy Taksa, ‘The Cultural Diffusion of Scientific Management: The United States and New 
South Wales’. Journal of Industrial Relations 37, no. 3 (1995): 427–61.
48  For example, Burawoy, ‘Between Labor Process’; Thompson, The Nature of Work.
49  Paul K. Edwards and Hugh Scullion, The Social Organisation of Industrial Conflict (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1985).
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tasks and so on, labour commonly retains some control.50 You cannot 
explain the cooperative nature that can be found in many workplaces, 
by the majority of employees, much of the time simply by referring to 
control and resistance on their own.51 For Burawoy, the labour process is 
organised such that employees consider that they have choices, and this 
‘participation in choosing … generates consent’.52 
Employees may create ‘games’ to counter the problems of repetitive work.53 
The British ‘surviving work’ website is an example of attempts to relieve 
the frustrations within any work.54 The opportunity for workers to gain 
small victories through ‘games’ is seen as disguising the core disadvantage 
of workers under capitalism.55 Burawoy talks about the ‘games’ that 
workers engage in as part of the wage–effort bargain. Many studies also 
refer to employee efforts to restrict work.56 What used to be called the 
‘darg’ was the accepted level of work effort, put in by employees, socially 
determined by informal work groups to which employees belonged.57 
They still do, but few call it the ‘darg’ any more. Employees may engage 
in what, to managers, is organisational misbehaviour but to themselves is 
a rational way of making work bearable and ensuring that everyone is able 
to get by—though some forms of misbehaviour may be frowned upon 
even by other employees.58
As per the title of Burawoy’s most famous book, management ‘manufactures 
consent’. Employees might ‘make out’ (reach an output target) and this 
achieves more than just higher earnings. There are benefits such as lower 
fatigue, overcoming boredom, and the ‘social and psychological rewards 
of making out on a tough job’.59 It is an example of the movement from 
coercion to consensual regimes in the labour process.60
50  Steven Tolliday and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds, Between Fordism and Flexibility: The Automobile 
Industry and Its Workers (New York: Berg, 1992).
51  Burawoy, Manufacturing Consent.
52  Ibid., 27.
53  Ibid.; Burawoy, ‘Between Labor Process’.
54  survivingwork.org/.
55  Jim Kitay, ‘The Labour Process: Still Stuck? Still a Perspective? Still Useful?’. Electronic Journal 
of Radical Organisation Theory 3, no. 1 (1997): 1–10.
56  Burawoy, Manufacturing Consent; Stephen Ackroyd and Paul Thompson, Organizational 
Misbehaviour (London: Sage, 1999); Donald Roy, ‘Quota Restriction and Goldbricking in a Machine 
Shop’. American Journal of Sociology 57, no. 5 (1952): 427–42.
57  For example, at a central Queensland coal mine in the 1950s, ‘The “Darg” for two mates was 
approx. 20 skips a day, and for this the average wage was between 35 & 40 pounds a fortnight’. 
Collinsville Memoirs [CD] (Collinsville, Qld: Collinsville Connect Telecentre, 2002).
58  Ackroyd and Thompson, Organizational Misbehaviour.
59  Burawoy, Manufacturing Consent, 85.
60  Thompson, The Nature of Work.
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Burawoy, who worked in a factory for his research, surprisingly found 
himself ‘breaking [his] back to make out … risking life and limb for that 
extra piece’.61 He described how ‘We participated and strategized our own 
subordination. We were active accomplices in our own exploitation’.62 Thus 
the labour process framework concentrates very much on control, consent 
and resistance, and often portrays workers as aware of whether it is consent 
or resistance that better serves their interests, or some combination of 
both.63 Management aims, in part, to persuade employees that consent, or 
even commitment, is in their best interests rather than resistance.64
So, will the future see employers more likely to offer, or employees more 
likely to seek, consent-based, consensual regimes? To consider this, we 
first need to look at the role of ‘culturism’ in management strategies and 
what it means for consent. 
Culturism, dissent and control
In recent decades, management in some, mostly large, firms has sought to 
win the conflict about control—to achieve full ‘consent’—by attempting 
to manage ‘culture’ in the organisation. This is often expressed as getting 
employees with the right ‘mindset’ or the right ‘fit’ into the organisation.65 
If employees have appropriate attitudes that support the objectives of the 
organisation and that are willing to subordinate other personal interests to 
that goal, then much conflict over control would disappear. Attempts to 
exercise such control are described as ‘culturism’, and this was the central 
focus of Hugh Willmott’s article discussed in Chapter 3.66 So here we 
consider the role of organisational ‘culture’ in maintaining consent and 
control in workplace industrial relations in the context of what might 
superficially appear to be ‘high-trust’ management styles and the problems 
they might bring, and the role of dissent in organisations. To do this, 
I return to what culture means.
61  Burawoy, Manufacturing Consent, xi.
62  Burawoy, ‘Between Labor Process’, 10.
63  David Knights and Darren McCabe, ‘Ain’t Misbehavin’?’. Sociology 34, no. 3 (2000): 421–36.
64  Townsend, ‘Teams, Control’, 14.
65  For example, the term ‘mindset’ is used by several of Van den Broek’s interviewees at ‘Servo’, 
though it was also used approvingly in this context by the Business Council of Australia as far back 
as the 1980s. Van den Broek, ‘HRM, Workforce Control’, 340; Business Council of Australia, 
Enterprise-Based Bargaining Units: A Better Way of Working. Part 1 (Melbourne: BCA, 1989), 2.
66  Hugh Willmott, ‘Strength Is Ignorance; Slavery Is Freedom: Managing Culture in Modern 
Organizations’. The Journal of Management Studies 30, no. 4 (1993): 515–52.
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Culture and culturism
The word culture comes from ‘the idea of cultivation, the process of 
tilling and developing the land’.67 We saw in Chapter 3 how it is about 
‘the set of shared, taken-for-granted implicit assumptions that a group 
holds and that determines how it perceives, thinks about and reacts to its 
various environments’,68 and that culturism is the attempt by management 
to create specific organisational cultures reflecting management’s 
objectives.69 In recent decades senior managers have often consciously 
attempted to create a particular type of culture at the workplace, and 
this is what Willmott, discussed in Chapter 3, was railing against.70 From 
the 1980s, numerous management gurus spoke of ‘managing culture’, 
‘managing myths’ and ‘creating meaning’—in effect, creating a form of 
intracorporate hegemony.71 Despite the rhetoric of managerial consultants 
and motivational texts, research has been unable to demonstrate that 
a particular culture is part of a recipe for success. The link between 
culture and performance ‘is a tenuous one, as only behaviour can affect 
performance, and culture is not the only determinant of behaviour’.72 
Some evidence suggests the direction of causality is the other way around: 
changing performance leads to a change in culture.73 A study of nearly 
200 organisations suggested ‘strong’ cultures did not aid performance, 
and indeed could be counterproductive if they were not ‘contextually 
or strategically appropriate’ and did not ‘contain norms and values that 
can help firms adapt to a changing environment’.74 (The term ‘strong’ in 
relation to culture suggests a common culture that is widely adopted and 
reinforced within the organisation, which those writing about it often 
suggest is a good thing, like the word ‘strong’ itself.)
67  Gareth Morgan, Images of Organisation (London: Sage, 1986), 112.
68  Edgar H. Schein, ‘Culture: The Missing Concept in Organization Studies’. Administrative 
Science Quarterly 41, no. 2 (1996): 236.
69  Willmott, ‘Strength Is Ignorance’.
70  Ibid.
71  Terence E. Deal and Allan A. Kennedy, Corporate Cultures—the Rites and Rituals of Corporate 
Life (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1982); Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, In Search of 
Excellence (New York: Harper & Row, 1982).
72  Dianne Lewis, ‘Five Years on—the Organizational Culture Saga Revisited’. Leadership & 
Organization Development Journal 23, no. 5 (2002): 280–87.
73  Randy G. Pennington, ‘Change Performance to Change the Culture’. Industrial and Commercial 
Training 35, no. 6 (2003): 251–55.
74  John P. Kotter and James L. Heskett, Corporate Culture and Performance (New York: Free Press, 
1992).
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Anyway, management rarely controls culture totally. Organisation 
culture reflects corporate history and practices. Culture may reflect the 
national and community environment and the different occupations of 
workers. It may be driven by employees and the communities from where 
they come. It may reflect the strategies and cultures of unions who are 
represented among the workforce. And it may reflect the importance 
of service versus profit objectives (in some public sector or nonprofit 
organisations, the former prevails over the latter).75 
The leadership of an organisation can attempt to drive cultural change. 
The chief executive officer (CEO) is often seen as shaping the culture of 
the organisation. However, it is very difficult to manipulate culture once 
it exists. Culture is a very complex social process in organisations. Many 
firms have tried to change corporate culture and failed. One study of 
22 cases of attempted culture change programs found that 16 of them 
failed.76 Perhaps the most potent force for cultural change, though, is 
critical junctures77 encountered by the organisation. That is, critical 
incidents or events tend to signal a break with past practices and the 
adoption of new practices and ideas.78 An organisation facing a crisis (such 
as looking down the barrel of financial oblivion) may make a radical shift 
from a low-trust to a high-trust strategy, or vice versa, with accompanying 
changes in culture if employees share the perspective of crisis.
Culturism and dimensions of management strategy
As already mentioned, culturism is often used by organisations who want 
to portray themselves as high-trust but practise low-trust management 
strategies—the contradiction between reality and rhetoric on the first 
dimension of management strategy. Culturism is also common where 
management adopts particular positions on the other two dimensions of 
management strategy. 
75  Morgan, Images of Organisation, 131–2.
76  Kotter and Heskett, Corporate Culture and Performance, 83.
77  The term ‘critical junctures’ was used by the Colliers to examine political change in Latin 
America, but it can have broader application. Ruth Berins Collier and J. David Collier, Shaping 
the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement and Regional Dynamics in Latin America 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991).
78  An example is ICI Botany (later Orica). See Tony Mealor, ICI Australia: The Botany Experience 
(Sydney: School of Industrial Relations and Organisational Behaviour, University of New South 
Wales, 1992).
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On the surface, it might seem that culturism is a form of collectivism. 
In one sense it is, in that organisations are attempting to get employees 
to take a collectively focused view of their welfare—that is, one focused 
on the collective welfare of the organisation (usually a corporation, which 
is itself a collective of capital). Yet many culturist policies are aimed at 
undermining collectivism by undermining unionism. On the other hand, 
some organisations seek to promote cooperative relations with their 
unions and members.79 If this is done with the support of union officials 
but not their members, or vice versa, it might lead to a split between 
union members and paid officials, and ‘wildcat’ actions by members or 
desertions from the union. 
Perhaps more commonly, these days, organisations pursue antiunion 
culturist strategies to promote commitment to the organisation. These 
organisations assume that employee commitment to their union is 
inconsistent with employee commitment to the organisation. Interestingly, 
the assumptions behind this organisational perspective are not supported 
by research. Studies from the 1950s to recent times show that employees 
can possess ‘dual commitment’ to the organisation and to a  union.80 
Indeed, there is a positive association between commitment to the 
organisation and commitment to a union. In other words, employees who 
are strongly committed to the union are likely to be strongly committed 
to the organisation. Not all studies show these findings, although a lot of 
them do. Very few studies find a negative relationship between union and 
organisational commitment.81 Despite these findings, that commitment 
to the union and employer are positively related; some managers still 
79  Ibid.
80  Ed Snape and Andy W. Chan, ‘Commitment to Company and Union: Evidence from Hong 
Kong’. Industrial Relations 39, no. 3 (2000): 445–59; D.G. Gallagher, ‘The Relationship between 
Organizational and Union Commitment among Federal Government Employees’. Academy of 
Management Proceedings. (1984): 319–23; Cynthia V. Fukami and Erik W. Larson, ‘Commitment 
to Company and Union: Parallel Models’. Journal of Applied Psychology 69, no. 3 (1984): 367–71; 
Harold L. Angle and James L. Perry, ‘Dual Commitment and Labor–Management Relationship 
Climates’. Academy of Management Journal 29, no. 1 (1986): 31–50; Edward J. Conlon and Daniel 
G. Gallagher, ‘Commitment to Employer and Union: Effects of Membership Status’. Academy of 
Management Journal 30, no. 1 (1987): 151; Daniel G. Gallagher and Paul F. Clark, ‘Research on 
Union Commitment: Implications for Labor’. Labor Studies Journal 14, no. 3 (1989): 52–71; John 
M. Magenau, James E. Martin, and Melanie M. Peterson, ‘Dual and Unilateral Commitment among 
Stewards and Rank-and-File Union Members’. Academy of Management Journal 31 (1988): 359–
76; Aaron Cohen, ‘Dual Commitment to the Organization and the Union: A Multi-Dimensional 
Approach’. Relations Industrielles 60, no. 3 (2005): 432–54.
81  Roderick D. Iverson and Sarosh C. Kuruvilla, Does Dual Commitment Underline Company 
and Union Commitment? An Application of Second Order Confirmatory Analysis. Working Paper 67 
(Melbourne: Centre for Industrial Relations and Labour Studies, University of Melbourne, 1992).
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oppose unionism because unions are a counterculture that recognises that 
the interests of employee and employer may not be synonymous—even 
if employees are committed to the employer. Thus hegemony through 
cultural control in Nineteen Eighty-Four’s Oceania and in The Handmaid’s 
Tale’s Gilead was aimed in part at preventing collective organisation 
against the ruling elites, not to improve efficiency but to maintain power. 
Even in The Circle, any collective organisation of employees, beyond those 
organising the countless work-related social activities, would have been 
frowned upon.
An early study that looked closely at nonunion culturism (before 
companies became too sensitive to allow such studies to happen) was 
that of ‘Servo’—a pseudonym for a large Australian company studied 
by Diane Van den Broek.82 Culture was created and reinforced through 
recruitment, induction and socialisation. Recruitment and selection 
were designed ‘to select employees most likely to aspire to company-
defined goals and objectives’. The idea was to avoid recruits with ‘cultural 
baggage’, and to select those from companies with the right ‘mindset’ or 
with little work experience. Induction workshops inculcated the Servo 
mission. Performance-related pay was used to discourage potentially 
disruptive behaviour. Servo was the company whose HR manager I met 
at the beginning of this chapter. 
Several aspects of culturism at Servo served to undermine any potential 
for unionism developing. Employees with incorrect attitudes could be 
weeded out. Performance-based remuneration and teamwork played an 
important role in individualising employment relations by breaking down 
the potential for employees to mount collective action around issues of 
pay and working conditions. Management at Servo believed that seeking 
assistance from ‘outside influences’ such as trade unions reflected a failure 
on the part of employees. Regarding a proposed nonunion enterprise 
agreement, the ‘internal management processes left many employees 
with the impression that undue managerial pressure was applied and 
that the agreement was a fait accompli’, for example through employees 
feeling ‘intimidated into acquiescence’. On this matter, group control 
was important: ‘some team leaders [stipulated] that voting be carried out 
as a team’. This was ‘not to suggest that Servo employees have not been 
willing partners’, Van den Broek added: ‘on the whole’, the remaining 
82  Van den Broek, ‘HRM, Workforce Control’.
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employees reacted favourably to Servo’s HR policies although they were 
aware of the existence of coercion. Most employees ‘were either unaware 
or uninterested in union activities or held the view that requesting union 
support would incite managerial hostility’.83 
In some cases, firms have used individual contracts and individual 
performance appraisal and pay as means of attempting to change 
culture. The most prominent example of this strategy was CRA, later 
known as Rio Tinto, which through a combination of financial, cultural 
and legal devices managed to largely deunionise substantial parts of its 
workforce in metalliferous mining and smelting, though it faced much 
more substantial difficulties in coal mining, where a different union had 
coverage.84 Companies that set out to avoid unions (or deunionise) shape 
the symbolic dimensions of their actions to attempt to create a culture 
that identifies certain individuals and forms of behaviour as ‘in’ and other 
individuals, groups (such as unions) and behaviours as ‘out’. The former 
can be referred to as inclusivist and the latter as exclusivist actions.85 That 
said, subsequent problems including the rejection of proposed nonunion 
agreements by several large, nonunionised Rio Tinto sites in Western 
Australia86 illustrated the vulnerability of culturism as a technique 
of control.
Related to this, cultural programs combined with deunionisation and 
individualisation can be a means of paying staff poorly. For example, the 
Merivale hotel chain in Sydney, Australia, emphasised its ‘family’ culture 
to employees—one manager said, ‘we’re not selling food, we’re not selling 
alcohol, we’re selling a feeling’, while the HR manager is called a ‘people 
experience manager’—but it used a nonunion agreement that had expired 
six years previously to pay employees below-award wages.87
83  Ibid.
84  Peetz, Brave New Workplace, Chapter 5.
85  Ibid., 207.
86  Bradon Ellem, Hard Ground: Unions in the Pilbara (Port Hedland: Pilbara Mineworkers Union, 
2004); Samantha Donovan, ‘Rio Tinto Loses Appeal on Worker Agreements’. ABC News Online, 
11 February 2012, www.abc.net.au/news/2012-02-11/rio-tinto-loses-appeal-on-work-agreements/ 
3824636.
87  ‘Merivale Staff Say They Aren’t Being Paid Properly’, 7.30, ABC, 12 November 2018, www.abc.
net.au/7.30/merivale-staff-say-they-arent-being-paid-fairly/10490500; Workplace Express, ‘FWC 
Kills Off “Zombie” Deals’. Workplace Express, 22 January 2019, www.workplaceexpress.com.au/nl06 
_ news _ selected.php?act=2&stream=1&selkey=57483 (subscription required).
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Strongly culturist organisations tend to have a set of characteristics on the 
dimensions of management style. They depict themselves as high trust 
but frequently behave as low trust and seek a monoculture to facilitate 
control. They are mostly individualistic, as opposed to collectivist. And 
they are usually highly structured because they are commonly large, with 
the HR functions (often renamed) to support such an approach. In the 
‘stronger’ forms of culturism they use formal elements of HR such as 
performance appraisal to reinforce the desired culture.
Culturism as control of employees
The use of culturism to promote individualisation brings us back 
to a  paradox—culturism appears collective but often undermines 
collectivism. As Willmott says, culturist organisations often use the 
rhetoric of individualism while aiming to suppress individual diversity. The 
(in)famous Milgram experiments of the 1960s88 help us under stand why 
sophisticated individualising corporations put such emphasis on creating 
a monoculture in which employees are not exposed to dissenting ideas, as 
exposure to dissent enabled participants to defy the directions of authority 
figures.89 They also therefore illustrate another aspect of the limits to 
culturism. A recent example of the points made (somewhat inadvertently) 
by Milgram, and by Zimbardo in the Stanford prison experiments, can be 
seen in the argument made by University of New South Wales psychiatrist 
Michael Dudley, concerning the organisational culture that developed 
within Border Force (the Australian immigration bureaucracy) and the 
private security corporations that are used to control asylum seekers 
in detention centres, mostly outside Australia. He wrote in Australian 
Psychiatry of how ‘policies misuse helping professionals to underwrite 
state abuses and promote public numbing and indifference, resembling 
other state abuses in the “war on terror” and (with qualification) historical 
counterparts, e.g. Nazi Germany’.90 It followed from earlier research he 
had published that focused on the culture of Nazi psychiatry.91 The interest 
in the behaviour of Nazi officials was what initially motivated Milgram’s 
interest in undertaking his experiments. The  power of organisational 
88  Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).
89  Randall Morck, Behavioral Finance in Corporate Governance—Independent Directors and Non-
Executive Chairs. Discussion Paper No. 2037 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Institute of Economic 
Research, May 2004).
90  Michael Dudley, ‘Helping Professionals and Border Force Secrecy: Effective Asylum-seeker 
Healthcare Requires Independence from Callous Policies’. Australasian Psychiatry (2016).
91  Michael Dudley and Fran Gale, ‘Psychiatrists as a Moral Community? Psychiatry under the Nazis 
and Its Contemporary Relevance’. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 36 (2002): 585–94.
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culture helps us understand what Hannah Arendt was talking about when 
she wrote of the ‘banality of evil’.92 Organisation culture makes what, in 
other circumstances, would be extraordinary seem ordinary, even banal.
Bad behaviour by banks led to a number of questions being asked, with 
a common official response being like this: ‘the culture that we’re building 
throughout the Commonwealth Bank … is one with the customer at the 
centre of what we do’.93 Yet as one observer remarked, a monoculture 
was at the core of the problem: ‘While the banks claim to want ethical 
cultures, in practice they are in the business of curtailing the very forms 
of critical questioning that allow ethical issues to be surfaced in the first 
place’.94 Performance appraisal and payment systems that rewarded and 
prioritised sales reinforced this culture.
The issues surrounding monoculturism are not just about the ethics of 
it—they are also about its economic efficiency. Diversity is the antithesis 
of monoculturism. Measuring the impact of a diverse workforce on 
improved firm performance is difficult, but McPherson concluded that 
diverse employees have the potential to improve firm performance.95 
Research has generally (though not always) found that companies with 
a diverse workforce have improved organisational outcomes based on 
financial performance.96 And in the end, the monoculture in banks 
described above, with the associated reputation cost, seems likely to see 
them losing customers and profit.
92  Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Viking, 1963).
93  Carl Rhodes, ‘“Command and Control” Banks Have Got Ethics and Culture All Wrong’. 
The Conversation, 18 March 2016. For an example of a ‘toxic and unsafe culture’, especially for 
women, at ANZ, see Jemima Whyte et al., ‘Inside ANZ’s Toxic Culture: The High-Octane World 
of Dealing Rooms’. Australian Financial Review, 15 January 2016. See also behaviour by a major 
insurance company owned by a bank in Adele Ferguson, Klaus Toft, and Mario Christodoulou, 
‘Money for Nothing’. Four Corners, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 8 March 2016, www.abc.
net.au/4corners/stories/2016/03/07/4417757.htm.
94  Rhodes, ‘“Command and Control” Banks’.
95  Mevyl McPherson, ‘Workforce Diversity: Evidence of Positive Outcomes and How to Achieve 
Them. A Review of the Literature’. Paper presented at Labour, Employment and Work conference, 
Wellington, 2008.
96  Catalyst, ‘The Bottom Line: Connecting Corporate Performance and Gender Diversity’. Catalyst, 
2004; O.C. Richard, ‘Racial Diversity, Business Strategy, and Firm Performance: A Resource-Based 
View’. Academy of Management Journal 43, no. 2 (2000): 164–77; C.W. Von Bergen, B. Soper, and 
J.A. Parnell, ‘Workforce Diversity and Organisational Performance’. Equal Opportunities International 
24, no. 3–4 (2005): 1–16; Robert A. Weigand, ‘Organizational Diversity, Profits and Returns in U.S. 
Firms’. Problems and Perspectives in Management 5, no. 3 (2007): 69–83; Anne M. McMahon, ‘Does 
Workplace Diversity Matter? A Survey of Empirical Studies on Diversity and Firm Performance, 
2000–09’. Journal of Diversity Management 5, no. 2 (2010): 37–48; Thomas A. Kochan et al., ‘The 
Effects of Diversity on Business Performance: Report of the Diversity Research Network’. Human 
Resource Management 42, no. 1 (2003): 3–21.
137
5 . MAnAgeMenT, cuLTuRe AnD conTRoL
In one article, Dennis Tourish, David Collinson and James Barker97 
drew on works such as that by Willmott, as well as Barker’s own study of 
concertive control at ISE electronics,98 the Milgram experiments99 and, in 
particular, an early study of Schein and colleagues.100 The last-mentioned 
looked at the experience of US POWs during the Korean War, and 
sought to explain the (slow) conversion many of them experienced to the 
philosophies of their captors (also referred to as ‘Stockholm Syndrome’, 
named after the reactions of hostages in a Swedish bank robbery and 
becoming prominent due to the events surrounding kidnapped heiress 
Patricia Hearst, in which she was said to have become sympathetic to her 
captors’ aims). Tourish and colleagues draw a number of analogies between 
the techniques used on the POWs and the techniques used by corporate 
culturists, in particular use of what they call ‘coercive persuasion’ to ensure 
conformist behaviour within organisations.101 
Yet although Willmott, as discussed earlier, was highly critical of culturism, 
he was not entirely pessimistic. This is because he suspected culturism 
might not work. From the standpoint of the individual, the distancing 
of self from corporate values may be the preferred means of preserving 
and asserting self-identity.102 This is closely related to the observation by 
Stephen Lukes, discussed in Chapter 2, that attempts to exercise the third 
dimension of power (in practice, hegemony) can never be more than 
‘partially’ effective.103 As Tourish et al. emphasised, ‘the imprisonment of 
US POWs in Korea clearly does not exactly parallel the context of most 
contempo rary organisations’, even though there are ‘interesting over-
laps between these contexts’.104 This is an important point that has been 
made by several authors. Culture ‘is not a variable that can be created, 
discovered or destroyed by the whims of management’ but ‘some are in 
a better position than others to attempt to intentionally influence aspects 
of it’.105 
97  Tourish, Collinson, and Barker, ‘Manufacturing Conformity’.
98  James R. Barker, ‘Tightening the Iron Cage: Concertive Control in Self-Managing Teams’. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1993): 408–37.
99  Milgram, Obedience to Authority.
100  E.H. Schein, I. Schneier, and C.H. Barker, Coercive Persuasion: A Socio-Psychological Analysis of the 
‘Brainwashing’ of American Civilian Prisoners by the Chinese Communists (New York: Norton, 1961).
101  Tourish, Collinson, and Barker, ‘Manufacturing Conformity’.
102  Willmott, ‘Strength Is Ignorance’, 537.
103  Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 2nd ed. (London: Palgrave, 2005).
104  Tourish, Collinson, and Barker, ‘Manufacturing Conformity’, 372–3.
105  V. Lynn Meek, ‘Organisational Culture: Origins and Weaknesses’. Organisational Studies 9, no. 4 
(1988): 453–73.
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The other reason culturism fails is the contradictions it creates. 
For  example, Peter Waring spoke of the ‘paradox of prerogative’ when 
management recognised the need for increased participation, but was 
unwilling to modify the practice and perception of managerial prerogative 
by providing employees with greater autonomy.106 Ogbonna observed how 
the ‘smile’ campaign at a UK supermarket, ‘Capro’, contradicted both 
the old ‘pile it high, sell it cheap’ culture and the more recent increase 
in number of difficult customers they had to deal with, leading to their 
jobs becoming more demanding, and the strategy of tight supervision 
of employees. As one manager said, ‘we are able to detect when a check 
out operator is not smiling or even when she is putting on a false smile 
… we call her into a room and have a chat with her’.107 ‘At the very 
best’, concluded Ogbonna, ‘many attempts to change culture are only 
successful at the overt, behavioural level’.108 That is, managers may get 
employees to change their behaviour but not the way they think about 
the organisation. Then there is the example of the coffee giant Starbucks, 
which as part of its culturist efforts referred to its employees as ‘partners’, 
but then announced store closures, job losses and cuts to sick leave and 
other employee (‘partner’) benefits.109
You see this doublespeak up close. I spoke to someone who worked at an 
organisation in which management had decided to close down a workplace 
interstate, and expand the Brisbane workplace. But workers in Brisbane 
still felt insecure about their jobs. At a meeting, management held out an 
olive branch (and a written offer) saying ‘we want to win your trust back’. 
The workers then looked at the offer that management had documented, 
and indicated their disagreement. The response from management was 
described as ‘you’re either in the bus, or under the bus’. So the rhetoric 
of ‘trust’ did not last very long.110 
106  Peter Waring, ‘The Paradox of Prerogative in Participative Organisations: The Manipulation of 
Corporate Culture?’. Paper presented at Current Research in Industrial Relations, Proceedings of the 
12th AIRAANZ Conference, Wellington, February 1998, 423–30.
107  Emmanuel Ogbonna, ‘Organisation Culture and Human Resource Management: Dilemmas 
and Contradictions’. In Reassessing Human Resource Management, ed. P. Blyton and P. Turnbull 
(London: Sage, 1992): 74–96.
108  Ogbonna, ‘Organisation Culture’, 90.
109  David Emerson, ‘Starbucks Axes 61 Stores and 685 Jobs’. Sydney Morning Herald, 29 July 
2008; Robert Booth and Patrick Strudwick, ‘Starbucks to Slash Paid Lunch Breaks and Sick Leave’. 
The Guardian, 4 December 2012.
110  Personal communication.
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All this raises an interesting ethical question: it is not just whether culturism 
ever can or does lead to better organisational performance that is at issue; 
also at issue is whether it is right for organisations to try to determine 
what employees think, not just how they behave, and to recruit, train and 
discipline employees on that basis. 
Employees’ ability to resist culturism depends on exposure to other 
influences, inside and outside the workplace, even before they enter the 
workforce. Surveillance technologies may enable organisations to exercise 
greater control on ideas discussed within the workplace by their employees. 
It also enables them to better (albeit imperfectly) manage ideas outside the 
workplace, in society as a whole. Some organisations seek to discipline, or 
even sack, employees who express dissenting views on social media.111 It is 
one reason why the maintenance of the employment relationship is central: 
organisations can have very little power over the culture or behaviour of 
their workers if their workers are genuinely independent contractors. The 
employment relationship helps maintain control of workers—not just 
control over what employees do but, at least in the aspirations of some 
managers, control over their ‘mindset’ and helping them manage ‘what 
they think’.112 Not all large organisations seek cultural control and, as 
we will see in the next chapter, even for those that do not run culturist 
agendas, the employment relationship is important for other aspects of 
control. However, culturism makes the employment relationship all that 
more important where culture is in management’s sights.
So, exposure to competing ideas outside the workplace matters because 
of the limits it places on culturism. But that exposure is, itself, facing 
challenges. The decline of newspapers and other traditional mass media 
encourages governments to ease anticoncentration laws and allow 
media firms to agglomerate, reducing diversity in views through those 
mechanisms, and promotes business models that focus on pandering to 
limited world views at the expense of balanced journalism.113 The rise of 
the internet as a source of news in principle increases diversity, but there 
is evidence that people are increasingly participating in ‘echo chambers’, 
encouraged particularly by social media, that reinforce their own views 
111  Joe Myers, ‘Swearing on Social Media Really Could Cost You Your Job’. World Economic 
Forum, 24 April 2017.
112  Willmott, ‘Strength Is Ignorance’, 516.
113  The most renowned media organisation adopting that strategy is News Corporation. Jane 
Mayer, ‘The Making of the Fox News White House’. New Yorker, 11 March 2019, www.newyorker.
com/ magazine/ 2019/03/11/the-making-of-the-fox-news-white-house.
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and perversely reduce the diversity of views most people are exposed 
to.114 Those resisting management efforts may become more fixed in their 
views, but less able to penetrate the media experience of those accepting 
of a corporate orthodoxy. Indeed, social media can be used to harass those 
who express dissenting views.115
Overall, the effects of technology can go either way. Uncontested, the 
most likely pathway is towards increasing the appearance of high-trust 
approaches at work but hiding the proliferation of low-trust approaches, 
especially when corporate norms are violated. Other pressures, though, 
may alter that. Mae could have gone either way in The Circle, as the 
contradictory endings of the book and the movie showed. So, what is 
necessary to effectively contest the direction of culturism and management 
strategy? Part of it is about the choices made by critical actors—not just 
the Maes of this world, but also regulators, policy-makers and civil society. 
That last player leads us to the other part of what makes a difference: the 
degree of collective organisation that, when it comes to the future of work, 
is the collective organisation of labour. That is something we will look at 
in Chapter 7. But first, in Chapter 6, we see how trends in management 
strategy and structure are affecting the employment relationship itself.
114  Michela Del Vicario et al., ‘The Spreading of Misinformation Online’. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 113, no. 3 (2016): 554–59.
115  Joshua A. Cuevas, ‘A New Reality? The Far Right’s Use of Cyberharassment against Academics’. 
American Association of University Professors, 17 January 2018.
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Flexibility, the ‘gig economy’ 
and the employment 
relationship
Take a moment to imagine the future world of work. It could be a world 
in which trucks and other vehicles drive themselves. A world in which all 
your shopping is without human interaction, either done online or by you 
walking into an unstaffed shop. A world in which queries you have about 
anything, from legal or financial to technical or customer service matters, 
are answered not by a person but by a bot that sounds, maybe even looks, 
perfectly human. A world in which energy is generated on the roofs of 
houses and shared in communities, ugly transmission towers having long 
ago been torn down. A world in which robots provide assistance to the 
aged, the disabled, the young. A world in which giant workplaces like 
mines (though not coal mines, there will not be many of them) or factories 
or construction sites are fully automated and remotely controlled from 
some air-conditioned office in Sydney, or Dallas, or Mumbai. A world in 
which we will all be freelancers, pursuing the next contract like the Uber 
driver pursues the next ride. Maybe.
If this libertarian vision of a world of freelancers frees us from the 
drudgery of employment, it is also a nightmare for those who worry about 
equity and security in the future. In another corner sit those (often also 
from conservative political camps) who reassure us that nothing really is 
changing, and it will all work out in the end. Who to believe?
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In this chapter I look at the interaction of matters we discussed in the 
preceding two chapters; that is, I look at trends in work in light of changing 
management structures and strategies. I look in particular at management 
and risk, including how management has responded to risk, and other 
factors including cost pressures and the pressure for accountability. This 
chapter considers the forms of flexibility that are sought by employers, 
their origins and their effects on employees, for example through their 
impact on security and insecurity. It examines ‘precaritisation’ of work 
through the push for flexibility. A common feature of precaritisation is the 
growth of nonstandard employment, including through casualisation and 
independent contracting, in which workers become self-employed and take 
on the risks of the self-employed. Yet claims that casualisation and self-
employment  have not increased are often made to dispute widespread 
perceptions that insecurity at work is increasing.1 How can these things be 
reconciled? That is one of the matters this chapter will investigate. As will 
be seen, the best way to start to reconcile these facts is to understand 
two simple things about how large corporations work these days: (a) they 
want to minimise the costs and risks they face, and avoid accountability 
when things go wrong; and (b) they also need to maintain control over 
workers to ensure the end product has the features, including quality, that 
they want—and, to date, the best way to do that has been through the 
employment relationship. 
In this chapter we also consider what aspects of digital change are 
affecting, and likely to affect, work and workplace relations. We investigate 
whether we are moving to a world of freelancers or the ‘gig economy’ 
(sometimes referred to as ‘Uberisation’). We test whether digital platforms 
are fundamentally changing or destroying the employment relationship. 
We do this through the lens of ‘not there’ employment—the attempts by 
core capital to centralise profits and minimise costs, risks and accountability 
(through such devices as contracting out, franchising and the use of digital 
platforms), and the surprising resilience of the employment relationship. 
So we consider the reasons, in the logic of capitalism, for employment’s 
resilience, and what this means for risk and insecurity.
1  Mark Wooden, ‘Factcheck: Has the Level of Casual Employment in Australia Stayed Steady 
for the Past 18 Years?’. The Conversation, 23 March 2016, theconversation.com/factcheck-has-the-
level-of-casual-employment-in-australia-stayed-steady-for-the-past-18-years-56212; Robert Sobyra, 
‘Australian Jobs Aren’t Becoming Less Secure’. The Conversation, 17 July 2018, theconversation.com/
australian-jobs-arent-becoming-less-secure-99739.
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Management, uncertainty and flexibility
Writing in Europe in 1987, Wolfgang Streeck captured the mood 
that prevailed at the time, and to varying degrees since, in his article 
‘The Management of Uncertainty and the Uncertainties of Management’. 
Streeck emphasised how management faced the problem of finding ways of 
dealing with ‘an unprecedented degree of economic uncertainty deriving 
from a need for continuous rapid adjustment to a market environment that 
appears to have become permanently more turbulent than in the past’.2 
He argued that the key concept for management had become ‘flexibility’, 
which he defined as ‘a general capacity of enterprises to reorganise in 
close response to fluctuations in their environment’.3 He identified both 
external (numerical) and internal (functional and temporal) flexibility 
(discussed below) and consequently two ways firms could seek to achieve 
organisational flexibility—through a ‘return to contract’ (what we call 
external flexibility) or ‘extension of status’ (internal flexibility). However, 
said Streeck, the ‘management of uncertainty’ remained incomplete due 
to the profound ‘uncertainties of management’ in this new regime as they 
faced other parties (especially trade unions) while they pushed for greater 
decentralisation in industrial relations. In doing this, Streeck explained 
the rising significance of flexibility for employers—it was a means by 
which management could minimise risk. 
Management and risk
Risk is a consistent theme through management, and indeed the 
corporation can be seen as a device for limiting risk, in the interests 
of capital. In particular, the corporate form enables owners of capital 
to collectively undertake gambles (or risks) that have the potential to 
generate substantial returns while limiting the amount of liability that 
the owners of capital face if the activity goes pear-shaped. In the era since 
the end of the 1970s, several important changes in risk have taken place. 
As noted by Streeck, higher volatility in product markets has increased 
uncertainty for management.4 Financialisation, discussed in Chapter 2, 
has substantially shortened the period in which the ‘return’ from risks is 
2  Wolfgang Streeck, ‘The Uncertainties of Management and the Management of Uncertainty’. 
Work, Employment and Society 1, no. 2 (1987): 281–308.
3  Ibid., 290.
4  Ibid.
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meant to be retrieved (though there are some opposing forces as well, as 
we shall see in Chapter 9). Consequently, there have been efforts by capital 
to improve the rates of return associated with risk, by affecting both sides 
of the risk equation; that is, through transferring risk (uncertainty) from 
capital to labour, and increasing capital’s share of returns (altering the 
share of income growth going to labour and profits). The last has been 
achieved both through changes in employment practices of corporations 
and through lobbying of the state to introduce regulatory changes that 
either transfer risk or increase capital’s share of returns.
There are several ways in which risk-shifting has occurred. Researchers 
Mike Rafferty and Serena Yu identified changes in the world of work 
(the nature of work performed, the nature of demand for and supply 
of labour, the structure of jobs, the nature of bargaining, and pay and 
conditions); changes in working lives beyond the workplace (the way risk 
is experienced across a lifetime and how it connects with the world of 
work); and changes in the relationships between workers (the way workers 
experience and understand their lives, especially their shared experience 
of risk both at work and elsewhere).5 Here, I centre attention on that key 
element focused on by Streeck: the management of uncertainty and its 
link to flexibility, though I start with some other issues surrounding risk.
Risk, randomness and the illusion of understanding
Cognitive psychologist Daniel Kahneman, whose work influenced 
the development of behavioural economics, had a lot to say about the 
way we think, a little to say about management and not much to say 
directly about work. But what he says in several areas (summarised in his 
book, Thinking, Fast and Slow) has implications for work and the role 
of management within it.6 Of particular relevance here is the illusion of 
understanding.
Talking about risk or uncertainty is another way of saying that we 
cannot be certain that a particular event will happen, only that it has 
a (commonly imprecise) probability that can be attached to it. All sorts 
of random events influence this probability. But we love to think that we 
5  Mike Rafferty and Serena Yu, Shifting Risk: Work and Working Life in Australia. A report for 
the Australian Council of Trade Unions (Sydney: Workplace Research Centre, University of Sydney, 
September 2010).
6  Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).
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are in control. So we will often ascribe agency for something that actually 
happened due to random variation. We grab the illusion of understanding 
that event. Naturally, we will take the credit if things go right and blame 
others if things go wrong. So, often the fault is not simply in failing to give 
enough recognition to others when things go right, or failing to accept 
blame ourselves when things go wrong; it is in failing to recognise that 
many of the good or bad things that happen are simply a result of chance 
events—what some would call good or bad ‘luck’ (perhaps as if ‘luck’ was 
somehow a characteristic that ascribed to people). Hence managers will 
often be seen to be good (or bad) depending on whether random events 
led to outcomes that (perhaps temporarily) looked good or bad. It creates 
an illusion of control for the CEOs themselves, and certainly for those 
observing them, such that ‘when a particular executive fails, or is embroiled 
in a scandal, there is a quick defence that it is the individual who is at fault 
for not living up to the moral status of the position they hold’.7
It also means that you get to hear and see lots of heroic case studies, where 
management in seemingly difficult situations overcomes the odds to create 
a brilliant successful product through its own skill (or, alternatively, turns 
a good situation bad by making some unlucky errors). Kahneman gives 
the example of the story of Google, oft trumpeted as a major success of 
great owners and managers, when in fact a whole series of chance events 
happened to go their way.8 These heroic tales overflow the bookshelves 
in airports. Some even get into university courses. We love to read case 
studies because they tell a coherent, plausible story from which we too can 
learn how to overcome the odds and succeed. 
The trouble is, we do not get to see the studies of how other managers 
faced similar choices, made similar decisions and yet ended face-down, 
or for whom little changed. ‘Stories of success and failure consistently 
exaggerate the impact of leadership style and management practices 
on firm outcomes.’9 So firms with revered CEOs, who are granted 
prestigious press awards, subsequently experience falls in share price and 
7  Peter Bloom and Carl Rhodes, CEO Society: The Corporate Takeover of Everyday Life (London: 
Zed, 2018), 49.
8  Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, Chapter 9.
9  Ibid., Chapter 19, citing Philip Rosenzweig, ‘The Halo Effect and the Challenge of Management 
Inquiry: A Dialog between Phil Rosenzweig and Paul Olk’. Journal of Management Inquiry 19 (2010): 
48–54.
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operating performance.10 This is because previous results (that led to their 
veneration) were simply unrepresentatively good and were followed by 
a ‘reversion to the mean’. Often ‘overcoming the odds’ is, as the term 
‘odds’ implies, simply a matter of probabilities: someone had to get lucky, 
and it’s the ones who got lucky that we want to hear and learn from and 
idolise. If you read a case study of a successful firm or person, ask yourself: 
‘How different might things have been if one or two random events had 
gone another way?’.
Sometimes it is just these random events that will determine which 
particular cases get highlighted in public discourse; but sometimes they 
are chosen because somebody wants to push a particular policy barrow. 
While it is often said that there are lies, damned lies and statistics,11 case 
studies are especially handy for those who wish to do this, as information 
can be selectively included or excluded when it is presented to an audience, 
and verifiability can be difficult. So, for example, an Australian employer 
lobby group in a widely publicised 1989 report made much of how the 
case studies it reported demonstrated both a 25 per cent productivity 
gap between Australia and the USA resulting from industrial relations 
regulations and the need for major industrial relations reform.12 Details 
of the cases were sparse13 and subsequent developments invalidated 
the claims. Two decades after most of the demanded reforms had been 
implemented, the 25 per cent ‘productivity gap’ remained.14 Yet the 
commissioning organisation experienced the ‘illusion of understanding’ 
to such an extent that they had come to believe their own rhetoric. The 
same organisation also commissioned independent academic researchers 
to undertake case studies of ‘excellence’ in 30 organisations, only to 
10  Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, Chapter 24, citing Ulrike Malmendier and Geoffrey Tate, 
‘Superstar CEOs’. Quarterly Journal of Economics 24 (2009): 1593–638.
11  This phrase was attributed, apparently incorrectly, to Disraeli by Mark Twain. For more information 
on the problem referred to, however, see Darrell Huff, How to Lie with Statistics (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1954).
12  Business Council of Australia, Enterprise-Based Bargaining Units: A Better Way of Working. Part 1 
(Melbourne: BCA, 1989); Business Council of Australia, ‘The Report That Will Change the Way We 
Work’. Business Council Bulletin 59 (1989): 38–39.
13  Stephen J. Frenkel and David Peetz, ‘Enterprise Bargaining: The BCA’s Report on Industrial 
Relations Reform’. Journal of Industrial Relations 32, no. 1 (1990): 69–99.
14  David Peetz, ‘Does Industrial Relations Policy Affect Productivity?’. Australian Bulletin of Labour 
38, no. 4 (2012): 268–92.
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surprisingly find that their premise (that individual contracting was 
superior to collective bargaining) was wrong, as the academics found that 
‘both union and non-union workplaces were excellent’.15
Lobbyists have learnt not to leave the commissioning of reports, on issues 
on which they want to push a policy proposal, to chance. They now 
typically commission consultancy firms (who will do exactly what is asked 
of them) rather than independent researchers for that purpose, or ‘think-
tanks’ established to promote the view for which the group, from which 
the commissioning organisation comes, wants support.16
This is not to say that case studies have no value. They are used a lot 
in studies  of work. But readers should always be wary of agendas, 
of overgeneralising, and of attributing agency in place of either luck 
or selection bias in the cases or the data.
Related to the illusion of understanding are several other aspects of 
human perception. One is the illusion of hindsight—we think we were 
better at predicting things than we actually were, plus we ‘believe that we 
understand the past, which implies that the future should be knowable, 
but in fact we understand the past less than we believe we do’.17 The other 
is a tendency to ‘overconfidence’ in our perceptual and decision-making 
abilities (hence the willingness of people, as mentioned, to believe their 
own rhetoric). 
Put these things together and management can be overly optimistic about 
how it is perceived by employees—in some cases wildly so, especially where 
countervailing employee voice mechanisms are limited. An example of this 
occurred after the Employment Contracts Act 1991 (ECA) was introduced 
15  Daryl Hull and Vivienne Read, Simply the Best: Workplaces in Australia. Working Paper 88 
(Sydney: ACIRRT, University of Sydney, December 2003), 8. See also David Peetz, ‘Hollow Shells: 
The Alleged Link between Individual Contracting and  Productivity’. Journal of Australian Political 
Economy 56 (2005): 32–55.
16  On consultants, see Ross Gittins, ‘Dark Art of Econometrics’. Sydney Morning Herald, 
27  August 2007; Peter Martin, ‘Is Tony Abbott’s “Cop on the Beat” Worth $6 Billion?’. Sydney 
Morning Herald, 28 August 2013; Michael West, ‘Ignore Page Count, Just Note Number on the 
Front’. Sydney Morning Herald, 8 March 2014. One organisation concerned later gained notoriety for 
suppressing results of a survey it had undertaken of its members that undermined its own position on 
reducing company tax: Laura Tingle and Phillip Coorey, ‘Secret BCA Survey Does Not Back Tax Cuts 
Going to Jobs, Wage Rises’. Australian Financial Review, 26 March 2018, www.afr.com/news/secret-
bca-survey-does-not-back-tax-cuts-going-to-jobs-wage-rises-20180326-h0xzm7#ixzz5BJxim97U. On 
think-tanks, see A. Salas-Porras and G. Murray, eds, Think Tanks and Global Politics: Key Spaces in the 
Structure of Power (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
17  Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 201–2.
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in New Zealand. A survey of employees showed that 12 per  cent of 
employees reported an increase in their trust of management, and 30 per 
cent reported a decline, with no differences between employees in firms 
with and without new individual contracts. But a contemporaneous survey 
of employers found that, in firms without new contracts, 23 per cent 
thought employee trust of management had increased (only 4 per cent 
conceded a fall), while in firms with new (mostly individual) contracts 42 
per cent claimed an increase in employee trust of management, and only 6 
per cent a fall.18 Overconfidence, or management self-delusion, therefore 
was both common and strongest in firms where managers thought that 
individual contracts had brought employees closer to management (when 
the reality was often the reverse). Formal voice mechanisms were weakened 
(the ECA debilitated unions) and many managers believed, somewhat 
self-servingly, that individual contracts were a better form of voice.
Just as managers have an illusion of control, so they also seek to maintain 
or increase control. It does not feel good to be not in control, and it is not 
good to be seen as not in control. So it takes a lot of belief by managers and 
supervisors in the benefits of employee participation in decision-making, 
or in any social justice considerations, for them to follow a high-trust or 
a collectivist strategy. Alternatively, it takes strong employee organisation 
to force management to do those things. No doubt, in the future, there 
will be some employers following such paths, but if power shifts further 
from employees then managers will be less likely to pursue paths that 
employees seek. 
Managers as employees
Finally, it is worth pausing to remember that managers are also employees, 
and sometimes they are subjected to the same contradictions and pressures 
as lower-level employees.19 A study of managers in call centres found their 
ability to manage was undermined by role conflicts, micromanagement 
and lack of development or strategic direction, and their coping strategies 
18  David Peetz et al., ‘Workplace Bargaining in New Zealand: Radical Change at Work’. In Workplace 
Bargaining in the International Context, ed. David Peetz, Alison Preston, and Jim Docherty. Workplace 
Bargaining Research Project (Canberra: Department of Industrial Relations and Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1993), 290–93.
19  Keith Townsend and Sue Hutchinson, ‘Line Managers in Industrial Relations: Where Are We 
Now and Where to Next?’. Journal of Industrial Relations 59, no. 2 (2017 ): 139–52.
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were a mixture of embracing and resisting.20 So they experience, in 
sometimes quite specific ways, a number of the issues facing employees 
that are discussed elsewhere in this book; for example, issues regarding 
culture, gender, emotional labour, work intensity and ethics. At times in 
later chapters we use examples from managers to highlight certain aspects 
of those issues. How much, and in what ways, they experience those 
issues is often a function of how close to, or distant from, the top of 
the organisation they are—and therefore how much power they possess. 
Management is stressful work, especially for those who, as individuals, 
are troubled by the conflict between financial considerations and human 
considerations. 
Flexibility explored
One person’s flexibility is another person’s uncertainty—just as one 
person’s stability is another person’s rigidity. The underlying questions, 
according to Richard Hyman, that we ultimately need to consider with 
flexibility are: who gains and who loses; and whose interests are promoted 
and whose interests are neglected.21
For Hyman, flexibility is ‘more a rhetorical slogan than … an analytical 
instrument’.22 The language of flexibility is value laden: flexibility is 
invariably portrayed as a ‘good thing’. If someone is deemed not flexible, 
then they are portrayed as rigid—a ‘bad thing’.23 Economists and others 
frequently tell us that labour market flexibility is a good thing.
But we could, of course, give the term ‘flexibility’ the opposite 
connotation. For instance, we could say flexible = uncertain = a bad thing; 
and that rigid = stable = a good thing. In this interpretation, flexibility 
would be characterised as a social ‘bad’ as opposed to a social ‘good’. 
As you can see, we need to separate out the prescriptive (‘we should be 
flexible’) component of the term flexibility from the analytical component 
(e.g. numerical vs functional). 
20  Maeve Houlihan, ‘Managing to Manage? Stories from the Call Centre Floor’. Journal of European 
Industrial Training 25, no. 2 (2001): 208–20.
21  Michele Salvati, ‘A Long Cycle in Industrial Relations’. Labour 3, no. 1 (1989): 42–72.
22  Richard Hyman, The Political Economy of Industrial Relations (London: Macmillan, 1989).
23  Salvati, ‘Long Cycle’.
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This rise of the idea that ‘flexibility’ by employees was a desirable thing 
coincided with the opening up of market forces and the movement of 
neoclassical economic ideas (‘market liberalism’) to ascendancy in policy 
debates and decisions. The ‘Great Recession’ (as Americans described it) 
or ‘global financial crisis’ (as Australians called it) showed that many of the 
key propositions behind the neo-liberal model can no longer be assumed 
to be true.24 For example, the highly ‘flexible’ US labour market generated 
worse increases in unemployment during the financial crisis than were 
generated by the less flexible European labour market, even though 
Europe suffered a larger fall in GDP.25 Since then, austerity programs 
implemented in Europe, but not the USA, have prevented Europe from 
making the recovery in unemployment that was subsequently seen in the 
USA. In economic terms, demand, not flexibility, has driven the course 
of unemployment.
First, though, let us differentiate between flexibility for workers and 
flexibility by workers. Flexibility for workers occurs when companies 
change work practices or working time to better suit worker needs. 
Allowing workers to take time off to attend school concerts, enabling 
job sharing, permanent part-time work, ‘48/52’ arrangements—these 
are all examples of employers being flexible for workers. Research shows 
these things are mostly effective in enabling better work–life balance, and 
are often aimed at increasing job satisfaction, attraction or retention of 
valuable employees.26 
But when employers or politicians complain about a lack of flexibility, 
they usually mean flexibility by workers. Here researchers distinguish 
between two types of flexibility by workers. They are functional and 
numerical flexibility.
Forms of labour flexibility by employees
Functional flexibility is the employer’s ability to deploy employees between 
activities and tasks to match changing workloads, production methods 
or technology. It is often loosely associated with multiskilling and the 
expansion of worker autonomy. Numerical flexibility is the employer’s 
24  John Quiggin, Zombie Economics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010).
25  David Peetz, Stephane Le Queux, and Ann Frost, ‘The Global Financial Crisis and Employment 
Relations’. In The Future of Employment Relations: New Paradigms, New Approaches, ed. Adrian 
Wilkinson and Keith Townsend (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 193–214.
26  Natalie Skinner and Janine Chapman, ‘Work–Life Balance and Family Friendly Policies’. 
Evidence Base 4 (2013); Jason Hess, ‘Ignore Flexible Working at Your Peril’. Real Business 5 February 
2014, realbusiness.co.uk/ignore-flexible-working-at-your-peril/.
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capacity to adjust labour inputs to fluctuations in output. Numerical 
flexibility in turn can be broken down into three forms. External numerical 
flexibility refers to nonstandard forms of employment—the ability to 
adjust the level of labour inputs, for example through use of casual labour, 
part-time workers, subcontracting, labour hire or fixed contract workers. 
Internal numerical flexibility (or temporal flexibility) refers to the ability 
to adjust the quantity and timing of work without engaging additional 
labour. ‘Financial’ or wage flexibility refers to the ability to adjust wages 
up or downwards in line with output or market circumstances, through 
mechanisms such as piece rates, gain-sharing, productivity bonuses, 
incentive pay schemes or pay cuts.27
Different types of flexibility are often associated with different 
management styles. For example, numerical flexibility tends to be 
associated with low-trust styles. It may be linked to individualism (in that 
contracting and casualisation make it harder for unions to organise, and 
sometimes this is a purpose of casualisation or contracting out). On the 
other hand, some aspects of numerical flexibility (in particular, profit-
sharing or productivity-related pay) may go hand in hand with employee 
participation mechanisms that in turn require high trust (though it may 
not always be provided). Indeed, it appears that contingent pay schemes 
only really work effectively when they are associated with employee ability 
to influence work, which, when profit-sharing or productivity-related 
pay are involved, means employee participation in decision making.28 
However, profit-pay and participation do not necessarily coexist. In short, 
it’s complicated.
By contrast, functional flexibility tends to be disproportionately linked 
to higher trust approaches (you want employees to stay in the firm 
as they are trained in multiple skills and tasks, and this requires the 
building of some trust). It may be linked to collectivism in that internal 
labour markets (ILMs), often tied to functional flexibility, are also more 
favourable to unionism, and may force management to recognise collective 
27  Karen Legge, Human Resource Management: Rhetorics and Realities. Management, Work & 
Organisations Series (Basingstoke, England: Macmillan Business, 1995).
28  John R. Cable and Felix R. Fitzroy, ‘Co-operation and Productivity: Some Evidence from West 
German Experience’. Journal of Economic Analysis and Workers Management 14, no. 2 (1980): 163–
80; Douglas Kruse, Employee Ownership and Employee Attitudes: Two Case Studies (Norwood Editions: 
Pennsylvania, 1984); Bjørne Grimsrud and Torunn Kvinge, ‘Productivity Puzzles—Should Employee 
Participation Be an Issue?’. Nordic Journal of Political Economy 32, no. 2 (2006): 139–67; General 
Accounting Office, Employee Stock Ownership Plans: Little Evidence of Effects on Corporate Performance 
(Washington DC: GAO, March 1987).
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organisations. And it might be linked to structured management, in that 
rules and procedures also tend to be linked to ILMs and their greater use 
of training. But the case should not be overstated: smaller firms may seek 
functional flexibility because they do not have enough staff for detailed 
specialisation, but they may also be too small to offer ILMs with strong 
career prospects. So these can be seen as theoretical tendencies rather than 
corollaries.
Functional flexibility
Functional flexibility denotes the ability of employees to move flexibly 
between different job tasks and assignments. While it appears that many 
employees are demonstrating functional flexibility in other work, Karen 
Legge’s case-study evidence suggested that, in firms that sought to focus on 
functional flexibility, the degree of flexibility achieved was ‘more modest 
than celebratory accounts of multiskilled teamworking or craft-based 
flexible specialisation might imply’.29 Changes reportedly rarely involved 
radical skill enhancement. One study examined attempts at introducing 
full functional flexibility—basically everybody can do everything—
at a Pirelli greenfield site. These attempts were eventually abandoned 
because of the importance of specialist knowledge that was lost with full 
functional flexibility; the importance of commitment that was associated 
with ‘ownership’ of a particular area; the cost and availability of training; 
and the problems of skill retention being weak if new skills were not 
constantly practised.30
A British study of collective agreements to achieve functional flexibility 
also detected problems. While most agreements contained promises of 
job security, they ‘almost always implied a reduction in the workforce, 
if not through redundancies then by so-called natural wastage’ resulting 
from anticipated rises in productivity.31 According to Legge, the objective 
was ‘increased managerial control over the deployment of labour and 
consequent labour intensification, with [quality of working life] outcomes 
secondary if not incidental’.32
29  Legge, Human Resource Management, 162; Tony Elger, ‘Task Flexibility and Intensification of 
Labour in UK Manufacturing in the 1980s’. In Farewell to Flexibility, ed. Anna Pollert (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1991).
30  J. Clark, ‘Full Flexibility and Self-Supervision in an Automated Factory’. In Human Resource 
Management and Technical Change, ed. J. Clark (London: Sage, 1993).
31  Income Data Services, Flexible Working. Study 407 (London: IDS, April 1988); Anna Pollert, 
‘The Flexible Firm: Fixation or Fact?’. Work, Employment and Society 2, no. 3 (1988): 281–316.
32  Legge, Human Resource Management, 169.
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Numerical flexibility
External numerical flexibility is concerned with the ease of increasing or 
reducing the number of employees. Broadly speaking, there are two ways 
in which this can be achieved: by making it easy to hire or fire ‘core’ 
or ‘permanent workers’; or by making it easy to have people working 
on ‘peripheral’ contracts—as casual employees, labour hire workers or 
dependent contractors.
One of the changes in employment relations from the mid-1980s 
was the  restructuring of employment associated with the growth of 
nonstandard or atypical forms of employment, such as contract, part-
time, casual, agency, homeworking, trainees and self-employment. 
Although it is common to include part-time in this list of nonstandard 
employment, this is not analytically very helpful, as part-time work can 
be permanent and is sometimes (not always) driven by the supply side 
(workers wanting part-time employment). The main exception—that 
is, the main instance where part-time noncasual work is precarious—is 
where underemployment is experienced.33 So we focus most on contract, 
casual, agency, homeworking, trainees and dependent self-employment 
(i.e. where the worker has the appearance of being self-employed but 
is actually dependent upon one organisation to provide him or her 
with work). Casual employment is a term used in Australia to describe 
employment contracts in which the contract lasts only for the period of 
the current shift, though in practice employees are usually expected to 
stay for weeks, months or sometimes even years. In most other countries, 
temporary employment is a term used to describe employees whose period 
of engagement is not ongoing. Time series data are not easy to obtain, 
and most Australian studies rely on data about people with no access to 
paid holiday or sick leave (as most casuals lack such access). Most Australian 
casuals have no access to protection against unfair dismissal, redundancy 
pay or long-service leave. The closest analogy in the UK is ‘zero hours 
contracts’ (you have a ‘job’ but no guarantee that you will work in any 
particular week) while the OECD usually uses ‘temporary employment’ 
as its indicator of precarity in employment and includes Australian casual 
33  Between 2010–11 and 2016–17, the number of hours sought, but not worked, by underemployed 
people in Australia grew by 31 per cent, five times the total growth in hours worked. See Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, ‘Labour Account Australia, Quarterly Experimental Estimates’, September 2017. 
Canberra 6150.0.55.003.
The ReALITIeS AnD FuTuReS oF WoRk
154
employment in that measure. There has not been much change in the past 
decade in the overall proportion of Australian employees who have access 
to holiday and sick leave.
Labour hire (where the worker is not a direct employee of the company 
for whom s/he is working) is another form of casual employment, and 
the growth of labour hire is part of the reason for the relative growth of 
full-time casual employment.34 Employees paid by labour hire agencies are 
in uncertain ‘triangular’ relationships with the labour hire firm and the 
firm for whom they are doing work. Labour hire workers appear to have 
inferior occupational health and safety outcomes35 and to lack protection 
from unfair dismissal and redundancy. 
In dependent contractor relationships, the worker is not even an employee, 
even though they are mostly only working for one organisation (that in 
other circumstances would be called an ‘employer’). The term ‘independent 
contractors’ is sometimes used in popular discourse to refer to both the 
above group and those who are genuinely independent and have many 
clients or customers.
Whereas external numerical flexibility allows the employer to change 
the number of workers they have at a point in time, internal numerical 
flexibility (or temporal flexibility) allows them to change when and for 
how many hours those employees work. Casual employment does both. 
Part-time employment contracts may (or may not) also allow the employer 
to vary hours per employee.
Another aspect of internal numerical flexibility is the capacity of employers 
to get more hours out of workers when needed, through paid or unpaid 
overtime. Over much of the last century, premiums or ‘penalty rates’ for 
working nights or weekends, and in particular premiums for overtime, 
reduced the incentive on employers to make existing employees work for 
extra hours (rather than take on additional workers). In the last quarter 
34  If we take the liberty of labelling people without leave as ‘casuals’, then the number of ‘casual’ 
full-timers grew in Australia by 38 per cent between 2009 and 2017. So-called ‘permanent’ full-timers 
(that is, those with annual leave) grew by just 10 per cent. On the other hand, some organisations 
have found their reliance on part-time casuals has been counterproductive, as it meant workers had no 
commitment and were unreliable. So some large retailers now use ‘permanent’ part-timers rather than 
casuals. So-called ‘casual’ part-timers grew by just 13 per cent between 2009 and 2016. ‘Permanent’ 
part-timers grew by 36 per cent. See Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Characteristics of Employment’.
Canberra 6333.0.
35  E. Underhill, ‘Changing Work and OHS: The Challenge of Labour Hire Employment’. Paper 
presented at the New Economies: New Industrial Relations conference, Noosa, February 2004, 544–51.
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century, there has been a breakdown of the standard working-time model. 
A diminishing proportion of workers are employed for a standard 38 to 
40 hours per week. A large proportion of the workforce are working either 
shorter hours (in part-time jobs) or longer hours.36
So, while part of internal flexibility concerns the number of hours people 
work, another part, one that employer organisations are putting more 
emphasis on, is about getting people to work when it best suits the 
employer—including on nights or weekends. Hence wage premiums for 
unsocial hours—that is, for working nights or weekends (referred to in 
Australia as ‘penalty rates’ and in New Zealand as ‘penal rates’)—are being 
challenged. These were established a long time ago, both as an effort to 
get people to work unsocial hours (i.e. to increase labour supply at those 
times) and to compensate people for the inconvenience of working those 
hours (part of what neoclassical economists would call a ‘compensating 
wage differential’). Sundays have (in recent centuries) been associated with 
religious observance in some countries, and so the decline of religion has 
been used by some employers to argue that Sunday wage premiums are 
outdated, though the concept of a rest day has a much stronger lineage.37
Although it is argued by some that the ‘24/7’ economy renders shift 
premiums obsolete, a counter is that it is still essential that people have 
time away from work on nights and weekends. In developed countries 
this is even more important now that two adults in a household are 
typically working, as otherwise the opportunities for a couple to spend 
time together would be very limited. Evidence indicates that people 
working at nights or weekends are more likely than others to be dissatisfied 
with the balance between their personal and family lives, and to report 
a deterioration in how well they get on with people at home. The partners 
of those working weekends are more likely than the partners of people 
who do not work weekends to want their spouses to get a different job 
and to complain about the way their social life is affected by their spouse’s 
work responsibilities.38
36  For example, Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Working Time Arrangements, Australia’, 
November 2012. Canberra 6342.0.
37  David Peetz, Scott Bruynius, and Georgina Murray, ‘Choice and the Impact of Changes to 
Sunday Premiums in the Australian Retail and Hospitality Industries’. Journal of Industrial Relations 
(2019), doi.org/10.1177/0022185618814578.
38  David Peetz et al., ‘Quality and Quantity in Work–Home Conflict: Nature and Direction of 
Effects of Work on Employees’ Personal Relationships and Partners’. Australian Bulletin of Labour 37, 
no. 2 (2011): 138–63.
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To the extent that flexibility is associated with uncertainty, it is numerical 
flexibility that is at issue. The growth of numerical flexibility since the 
mid-1980s has been seen as signifying the growth of ‘precaritisation’; 
that is, the creation of precarious jobs. People in casual jobs, including 
labour hire, fixed-term employees and dependent contractors, can be 
seen as in particularly precarious jobs. So too, however, may be a number 
of people in ‘permanent’ jobs, as they can still be made redundant or 
otherwise dismissed—especially in the context of the emergence of ‘not 
there’ employment, discussed below. Guy Standing coined a term, ‘the 
precariat’, to encompass what he considered to be a new and dangerous 
social class, evident globally, experiencing ongoing precarity in work 
and open to political extremism. It evokes, but does not mean the same 
as, Marx’s ‘lumpenproletariat’, described as a dispossessed group at the 
bottom of society, including ‘vagabonds … knife grinders, tinkers [and] 
beggars’ who lacked class consciousness.39 Precarity, however, affects more 
than just a particular class of people or the ‘low skilled’—the precarity 
of casual (‘sessional’ or ‘adjunct’) university teachers, often with PhDs, is 
illustrative of this.40
That growth in casualisation since the 1980s should not be seen as 
the emergence of a new phenomenon. It is better understood as the 
reemergence of an old phenomenon, reflecting a reversal of the gains 
workers had achieved in much of the preceding part of the twentieth 
century. In Australia, for example, casual employment was a dominant 
feature of working-class employment in the 1870s and 1880s. This 
reflected the high seasonality of rural and downstream employment, the 
unpredictability of demand in manufacturing, and employers’ ability to 
pass the costs of these things to employees (while maintaining an ILM for 
more trusted or important employees and relatives).41
39  Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (London: The Electric Book Company, 
1852; repr., 1998), 78. See also Robert L. Bussard, ‘The “Dangerous Class” of Marx and Engels: 
The Rise of the Idea of the Lumpenproletariat’. History of European Ideas 8, no. 6 (2012): 675–92.
40  For example, Robyn May, David Peetz, and Glenda Strachan, ‘The Casual Academic Workforce 
and Labour Market Segmentation in Australia’. Labour and Industry 23, no. 3 (2013): 258–75.
41  Jenny Lee and Charles Fahey, ‘A Boom for Whom? Some Developments in the Australian Labour 
Market, 1870–1891’. Labour History—A Journal of Labour and Social History 50 (1986): 1–27.
157
6 . FLexIbILITy, The ‘gIg econoMy’ AnD The eMPLoyMenT ReLATIonShIP
Is risk about job insecurity?
We need to recognise that transferring risk need not be the same thing 
as making jobs insecure. Campbell and Burgess, in a significant review 
article, refer to precariousness as manifested not only in employment 
insecurity (including underemployment) but also in earnings insecurity 
and working-time insecurity (i.e. unpredictability of shifts).42 Risk can 
simply be about making the livelihoods of workers insecure. If, in relative 
terms, wages are lowered, and workers are juggling which bill they can 
afford to not pay in which week, then people’s livelihoods are precarious 
in a way that is not captured by data on the probability of unemployment 
or the rate of casualisation. Wages growth has slowed in many countries 
including Australia,43 and ‘in a majority of countries across the world 
wage growth in recent decades has lagged behind the growth of labour 
productivity’.44 Over the past three decades, median real wages in the 
USA have barely improved,45 and there an unexpected ill-health event can 
send even an insured family into penury.46
In economics, risk is typically correlated with returns (high risk implies high 
returns). In recent decades, large firms have shifted the risk component of 
that equation onto labour, but protected the returns for themselves (and 
so the labour share of national income has generally declined).47 So risk 
transference has been an asymmetrical process that, in order to maintain 
returns to capital, has imposed greater precarity of livelihoods onto parts 
of labour than would otherwise occur, at a time when average incomes in 
society have been increasing. 
42  Iain Campbell and John Burgess, ‘Patchy Progress? Two Decades of Research on Precariousness 
and Precarious Work in Australia’. Labour & Industry 28, no. 1 (2018): 48–67.
43  Andrew Stewart, Jim Stanford, and Tess Hardy, eds, The Wages Crisis in Australia: What It Is and 
What to Do About It (Adelaide: University of Adelaide Press, 2018); Joe Isaac, ‘Why Are Australian 
Wages Lagging and What Can Be Done About It?’. Australian Economic Review 51, no. 2 (2018): 
175–90.
44  International Labour Office, Global Wage Report 2016/17 (Geneva: ILO, 2016), xvi.
45  Drew Desilver, ‘For Most U.S. Workers, Real Wages Have Barely Budged in Decades’. Fact 
Tank, Pew Research Center, 7 August 2018, www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/08/07/for-most-
us-workers-real-wages-have-barely-budged-for-decades/.
46  Kimberley Amadeo, ‘Medical Bankruptcy and the Economy’. The Balance (financial advisers), 
3 February 2019, www.thebalance.com/medical-bankruptcy-statistics-4154729.
47  Jim Stanford, ‘The Declining Labour Share in Australia: Definition, Measurement, and 
International Comparisons’. Journal of Australian Political Economy 81 (2018): 11–32; Loukas 
Karabarbounis and Brent Neiman, ‘The Global Decline of the Labor Share’. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 129, no. 1 (2013): 61–103; David Autor et al., ‘Concentrating on the Fall of the Labor 
Share’. American Economic Review 107, no. 5 (2017): 180–85.
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The flexible firm
As firm strategy changed again in the 1980s, one model that emerged to 
explain the new behaviours of corporations was the ‘flexible firm’ model. 
This model was principally developed by John Atkinson in the UK.48 
In the flexible firm model, employers seek an optimal balance between 
functional and numerical flexibility through segmenting the labour force 
into two groups: the core and periphery groups. The core of full-time 
employees enjoys job security, career development, high wages and are 
multiskilled. They occupy the primary ILM within the firm. The core 
group is the principal source of functional flexibility. The periphery is 
the source of numerical flexibility. So, by contrast to core employees, the 
periphery has job insecurity, poor career options, lower wages and low 
multiskilling.
The occupation of the employees who might comprise these groups is 
to some extent influenced by the adoption and uses of technology. For 
example, blue collar workers might be part of the stable core if the 
tasks they do require the use of the employee’s discretion and judgment 
(e.g. in small batch production). From earlier, we could expect the core 
to be associated with high-trust management styles, perhaps structured 
management, perhaps collectivist approaches. By contrast the periphery 
would be associated with low-trust styles, more likely individualism, 
and possibly less structure. That in turn implies management may 
have different management styles for dealing with different parts of the 
workforce—something that, as we have seen, indeed happens.
There have been a number of criticisms of the flexible firm model.49 
Some relate to the ways in which employees are categorised. Precarity 
is not restricted to the group Atkinson describes as the periphery. Legge 
claims that the flexible firm model suffers from confusion as to whether 
it is a prescriptive model—considering ‘what should be’—or a descriptive 
model, considering ‘what is’.50 At times, it appears to do both. Yet, if 
it is prescriptive it shows little evidence of being a conscious strategy. 
48  John Atkinson, ‘Manpower Strategies for Flexible Organisations’. Personnel Management (1984): 
28–31; John Atkinson, Flexibility, Uncertainty and Manpower Management. IMS Report No. 89 
(Brighton, UK: Institute for Manpower Studies, 1985). You may find out more about this model by 
reading Pollert, ‘The Flexible Firm: Fixation or Fact?’. A graphical representation of the model is there 
at p. 284.
49  See the studies cited in Legge, Human Resource Management.
50  Ibid., 154.
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Company survey data in the UK suggested that moves to greater numerical 
flexibility were mainly piecemeal, opportunistic and ad hoc rather than a 
result of strategic intent.51 In Australia, casualisation appeared higher in 
workplaces with ‘unstructured’ rather than ‘structured’ management.52 
Internationally, however, ‘one place where the core–periphery model 
undoubtedly has been strategically enacted is in the public services’.53 If, on 
the other hand, it is meant as a descriptive model, Legge asks how does it 
improve on preexisting models of labour market segmentation? In essence, 
segmentation theorists argue that ‘labour markets are characterised by 
noncompeting groups, and economic, social and political forces combine 
to differentiate the rewards of comparable groups of workers’.54
My concerns are several. The model treats part-time workers as part of 
the periphery, which is only true for some (mostly those underemployed 
or on temporary or casual contracts). It fails to explain why, in the 
face of all this flexibility, the employment relationship persists. It gives 
inadequate consideration to employer strategy towards employees and 
what determines that strategy—in particular, the importance for firms 
of avoiding accountability—and so has limited predictive value. In that 
sense, it privileges ‘flexibility’ above all other elements—hardly surprising 
as that is the focus of so much rhetoric from employers and policy-makers. 
But why doesn’t everyone just use independent contractors? To be fair, 
though, it is a theoretical model that emerged in the 1980s, so it is hardly 
surprising that modifications should be required. 
‘Not there’ employment
Even if moves to the flexible firm model were initially piecemeal, ad hoc 
and opportunistic, its appearance in the literature signalled pressure for 
some fundamental changes to the way firms organise. More than just 
reduce risk and cost, however, firms have also sought to achieve ‘distancing’ 
through what can be called ‘not there’ employment—a method of corporate 
organisation whereby firms can avoid accountability for misbehaviour 
by affiliates or subsidiaries by denying responsibility: ‘We’re not there!’. 
The term ‘not there’ employment is deliberately ironic: of course workers 
51  Ibid., 160.
52  Ron Callus et al., Industrial Relations at Work: The Australian Workplace Industrial Relations 
Survey (Canberra: AGPS, 1991).
53  Legge, Human Resource Management, 161.
54  Peter  Brosnan, David Rea, and Moira Wilson, ‘Labour Market Segmentation and the State: The 
New Zealand Experience’. Cambridge Journal of Economics 19, no. 5 (1995): 667–96.
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are experiencing the capitalist employment relationship, so in that sense it 
is very much ‘there’; but it is also a device by which large corporations can 
say we are not there. So it is not necessarily employment that is ‘not there’, 
it is the lead corporation. At least, that is how it is meant to be in the eye 
of the intended beholder.
As a model of firm behaviour, it has some similarities to the ‘flexible 
firm’ model, but focuses less on forms of ‘flexibility’ and more on capital, 
accountability and transaction costs. ‘Not there’ employment facilitates 
a higher rate of noncompliance with labour laws. It is thus more akin 
to the process of ‘fissuring’ that has often been used to describe modern 
workplaces.55 The terms ‘fractured’ and ‘fragmented’ have also been 
used.56 And yet, the employment relationship persists. Many corporations 
are seeking to make greater use of ‘flexible’ labour, and engage in ‘not 
there’ employment to minimise costs and risk and to avoid responsibility 
for some of the labour costs they would otherwise incur and possible 
breaches of the law. They typically contract to others who in turn hire 
employees (or who subcontract to others, who in turn hire employees). 
So part of their workforce is ‘flexibly’ deployed. But they also retain an 
ILM for their ‘core’ employees. This bit, then, is what Atkinson referred 
to as the ‘flexible firm’ model in the 1980s. The details have changed a bit 
since then, but the central idea—many firms simultaneously operating 
an ILM-based core and a periphery participating in an external labour 
market—remains true.
So ‘not there’ employment is the process by which centres of capital 
(we might call these ‘lead firms’ or ‘core capital’) fragment what would 
otherwise be corporate structures in ways that maintain high control, 
minimise labour costs and risk, maximise centralised profits and minimise 
accountability for externalities. Thus, ‘not there’ employment is the key 
feature of an emerging ‘not there’ capitalism, in which the concentration 
of capital within product markets grows.57
55  David Weil, The Fissured Workplace: Why Work Became So Bad for So Many and What Can Be 
Done to Improve It (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014).
56  Tony Dundon, ‘The Fracturing of Work and Employment Relations’. Labour and Industry 29, 
no. 1 (2019): 6–18.
57  Andrew Leigh and Adam Triggs, ‘A Few Big Firms’. The Monthly, 17 May 2017; John Van 
Reenen, ‘Research: The Rise of Superstar Firms Has Been Better for Investors Than for Employees’. 
Harvard Business Review, 11 May 2017; Data Team, ‘Corporate Concentration’. Economist, 24 May 
2016; Autor et al., ‘Concentrating on the Fall of the Labor Share’.
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More precisely, the key methods of ‘not there’ employment are: control 
is retained by a central entity (e.g. the ‘lead firms’ in supply chains); 
production is undertaken within smaller entities (the ‘dependent firms’—
we might call them ‘peripheral capital’), which are formally separated 
from the lead firms; core and dependent firms are linked by contract; 
and labour is ostensibly and directly controlled by the peripheral capital 
in dependent firms. That labour may be classed as ‘employees’ or as 
‘contractors’, according to the context. Fundamentally, though, the 
employment relationship—hence ‘not there’ employment—persists, 
despite all the fissuring pressures.
The manifestations of this phenomenon vary between sectors and 
industries. In the public sector, the urge to minimise accountability is 
manifested as privatisation, or contractual relationships (such as ‘public–
private partnerships’) made opaque through contracts that are ‘commercial 
in confidence’. In the private sector, variations between industries may 
occur according to the nature of the product in that industry, the degree of 
competition, the share of costs represented by labour costs, the geographic 
scale of production, the nature of labour and labour organisation including 
exposure to secondary labour markets, occupational norms and the 
ideology and strategy of employers, among other factors. If there is one 
major difference with the casualised employment of the late nineteenth 
century that we saw, it is this: whereas at that time much peripheral 
labour was directly hired by the responsible employer,58 under ‘not there’ 
employment a growing part of the responsibility for hiring peripheral 
labour rests with dependent firms or peripheral capital.
What determines the activities that are done ‘in-house’ and those that are 
‘not there’—undertaken in franchises, contractor firms or some other form 
of peripheral capital? Transaction cost economics, a form of institutional 
economics associated with writers such as Coase and Williamson, suggests 
that the transaction costs (including supervision costs) of having work done 
determine whether it is done in-house or by ‘the market’.59 This, correctly, 
puts the emphasis on control. As Gramsci said, ‘discipline and a  good 
state of production is only possible if there exists at least a minimum of 
58  Lee and Fahey, ‘Boom for Whom?’.
59  Ronald Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’. Economica 4 (1937): 386–405; Ronald Coase, ‘New 
Institutional Economics’. American Economic Review 88, no. 2 (1998): 72–74; Oliver E. Williamson, 
Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (New York: Free Press, 1975); Oliver E. 
Williamson, Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1985).
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constitutionality, a minimum of consent on the part of the workforce’.60 
An aspect of this is being able to deliver, cheaply, products or services 
that might otherwise be considered too expensive: getting a product to 
a customer in time, or having a service available at an abnormal time.61 
In addition, the desire to minimise risk and to avoid accountability 
(to minimise the appearance of control) are also factors in deciding whether 
to internalise or externalise particular aspects of production. In  effect, 
each corporation makes an assessment of whether the combination of 
these factors—cost, control, risk and accountability—makes internal or 
external production more attractive. Some of these things lend themselves 
to calculation more than others. Cost is the simplest thing to express 
as dollars while, at the other extreme, the benefits or disadvantages of 
minimising accountability may be very difficult to express as dollars, and 
so judgements about that (expressed as ‘sticking to our core business’) may 
be taken at a higher level in the organisation.
The employment relationship and the future
The rise of the ‘gig economy’, discussed in more detail below, has raised 
a debate about whether the employment relationship has a future at all. 
Yet despite all the predictions of the ‘death of employment’ (including 
a  2008 book by that title),62 it has not happened and most likely will 
not happen.
The meme that the employment relationship is dying may be seen in a few 
ideas, not just the emergence of ‘not there’ employment. The first is the 
idea that, instead of the employment relationship, we are witnessing the 
rise of ‘freelancing’ or the ‘gig economy’ as workers become self-employed 
and contractors instead of employees. Second is the idea that workers will 
not want to stay with organisations any more—they want not one career, 
but lots of careers, even ‘boundary-less careers’ or ‘portfolio careers’. 
The third one is the idea that firm size is decreasing, and large firms are no 
longer as important as they used to be. 
60  Antonio Gramsci, La Construzione Del Partito Comunista 1923–1926 (Turin: Einaudi, 1971), 
6. Translated and cited in Anne Showstack Sassoon, ed., Approaches to Gramsci (London: Writers and 
Readers Publishing Cooperative Society, 1982), 103.
61  The extent to which consumer demands for timely delivery influence outsourcing in Australian 
road transport is presently being investigated by Kaylee Boccalatte.
62  Ken Phillips, Independence and the Death of Employment (Ballan, Vic.: Connor Court Publishing, 
2008).
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These ideas are clearly interrelated. They are also mostly either exaggerated 
or plain wrong. I address them in reverse order.
First, evidence shows that firm size is not decreasing.63 Nor is workplace 
size declining structurally. Such measures vary with the state of the 
business cycle (a more prosperous economy means bigger businesses, on 
average), but there is not a clear long-term trend.
Second, while the employer demand for increased ‘flexibility’ is genuinely 
‘a thing’, self-employment, by contrast, is not growing. Table 6.1, using 
OECD data, shows self-employment declining between 2000 and 2014 
in 26 countries for which data were available, and increasing in only 11. 
Across those 37 countries, the unweighted average rate of self-employment 
fell by 2.2 percentage points over the period. Across the OECD 
(a smaller grouping), the weighted average rate of self-employment fell by 
1.9 percentage points between 2000 and 2011. The death of employment 
is an international myth without international substance. 
The mythology of the ‘portfolio’ career, as if workers like to be shunted 
from industry to industry over their lifetime, hides the likelihood that 
workers are more insecure than before. Some, of course, may prefer 
changes of career, but for others career changes are a euphemism that is 
forced upon them by the impermanency of work.
Table 6.1: Percentage change in self-employment, 37 countries, 2000–14
Self-employment share
2000 2014 Change, 
2000–2014
Turkey 51 .4 34  .0 –17 .4
korea 36 .8 26 .8 –10 .1
greece 42 .0 35 .4 –6 .5
Portugal 26 .1 19 .9 –6 .3
Poland 27 .4 21 .4 –6 .0
Iceland 18 12 .5 –5 .4
new Zealand 20 .6 15 .3 –5 .4
Japan 16 .6 11 .5* –5 .1
63  See, for example, Stefan Hajkowicz et al., Tomorrow’s Digitally Enabled Workforce: Megatrends 
and Scenarios for Jobs and Employment in Australia over the Coming Twenty Years (Brisbane: CSIRO, 
2016), 41, Figures 14 & 15. The figures show declining shares of small business, even though the 
accompanying text suggests the opposite.
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Self-employment share
2000 2014 Change, 
2000–2014
brazil 37 .1# 32 .3 –4 .8
hungary 15 .2 11 .0 –4 .2
chile 29 .8 25 .9 –4 .0
Mexico 36 32 .1 –3 .9
Italy 28 .5 24 .9 –3 .5
Australia 13 .5 10 .2 –3 .3
Switzerland 13 .2 10 .0 –3 .2
Russia 10 .1 7 .2 –2 .9
Spain 20 .2 17 .7 –2 .5
canada 10 .6 8 .8 –1 .9
Israel 14 .2 12 .5 –1 .7
Ireland 18 .8 17 .4 –1 .4
belgium 15 .8 14 .6 –1 .2
Luxembourg 7 .4 6 .2 –1 .2
uSA 7 .4 6 .5 –1 .0
norway 7 .4 7 .2 –0 .2
columbia 51 .8# 51 .8 –0 .1
Denmark 9 .1 9 .0* –0 .1
germany 11 .0 11 .0 0 .0
Sweden 10 .3 10 .3 0 .0
Austria 13 .3 13 .3 0 .1
estonia 8 .8 9 .1 0 .4
Finland 13 .7 14 .1 0 .4
France 9 .3 9 .7* 0 .4
Slovenia 16 .1 18 .6 2 .5
great britain 12 .8 15 .4 2 .6
Czech Republic 15 .2 18 .1 2 .9
netherlands 11 .2 15 .9* 4 .7
Slovakia 8 15 .4 7 .4
unweighted average (all) 19 .3 17 .1 –2 .2
oecD average 17 .7 15 .8** –1 .9
notes: * 2013 ** 2011 # 2001
Source: oecD database accessed 23 August 2016 . The 3-digit country codes can be 
found at www.iban.com/country-codes.
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Globally, only about half of all employed people are employees. That’s 
mostly because, in developing countries, a lot of work is in the ‘informal’ 
sector outside the scope of employment regulation. In sub-Saharan Africa 
and South Asia, only about one in five employed people are employees 
earning a wage or salary. This is nothing new. As countries become more 
industrialised, the informal sector declines and the use of the employment 
model grows, as capitalism organises production through employees and 
the need for control of workers grows.
So there is another paradox: the rise of new models like Uber, with its 
use of contract labour rather than employees, exists side by side with the 
continuing importance of employment. That paradox is explained by two 
things: the resistance of employees to greater insecurity; and the ongoing 
efficiency of employment as a means to control worker behaviour, 
alongside the ongoing urge of capital to cut costs.
The first of these has already been discussed. The second warrants 
elaboration. The employment contract is open-ended, and it is impossible 
to put into it every aspect of what an employee must do. That problem 
is multiplied many times over when you move from an employment 
contract to a contract for service.
Contracting is a way of reducing costs and risk, increasing profits and 
avoiding accountability, but it is not effective for maintaining control, so 
firms may use a combination that involves contracting out to others (I call 
them ‘mid contractors’) that in turn often (not always) hire employees.
For most owners of capital, and for most CEOs, the corporation is the most 
efficient form of economic organisation and it most efficiently operates 
through employing people. This is fundamentally because the transaction 
costs in controlling workers through an employment relationship are 
lower than the transaction costs of alternatives, such as drawing up and 
implementing contracts with them as independent contractors. So, for 
example, a firm can more closely supervise employees than contractors, it 
can manage uncertainty better, it can minimise the risk of opportunistic 
behaviour, and it need not waste time and money renegotiating contracts 
with them when they turn up for work each day. In The Circle, Mae is an 
employee, even though her job (the equivalent of an Instagram ‘influencer’ 
of the 2010s) is in effect held by the self-employed at present; she is an 
employee of The Circle because that is how best the company can exercise 
control over her.
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Even when firms contract out part of their operations, the people who 
end up doing the work are often still employees, because that is the most 
efficient way for a firm to run its business. For example, when a mining 
company gets what are known in the industry as ‘contractors’ in to work 
in a mine, they are usually employees of a contracting firm, that supplies 
just the workers (a ‘labour hire’ firm) or both workers and equipment. 
They work on the mine site, but are employees—hired on a casual basis 
and at much lower cost to the mines.
Through global value chains, an organisation can control a very large 
number of workers, while having very few as employees within its own 
organisations. The rest may be employees in contracting forms. In 2013, 
over 700,000 people were part of Apple’s global value chain, but only 
80,000 of them were employed directly by Apple itself.64
Another, growing, example is franchises: a large organisation like 7-Eleven 
or McDonald’s may contract out business to many franchisees, but they in 
turn hire employees to work in the stores. Franchising is a way by which 
the owners of capital (at the top or peak of the hierarchy) contract out 
to ‘franchisees’ who run the outlets (fast food, retail, etc.) rather than the 
large firms running the outlets themselves. But most of the people who 
work in the outlets are employees—of the franchisees, rather than the 
capital at the top of the hierarchy.
The franchisors still control the product, but franchisees have responsibility 
for employment. The franchisees are also small businesses, and so less 
likely to  comply with labour regulations  than large firms.65 Hence the 
franchisors gain the financial benefit from franchisees’ low-cost way of 
operating. This model cuts costs and transfers risk down the chain—
64  Direct employment estimate from Bloomberg, quoted in Ricarda McFalls, The Impact of 
Procurement Practices in the Electronics Sector on Labour Rights and Temporary and Other Forms 
of Employment, (Geneva: International Labour Office, Working Paper WP313, 2016).  Global value 
chain data implied from a statement by Tim Cook, Apple CEO, on a 2014 BBC Panorama program 
quoted in Thomas Clarke and Martijn Boersma, ‘The Governance of Global Value Chains: Unresolved 
Human Rights, Environmental and Ethical Dilemmas in the Apple Supply Chain’. Journal of Business 
Ethics 143 (2017): 111–31.
65  Weil, The Fissured Workplace. Haroon Bhorat, Ravi Kanbur and Natasha Mayet, ‘Estimating the 
Causal Effect of Enforcement on Minimum Wage Compliance: The Case of South Africa’. Review of 
Development Economics 16, no. 4 (2012): 608–23; Tim H. Gindling and Katherine Terrell, ‘Minimum 
Wages, Globalization, and Poverty in Honduras’. World Development 38, no. 6 (2010): 908–18; Eric 
Strobl and Frank Walsh, ‘Minimum Wages and Compliance: The Case of Trinidad and Tobago’. 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 51, no. 2 (2003): 427–50; Jeremy Buultjens, ‘Labour 
Market Deregulation: Does Small Business Care?’. International Journal of Employment Studies 2, 
no. 1 (1994): 132–57.
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which means jobs, or at least personal finances, are more insecure, and the 
opportunities for underpayment of workers (discussed in Chapter 10) are 
increased. Franchising has been growing in importance, and employment 
in franchisees as a share of total employment has likewise grown.66
Many organisations have sought to adopt the Uber platform model. 
I discuss that shortly. Others firms have tried to turn employees into faux 
‘independent contractors’ (such as at Kemalex, in Australia, a few years 
ago) to avoid paying leave, superannuation and workers’ compensation. 
Workers and unions have resisted this  ‘sham contracting’.67 Most 
employees do not actually want to be contractors. Like employers, they 
prefer the stability of the employment relationship.
Meanwhile, a lot of the people who end up as the ‘mid contractors’ are 
probably people who would otherwise have been small-business owners 
or self-employed anyway. Circumstances differ between industries. For 
example, people who love trucks might buy one. They will then become 
owner-drivers—and sit at the bottom of the road transport industry 
supply chain. In the textiles, clothing and footwear industries, workers 
were forced to be contractors (‘homeworkers’) and as recently as a decade 
ago worked in Australia for pay averaging as little as $6 per hour with 
some receiving half that or less.68
That has been the pattern in those industries for a long time. Most 
new manifestations of ‘not there’ employment take one of two forms. 
In most industries new forms of ‘not there’ employment continue to 
ultimately rely on employees. In some, though—mostly associated with 
the ‘platform economy’—core capital contracts to people, many of whom 
would have been self-employed anyway or, like many Uber drivers, have 
a ‘main’ job as an employee.69 The sources of worker insecurity vary 
between industries, and a lot of variation between industries and periods 
66  Lorelle Frazer, Scott Weaven, and Anthony Grace, Franchising Australia 2014 (Brisbane: Griffith 
University, 2014).
67  Anthony O’Donnell, ‘Reality Bites for Bosses of Nothing’. Age, 29 September 2005, www.theage.
com.au/news/business/reality-bites-for-bosses-of-nothing/2005/09/28/1127804547436.html.
68  Mindy Thorpe, ‘Outworkers’. In Pay Equity in Queensland, ed. David Peetz and Rosemary 
Hunter (Brisbane: Centre for Research on Employment and Work and Socio Legal Research Centre, 
Report to Department of Employment, Training and Industrial Relations, Queensland Government 
Submission, Pay Equity Inquiry, Queensland Industrial Relations Commission, No. B1568 of 2000), 
99–114; Emer Diviney and Serena Lillywhite, Ethical Threads: Corporate Social Responsibility in the 
Australian Garment Industry (Melbourne: Brotherhood of St Laurence, 2007), 4.
69  Justin Fox, ‘Your Uber Driver Probably Has Another Job’. Bloomberg, 20 February 2016, www.
bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-02-20/your-uber-driver-probably-has-another-job. 
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can be hidden by national aggregates. Franchising has grown in retailing; 
labour hire in mining; outsourcing in the public sector; second jobs in 
manufacturing; spinoffs in communications; casualisation in education 
and training; and global supply chains send jobs internationally to low-
paid, often dangerous workplaces in a number of industries.
Even ‘casual’ or ‘permanent’ employment status (as proxied by access to 
paid leave) can be an inadequate indicator of worker insecurity. Employees 
at the bottom of the chain in many of these industries might have access 
to annual leave and sick leave. Offering leave is better for attracting labour 
and might be cheaper than paying the casual loading. There is also no need 
to hire someone on a casual contract if you can make them redundant 
when the work dries up—if, for example, you lose your contract with the 
main firm. If your firm can go bankrupt, then you often will not even 
have to pay redundancy benefits.
Other sources of worker insecurity might arise from weaknesses in the 
operation of labour-market institutions. In Australia, for example, firms 
have discovered they can terminate collective agreements, or get a handful 
of workers to sign new agreements that then apply to everyone, as a means 
of cutting pay and conditions.70 Some firms put employees onto contrived 
arrangements that make them out to be contractors, often illegally.71 The 
growing insecurity of workers, including through underemployment, and 
the concentration of economic power help explain why wage growth has 
been  stagnating. Indeed, with wage growth low across most developed 
countries, that successful ‘war on wages’ may be the biggest single sign of 
worker insecurity.72
70  Josh Butler, ‘Streets Look to Cut Workers Pay and Ice-Cream Fans Are Furious’. Huffington Post, 
29 August 2017, www.huffingtonpost.com.au/2017/08/29/streets-look-to-cut-workers-pay-and-ice-
cream-fans-are-furious_a_23187395/; Emma Field, ‘Hundreds Rally in Gippsland at Longest Industrial 
Dispute in 40 Years’. ABC News Online, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 28 June 2018, www.abc.
net.au/news/2018-06-28/esso-protest-marks-12-months-with-union-gathering-at-longford/9918668.
71  ‘Factory Workers Strike over Contract Plan’. The Age, 3 May 2005, www.theage.com.au/national/
factory-workers-strike-over-contract-plan-20050503-ge0344.html; Australian Government, ‘Unfair 
Contracts and Sham Contracts’ (Department of Innovation, Industry and Science, 2018), www.
business.gov.au/people/contractors/independent-contractors/unfair-contracts-and-sham-contracts.
72  Mike Seccombe, ‘The Truth About Wage Stagnation’. Saturday Paper, 12 May 2018, www.
thesaturdaypaper.com.au/news/economy/2018/05/12/the-truth-about-wage-stagnation/ 1526047 
2006221; Anna Patty, ‘War on Wages: Australians Are Working Harder and Going Backwards’. 
Sydney Morning Herald, 5 August 2018, www.smh.com.au/business/workplace/war-on-wages-
australians-are-working-harder-and-going-backwards-20170803-gxoh9c.html.
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The ‘platform’ or ‘gig’ economy
Technology is often seen as fundamentally changing workplace relations 
through the ‘platform economy’, the ‘gig economy’ or ‘freelancing’. 
These terms are often used interchangeably, as if to indicate that the 
growth of the gig economy is synonymous with ‘freelancing’. The term 
‘freelancing’ is used very loosely and often in multiple ways, and so some 
large estimates of the freelancing workforce are made. For example, the 
Freelancers Union, a lobby group (not a trade union) in whose interest 
it is to maximise the number of ‘freelancers’, defined them as including 
employees who at any time in the previous year had held a fixed-term job 
or a second job as a contractor, and so it claimed that freelancers made up 
34 per cent of the US workforce.73 Using a different definition, Kitching 
estimated freelancers at just 6 per cent of the UK workforce.74 ‘Freelancer’ 
is such a poorly defined concept that we do not use it in the remainder 
of this chapter.
To get a clearer understanding of the platform economy, also known as 
the gig economy, we turn to Valerio De Stefano: 
The gig-economy is usually understood to include chiefly two 
forms of work: ‘crowdwork’ and ‘work on-demand via apps’ … 
The first term is usually referred to [sic] working activities that 
imply completing a series of tasks through online platforms … 
‘Work on-demand via apps’, instead, is a form of work in which 
the execution of traditional working activities such as transport, 
cleaning and running errands, but also forms of clerical work, is 
channelled through apps managed by firms that also intervene in 
setting minimum quality standards of service and in the selection 
and management of the workforce.75
73  Freelancers Union and Elance-oDesk, Freelancing in America: A National Survey of the New 
Workforce (2013).
74  John Kitching, Exploring the UK Freelance Workforce in 2015 (London: Association of 
Independent Professionals and the Self-Employed, 2016); Kitching’s data indicate that the estimate 
would more than double if a broader occupational definition of freelancers were used.
75  Valerio De Stefano, The Rise of the ‘Just-in-Time Workforce’: On-Demand Work, Crowdwork and 
Labour Protection in the ‘Gig-Economy’. Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 71 (Geneva: 
International Labour Office, 2016), 1.
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Platforms involve many workers. Uber, for example, has a global 
workforce of around 160,000; its US competitor Lyft has 50,000. Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (AMT) mediates crowdwork for up to 500,000 people 
internationally and Crowdflower 10 times that number.76
Still, this is only a small portion of the overall workforce. In the UK, 
the estimates of platform economy work are fairly consistent, probably 
reflecting similarities in data methods. The UK Chartered Institute of 
Personnel and Development (CIPD), drawing on its own online survey 
of 5,000 adults in December 2016, estimated 4 per cent of adults had 
been ‘gig workers’ at some time in the previous 12 months.77 An online 
survey for the UK Department for Business, Energy & Industrial 
Strategy (BEIS) estimated that 4.4 per cent of the population in Great 
Britain had worked in the gig economy in the preceding 12 months.78 
Of those, just slightly under one-third provided services this way at least 
once a week. That is, roughly 1 per cent of British workers regularly 
participated in the platform economy.
American estimates are more variable. An August 2016 online survey by 
the Pew Research Center of 4,500 adults in the US found only 8 per cent 
of adults had used digital work or task platforms in the previous year.79 
It appeared to pick up especially more crowdworkers than the UK surveys. 
A more indirect estimate, by J.P. Morgan based on money transfers, put 
the number much lower: a cumulative 0.9 per cent of US adults had 
ever participated in the gig economy according to it.80 US economists 
Lawrence Katz and Alan Krueger, based on 2015 data from an official 
labour force survey, estimated only 0.5 per cent of US workers had 
identified customers through an online intermediary, and noted this was 
close to two other, independently derived estimates.81
76  Ibid.
77  Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, To Gig or Not to Gig? Stories from the Modern 
Economy (London: CIPD, March 2017).
78  Katriina Lepanjuuri, Robert Wishart, and Peter Cornick, The Characteristics of Those in the Gig 
Economy (London: Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2018).
79  Aaron Smith, Gig Work, Online Selling and Home Sharing (Pew Research Center, 17 November 
2016).
80  Diana Farrell and Fiona Greig, The Online Platform Economy: Has Growth Peaked? (New York: 
JPMorgan Chase Institute November 2016).
81  Lawrence F. Katz and Alan B. Krueger, The Rise and Nature of Alternative Work Arrangements in 
the United States, 1995–2015. NBER Working Paper No. 22667 (Washington DC: National Bureau 
of Economic Research, September 2016), www.nber.org/papers/w22667.
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Another study (not aimed at estimating its penetration) was undertaken 
by the ILO in 2016 and involved surveying 1,800 workers in Crowdflower 
and AMT.
It is likely that online surveys, by their nature, will overestimate the incidence 
of ‘platform economy’ workers relying on online apps, potentially by 
quite a bit, but that alone does not account for the discrepancies between 
estimates. Question wording also matters. Another important factor in 
interpreting these estimates is time-related: at any single point in time, 
only a small number of people will be employed in the gig economy, but 
a much larger number of people will have worked in it at some time over 
the previous year to supplement otherwise low incomes, sometimes only 
once and with minimal effect. There may be international differences, 
but it seems likely that 1 per cent or less of the workforce is regularly 
part of the platform economy in developed countries, many others dip 
their toes into it and then take them out again, the numbers are likely 
growing, but they are presently exceeded by the numbers of contractors 
and comparable workers who do not rely on apps for their work.
Despite its limited size, the ‘platform’ economy is a major area where 
digital technology has allowed a new form of work organisation to develop. 
There are many stories, ranging from exciting to horrifying, about work in 
the gig economy.82 Some of the key points about the ‘gig’ economy from 
the above research and another ILO study83 are as follows.
The use of digital work or task platforms is more common among younger 
workers. In the Pew survey, 17 per cent of 18–29 year olds, compared to 
10 per cent of 30–49 year olds and just 4 per cent of 50–64 year olds, had 
earned money through digital work or task platforms.84
82  For example, Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, To Gig; Steven Hill, ‘Good 
Riddance, Gig Economy: Uber, Ayn Rand and the Awesome Collapse of Silicon Valley’s Dream 
of Destroying Your Job’. Salon, 28 March 2016, www.salon.com/2016/03/27/good_riddance_gig_
economy_uber_ayn_rand_and_the_awesome_collapse_of_silicon_valleys_dream_of_destroying_
your_job/; A.J. Wood et al., ‘Good Gig, Bad Gig: Autonomy and Algorithmic Control in the Global 
Gig Economy’. Work, Employment and Society 33, no. 1 (2018): 56–75.
83  This was undertaken by the ILO in 2016 and involved surveying 1,800 workers in Crowdflower 
and AMT. Janine Berg, Income Security in the on-Demand Economy: Findings and Policy Lessons 
from a Survey of Crowdworkers (Geneva: Inclusive Labour Markets, Labour Relations and Working 
Conditions Branch, International Labour Office, 2016).
84  Smith, Gig Work.
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The use of digital work or task platforms is more common among lower 
income earners. In the Pew survey, the proportions of adults who had 
earned money through digital work or task platforms were 10 per cent in 
households with annual income less than $30,000, compared to 8 per cent 
with income of $30,000–$75,000 and 4 per cent in households with 
incomes above $75,000.85 The incidence was also higher among blacks 
(14 per cent) and Latinos (11 per cent) than whites (5 per cent), and lower 
among those who had college (university) qualifications (6 per cent) than 
those with lower qualifications (9 per cent).
‘Gig economy’ work provides essential income for a minority of 
participants. In the CIPD survey, only 25 per cent of ‘gig’ workers said it 
was their main job.86 In the Pew survey, 29 per cent of platform workers 
said that the income they earned from it was essential for meeting basic 
household needs, while 27 per cent said it was ‘important’ and 42 per cent 
‘nice to have, but not essential’.87 In the BEIS survey, only 14 per cent of 
gig workers earned half or more of their total income from gig work.88
Many gig-economy workers have other jobs. In the CIPD survey, 
58 per cent of gig-economy workers with other jobs had permanent jobs 
(compared to 78 per cent in the population at large). Only a minority 
(20 per cent) were self-employed.89 Another survey by the ILO confirmed 
that the otherwise self-employed were only a minority of ‘gig’ workers, 
and only a minority had been running a business before taking up ‘gig’ 
economy work.90
A majority of ‘gig’ workers are chronically underemployed. In the CIPD 
survey, only 26 per cent said that, overall, they got enough work on 
a regular basis in the gig economy.91 In the ILO survey, the most common 
reason given, when respondents were asked why they were not doing 
more crowdwork (or non-crowdwork), was that there isn’t enough work.92 
85  Ibid.
86  Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, To Gig.
87  Smith, Gig Work.
88  Lepanjuuri, Wishart, and Cornick, Characteristics.
89  Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, To Gig.
90  Berg, Income Security.
91  Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, To Gig.
92  Berg, Income Security.
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Expressed as an hourly rate, pay in the gig economy is low and often below 
minimum wages. In the CIPD survey, median earnings for transport 
or delivery was £6 per hour, and for short-term jobs was £7 per hour, 
below the then living wage of £7.20 per hour and the minimum wage for 
21–24 year olds of £6.95 per hour.93 In the BIES survey, only 36 per cent 
of those who disclosed earnings received less than £7.50 per hour but 
85 per cent of those who were involved in gig work from one to three 
times a week in the gig economy had earned less than £5,000 from their 
work in the preceding 12 months.94 In the ILO survey, median pay for 
AMT workers was US$4.65 per hour, well below the minimum wage.95 
A separate analysis of 3.8 million tasks on AMT found that the median 
pay was closer to US$2 per hour, much less than requestors paid, due in 
part to time between tasks (e.g. time spent searching for tasks) and tasks 
‘returned’ (not completed, perhaps because the requestor’s description was 
inaccurate).96 In Australia, Unions NSW calculated that rates received via 
Airtasker for data entry, cleaning and sales were between AU$3 and AU$9 
below the relevant minimum award rates.97 Hence the Twitter user named 
‘Fair Gig for all’ tweeted on a regular basis about vacancies on Airtasker 
for jobs paying below the minimum wage.98
Although platform economy workers are doing it tough, they also seem 
surprisingly optimistic, perhaps reflecting an optimism bias identified 
by Kahneman,99 related to ‘adaptive preferences’.100 In the CIPD survey, 
only 49 per cent of ‘gig workers’ (compared to 56 per cent of other 
workers) said they were ‘living comfortably’ or ‘doing alright’. However, 
46 per cent of platform workers (compared to 26 per cent of other workers) 
expected their economic situation to improve over the coming year. And 
while only 57 per cent of platform workers (compared to 67  per  cent 
of other workers) were saving for retirement through a  pension plan, 
93  Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, To Gig.
94  Lepanjuuri, Wishart, and Cornick, Characteristics.
95  Berg, Income Security.
96  Kotaro Hara, Abi Adams, Kristy Milland, Saiph Savage, Chris Callison-Burch and Jeffrey P. 
Bigham, ‘A Data-Driven Analysis of Workers’ Earnings on Amazon Mechanical Turk’, paper presented 
to CHI 2018 conference, Montreal, 21–26 April 2018, arxiv.org/pdf/1712.05796.pdf.
97  Unions NSW, Innovation or Exploitation: Busting the Airtasker Myth (Sydney: Unions NSW, 
2016).
98  twitter.com/FairGigForAll.
99  Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow.
100  Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 2nd ed. (London: Palgrave, 2005), 124.
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fully 33 per cent of platform workers (compared to 21 per cent of other 
workers) were confident they could live comfortably when they stopped 
working.101
Platform economy workers did not think highly of their training 
opportunities. Nor did their thoughts readily turn to trade unions when 
asked to whom they would take complaints.102 For some ‘platform 
economy’ workers, like Uber drivers or their equivalent in other industries, 
who have a main job elsewhere, their attachment to work may be low and 
their willingness to organise resistance to their conditions of employment 
may be low. But for those who are reliant on gig-economy earnings as their 
sole source of income, their responses to attempts to organise to improve 
conditions of employment may be quite different. There are many media 
reports of such workers taking collective action, sometimes strike action, 
in support of improvements in pay or conditions, and some instances 
where they have won treatment equivalent to that of employees.103 The 
whole idea of them being independent contractors, not employees, 
has been challenged in several jurisdictions, sometimes successfully,104 
and sometimes not (e.g. in Australia).105 Uber says it is not a transport 
101  Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, To Gig.
102  Ibid.
103  Caroline O’Donovan, ‘Uber Rallies Drivers against Teamster Unionization Efforts with Podcasts 
and Pizza Parties’. Buzzfeed News, 10 March 2017; Kate Minter, ‘Negotiating Labour Standards in 
the Gig Economy: Airtasker and Unions New South Wales’. Economic and Labour Relations Review 
28, no. 3 (2017): 438–54; Anna Sansom, ‘Bicycle Couriers Protest against Takeaway Food Service 
Deliveroo’. France24, 12 August 2017, www.france24.com/en/20170812-france-paris-protest-
food-delivery-service-deliveroo-financial-insecurity-emmanuel-macron; Zachary Kilhoffer, Karolien 
Lenaerts, and Miroslav Beblavý, The Platform Economy and Industrial Relations: Applying the Old 
Framework to the New Reality. CEPS Report No. 2017/12 (Brussels: Centre for European Policy 
Studies, 2017); Rebecca Burns, ‘The Sharing Economy’s “First Strike”: Uber Drivers Turn Off the 
App’. In These Times, 22 October 2014, inthesetimes.com/working/entry/17279/the_sharing_
economy_first_strike_uber_drivers_turn_off_the_app; Alison Griswold, ‘Uber Just Caved on a 
Big Policy Change after Its Drivers Threatened to Strike’. Slate, 12 September 2014, www.slate.
com/blogs/moneybox/2014/09/12/uber_drivers_strike_they_protested_cheap_uberx_fares_uber_
backed_down.html; Adam Carey, ‘Uber Strike: Group Calls for Drivers to “Log Off” in One-Day 
Protest over Pay and Conditions’. The Age, 12 March 2017.
104  BBC, ‘Bike Courier Wins “Gig” Economy Employment Rights Case’. BBC News, 7 January 
2017; Jamie Grierson and Rob Davies, ‘Pimlico Plumbers Loses Appeal against Self-employed Status’. 
Guardian, 11 February 2017; Gregor Gall, ‘Is Uber Ruling the Beginning of the End for Bogus Self-
Employment?’. The Conversation, 5 November 2016.
105  ‘Uber Employee Question Not Settled: Expert’, Workplace Express, 9 February 2018, www.work 
place express.com.au/nl06_news_selected.php? act=2&stream= 1&selkey=56469 (subscription required), 
referring to [2017] FWC 6610 (21 December 2017).
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company, it is a technology company, acting as a client to drivers, but it is 
clearly in competition with transport companies and celebrates providing 
that competition.106
There have been reports of a new labour-hire app called ‘Squaddle’, 
described as the ‘Uber of hospitality.’ This app allows ‘contractors’ to bid 
for work at restaurants and bars to fill last-minute staffing gaps.107 Many 
firms are trying this approach, and app developers see it as a way of making 
lots of money. Platform firms both supply and discipline low-paid blue-
collar contractors, for use by warehouses or other corporations, much like 
the day labour of the past.108 They may even pretend to represent the 
interests of those contractors by compulsorily enrolling them as members 
in associations in which they have no voting rights.109 It is a model that has 
already spread to many industries and occupations and that will likely find 
its way into almost any area of work that lends itself to casual employment 
or contracting, including some where those modes of employment have 
not been used before—because it provides for a new mechanism of 
control that partially takes the place of the employment relationship in 
exercising control, especially through the ‘rating’ functionality. That said, 
many US firms following the Uber model—like Cherry (car washes), 
Prim (laundry), SnapGoods (gear rental), Rewinery (wine) and HomeJoy 
(home cleaning)—have failed. One author argues, ‘they provide crummy 
jobs that most people only want to do as a very last resort. These platforms 
show their workforce no allegiance or loyalty, and they engender none 
in return’.110
106  Jenna Castle, ‘UberX vs Taxi—Which Is Best?’. Choice, Australian Consumers Association, 
14  August 2017, www.choice.com.au/transport/cars/general/articles/uberx-vs-taxi-which-one-is-best; 
Stephen Corby, ‘Uber vs Taxi’. CarsGuide,  31 October 2017, www.carsguide.com.au/car-news/taxi-vs-
uber-30943; Caspar, ‘Sydneysiders Have Spoken—and They Choose Ridesharing!’. Uber Newsroom, 
Uber, 10 October 2015, www.uber.com/en-AU/newsroom/sydney-has-spoken/.
107  Charlie Lewis, ‘What Does the Gig Economy Do to Workers’ Rights?’. Crikey, 13 April 2017; 
Laura Gartry, ‘“Uber for Hospitality” App Hopes to Shake up on-Demand Job Market’. ABC News, 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 6 April 2017, www.abc.net.au/news/2017-04-06/uber-for-
hospitality-app-connects-workers/8419530.
108  Venee Dubal, ‘The Digitalisation of Day Labor as Gig Work’, OnLabor, 7 May 2019, onlabor.
org/the-digitalization-of-day-labor-as-gig-work/.
109  Ibid.
110  Hill, ‘Good Riddance’.
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In effect, there is a major labour supply problem that many of these 
firms have been unable to reconcile. Uber itself has never made a profit. 
Despite the low wages, and frequent law-breaking,111 its prices are too low, 
and its financiers are waiting for a return on their investment. It might 
appear that it aims to drive competitors (taxis) out of business and grow 
its market share and prices over the long run. Yet, if it does that, other 
platform-based ride services (such as Lyft) would step in and out-compete 
it. Perhaps it is hoping to hold on until driverless cars are available, in 
which case it would no longer have to worry about payments to drivers, 
but unless it hires those cars from owners it would face huge capital costs 
that it has so far avoided. Its hopes likely extend beyond driverless cars.
The biggest challenge to the employment relationship is in the ‘platform 
economy’. This is because virtual platforms provide a new, cheap way 
of control that may replace the need for the employment relationship. 
It is not only the availability of electronic control and surveillance that 
makes this possible. It is also that the rating systems in many platforms 
minimise the costs of monitoring quality. Not only does the platform 
reduce the need for an employment relationship, it also reduces the need 
for intermediate or peripheral capital to organise labour on behalf of core 
capital.
However, there are still limits to the use of cost cutting and of platform 
control. The gig economy will grow, but it will not overtake the 
employment relationship.
Conclusions
Flexibility is not a concept restricted to the gig economy and has been 
important in work for over three decades. The language of flexibility, we 
have seen, is value laden. The platform (or ‘gig’) economy is a major area 
where digital technology has allowed a new form of work organisation to 
develop. It is an area of heightened flexibility by labour, income insecurity, 
minimal employee control, and barriers to labour organisation.
111  Benjamin Edelman. ‘Uber Can’t Be Fixed — It’s Time for Regulators to Shut It Down’. Harvard 
Business Review, 21 June 2017, hbr.org/2017/06/uber-cant-be-fixed-its-time-for-regulators-to-shut-
it-down.
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The emergence of a new phase of capitalism, featuring ‘not there’ 
employment, signals some major challenges to labour and to regulators. 
But it does not signal the demise of the employment relationship and its 
replacement by a horde of freelancers. This is because cores of capital want 
to minimise costs and accountability, but they do not wish to minimise 
control. Their share of product markets increases. The paradox of the rise 
of new ‘gig economy’ models like Uber, and the continuing importance 
of employment, is explained by the ongoing efficiency of employment 
as a means to control worker behaviour, alongside the ongoing urge of 
capital to cut costs. The employment contract is open-ended, and it is 
impossible to put into it every aspect of what an employee must do. 
Contracting is a way of reducing costs and risk, increasing profits and 
avoiding accountability, but it is not effective for maintaining control. 
The contradiction discussed here is at the heart of ‘not there’ employment 
and its resolution plays out differently in different industries, but in the 
end the employment relationship provides a form of control that no 
other contractual relationship can achieve. Even when critical activities 
are outsourced to peripheral capital, the labour used by peripheral 
capital is often (not always) kept under control through the employment 
relationship, because this enables peripheral capital to control labour 
(and to minimise labour turnover costs) in the way it needs, to meet its 
obligations to core capital. The platform economy reduces the need for 




Worker voice and  
collectivism
Out of Google offices around the world, at 11.10 am on 1 November 
2018, poured 20,000 workers. They were walking off the job, most directly 
about the way the company was seen as having protected three senior 
employees accused of sexual harassment, but if you looked deeper you also 
saw complaints about pay discrimination, lack of transparency, racism 
and the treatment of contract workers.1 That protection, it gradually 
transpired, included providing two of the controversial executives 
with exit packages worth a total of US$135 million (approximately 
AU$200 million).2 The walkout was astonishing to many because Google, 
one of the largest tech companies in the world, was also notably nonunion. 
‘Google Walkout for Real Change’ does not call itself a union, but its 
activists behave as if it is.3 Google, meanwhile, tried to suppress collective 
organisation within the corporation, much as many nonunion employers 
had done.4 The dispute continues, and since then its organisers have 
1  Shirin Ghaffary and Eric Johnson, ‘After 20,000 Workers Walked out, Google Said It Got the 
Message. The Workers Disagree’. Recode, 21 November 2018, www.recode.net/2018/11/21/18105719/
google-walkout-real-change-organizers-protest-discrimination-kara-swisher-recode-decode-podcast.
2  Daisuke Wakabayashi and Katie Benner, ‘How Google Has Protected Its Elite Men’. New York 
Times, 25 October 2018; Bryan Menegus, ‘Google Agreed to Pay Execs Accused of Sexual Harassment 
$135 Million’. Gizmodo, 11 March 2019, gizmodo.com/google-agreed-to-pay-execs-accused-of-sexual-
harassment-1833214767.
3  Jon Evans, ‘What If Google Unionized?’. Techcrunch, 4 November 2018, techcrunch.com/ 2018/ 
11/04/what-if-google-unionized/.
4  Josh Eidelson, Hassan Kanu, and Mark Bergen, ‘Google Urged the U.S. to Limit Protection 
for Activist Workers’. Bloomberg, 24 January 2019, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-24/
google-urged-the-u-s-to-limit-protection-for-activist-workers.
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provided support for worker actions in other tech firms.5 It shows that 
even in the virulently antiunion climate of Silicon Valley6 (the location for 
The Circle), employees want voice.
Voice refers to a range of ways through which workers can influence 
decisions that affect them. As we’ve seen in previous chapters, management 
of employees has tended to move in two seemingly contradictory directions: 
towards tighter managerial control, or towards greater responsibility on 
employees. This pattern is likely to continue into the future. In which 
direction individual managers move will depend on the industry of the 
firm, the technology available to management, and the strategic direction 
chosen by managers, sometimes in response to pressures from owners, 
sometimes driven by their own preferences or the possibilities that arise 
from technology. Efforts by management to tighten control lead to 
resistance from employees and generate conflict, and the tendency of 
technological changes to enhance that capacity for managerial control 
makes that resistance no less likely. So management tries to persuade 
employees that it is all in their interests, often via culturism (as discussed 
in Chapter 5), and sometimes by adopting ‘high-trust’ approaches centred 
on enhancing employees’ ‘voice’ at work
If management does not want to give employees voice, employees will want 
voice anyway. Most employees seek more say at work, sometimes calling it 
‘participation in decision-making’ or even ‘workplace democracy’,7 while 
psychologists refer to ‘job control’. The phrase you sometimes hear about 
the workplace—‘leave your brains at the gate’—is used by workers to 
summarise the dismissive view many bosses have about the contribution 
employees can make, and about how much say workers have in what 
they do at work. Whatever some employers have done voluntarily about 
employee voice, there is little doubt that the underlying trend is towards 
less worker power in the workplace, as explained in Chapter 2 and shown 
by the decline in union membership,8 and the growth of managerial 
surveillance and control discussed in Chapter 5. So I want to explore this 
concept of ‘voice’, including how employees can, do and will exercise it.
5  See twitter.com/GoogleWalkout.
6  Noam Scheiber, ‘Google Workers Reject Silicon Valley Individualism in Walkout’. New York Times, 
6 November 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/business/google-employee-walkout-labor.html? 
smid=nytcore-ios-share.
7  Richard B. Freeman and Joel Rogers, What Workers Want (Ithaca: ILR Press, 1999).
8  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Employment Outlook (Paris: 
OECD, 2017).
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Voice
Voice is a term with complex and ‘uneven’ meanings—that is, different 
people use it to describe different things.9 At the simplest level, it can 
be divided into formal voice, which is often referred to as ‘employee 
participation’, and informal voice, which concerns the day-to-day 
behaviour of management—the extent to which managers have ‘open 
door’ practices, engage in behaviours such as a daily ‘walk around’ the 
factory or office floor, or otherwise obtain, welcome and pay attention 
to the views of ordinary employees. Informal voice is very much a 
function of management style, particularly regarding the high-trust/low-
trust dimension, discussed in Chapter 5. Our focus in this chapter is 
on formal voice, though beware that formal voice mechanisms will be 
blunted or even rendered ineffective if they are undermined by informal 
practices that ignore employee views. That said, just because something 
is formalised does not make it participatory. Formalised ‘information 
sharing’ does not equate to employee participation. Employee voice can 
only be said to exist if it travels ‘upwards’; that is, if management decisions 
are influenced by what those ‘below’ them are saying or demanding. As 
we saw in Chapter 5, sometimes firms will want to give the appearance 
of being participatory in order to disguise a high level of control over 
employees. 
A common distinction is also made between direct participation 
(e.g. productivity improvement groups, management employee meetings, 
quality circles and semiautonomous work groups); and representative 
(or ‘indirect’) participation (e.g. joint consultative committees, works 
councils and employee board representatives).
The most important way of categorising voice, though, is the extent to 
which it is management-constrained (conditional) or employee-controlled 
(independent). The issue of constraint and control here refers not just 
to whose voice is heard but also to who makes the decisions about 
whether employee voices will continue to be heard. This dimension is 
therefore closely related to the implications of employee voice for power. 
‘Management-constrained’ implies lower employee power; ‘employee-
controlled’ implies the opposite.
9  Tony Dundon and Derek Rollison, Employment Relations in Non-Union Firms (London: 
Routledge, 2004).
The ReALITIeS AnD FuTuReS oF WoRk
182
A voice mechanism is management-constrained if it is conditional 
on management’s acquiescence, and so management can ultimately 
terminate an arrangement for voice. Most forms of ‘employee 
participation’ that you may have heard of come under this category. These 
include almost all ‘direct’ and some ‘indirect’ or ‘representative’ forms 
of employee participation. A voice mechanism is employee-controlled if 
it is independent of management’s intent, and so management cannot 
unilaterally terminate an arrangement for voice. Some representative 
forms of employee participation are employee-controlled. In developed 
countries, by far the most common form of employee-controlled 
participation is trade unionism. Sometimes, though, the term may refer 
to ‘works councils’ (a form of representative participation found in parts 
of Europe), the activation of which may depend on employees specifying 
they want to have it. As they may be pressured against this, there are 
proposals to make this (called Mitbestimmung in Germany) compulsory.10 
So the distinction, while useful, is not without caveats. In some developing 
countries nongovernment organisations (NGOs) are mechanisms by 
which employees might independently express their voice. 
Employee participation is promoted by different people for different 
reasons. Some managers, and some policy-makers, encourage employee 
participation because of the perceived potential to improve economic 
performance, and there is quite a lot of evidence that it does this.11 Usually, 
such arguments are made about conditional voice, and that is the main 
reason management allows it to occur. Independent voice probably has 
a weaker, perhaps more neutral impact on economic performance due 
to opposing influences.12 On the one hand, workers’ knowledge of their 
situation can make major contributions to improving efficiency, and 
workers committed to a union tend on average to be more committed to 
10  Werner Nienhüser, ‘Employees Want Democracy in the Workplace’. Magazin Mitbestimmung, 
Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, 2018, www.boeckler.de/66359.htm.
11  George Strauss, ‘Workers’ Participation in Management’. In Employment Relations: The Psychology 
of Influence and Control at Work, ed. Jean F. Hartley and Geoffrey M. Stevenson (Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell, 1992), 291–311; Derek C. Jones and Jan Svejnar, ‘The Economic Performance of 
Participatory and Self-Managed Firms: A Historical Perspective and a Review’. In Participatory and Self-
Managed Firms, ed. Derek C. Jones and Jan Svejnar (Lexington, MA: DC Heath & Co, 1982), 3–16; 
Department of Employment and Industrial Relations, Industrial Democracy and Employee Participation: 
A Policy Discussion Paper (Canberra: Working Environment Branch, DEIR and AGPS, 1986); John 
R. Cable and Felix R. Fitzroy, ‘Co-operation and Productivity: Some Evidence from West German 
Experience’. Journal of Economic Analysis and Workers Management 14, no. 2 (1980): 163–80.
12  Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do? (New York: Basic Books, 1984); 
Richard B. Freeman, ‘What Do Unions Do? The 2004 M-Brane Stringtwister Edition’. Journal of 
Labor Research 26, no. 4 (2005): 642–68.
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the organisation.13 On the other hand, employees may resist management 
overtures, and worker control that cannot be negated by management can 
give them an effective tool for resistance and restricting output.14 The net 
effect appears to depend on circumstances.15 It is not designed to enhance 
organisational performance, but if employees want to use it in part for 
that purpose (which many rationally would—workers typically want 
to preserve their jobs and improve the prospects of their organisation) 
it will likely have the effect of improving organisational performance, 
as management is rarely the source of all wisdom.
Sometimes the benefits for performance arising from increased employee 
participation derive from the greater reliance on supervision by peers 
rather than supervision through a hierarchical chain of command. This 
sounds quite exciting for employees, but there is a different, grim angle 
on this coming from Barker’s study of a firm he called ‘ISE Electronics’.16 
Here, there was a shift from hierarchical, bureaucratic control to self-
managing teams. Barker noticed that employees felt more closely watched 
than when they were under bureaucratic control. He described ‘concertive 
control’ as something that grows out of a substantial consensus about 
values, high-level coordination, and a degree of self-management by 
members or workers in an organisation’. Barker considered that:
contrary to the proponents of such systems, concertive control 
did not free workers from [Max] Weber’s iron cage of rational 
control. Instead, the concertive system, as it became manifest in 
this case, appeared to draw the iron cage tighter and to constrain 
the organisation’s members more powerfully.17 
13  As discussed in Chapter 5, this phenomenon is called ‘dual commitment’. See reference 80 in 
that chapter.
14  Bernard Elbaum and Frank Wilkinson, ‘Industrial Relations and Uneven Development: 
A Comparative Study of the American and British Steel Industries’. Cambridge Journal of Economics 
3, no. 3 (1979): 275–303.
15  Sandra E. Black and Lisa M. Lynch, ‘How to Compete: The Impact of Workplace Practices 
and Information Technology on Productivity’. The Review of Economics and Statistics 83, no. 3 
(2001): 434–45; Eileen Appelbaum, Jody Hoffer Gittell, and Carrie Leana, ‘High-Performance Work 
Practices and Sustainable Economic Growth’. Memo to Obama Administration, Brandeis University, 
20 March 2011.
16  James R. Barker, ‘Tightening the Iron Cage: Concertive Control in Self-Managing Teams’. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1993): 408–37.
17  Ibid. See also Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Routledge, repr.  2013).
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Still, not all systems of self-managing teams may have this effect: if culture 
is fragmented, pressure for concertive control will be weak. Even if it is 
intended to act in that way, as we saw in Chapters 3 and 5, no system of 
control is total.
While Barker’s was an American case study, there was also Australian 
survey evidence from the 1990s to support his interpretations. It suggested 
that not all changes at work were being ‘forced’ upon employees against 
their ‘will’. While many employees were being made to work harder as 
a consequence of the growing exercise of managerial prerogative, others 
were working harder in the context of what might appear to be greater 
employee control over their own working lives. Even changes that gave 
employees greater control over their working time appear to be associated 
with increased work intensity. Thus it may ironically reduce rather than 
enhance the autonomy of employees.18 Moves either to ‘high performance’ 
work systems or their opposite, Taylorism, were both associated with 
increased work intensity and stress—two paths to work intensification.19 
Adverse effects such as this could limit the gains from participation. We 
can think of management seeking to loosen direct control of employee 
work methods and hours as a means of tightening control of employee 
outputs. There is some indication of increasing use by corporations of 
management-constrained participation mechanisms.20
So while workers typically want more say, they are not necessarily better 
off in all respects if this is designed to benefit management. Another, 
Danish study found that, while participation enhanced the quality of the 
working environment, increasing direct participation without increasing 
collective (indirect) participation could have a negative effect on employee 
psychological wellbeing ‘if participation is limited to operational issues 
pertaining to job performance, framed by a top-down involvement 
scheme and/or linked to productivity targets and performance control 
of employees’.21 
18  David Peetz, Cameron Allan, and Michael O’Donnell, ‘Are Australians Really Unhappier with 
Their Bosses Because They’re Working Harder? Perspiration and Persuasion in Modern Work’. Paper 
presented at Rethinking Institutions for Work and Employment, Selected Papers from the XXXVIII 
Annual Canadian Industrial Relations Association Conference, Quebec, 26–28 May 2001.
19  Ibid.
20  Richard B. Freeman, Peter Boxall, and Peter Haynes, eds, What Workers Say: Employee Voice in 
the Anglo-American World (Ithaca NY: ILR Press, 2007).
21  Ole Busck, Herman Knudsen, and Jens Lind, ‘Who Is in Control? The Effect of Employee 
Participation on the Quality of the Work Environment’. Paper presented at European congress of 
International Industrial Relations Association, Copenhagen, June 2010.
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In many firms, management will give employees enough autonomy, 
and the illusion of control, to improve productivity until the point 
when employees decide to challenge managerial authority or decisions 
in some way. Then it becomes very clear that employees have to submit 
to managerial directives in the absence of any countervailing employee 
power. In many ways, that is what we saw with ‘Servo’ and Starbucks 
in Chapter  5: ‘members’, ‘associates’ and ‘partners’ may have all felt 
they had their say, until they were performance-managed out of their 
job or made redundant. As the Danish researchers discovered, direct 
without representative participation—that is, without some form of 
independent voice—may be damaging, as ‘collective participation, found 
at the workplaces with a democratic governance system of management–
employee relations, is very helpful in resisting or compensating for 
strenuous psychological demands’.22 
So greater productivity, for the benefit of the organisation, is one rationale 
for employee participation. A second rationale is a social justice one—a 
rationale more commonly associated with left-leaning political parties. 
According to this view, voice is justified because it is a right of employees 
to be able to influence the decisions that affect their working lives. That 
is, if society is pluralist outside the workplace, why should it become 
dictatorial once you step inside the workplace? Industrial democracy, and 
even economic democracy, are seen as corollaries of political democracy.
Although this rationale is about people’s rights, it is bolstered by evidence 
showing that employee participation in decision-making is good for 
people who exercise it. For example, before you conclude from the earlier 
material that giving employees greater say doesn’t help them deal properly 
with the long-hours issue, consider this: one Australian employee study 
showed that, despite working harder, employees experiencing greater 
say—including on hours—showed other benefits in areas like job 
satisfaction, training opportunities, use of skills and receipt of a pay rise.23 
In another study, of mine and energy workers, those who had no say 
over their hours and shifts reported more short-term illnesses. The use 
of sleeping tablets was higher among workers who had no say in their 
hours. Those who wished to reduce hours and had no say over their hours 
22  Ibid.
23  Peetz, Allan, and O’Donnell, ‘Are Australians Really Unhappier’.
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were three-quarters more likely to use anti-depressants.24 So, greater say 
over hours was associated with better health outcomes, even in a long-
hours industry. That study also showed that mining and energy workers 
who had no say over when they could take time off were considerably 
more likely to say that they were getting on worse with people at home: 
11 per cent said that how well they ‘got on with people at home’ had 
gone down over the previous two years, versus 6.5 per cent for whom it 
had gone up.25 In a broader study, the mining industry was ranked the 
second worst on the index measuring the degree of interference between 
work and family life. One reason may be the divergence between hours 
preferred and hours worked.26
The third rationale for employee participation relates exclusively to 
employee-controlled voice. Just as a corporation is a collective of capital 
(a collection of shareholders seeking to maximise their economic power 
by combining), so too a union is a collective of labour. Workers come 
together to form unions in order to increase their bargaining power. In the 
absence of this, most workers would have little or no bargaining power as 
individuals when negotiating with a corporation, a collective of capital, 
over employment. That is, as there are some issues on which the interests 
of workers and employers are in conflict, it is rational for employees to 
want to improve their bargaining power, and to do so in a way that is not 
controlled by management. Whether employers think that employee voice 
is a good idea is irrelevant to this rationale—though it also happens to be 
the case that many employers prefer dealing with unions as this reduces 
their transaction costs in employee relations (hence some employers have 
a ‘collectivist’ style, discussed in Chapter 5). Employee-controlled or 
independent voice is what the rest of this chapter concentrates upon, as 
it represents the main means by which employees can seek to alter the 
direction in which management wishes to take them.
24  David Peetz, Georgina Murray, and Olav Muurlink, Work and Hours Amongst Mining and 
Energy Workers (Brisbane: Centre for Work, Organisation and Wellbeing, Griffith University, 2012), 
11–12.
25  Ibid.
26  Natalie Skinner and Barbara Pocock, Work, Life & Workplace Culture: The Australian Work and 
Life Index 2008 (Adelaide: Centre for Work + Life, University of South Australia, 2008).
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Independent voice: Trade unionism
As mentioned, independent or employee-controlled voice—collective 
voice—mostly takes the form of trade unionism, at least in developed 
countries. Still, as former US Secretary of Labor Thomas Perez said 
recently:
There are many ways to give voice to workers. Unions are certainly 
one way. There are also a number of non -profits that are working 
with taxicab drivers and home health workers and fast food 
workers, nonprofits that are very agile, and they’re really standing 
up for low-wage workers trying to give voice.27
These new institutions might include cooperatives, worker centres, ‘fast 
food strikes’ or even ‘Turkopticon’, which rates organisations soliciting 
workers through the gig platform Amazon Mechanical Turk.28 That said, 
I focus here on unions.
Some writers have distinguished between two forms of unionism, which 
broadly speaking can be described as unionism mostly outside the 
workplace (sometimes called ‘political unionism’, ‘arbitration unionism’, 
‘labourism’, or, in a particular form, ‘service unionism’) and unionism 
mostly focused within the workplace (sometimes called ‘organising 
unionism’). The terms ‘organising’ and ‘service’ unionism emerged 
initially in the USA and spread to other Anglophone countries in the 
1990s, having particular salience in Australia because the arbitration 
system, within which Australian unions developed, had discouraged the 
development of workplace unionism.29
Workplace unionism is very important for the sustainability of unionism. 
Although that statement may seem obvious, for long periods in the 
twentieth century activism at the workplace was not encouraged by 
unions, especially in some Anglophone countries, whether because of fear 
27  Thomas Perez, ‘Video: A Message from Former US Secretary of Labor Thomas Perez to the 
Next Generation Workforce’. Shaping the Future of Work (Cambridge, MA: MIT and EdX, 2017), 
courses.edx.org/courses/course-v1:MITx+15.662x_3+1T2017/courseware/d670b05 d28d1497fb 
57422c10cbb6319/f7b6dd9e996e4ec9b9981566a69a16eb/?child=first (subscription required).
28  Thomas A. Kochan, ‘Video: All Innovations Are Local’. Shaping the Future of Work (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT and EdX, 2017).
29  Malcolm Rimmer, ‘Work Place Unionism’. In Australian Unions: An Industrial Relations 
Perspective, ed. William Ford and David Plowman (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1989), 122–44; David 
Peetz and Janis Bailey, ‘Dancing Alone: The Australian Union Movement over Three Decades’. 
Journal of Industrial Relations 54, no. 4 (2012): 524–41.
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of loss of central control or ‘wildcat’ strikes or, in the case of Australia and 
New Zealand, the logic of arbitration systems that privileged advocacy 
skills in front of tribunals ahead of organising skills.
From the 1990s, unionism was in decline in many countries, especially in 
Australia. Although some attributed this to the decline of manufacturing, 
‘blue collar’ jobs or other industrial or occupational change,30 empirically 
this explanation does not hold up except for a relatively short period 
(mostly in the 1980s).31 For example, in Australia, manufacturing 
employment virtually halved, from around 14.5 per cent to 7.5 per cent, 
between 1990 and 2016. But union density in manufacturing was only 
5 percentage points above the national average in 1990 anyway, so that 
change in its share of employment could only account for about a third 
of a percentage point of union decline, out of the 27 percentage point 
decline in union density over this period—union density across Australia 
fell from 41 per cent in 1990 to about 14 per cent in 2016. Indeed, 
union density within manufacturing fell from 46 per cent in 1990 to little 
over 12 per cent in 2016—greater than the decline across the nation, 
in fact.32 Density declined within all industries and occupations, and 
structural effects associated with industry of employment were small. The 
decline of public sector employment had a more noticeable effect, but still 
only accounted for a minor portion of union decline. In other countries, 
composition change among industries or occupations after 1990 does 
30  For example, ‘union decline has broadly tracked the declining share of jobs held by blue-collar 
workers’: Bradley Bowden, ‘Three Charts On: The Changing Face of Australian Union Members’. 
The Conversation, 4 July 2017, theconversation.com/three-charts-on-the-changing-face-of-australian-
union-members-80141.
31  In the UK, compositional change between 1983 and 1989 accounted for about 30 per cent of 
the decline in density. Francis Green, ‘Recent Trends in British Trade Union Density: How Much of 
a Compositional Effect?’. British Journal of Industrial Relations 30, no. 3 (1992): 445–58. In Australia 
during the 1980s its contribution could have been up to a half. David Peetz, Unions in a Contrary 
World: The Future of the Australian Trade Union Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998). Its contribution appeared considerably smaller in most other OECD countries: Jelle Visser, 
‘Trends in Trade Union Membership’. In Employment Outlook (Paris: Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, 1991), 97–134.
32  Australian Bureau of Statistics. ‘Trade Union Members’. Canberra 6325.0; Australian Bureau of 
Statistics. ‘Characteristics of Employment’. Canberra 6333.0.
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little to explain declines in density.33 All of this is nothing new: that the 
fastest growing sectors of employment have been hardest to unionise is 
‘a problem as old as the union movement’.34
Some workplaces that were previously unionised were deunionised. Union 
collapse at Australian workplaces in the 1990s occurred most commonly 
where unions had weak workplace organisation, where there was no 
delegate presence or where delegates were inactive or unions were not 
involved in workplace bargaining. Workplace delegates, therefore, played 
a vital role in preventing deunionisation. Workplaces with active unions 
were more likely to resist deunionisation.35
The response of unions in several (mostly Anglophone) countries to the 
crisis of the 1990s was to place increasing emphasis on the future of 
workplace unionism. This concept—or at least, ‘organising’—re-emerged 
in the USA and Canada,36 and led, in Australia, to the establishment of 
‘Organising Works’, a centre (since renamed) run through the Australian 
Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) for training union activists. This 
became the model for the Organising Academy, established by the 
British Trades Union Congress. These agencies promoted the ‘organising 
model’ of unionism. At the core of this concept of ‘organising’ was the 
fermentation of workplace activism, through developing and providing 
support for workplace delegates. The idea was that members be empowered 
to solve problems themselves, as opposed to having paid union officials 
33  Frank Walsh and Eric Strobl, ‘Recent Trends in Trade Union Membership in Ireland’. Economic 
and Social Review 40, no. 1 (2009): 117–38; Claus Schnabel, ‘Union Membership and Density: Some 
(Not So) Stylized Facts and Challenges’. European Journal of Industrial Relations 19, no. 3 (2013): 
255–72.
34  R. Archer, ‘Organising: An International Perspective’. In Unions 2001, ed. Evatt Foundation 
(Sydney: 1995).
35  Peetz, Unions in a Contrary World.
36  The word ‘re-emerged’ is used because many argue that this is how unionism originally formed 
and, in North America, the ‘organising’ approach owed much to the work of Saul Alinsky who, in 
the 1930s, led the organising of a depressed Chicago ‘slum’. Saul D. Alinsky, Reveille for Radicals 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946); Saul D. Alinsky, Rules for Radicals (New York: Random 
House, 1971).
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solve them on their behalf.37 In practice, organising unions engaged in 
both ‘organising’ and ‘servicing’ activities (acting as agents in response to 
member queries), but they may have had dedicated functions within the 
union to deal with servicing requests (‘member service centres’), leaving 
organisers to do organising work. A union approach that did not extend 
beyond the workplace would be crippled. The ability to refer beyond the 
workplace—and by reference to considerations beyond the workplace, 
to make demands upon management—is one of the characteristics 
distinguishing between management-constrained and employee-
controlled forms of voice.
Recent patterns of union membership show interesting, in some cases 
seemingly contradictory, features. In most Anglophone countries, 
for example, employees have reported that they desired a cooperative 
relationship between the union and management at the workplace.38 Not 
only did they see that the union needed to behave cooperatively; they also 
expected management to reciprocate by cooperating with the union to 
solve workplace problems. Detailed questioning revealed that, to workers, 
cooperation meant management sharing power and authority with unions, 
not some sort of sham whereby management leads and the union cooperates 
by following. Union members were more vigorous in demanding that 
management cooperate more with unions than that unions cooperate more 
with management,39 and almost unanimously wanted unions to continue 
to vigorously defend their interests. Thus the meaning of ‘cooperation’ was 
quite complex, and a long way from ‘acquiescence’. Union members were 
more likely to have taken part in industrial action where they saw unions as 
37  Examples of studies or publications that related to organising include: Bradon Ellem, ‘New 
Unionism in the Old Economy: Community and Collectivism in the Pilbara’s Mining Towns’. Journal 
of Industrial Relations 45, no. 4 (2003): 423–41; Patricia Findlay and Alan McKinlay, ‘Union Organising 
in “Big Blue’s” Backyard’. Industrial Relations Journal 34, no. 1 (2003): 52–66; Christopher L. Erickson 
et al., ‘Justice for Janitors in Los Angeles: Lessons from Three Rounds of Negotiations’. British Journal 
of Industrial Relations 40, no. 3 (September 2002): 543–67; David Peetz, Brave New Workplace: How 
Individual Contracts Are Changing Our Jobs (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2006), Chapter 7; Bob Carter 
and Rae Cooper, ‘The Organizing Model and the Management of Change: A Comparative Study of 
Unions in Australia and Britain’. Relations Industrielles 57, no. 4 (Fall, 2002): 712–42; Unions@Work 
(Melbourne: ACTU, 1998); Kate Bronfenbrenner, Sheldon Friedman, Richard W. Hurd, and Rudolph 
A. Oswald, eds, Organising to Win (Ithaca NY: ILR Press, 1998).
38  This is another example of dual commitment, mentioned in an earlier footnote. For data, see 
Freeman, Boxall, and Haynes, What Workers Say. This includes the chapter David Peetz and Ann 
Frost, ‘Employee Voice in the Anglo-American World: What Does It Mean for Unions?’. In What 
Workers Say: Employee Voice in the Anglo-American World, ed. Richard B. Freeman, Peter Boxall, and 
Peter Haynes (Ithaca NY: ILR Press, 2007).
39  In Australia, the numbers for these two last estimates were 82 per cent and 66 per cent, respectively.
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having tried to cooperate with management.40 It may seem paradoxical, but 
it meant members were more likely to get involved in union actions if they 
perceived the union as reflecting their own interests—as being ‘democratic’. 
We will come back to this.
Union density among young workers has been very low. Yet research finds 
that generally young people are not opposed outright to unionism—
this is not surprising, given the evident responsiveness of young voters 
to left-wing causes in elections in the USA and UK.41 Young people 
tend, instead, to be simply unaware of what unionism is, partly because 
many of them do not have parents who are union members.42 So there is 
a generational aspect to union membership. Where they have an opinion 
(which is not so often), young employees are as likely to want to belong 
to a union as older employees, but much less likely to actually belong, 
perhaps because they have less opportunity to join, and have lower 
awareness of workplace issues.43 As the proportions of young workers who 
are socialised by unionised parents falls, however, ignorance of unions 
and workplace issues increases. Some unions use a range of strategies to 
allow young people to ‘sample’ unionism or ‘activist’ programs that target 
young members.44 Researchers urge unions to explain unions’ raison 
d’etre and their internal processes to young workers but also to ‘allow 
young members to contribute to bringing about the kinds of changes they 
are calling for’.45
40  David Peetz, ‘Workplace Cooperation, Conflict, Influence and Union Membership’. In 
Contemporary Research on Unions: Theory, Membership, Organisation and Non-Standard Employment, 
ed. G. Griffin, Monograph No. 8 (Melbourne: National Key Centre in Industrial Relations, 1996), 
309–46.
41  Sarah Wildman, ‘How Angry Young Voters Help Explain the Historic UK Election Upset’. 
Vox, 13 June 2017, www.vox.com/world/2017/6/13/15771640/bernie-corbyn-melenchon-uk-
election-young-voters-youth-vote; Kei Kawashima-Ginsberg, Noorya Hayat, Abby Kiesa, and Felicia 
Sullivan, ‘Donald Trump and Young Voters’ (Medford, MA: Tufts University, Center for Information 
and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement, June 2016), civicyouth.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/06/Trump-and-Youth-Vote.pdf, 4.
42  Freeman, Boxall, and Haynes, What Workers Say.
43  Julian Teicher et al., ‘Employee Voice in Australia’. In What Workers Say: Employee Voice in the 
Anglo-American World, ed. Richard B. Freeman, Peter Boxall, and Peter Haynes (Ithaca NY: ILR 
Press, 2007); David Peetz, Robin Price, and Janis Bailey, ‘Ageing Australian Unions and the “Youth 
Problem”’. In Young People and Trade Unions: A Global View, ed. Lefteris Kretsos and Andrew Hodder 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
44  Janis Bailey et al., ‘Daggy Shirts, Daggy Slogans? Marketing Unions to Young People’. Journal of 
Industrial Relations 52, no. 1 (2010): 43–60.
45  Mélanie Dufour-Poirier and Mélanie Laroche, ‘Revitalising Young Workers’ Union Participation: 
A Comparative Analysis of Two Organisations in Quebec (Canada)’. Industrial Relations Journal 45, 
no. 5–6 (2015): 418–33.
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Union members tend to report high levels of satisfaction with their 
union.46 Many nonmembers would be willing to join a union, given the 
opportunity, including approximately a third of all workers in nonunionised 
workplaces in several countries in one 2000s study,47 probably rising to 
nearly half of US nonmembers by 2017.48 These ‘frustrated nonmembers’ 
are typically on low incomes (often in the secondary labour market), 
in small workplaces or enterprises, or young. Those with more unmet 
workplace ‘needs’ are more likely to want unionism.49
Are unions doomed by the shift to 
individualism?
Some of the above considerations, such as the high satisfaction with 
unions among members, and stresses on wages and working conditions 
in recent years, might suggest there would be reasons why unions could 
grow. Yet the idea is often dismissed because of modern attitudes. One of 
the common suggestions made in talking about the future of work is that 
there will be no more unions because we will be working as freelancers 
and nobody will want unions any more as we will all want to be—and 
all will be—treated like individuals, with individualistic values and 
philosophies.50 As seen in earlier chapters, we will not all be working as 
freelancers and will not all be treated like individuals at work. But what 
about our values? People have been saying for 30 years or more that we are 
becoming individualistic in our philosophies and that this will preclude 
collective behaviour in the future. Class is said to be losing its significance 
and individuals embedded in market relations, making their own choices, 
undergoing ‘individuation’, fashioning their own identities, isolated and 
egocentric.51
46  Freeman, Boxall, and Haynes, What Workers Say; Peetz, Unions in a Contrary World.
47  Freeman, Boxall, and Haynes, What Workers Say.
48  Thomas Kochan et al., ‘Who Wants to Join a Union? A Growing Number of Americans’. The 
Conversation, 31 August 2018, theconversation.com/who-wants-to-join-a-union-a-growing-number-
of-americans-102374.
49  Freeman, Boxall, and Haynes, What Workers Say.
50  Peter Frase, ‘Delusions of the Tech Bro Intelligentsia’. Jacobin, 21 October 2013. www.
jacobinmag.com/2013/10/delusions-of-the-tech-bro-intelligentsia/.
51  Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage, 1992); Rainer Zoll, ‘Failing 
to Modernize?’. European Journal of Industrial Relations 1, no. 1 (1995): 119–28; Ben Valkenburg, 
‘Individualization, Participation and Solidarity’. European Journal of Industrial Relations 1, no. 1 (1995): 
129–44.
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The numbers show otherwise. It is true that respondents can interpret 
survey questions in different ways in different geographic contexts, so 
standardised questions are not all that useful for telling you whether, say, 
Norway is less individualistic than the USA. But standardised questions 
asked in the same place at different times can give you a pretty good 
idea as to whether, and in which direction, beliefs in that place have 
changed. And generally speaking they show no net general drift towards 
individualism. If anything, the opposite is the case. For example, a 
question asking respondents, across up to two dozen countries, to choose 
between ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’ shows on average a leftward drift in more 
countries than not, over a series of periods from 1981 –83 to 2008.52 
Several international studies have found majority support for government 
action to reduce inequality or for reducing the gap between the pay of 
chief executive officers and ordinary wages.53 American public attitudes 
against wide differentials between the highest income earners and the rest 
appeared to harden from 1987 to 1999.54 Despite massive changes in the 
occupational structure, patterns of class identification are very similar in 
the twenty-first century to what they were two to four decades earlier in 
Britain, Australia, the USA or Canada.55 Consistently, opinion polls had 
shown around half the US workforce had identified as working or lower 
class from at least the early 1970s onwards.56 Yet this was largely considered 
irrelevant by media commentators and politicians. Almost none used the 
term ‘working class’ in public discourse for years (preferring, if anything, 
‘middle class’) until Donald Trump colonised the term in 2016.
52  A ‘leftward drift’ here refers to moves towards attitudes supportive of collective or redistributive 
action  by labour or the state. IFO Institute for Economic Research, ‘Database for Institutional 
Comparisons in Europe’ (University of Munich, 2008).
53  GlobeScan/BBC World Service, ‘Wide Dissatisfaction with Capitalism — Twenty Years after Fall 
of Berlin Wall’ (London: BBC, 2009), 9 November; S. Kiatpongsan and M.I. Norton, ‘How Much 
(More) Should CEOs Make? A Universal Desire for More Equal Pay’. Perspectives on Psychological 
Science 9, no. 6 (2014): 587–93; International Labour Office, Economic Security for a Better World 
(Geneva: Socio-Economic Security Programme, ILO, 2004).
54  Lars Osberg and Timothy Smeeding, ‘“Fair” Inequality? Attitudes toward Pay Differentials: The 
United States in Comparative Perspective’. American Sociological Review 71, no. 3 (2006): 450–73.
55  Mike Savage, ‘Individuality and Class: The Rise and Fall of the Gentlemanly Social Contract in 
Britain’. In Social Contracts under Stress: The Middle Classes of America, Europe, and Japan at the Turn 
of the Century, ed. Olivier Zunz, Leonard James Schoppa, and Nobuhiro Hiwatari (New York: Russell 
Sage, 2002), 47–65; Chris Arnot, ‘No Such Thing as a Classless Society’. Guardian, 7 October 2009, 
www.guardian.co.uk/society/2009/oct/07/class-influence-british-sense-identity; David Peetz, ‘Are 
Individualistic Attitudes Killing Collectivism?’. Transfer—European Review of Labour and Research 
16, no. 3 (2010): 383–98.
56  National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey Data Explorer: Subjective Class 
Identification (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2019), gssdataexplorer.norc.org/variables/568/vshow.
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Changes in attitudes do not explain the decline in union density in 
Australia or elsewhere among advanced industrialised nations. Rather, 
the reasons are principally institutional. Chief among them have been 
employer strategies that increasingly focus on achieving nonunion 
status, ‘distancing’ and cost minimisation. These have been assisted by 
government strategies, particularly in Anglophone countries, that have 
marginalised unions through legislation, privatisation and administrative 
action.57 The greater use of ‘not there’ employment has made it harder 
for unions to organise, by fragmenting bargaining and placing workers 
into jobs where price competition makes wage claims difficult. Weak 
unionism and weak regulation in turn encourage ‘not there’ employment, 
because the cost gains are higher and the potential for underpayment 
greater where workers are relocated to an entity where they are unable 
to organise resistance. At the heart of these strategies by both employers 
and governments is the rise of market liberalism or ‘neo-liberalism’. To 
varying degrees (particularly in Australia, where the legacy of the award 
system’s effects on unions was pervasive) unions exacerbated this by 
having difficulty in adapting to these changing circumstances—what 
Pocock called ‘institutional sclerosis’—in the face of neo-liberalism.58 
Unions found it hard to redirect resources internally, to enable them to 
demonstrate power in ways that ensured retention of members.
Unionism is what economists call an ‘experience good’, so for current 
or recent union members the public image of unions matters little in 
determining workers’ decision to stay, compared to their own experiences. 
However, unions’ public image is important in shaping the behaviour of 
people who have never belonged to one,59 and recruitment may become 
more difficult in the future, as fewer people have experience of unions 
that influences their decision to join and fewer people have union parents. 
There is already evidence that ‘never joining’ has increased;60 so unions’ 
public image, including that developed by the firms for which people 
work, becomes more influential in choices about union membership.
57  Peetz, Unions in a Contrary World.
58  Barbara Pocock, ‘Institutional Sclerosis: Prospects for Trade Union Transformation’. Labour & 
Industry 9, no. 1 (1998): 17–33.
59  Peetz, Unions in a Contrary World.
60  Alex Bryson and Rafael Gomez, Why Have Workers Stopped Joining Unions? (London: Centre for 
Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, November 2003).
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Collective behaviour is unlikely to go away, even if people are unwilling 
or unable to join unions. Collective behaviour arises where a number 
of conditions are met.61 The first is that others also share needs or 
grievances felt by individuals—that is, grievances are collective. The 
objective circumstances promoting collectivism—the existence of 
exploitation creating grievances—are set to continue. Nor is there any 
sign that the values enabling collectivism are in decline. Where people 
possess values that promote altruistic or mutually supportive behaviour, 
that reinforce trust among members of the group, or that emphasise the 
welfare of a group as a whole as opposed to that of successful individuals, 
then collective attitudes and the scope for collective behaviour will be 
strengthened. Where people share common social identities, they are 
likely to act together, but where they lack a sense of common identity 
or are divided they are unlikely to act together.62 Where people possess 
beliefs of collective efficacy, that is, they sense agency and believe they 
have the power to achieve their goals through collective behaviour, they 
will be more likely to behave collectively,63 as ‘a collective of self-doubters 
is not easily forged into a collectively efficacious force’.64
Collective action also depends on potential participants having collective 
values—such as concern about inequality, solidarity or the belief that acting 
together is a ‘good thing’. It also requires coordination, through connections 
or networks between members of the group; the existence of collective 
mobilisers (e.g. union delegates or leaders) who can mobilise collective 
cooperation; and democratic (collective) coordination (as opposed to 
autocratic or individual coordination) within the collective. How much all 
this translates to the exercise of collective power will also depend on the 
institutional and environmental responses to collective action (including 
the actions of the state, the behaviours of corporations and employers, 
and the condition of the labour market). There has been a major decline 
in collective labour institutions (trade unions) and in collective industrial 
conflict (measured by numbers of strikes or working days lost) over the past 
61  Peetz, Brave New Workplace.
62  Caroline Kelly and Sara Breinlinger, ‘Identity and Injustice: Exploring Women’s Participation 
in Collective Action’. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology 5 (1995): 41–57; John E. 
Kelly, Rethinking Industrial Relations: Mobilization, Collectivism, and Long Waves. Routledge Studies 
in Employment Relations (London, New York: Routledge, 1998). John Kelly’s book is one of the 
more important in understanding union mobilisation.
63  Albert Bandura, Self-Efficacy: The Exercise of Control (New York: W.H. Freeman & Company, 
1997); John Kelly, ‘British Trade Unionism 1979–89: Change, Continuity and Contradictions’. 
Work, Employment and Society special issue (1990): 29–60.
64  Bandura, Self-Efficacy, 480.
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three decades. There is little evidence, however, that this is due to a decline 
in collective values, as these have changed little.65 Rather, changes in the 
institutional framework, in particular the policies and actions of the state 
and employers, offer more persuasive explanations.
If people are prevented from acting collectively through unions, they will 
look for other means of doing so. Even if unions can no longer play the 
role of mobilisers, there is no reason to think that collective grievances will 
go away, or that common work identities will disappear.66 Actions may 
be more disorganised, individualistic, self-destructive, even violent, but 
dissatisfaction and resistance are unlikely to go away.
Power and activism
Unions aim to achieve gains for their members by obtaining and exercising 
power in the workplace and elsewhere. Richard Hyman made one of the 
classical observations on union power.67 He noted the significance for 
a union of the power of its members, its ability to advance their interests. 
But he also identified the importance of a union’s power over its members, 
without which it would not have power for its members. In other words, 
a union can only exercise collective power on behalf of its members ‘if, and 
to the extent that, it can mobilise disciplined collective action on the part 
of its members’.68 It needs to be able to promote solidarity among and 
enforce discipline within its membership. 
This also relates back to one of the oldest issues that have faced collectives 
of any type, since people came together to form villages and societies, 
tradesmen came together to form guilds and workers came together 
to form trade unions: the problem of the ‘free rider’. In biology and 
economics this is termed the problem of the ‘cheat’—someone who obtains 
the benefits of membership of a group without contributing towards the 
65  Peetz, Brave New Workplace; David Peetz, ‘Are Collective Identity and Action Being Squashed by 
Individualism?’. In Work and Identity: Contemporary Perspectives on Workplace Diversity, ed. Shalene 
Werth and Charlotte Brownlow (New York: Palgrave, 2018).
66  Peetz, ‘Squashed by Individualism?’.
67  Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction (London: Macmillan, 1975).
68  Ibid., 65.
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costs.69 For trade unions, free riders dilute the bargaining strength of the 
group, reducing the impact of any collective action on an employer and 
the power resources available to union members. Free riding appears to 
have recently increased in Australia and some other countries, due not 
to changing values but to institutional developments.70
Some of the major research on union renewal has been among Canadian 
academics. From there, Lévesque and Murray point out, the ‘key factors 
currently challenging union power clearly cut across the different national 
institutional arrangements in which unions are embedded’. Levesque and 
Murray identified four key ‘power resources’ for unions:
1. internal solidarity (sufficiently cohesive identities to pursue their goals; 
and ‘deliberative vitality’—the participation of members in the life of 
their union);
2. network embeddedness (the degree to which unions are linked to 
their own and other union organisations, community groups, social 
movements or other types of actors);
3. narrative resources (the range of values, shared understandings, 
stories and ideologies that aggregate identities and interests, translate 
and inform motives and create a sense of efficacy)71 that frame 
understandings and union actions; 
4. infrastructural resources (material, human, processes, policies and 
programs).72 
69  The issue of free riding, in nature, ancient societies and modern collectives, is discussed in 
Chapter 2 of Peetz, Brave New Workplace, and more extensively by other authors; for example, 
John Stewart, Evolution’s Arrow: The Direction of Evolution and the Future of Humanity (Canberra: 
Chapman Press, 2000).
70  For instance, union density has, in Australia, declined by more than collective bargaining 
coverage, as it is convenient for many employers to continue to negotiate with a union than go 
through the upheaval from shifting to non-union negotiation. David Peetz and Serena Yu, Explaining 
Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining. Research Report 4/2017 (Melbourne: Fair Work Commission, 
February 2017). Changes in union density also appear greater than changes in union density in 
Sweden, Slovenia and Switzerland, but the trends appear in the other direction in the UK, USA and 
Germany.
71  Albert Bandura, ‘Exercise of Personal and Collective Efficacy in Changing Societies’. In Self-
Efficacy in Changing Societies, ed. Albert Bandura (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995): 
1–45; Bandura, Self-Efficacy: The Exercise of Control.
72  Christian Lévesque and Gregor Murray, ‘Understanding Union Power: Resources and 
Capabilities for Renewing Union Capacity’. Transfer—European Review of Labour and Research 16, 
no. 3 (2010): 333–50.
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However, as Levesque and Murray point out, resources alone are not 
enough—unions must be capable of using them as the context changes. 
For example, intensified competition and globalisation have weakened 
pattern bargaining (lodging of similar claims with the other side across 
a number of bargaining sites). They have also weakened union links 
to political processes so that ‘external solidarity resources derived from 
previous patterns of network embeddedness are not providing the 
leverage on which past patterns of union action relied’.73 This increases the 
importance of the workplace, while highlighting unions’ need to develop 
new ways of organising beyond the workplace and articulating back to it 
including through developing new forms of networks. One illustration is 
the increasing (though still limited) use by unions of social media74 and 
online actions.75 As ‘understanding … union resources and capabilities is 
critical to an understanding of efforts to enhance union power’, Lévesque 
and Murray identified four key strategic capabilities required for union 
power. These were unions’ abilities to put forward an agenda (‘framing’); 
intermediate between contending interests to foster collaborative action 
and activate networks; reflect on, build, anticipate and act upon change, 
and spread these lessons throughout the organisation (‘learning’); and 
articulate actions over time (short term versus long term) and space 
(including the multiple levels at which unions act).
How does the future of unions look in relation to these issues? One of 
the major weaknesses of progressive groups has been their inadequate 
framing of political debate and union rhetoric about inequality.76 
Framing is a major challenge when the media are replete with stories—
some beat-ups, some fictional and some based on grim facts—about 
poor union governance, misbehaviour or corruption. Years of observing 
unions suggest to me that, while many individuals are great learners, the 
organisations themselves often are not, despite many years passing since 
Pocock had remarked on this problem not long after the start of unions’ 
73  Ibid., 345.
74  Alex White, Social Media for Unions (Melbourne: Aleithia Media and Communications, 2010), 
alexwhite.org/2010/12/social-media-for-unions/.
75  LabourStart, Labourstart Australia (2014), www.labourstart.org/2013/country.php?country= 
Australia&langcode=en.
76  Anat Shenker-Osorio, Don’t Buy It: The Trouble with Talking Nonsense about the Economy (New 
York: Public Affairs, 2012). In Australia, this is despite the successful ‘Your Rights at Work’ campaign 
that led to the defeat of the Howard government—a campaign framed in terms of ‘rights’. Kathie 
Muir, Worth Fighting For: Inside the Your Rights at Work Campaign (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2008). The 
Your Rights at Work campaign also failed, despite lofty ideals, to deeply engage community groups 
and build strong linkages with them. Peetz and Bailey, ‘Dancing Alone’.
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reform process.77 On articulation, a critical link is that between the paid 
and unpaid levels of the union—between the office and the workplace. 
Effective union mobilisation requires power and capabilities on many 
levels. But perhaps the first of these, the foundation, is the workplace, and 
that is worth some special focus here. 
Building workplace organisation and democratisation
Workplace power for unions requires workplace activism. Workplace 
activism requires effective delegates, as the collapse of Australian 
unionism in the 1990s showed.78 Activism also requires delegates with 
a sense of efficacy, as confidence and self-belief are a strong predictor of 
activism, even stronger than self-assessed skill levels.79 Workplace power 
requires support by the union office, particularly organisers, for workplace 
delegates.80 While unions are more than just a form of workplace social 
capital,81 workplace power requires delegates have access to networks, 
internal and external to the workplace, formalised or informal, that 
provide support, information and ideas. And it requires that delegates, 
and members, have a sense that they can and do influence what the union 
itself does. Democracy within unions is a precondition for success. It is 
not just a  question of a union’s power for its members depending in 
part on power over its members:82 in a world without wage arbitration, 
workers cannot have power in the workplace if they do not have power 
in the union.83
Some of the implications, of what unions need to do to value and empower 
delegates, are obvious but not always easy. The research shows that activism 
is severely hampered unless workplace delegates are trained. Setting aside 
resources for education promotes learning within and by organisations. 
Training enhances not only the skills but also the confidence of delegates 
for engaging in activism, and for spreading the load to others with different 
77  Pocock, ‘Institutional Sclerosis’.
78  Peetz, Unions in a Contrary World.
79  David Peetz, Carol Webb, and Meredith Jones, ‘Activism Amongst Workplace Union Delegates’. 
International Journal of Employment Studies 10, no. 2 (2002): 83–108.
80  David Peetz and Barbara Pocock, ‘An Analysis of Workplace Representatives, Union Power and 
Democracy in Australia’. British Journal of Industrial Relations 47, no. 4 (2009): 623–52.
81  Paul Jarley, ‘Unions as Social Capital: Renewal through a Return to the Logic of Mutual Aid?’. 
Labor Studies Journal 29, no. 4 (2005): 1–26.
82  Hyman, Industrial Relations, 65.
83  Peetz and Pocock, ‘Workplace Representatives’.
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but complementary capabilities or interests.84 The research also shows that 
formal training of delegates is almost wasted if resources are not also put 
into the follow-up of training, to imprint the lessons. The formal and the 
informal are two very important sides of the training coin.85 Devoting 
resources to training is expensive but not necessarily controversial; the 
structural changes needed to ensure it is followed up and complemented 
can be both. The provision and facilitation of opportunities for networking 
is as important for developing supportive networks for delegate networks 
as is the provision of training itself.86 
To be capable and motivated, delegates require both training and meaning 
from the union. By ‘meaning’ I refer to a sense of what the union stands for, 
through an articulation of union values through the union organisation.87 
It also is about a sense of real say in the decisions that affect delegates and 
members, both direct participation in decision-making (influencing the 
day-to-day decisions about work as a member and delegate) and indirect 
participation (influencing the decisions of the union itself ).
Democratisation, in this context, is not just about having elected 
structures.  Generally and on average, elected structures are good. 
However they do not have much impact if people are elected to positions 
unopposed, along factional lines. At times, certain forms of elected 
positions (such as elected organisers in some unions) can retard reform 
processes within unions and maintain the status quo. Union democracy 
is a contested and paradoxical concept. Democratisation is more about 
how much ability members and delegates have, to shape what the union 
does. It is about how a union functions, and how open it is to members’ 
preferences and their diversity. The correlates of perceived democracy 
within unions suggest it is closely related to a willingness of the union to 
embrace and respond to broad constituencies, both inside and outside, 
such as those representing women’s interests.88
84  Peetz, Webb, and Jones, ‘Activism’; Peetz and Pocock, ‘Workplace Representatives’.
85  David Peetz and Michael Alexander, ‘A Synthesis of Research on Training of Union Delegates’. 
Industrial Relations Journal 44, no. 4 (2013): 425–42.
86  David Peetz et al., ‘The Meaning and Making of Union Delegate Networks’. Economic and 
Labour Relations Review 26, no. 4 (2015): 596–613.
87  Christian Levesque and Gregor Murray, ‘Local Versus Global: Activating Local Union Power 
in the Global Economy’. Labor Studies Journal 27, no. 3 (2002): 39–65; Lévesque and Murray, 
‘Understanding Union Power’.
88  David Peetz and Barbara Pocock, ‘Community Activists, Coalitions and Unionism’. In Trade 
Unions in the Community: Values, Issues, Shared Interests and Alliances, ed. D. Buttigieg, et al. (Adelaide: 
Heidelberg Press, 2007).
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So, are unions becoming more workplace-focused? The evidence of the 
past two decades suggests that in several countries the answer is ‘yes’. Are 
they becoming more democratic? That is much harder to assess. Their 
formal structures appear to be changing to make it harder for individuals 
to unilaterally control or ‘run off with’ resources, but ‘professionalisation’ 
may also reduce directly elected positions. One-off surveys in Australia 
have tended to suggest that members and organisers felt that, at the time 
of the survey, their ‘say’ in decision-making was increasing,89 but there are 
not enough of these to demonstrate a trend. One could tentatively answer 
with ‘probably’ but ‘not quickly enough’.
Unionism in the platform economy
The changing nature of work is often seen as creating major difficulties for 
unions. There is no doubt that casualisation and the shift from the public 
to the private sector damages unions, because union density is lower 
among casual and temporary workers and, compared to the public sector, 
among private sector workers. That said, empirically, these structural 
changes account for only a minority of the decline in union density in 
countries like Australia, and most of that happened in the 1980s.90 The 
issue is not so much a change in the composition of the workforce but 
a change in management (and government) strategies, involving more 
aggressive approaches towards trade unions and worker organisation as 
a means of minimising costs, transferring risk and regaining control, 
including through restructuring of capital, fragmentation through use of 
contractors, outsourcing, franchises, labour hire and spinoffs. These all 
create problems for union organisation: a union that undertakes industrial 
action in a contractor firm and interrupts supply, or that succeeds in 
obtaining higher wages for its members in that contractor firm, may 
find the employer of its members cut off from work and its members 
out of a job, regardless of whether they have ‘permanent’ or ‘temporary’ 
employment contracts. Others might decide not to risk it.
89  David Peetz and Barbara Pocock, ‘Organising and Delegates: An Overview’. Association of 
Industrial Relations Academics of Australia and New Zealand conference, Sydney, February 2005; 
Peetz and Pocock, ‘Workplace Representatives’; David Peetz, Chris Houghton, and Barbara Pocock, 
‘Organisers’ Roles Transformed? Australian Union Organizers and Changing Union Strategy’. Journal 
of Industrial Relations 49, no. 2 (2005): 151–66; ibid.
90  Peetz, Unions in a Contrary World; David Peetz, ‘Trend Analysis of Union Membership’. Australian 
Journal of Labour Economics 8, no. 1 (2005): 1–24.
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That said, these new forms of capitalist organisation are not invulnerable. 
Kim Moody refers to the ‘new terrain of class conflict’ that arises from 
tightly integrated production and logistics systems, with companies that 
are ‘bigger, more capital- intensive, and more economically rational’. 
It provides, he says, opportunities for unions to ‘take advantage of the 
vulnerable points in just-in- time logistics and production to bring 
some of these new giants to heel’.91 This harks back to an idea that has 
been around for a long time: workers have more power when they are 
strategically located, meaning they are located at points in the production 
process that are vulnerable to disruption. The JIT system increases the 
number of vulnerable points in the production process.
One of the biggest challenges facing unions in the future is the development 
of the ‘platform economy’, discussed in Chapter 6. People doing such work 
have the classic characteristics of casual employees—fragmented, lacking 
commitment to the organisation and hence to any union, often not highly 
engaged with their work—or more commonly contractors, who do not 
even have an ‘employer’ and so lack the protections, such as they exist, of 
employment law (though this depends on the specific legal context). In 
addition, those working for one firm may still be geographically separated 
from each other, perhaps by thousands of kilometres, perhaps in different 
time zones, and having no face-to-face contact with their fellow workers. 
So they may be classed as ‘self-employed’. In Australia, the likelihood of 
union membership among ‘casual’ employees is just a quarter of what it 
is among ‘permanent’ employees, and among the self-employed (owner-
managers of enterprises without employees) it is just one-eleventh.92 
So ‘platform economy’ or ‘gig’ workers appear very difficult for unions to 
organise. Yet, as we saw in Chapter 6, they are also highly susceptible 
to exploitation, with many (but not all) being paid below the equivalent 
of relevant minimum wage rates.
The result has been some seemingly spontaneous resistance by gig workers 
to their situation, alongside some rather innovative efforts by unions to 
engage with them. Among the efforts by unions to engage, the Austrian 
union vida set up a works council for food delivery cyclists working for 
Foodora (predominantly in Vienna), with the ultimate aim of establishing 
91  Quoted in Chris Brooks and Kim Moody, ‘Labor’s New Sources of Leverage’. Labor Notes, 
12 August 2016, www.labornotes.org/MoodyInterview.
92  Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Characteristics of Employment’.
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a collective agreement for all bicycle delivery services.93 Unions New South 
Wales (a peak union body in an Australian state) in 2017 negotiated ‘agreed 
minimum standards’ for engagements negotiated through Airtasker 
in that state.94 A Swedish union negotiated an industry-wide collective 
agreement that covers workers in Bzzt, an Uber-style organisation using 
electric taxis.95 In the USA, the Service Employees Industrial Union 
had largely negotiated an agreement with Airbnb about unionisation of 
and pay rates for housekeepers, until it withdrew in the face of severe 
criticism from members and other unions.96 A newly established union 
of Uber drivers in France organised a strike and road blockades, leading 
to the intervention of the state and negotiations over a minimum wage 
for Uber drivers.97 Germany’s IG Metall established the ‘FairCrowdWork’ 
platform, enabled self-employed crowdworkers to join the union, 
negotiated agreements with eight platforms to respect the minimum 
wage, and promoted the ‘Frankfurt Declaration on Platform-Based Work’ 
that also involved large unions from Austria, Denmark, Sweden and the 
USA.98 Britain’s GMB union backed cases run by drivers or riders against 
several gig firms, arguing (successfully) that they had been misclassified 
as self-employed rather than employees.99 It also negotiated an agreement 
with Hermès providing couriers the option of ‘self-employed plus’ status, 
which included union representation, minimum wage guarantees and 
paid recreation leave.100
93  vida, ‘Betriebsrat Für Fahrradzustelldienst Foodora’. vida (Austrian transport and service union), 
2017, www.vida.at/cms/S03/S03_0.a/1342577497037/home/artikel/betriebsrat-fuer-fahrrad zustell 
dienst-foodora.
94  Kate Minter, ‘Negotiating Labour Standards in the Gig Economy: Airtasker and Unions New 
South Wales’. Economic and Labour Relations Review 28, no. 3 (2017): 438–54.
95  Hannah Johnston and Chris Land-Kazlauskas, Organizing on-Demand: Representation, Voice, 
and Collective Bargaining in the Gig Economy. Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 94 
(Geneva: Inclusive Labour Markets, Labour Relations and Working Conditions Branch, International 
Labour Office, 2018).
96  Sam Levin, ‘Airbnb’s Controversial Deal with Labor Union Falls Apart after Intense Backlash’. 
Guardian, 22 April 2016.
97  Zachary Kilhoffer, Karolien Lenaerts, and Miroslav Beblavý, The Platform Economy and Industrial 
Relations: Applying the Old Framework to the New Reality. CEPS Report No. 2017/12 (Brussels: 
Centre for European Policy Studies, 2017).
98  Ibid.
99  Ibid; Robert Booth, ‘Addison Lee Wrongly Classed Drivers as Self-Employed, Tribunal Rules’. 
Guardian, 26 December 2017.
100  Sarah O’Connor, ‘Gig Economy Agreements Promise a Brighter Future for Trade Unions’. 
Financial Times, 26 February 2019.
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Indeed, in a number of jurisdictions, attempts by platform companies 
to define workers as self-employed have been challenged in courts and 
at times overturned, with tribunals or courts in parts of the USA, UK 
and Brazil ruling that various groups of platform workers are employees, 
not self-employed. Foodora went into administration (a weak form of 
bankruptcy) in Australia after a regulator argued to a tribunal that its 
workers were underpaid by being classified as contractors.101 
And then there have been the spontaneous efforts of seemingly unorganised 
gig workers to organise ‘strikes’ or other forms of what would normally 
be seen as industrial action, including Deliveroo workers in France, Uber 
drivers in California and New York, and Uber Eats workers in Britain.102 
Some workers do these things without any structure. Sometimes they set 
up their own forms of worker collective, be they to organise production 
through cooperatives103 or power through association.104 In a book of essays 
about platform worker cooperatives, the editors point to the imbalance of 
power between any cooperative and the huge private firms in the markets: 
the latter ‘aren’t coming to dominate just because of a good idea and 
a charismatic founder; they grow out of supportive ecosystems, including 
investors, lawyers, sympathetic governments and tech schools’.105 Despite 
some lower overheads (no extracted surplus), cooperatives struggle against 
the ability of large capitalist entities to consume competition.
101  BBC, ‘Bike Courier Wins “Gig” Economy Employment Rights Case’. BBC News, 7 January 
2017; Matt Hamilton, ‘Judge Finds NYC Uber Drivers to Be Employees; Upstate Impact Debated’. 
Timesunion, 12 September 2016, www.timesunion.com/allwcm/article/Judge-finds-NYC-Uber-drivers-
to-be-employees-11220139.php; Jamie Grierson and Rob Davies, ‘Pimlico Plumbers Loses Appeal 
against Self-employed Status’. Guardian, 11 February 2017; David Marin-Guzman, ‘Foodora Enters 
Voluntary Administration’. Australian Financial Review, 17 August 2018. More details are in Chapter 10.
102  Anna Sansom, ‘Bicycle Couriers Protest against Takeaway Food Service Deliveroo’. France24, 
12 August 2017, www.france24.com/en/20170812-france-paris-protest-food-delivery-service-delive 
roo-financial-insecurity-emmanuel-macron; Rebecca Burns, ‘The Sharing Economy’s “First Strike”: 
Uber Drivers Turn Off the App’. In These Times, 22 October 2014, inthesetimes.com/working/entry/ 
17279/the_sharing_economy_first_strike_uber_drivers_turn_off_the_app; Alison Griswold, ‘Uber 
Just Caved on a Big Policy Change after Its Drivers Threatened to Strike’. Slate, 12 September 2014, 
www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2014/09/12/uber_drivers_strike_they_protested_cheap_uberx 
_fares_uber_backed_down.html; Sarah Butler, ‘Uber Eats Drivers Plan Protest against Cuts in Pay 
Rate Per Delivery’. Guardian, 26 August 2016, www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/25/
ubereats-drivers-plan-protest-cuts-pay-rate-per-delivery-london-uber.
103  Sarah Kaine, Danielle Logue, and Emmanuel Josserand, ‘The “Uberisation” of Work Is Driving 
People to Co-operatives’. The Conversation, 28 September 2016.
104  Many of the alternatives are discussed in Johnston and Land-Kazlauskas, Organizing on-Demand.
105  Trebor Scholz and Nathan Schneider, Ours to Hack and to Own: The Rise of Platform Cooperativism, 
a New Vision for the Future of Work and a Fairer Internet (New York: OR Books, 2017).
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The most effective form of collective response appears to be when platform 
workers work with, form, or become part of, a union, and work with 
others with experience in building collective power.
For many unions, this is new territory that they are venturing into; but 
for some, it has been the nature of the work that they have always been 
organising. Unions representing workers in the film, video and theatrical 
industries have been organising gig workers—that is, those engaged 
in single musical performances or shows—for decades. In Hollywood, 
for example, unions representing independent contractors have long 
negotiated with the centres of capital—movie producers and firms—
to guarantee minimum pay and benefits, and those unions reinforce 
the values, sense of efficacy and collective identity of those workers.106 
In Canada, entertainment unions have made use of cultural policy to 
promote adequate labour standards and employment rights.107
Technological changes that make it easier for employers to disorganise 
workers into fragmented units can also be used by unions. For example, 
Facebook technology has been used by some unions, such as United Voice 
in Australia, not only to organise their own members (indeed, many 
unions have a social media presence) but also to mobilise nonmembers 
around particular issues or interest groups, such as underpayment of 
workers in the hospitality industry. That said, few union delegates across 
Australian unions in the mid-2010s made substantial use of Facebook or 
Twitter for union matters.108
In the USA, Walmart has been one of the most determined and 
successful  employers at keeping unions out, even closing stores after 
they unionised,109 so a new organisation, ‘OUR Walmart’ (‘Organisation 
United for Respect at Walmart’), was established by the  United Food 
106  W. Harry Fortuna, ‘The Gig Economy Is a Disaster for Workers. Hollywood’s Unions Can Help 
Them Learn to Fight Back’. Quartz, 1 September 2017, qz.com/1052310/hollywood-unions-offer-
the-perfect-model-for-the-beaten-down-workers-of-todays-gig-economy/.
107  Amanda Coles, ‘Unintended Consequences: Examining the Impact of Tax Credit Programmes 
on Work in the Canadian Independent Film and Television Production Sector’. Canadian Journal of 
Communication 31, no. 3 (2010): 519–40.
108  Peetz et al., ‘The Meaning and Making of Union Delegate Networks’.
109  Rhéal Séguin, ‘Ex-Wal-Mart Workers Win Battle’. Globe and Mail, 17 September 2005; 
Benedict Sheehy, ‘Corporations and Social Costs: The Wal-Mart Case Study’. University of Pittsburgh 
Journal of Law and Commerce 24 (2004): 1–39; Michael P. Vandenbergh, ‘The New Wal-Mart Effect: 
The Role of Private Contracting in Global Governance’. UCLA Law Review 54 (2007): 913–70; Paul 
Weinberg, ‘Closure of First Unionised Wal-Mart Sends Chilling Signal’. Inter Press Service News 
Agency, 15 April 2005.
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and Commercial Workers  Union to support and, at times, mobilise 
workers, first through Facebook and then through a customised app 
(‘WorkIt’) that Walmart warned its employees (‘associates’) not to 
download.110 The campaigning by OUR Walmart, through organising in 
workplaces from outside workplaces, led to public demonstrations and 
to Walmart raising wages to over $10 per hour and some victories for 
pregnant workers, though OUR Walmart continued to campaign for 
much more.111 By mid-2017, the app had seen cumulative totals of over 
150,000 Walmart employees from 3,100 stores engaged in discussions, 
with 50,000 per week seeing messages from OUR Walmart and 40,000 
in private groups linked to the organisation. When Walmart employees 
use the app to ask questions, they may be answered by an AI bot (if the 
question is simple), by fellow members of online communities, or by 
volunteers or union employees if very complicated. Membership costs 
$5 per month. Although Walmart infiltrates and monitors the WorkIt 
community, and pressures employees not to participate, the structure 
appears to have been resilient.112 The WorkIt approach has been spreading 
to other countries, including Australia.113
These new forms of union responses to new work organisation or 
technology often involve quite different repertoires of action to traditional 
unionism: perhaps less reliance on militancy and industrial action, more 
reliance on new methods of communication and campaigning. They may 
also sometimes use less hierarchical organisational structures, with OUR 
Walmart, for example, having more of a network form than a traditional 
union structure. Rather than seeing these techniques as taking the place 
of conventional union methods, it is more appropriate to interpret them 
as supplementing these methods—as ways of developing collective (rather 
than individual) grievances, building collective values and identities, 
110  Eduardo Munoz, ‘Walmart Warns Workers Not to Use App Helping Them Understand 
Company’s Labor Rules’. RT, 17 November 2016, www.rt.com/usa/367062-walmart-worker-app-
workit/; Andy Kroll, ‘Walmart Workers Get Organized—Just Don’t Say the U-Word’. Mother Jones, 
March/April 2016, www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/02/our-walmart-black-friday-union/.
111  Sean McElwee and Amy Traub, ‘Don’t Believe the Wal-Mart Hype: Here’s Proof It Still Isn’t Paying 
Its Workers Enough’. Salon, 19 September 2015, www.salon.com/2015/09/19/dont_believe_the_ wal_ 
mart_hype_heres_proof_it_still_isnt_paying_its_workers_enough/; Mike Hall, ‘Our Walmart Wins 
Some Victories for Pregnant Workers’. People’s World, 10 April 2014, www.peoples world.org/ article/
our-walmart-wins-some-victories-for-pregnant-workers/.
112  Discussion with and talk by Dan Schlademan, Co-Director of Organisation United for Respect, 
Sydney, 26 June 2017.
113  David Marin-Guzman, ‘How “Young Tech Dudes” Are Decentralising Unions with Blockchain, 
AI’. Australian Financial Review, 28 December 2017. Ignore the blockchain in this article, focus on 
the AI.
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and perhaps critically developing a sense of collective efficacy. Building 
networks that facilitate collective action are also essential purposes of such 
techniques, while the unions themselves become collective mobilisers 
and, through flatter structures, promote democratic coordination. 
As this book shows, though, the platform economy and new technologies 
at the workplace are not really the main game in the future of work. The 
main game is more about who has power. After all, Walmart is not a tech 
firm, the platform economy is still quite small, but there have been huge 
changes in union density, public policy and financialisation over recent 
decades. American activists Sarita Gupta, Stephen Lerner and Joseph 
McCartin dismiss concerns about technology and instead urge unions 
to find ‘new ways of organizing and bargaining’ in a world characterised 
by ‘fissuring’, financialisation, austerity, concentrated power, widening 
inequality and unwillingness by the state to act for workers.114 They suggest 
‘bargaining for the common good’, in which unionised (or even nonunion) 
workers take action that ‘advance[s] the shared goals of workers and their 
allies’—that is, other community groups. They suggest organising against 
large, core companies to challenge not just their treatment of workers 
but also monopolisation. And they suggest targeting banks and private 
equity, in part to attempt to ‘regulate from below’ and to engage with 
external groups affected by finance capital. The emphasis is on extending 
unions’ focus outside the employment relationship to broader social and 
economic issues, working with the rest of civil society.115 This is perhaps 
the most promising but probably the most difficult thing for unions to 
do. Working with community groups was an unfulfilled aim of Australian 
unions’ otherwise successful 2007 ‘Your Rights @ Work’ campaign.116 It is 
slow: unions often have a tactical rather than strategic focus and want to 
play a dominant role in an alliance, disengaging other groups.117 It faces 
legal barriers that other forms of union cooperation do not: competition 
law in many countries, constraining or prohibiting collective action 
114  Sarita Gupta, Stephen Lerner, and Joseph A. McCartin, ‘It’s Not the “Future of Work,” It’s the 
Future of Workers That’s in Doubt’. American Prospect, 31 August 2018, prospect.org/article/its-not-
future-work-its-future-workers-doubt.
115  Ibid.
116  Kathie Muir and David Peetz, ‘Not Dead Yet: The Australian Union Movement and the Defeat 
of a Government’. Social Movement Studies 9, no. 2 (2010): 215–28.
117  Amanda Tattersall, Power in Coalition: Strategies for Strong Unions and Social Change (Ithaca NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2010); Jane Holgate, ‘The Sydney Alliance: A Broad-Based Community 
Organising Potential for Trade Union Transformation?’. Economic and Industrial Democracy 39, no. 3 
(2015).
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outside of labour law, is not just a challenge to organising workers classed 
as ‘self-employed’ or ‘contractors’, it is a challenge to all ‘bargaining for 
the common good’.118
In the end, it is the taking of collective action that damages the profitability 
of capital and forces capital to concede workers’ demands. It can also 
force the state to concede. Sometimes this is achieved through causing 
reputational harm to corporations or the state—examples include some 
international campaigns around multinational codes of conduct (discussed 
in Chapter 9) as well as, in Australia, the ‘Destroy the Joint’ campaign, 
and union campaigns against attempts by some firms to substantially 
reduce wages through the use of contractors (Carlton United Breweries) 
or terminating agreements (Streets).119 More often, damage is achieved 
through the withdrawal of labour. The failure of previous attempts to 
organise Walmart workers in the face of strong and sophisticated employer 
opposition suggested that the old methods were not working there. The 
methods of leverage used by OUR Walmart—damaging the reputation of 
the firm through street demonstrations and other public actions—point 
to how threatening profits will always be the ultimate means by which 
workers achieve gains relative to capital, no matter what the mode of 
production is. 
In extending from tackling the corporations that hire workers to 
‘bargaining for the common good’, unions may also find the state actively 
mobilises against labour in ways that it does not always do when labour 
just takes on those corporations. The state, though, responds to very 
different incentives to corporations. Maximising votes and legitimacy are 
not the same as maximising profits, and the political strategy for achieving 
concessions from the state need not be the same as that for achieving 
concessions from capital. 
118  Johnston and Land-Kazlauskas, Organizing on-Demand.
119  AAP, ‘Union Launches Streets Ice-Cream Boycott for Australian Summer’. Guardian, 30 October 
2017, www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/oct/30/union-launches-streets-ice-cream-boycott-
for-australian-summer; Jane Caro, ed., Destroying the Joint: Why Women Have to Change the World 
(Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 2013).
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Conclusion
While some corporations may encourage their workers to conditionally 
exercise ‘voice’, and may increasingly do this in future to facilitate 
productivity or even disguise other, pervasive methods of control, it is 
only through independent voice mechanisms—mostly trade unions—
that workers can guarantee they have some control at work. These 
employee-controlled mechanisms have been in decline for several 
decades, not because of changing attitudes by employees, but because of 
the institutional changes that neo-liberalism has encouraged. 
There is no single solution that applies universally, but common to success 
is a focus on the workplace, albeit with strong articulation outside the 
workplace, and an emphasis on democracy. Some unions are successfully 
adapting to the fragmentation created by modern management strategies 
by adopting new techniques that promote collective recognition of 
grievances, efficacy, identity, values and networks. Strength in these will 
be key to the success of collective mobilisation in future.
If the voice of workers—that is, the collective power of labour—does not 
increase, in the face of the growth of other centres of power in society, 
it is unlikely that the outcomes for workers from developments in the 
future of work will be good. This is a critical aspect of the ‘sliding doors’ 
situation that society faces. We saw in Chapter 1 how significant unions 
are for reducing inequality in incomes, wealth and power in society. So the 
choices that unions make will have a crucial impact on workers and on 
society, as will the choices made by policy-makers that affect the ability of 





In 1888, a group of women, mostly teenagers, were working in London 
factories, making matchsticks. The pay was low and employment 
conditions were poor. The work was dangerous, exposure to phosphorous 
often leading to disfigurement and an early, painful death. Workers’ pay 
was docked for seemingly arbitrary reasons. One day, after yet another 
worker was visibly victimised, the women had had enough. The women 
went on strike, refusing to return to work until things changed. They won, 
and the impact on labour relations across society was profound. Others 
followed suit in striking, from coal miners to female garment workers, 
even in the US. Conditions improved. British union membership trebled 
over the next 30 years.1 
A century plus later, much has changed, but some things remain the 
same. Working conditions, particularly regarding occupation health 
and safety, have improved. Women remain militant. Gender-based 
pay discrimination has persisted through most societies; in some (like 
Australia) it was institutionalised through legally binding decisions or 
enactments until explicit discrimination was technically abandoned in the 
1  Most of the strikers were at a Bryant and May factory, though this company is unrelated to 
the modern-day firm of the same name. A.J. Arnold, ‘Ex Luce Lucellum’? Innovation, Class Interests 
and Economic Returns in the Nineteenth Century Match Trade. Paper No. 04/06 (Exeter: University 
of Exeter, 2004), business-school.exeter.ac.uk/documents/papers/accounting/2004/0406.pdf; Ali 
Alkhatib, Michael S. Bernstein, and Margaret Levi, ‘Examining Crowd Work and Gig Work through 
the Historical Lens of Piecework’. Paper presented at CHI’17—Proceedings of the 2017 CHI Conference 
on Human Factors in Computing Systems, Denver, CO, 6–11 May 2017): 4599–4616; Catherine 
Best (Kelsey), ‘Meet the Matchstick Women—the Hidden Victims of the Industrial Revolution’. 
The  Conversation, 8 March 2018, theconversation.com/meet-the-matchstick-women-the-hidden-
victims-of-the-industrial-revolution-87453.
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1970s.2 The gap between men’s and women’s pay—the ‘gender pay gap’—
has reduced but it endures in most countries.3 The term ‘gender gap’ may 
also refer to situations in which women receive poorer working conditions 
than men or may have inferior experiences such as being harassed more 
commonly at work than men. Thus the ‘gender gap’ is an indicator of 
disadvantage experienced by women at work.4
In this chapter we focus on the issues of gender and related segmentation at 
work. It starts with a discussion of the broad institutional factors shaping 
how gender and work interact: the domestic sphere, its link to social 
values and norms, regulation through the state and unions and the role of 
organisational policies and practices. The situations of and problems faced 
by women are quite different in female-dominated and male-dominated 
work, so the largest part of this chapter gives attention to the specific 
circumstances of women in female-dominated and male-dominated 
work. In doing that, we also look to the future: are female-dominated jobs 
under threat, or is the greater threat from what is happening to women 
in male-dominated jobs? The chapter includes brief discussion of some of 
the other issues facing women no matter whether they are in a ‘men’s job’ 
or a ‘women’s job’.
With the title ‘Women and segmentation’, the focus is very much on 
gender as a source of disadvantage, rather than on other factors that may 
create disadvantage in the labour market, such as age (being young, or 
old), disability, race or ethnicity. Some factors involved in labour market 
disadvantage (such as labour market segmentation and regulation distance) 
have general application across many forms of disadvantage. Others (such as 
the role of the domestic sphere) are specific to understanding disadvantage 
associated with gender. Importantly, no matter whether a female worker is 
in a ‘men’s job’ or a ‘women’s job’, her situation is also made more difficult 
if she also possesses one of these other sources of disadvantage. Researching 
2  Suzanne Franzway, ‘The Changing Sexual Politics of Gender Regulation by Unions’. In Women, 
Labor Segmentation and Regulation: Varieties of Gender Gaps, ed. David Peetz and Georgina Murray 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 61–78.
3  For example, Alison C. Preston, ‘Female Earnings in Australia: An Analysis of 1991 Census Data’. 
Australian Bulletin of Labour 26, no. 1 (2000): 38–58; Phyllis Tharenou, ‘The Work of Feminists Is 
Not Yet Done: The Gender Pay Gap—a Stubborn Anachronism’. Sex Roles 68, no. 3–4 (2013): 
198–206; Rebecca Cassells et al., ‘The Impact of a Sustained Gender Wage Gap on the Australian 
Economy’. Report to the Office for Women, Department of Families, Community Services, Housing 
and Indigenous Affairs (Canberra: NATSEM, University of Canberra, November 2009).
4  David Peetz and Georgina Murray, Women, Labor Segmentation and Regulation.
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this is what is referred to as studying ‘intersectionality’.5 One  of those 
forms of intersectionality, and the one that is discussed in the latter part 
of this chapter, is the intersection of gender and migrant status. It could 
be persuasively argued there are other, more important ones, such as the 
intersection of gender and ‘race’.6 In the USA, for example, ‘race’ is the 
principal cleavage in the labour market, and the factor most closely linked 
to class and disadvantage. Its role is explicitly tied to the history of slavery.7 
In Europe, however, ‘race’ is almost a taboo term in many circles, and in 
several countries the collection of racial statistics is illegal,8 probably a tie 
to the history of war. More research and academic discourse there focuses 
on the related themes of ethnicity, migrants and migration. There is not 
sufficient space here to do justice to either issue, but the issues discussed 
later in this chapter are more akin to those relevant in Europe (and among 
the Hispanic population of North America).
Institutions and gender at work
How gender interacts with work is influenced by a number of institutions. 
These include domestic labour; social values and norms; and the state—
including the regulatory and legal framework and the behaviour of the 
state as employer and provider of social infrastructure and services such 
as childcare.
Domestic labour and the workplace
The domestic sphere is a central factor in gender segmentation of the 
labour force—perhaps, ultimately, the driving force for the durability of 
gender inequality. Men were traditionally available for working long hours, 
5  Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics’. University 
of Chicago Legal Forum 1989, no. 1 (1989): 139–67.
6  ‘Race’ is in quotation marks because of strong genetic evidence there is no biological concept 
of race, it is entirely a social construct. See Race: The Power of an Illusion (California Newsreel in 
association with the Independent Television Service, 2003), summarized at www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Y8MS6zubIaQ or read the transcript at newsreel.org/transcripts/race.htm. See also Audrey 
Smedley, ‘The History of the Idea of Race … And Why It Matters’. Paper presented at Race, Human 
Variation and Disease: Consensus and Frontiers conference, Warrenton, VA, 14–17 March 2007.
7  Kevin B. Anderson, ‘Marx’s Intertwining of Race and Class During the Civil War in the U.S.’. 
Journal of Classical Sociology 17, no. 1 (2017): 24–36; Smedley, ‘History of Idea of Race’.
8  Karina Piser, ‘Breaking France’s Race Taboo’. Nation, 10 August 2018. www.thenation.com/
article/breaking-frances-race-taboo/.
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only because someone was at home doing all the things that needed to be 
done to get men to work and to produce the next generation of workers. 
It is a variant on this model that is depicted in Atwood’s The Handmaid’s 
Tale. This traditional ‘breadwinner’ model of domestic organisation has 
declined as more women enter the labour force and participate in paid 
labour, a phenomenon that has been gathering pace since the 1960s.
The tasks allocated within the domestic sphere are largely replicated in the 
market sphere. For example, as women have entered the workforce, and 
activities that were previously undertaken within the household now have 
to be organised through the market, those paid occupations previously 
done in the household tend to be undertaken in the market by women. 
Tasks that are done seemingly for free in the home are generally perceived 
to be of low value in the formal economy and, as we see later, receive low 
pay and status.9
Social values and norms
The role of women in domestic labour shapes and is in turn shaped by 
social values and norms that prioritised roles of women as homemakers. 
Attitudes towards working women vary considerably between societies. 
Depending on the strength and scope of ‘conservative’ views about 
women’s roles, in some societies women may, as a result of such values, be 
barred from particular occupations or industries, prevented from working 
at all if they are married, or paid substantially less than men who are doing 
exactly the same work. In fact, all of those things happened in several 
countries until at least the 1960s or 1970s, and in some countries they 
still do—not just in Atwood’s Gilead.10
Social values and norms are not created from thin air, of course. They 
reflect the reinforcement of ideas (to serve the interests of powerful groups) 
through socialisation and the contestation of ideas. Socialisation may occur 
within the home; within the primary and secondary education systems; 
through the mass media; through religious institutions; and within the 
workplace. The contestation of ideas may occur as objective circumstances 
raise doubt about the validity of dominant values (e.g. the idea never really 
9  Damian Grimshaw and Jill Rubery, Undervaluing Women’s Work. EOC Working Paper Series 
(Manchester: Equal Opportunities Commission and European Work and Employment Research 
Centre, University of Manchester 2007).
10  To see a realistic cinematic depiction of those things in a contemporary society outside the 
industrialised world, see the 2012 Saudi movie Wadjda.
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seemed fair to most single women that they should be paid less than single 
men); as social movements (such as the feminist movement) challenge the 
interests of powerful groups; through alternative institutions and media; 
and even in tertiary education (e.g. racism is negatively correlated with 
education levels).
As we saw in previous chapters, dominant groups may seek to maintain 
and exercise their power by attempting to shape the values and preferences 
of those in the dominated group, sometimes using members of the 
dominated group (as in The Handmaid’s Tale’s Aunts). Yet, as we also 
saw, the control so exercised is almost always only partial, and sometimes 
eventually collapses. Values such as fairness (or even self-preservation) can 
directly confront existing cultural practices and eventually overturn them. 
The women in The Handmaid’s Tale attempted (often successfully) to flee 
Gilead for Canada, and eventually (though we are not told precisely how) 
Gilead collapsed.
There is another aspect of norms and behaviour we must consider. 
A fundamental difference between men and women is their experience of 
violence, best summarised by Margaret Atwood’s observation, long after 
writing The Handmaid’s Tale, that men are ‘afraid women will laugh at 
them’ while women are ‘afraid of being killed’.11 The implicit threat of 
violence, even if never actualised, can help suppress the wage demands 
of any group,12 including women. Violence does not only occur in the 
domestic setting, of course. It is also potentially relevant at work. One 
important aspect of many women’s experience at work is harassment, 
which might be sexual or simply sex-based (i.e. arising from the fact that 
the offender’s coworker is a woman).13 Gender-based harassment is one 
way in which the threat or actuality of violence is manifested at work, 
and so prohibitions on sexual harassment, as implemented through 
judge-based law in the USA, have been shown to increase female labour 
11  Margaret Atwood, Curious Pursuits (London: Hachette Digital, Little Brown Book Group, 2009). 
This line was also uttered by one of the characters in the second TV series of The Handmaid’s Tale.
12  Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1970).
13  One recent example, by no means the most extreme, concerned the ANZ Bank. Andrew 
Robertson, ‘ANZ Controversy: Stricter Penalties May Be Needed to Improve Bank Culture’. 
The  Drum (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2016), 22 January, www.abc.net.au/news/2016-
01-22/robertson-penalties-may-be-needed-to-improve-bank-culture/7106804.
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force participation and relative female incomes.14 The less strict are 
prohibitions on any form of violence, including harassment, the more 
likely that harassment of women will be higher and their relative incomes 
will be lower.
Some organisations have ‘employee action plans’ that provide counselling 
or assistance to employees who have experienced domestic violence, and 
a growing number of collective agreements in Australia contain domestic 
violence clauses, enabling people to access leave in such situations. 
It is only used by a small proportion of workers but, for those who do, it 
is extremely important.15
Regulation
A key factor influencing the situation of women at work is the roles played 
by regulation and by the state. There are three aspects of what the state 
does that have a critical impact on women’s situation.
The law and regulatory framework
Just as attitudes vary hugely between societies, so too does the legal 
framework: from Scandinavia (where parental leave available on birth of 
a child can only be fully used if it is shared between fathers and mothers) 
to Pakistan (in parts of which girls are unable to even attend school, let 
alone gain skilled employment). Within a country, legislation on such 
matters as sex discrimination and equal employment opportunity, the 
rules of industrial tribunals16 and decisions of courts17 can have major 
impacts on what happens in the workplace.
14  Daniel L. Chen and Jasmin Sethi, Insiders and Outsiders: Does Forbidding Sexual Harassment 
Exacerbate Gender Inequality? John M. Olin Centre for Law, Economics and Business (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard Law School, 2011), www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/Prizes/2008.pdf.
15  There is a range of research in this area; for example, Suzanne Franzway, C. Zufferey, and D. Chung, 
‘Domestic Violence and Women’s Employment’. Paper presented at the Our Work, Our Lives National 
Conference on Women and Industrial Relations, Adelaide, 21 September 2007; Sylvia Walby, Jude 
Towers, and Brian Francis, ‘Mainstreaming Domestic and Gender-Based Violence into Sociology 
and the Criminology of Violence’. Sociological Review 62, no. S2 (2014): 187–214; Jeff Hearn, ‘The 
Organization(s) of Violence: Men, Gender Relations, Organizations and Violences’. Human Relations 
47, no. 6 (1994): 731–54. Data on the incidence of domestic violence in Australia were published by the 
ABS (Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Recorded Crime—Victims, Australia, 2014’. Canberra 4510.0; 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Recorded Crime—Offenders, Australia, 2014–15’. Canberra 4519.0.
16  Such as those shaping the restructuring of Australian awards in the 1980s.
17  For example, a 1980s judicial finding that BHP had discriminated against women in its ‘last-on-
first-off’ firing practices.
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The state as employer
Legislation is not the only way by which the state affects the workplace. 
The state is itself a large employer, and its practices can be models for 
private sector employers, particularly large ones. For example, equal 
opportunity requirements on Australian public service employers have 
been more detailed and demanding than those affecting private sector 
employers. Entitlements (such as annual leave or maternity leave) may be 
put in place first in public sector organisations and then spread through 
comparison pressures to larger private sector employers.
State infrastructure and services
The state affects the workplace through the allocation of resources in the 
budget. As just one example, the availability of affordable childcare,  in 
appropriate locations, is a key factor enabling women to participate 
in the labour force and influencing the number of hours they work. The 
availability, generosity and conditions for parental leave are another. 
In Sweden, for example, part of the parental leave entitlement in effect 
must be taken by the father, so male involvement in child rearing 
(or ‘childcare’) is much higher.
Thus the state regulates by setting rules and procedures that shape the 
framework, but also by example (as employer) and by the allocation of 
public resources. The state matters when its behaviour reflects something 
different to what would otherwise have come about as a result of the 
operation of existing social values and norms held by people in power 
and operating in a market. So if the state passes laws that just formalise 
what everybody would have done anyway, it will make no difference. 
In The Handmaid’s Tale, the state created regulations that were out of step 
with many people’s views. In that story, as with most regulatory paradigm 
shifts, attitudes evolved to adjust to and in many cases accept the new 
norms embodied in the regulation, though many continued to resist. But 
if laws preclude discriminatory behaviour when some employers would 
otherwise behave in a discriminatory manner, then regulation will make 
a difference to the gender gap at work.
Trade unions and women
The state is not the only regulatory institution. Unions also perform that 
function. Unions regulate work by negotiating collective agreements with 
employers that shape the pay and conditions of workers. They constrain 
the freedom of management to exercise its prerogative to manage 
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workers in whatever way they see fit. They also put pressure on the state 
(governments, courts and tribunals) to establish or improve minimum 
wages or minimum conditions of employment in a number of areas.
As with the state, if unions just reflect the values of people with power, 
they make no positive difference to gender at work. For example, up until 
the 1960s, trade unions paid little attention to women,18 and indeed 
supported unequal wages for men and women, institutionalising the 
discriminatory norms of the time. That is, their position reflected the 
dominance of the ‘family needs’ or ‘male breadwinner’ notion in wage 
fixing and union ideology. Unions primarily concerned themselves with 
organising and representing male members. Unions as a regulatory 
institution reinforced the lower pay of women compared to men and 
essentially did nothing to alter the situation of women.
Around the 1960s—under the rising influence of the women’s 
movement—union policy changed. They tended to support equal pay 
and thus union rules and agreements reduced the ability of managers 
to pay men and women differently. Still, women were, and remain, 
underrepresented in unions at all levels, and underrepresentation is most 
severe in the senior levels of unions.19 Women are also underrepresented 
among union delegates. However, underrepresentation of women in 
union officialdom and delegate structures has been easing.20 A number 
of researchers have referred to the poor performance of unions in serving 
their female members and the lack of interest by male-dominated unions 
in women.21 
18  For example, Franzway, ‘Changing Sexual Politics by Unions’.
19  Ibid.; Geraldine Healy and Gill Kirton, ‘Women, Power and Trade Union Government in 
the UK’. British Journal of Industrial Relations 38, no. 3 (2000): 343–60; Barbara Pocock, ‘Women 
Count: Women in South Australian Trade Unions’ (Adelaide: Centre for Labour Studies, University 
of Adelaide, 1992).
20  For example, Barbara Pocock, ‘Gender and Activism in Australian Unions’. Journal of Industrial 
Relations 37, no. 3 (1995): 377–400; Jane Parker and Julie Douglas, ‘Can Women’s Structures Help 
New Zealand and UK Trade Unions’ Revival?’. Journal of Industrial Relations 52(4) (2010): 439–58; 
Rae Cooper, ‘The Gender Gap in Union Leadership in Australia: A Qualitative Study’. Journal of 
Industrial Relations 54, no. 2 (2012): 131–46.
21  For example, Franzway, ‘Changing Sexual Politics by Unions’; Des Storer and Kay Hargreaves, 
‘Migrant Women in Industry’. In Social Policy and Problems of the Workforce, ed. Steven Staats 
(Melbourne: Australian Council of Trade Unions, 1976), 39–104.
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Yet union density has been slightly higher among females than males in 
several countries (such as Sweden, the UK, New Zealand and Australia) for 
several years now.22 Women are disproportionately employed in the public 
sector, which has higher union density than the private sector, and now this 
more than offsets the downward effect on women’s overall density arising 
from the concentration of women in particular occupations and in casual 
or temporary employment.23 The evidence generally suggests that, when 
they are in similar situations in the labour market, females and males are 
now equally likely to join unions.24 Women appear to have more to gain 
from union membership than men, as those with weaker labour market 
positions often (though not always) have more to gain from unionisation. 
That is another way of saying the gender gap in pay or conditions is lower 
for unionised workers.25 Unionisation appears positively linked to gender 
equity: countries with higher rates of union density tend to have higher 
ratios of female to male earned income and higher scores on the United 
Nations Gender Development Index.26
Regulation distance
Not all workers are equally affected by regulation. Those on low wages are 
more likely to be affected by minimum wage laws than other workers, and 
those minimum wage laws apply equally to men and women (but there 
are more women than men in low-wage jobs affected by minimum wages). 
Those in larger and unionised workplaces are much more likely to be 
covered by a collective agreement. Those in senior management positions 
are less likely to be affected by any wage regulation by unions or the state. 
Lower-level employees, especially those without union membership, are 
22  Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Employee Earnings, Benefits and Trade Union Membership, 
Australia’. Canberra 6310.0; Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Characteristics of Employment’. 
Canberra 6333.0.
23  David Peetz, ‘Trend Analysis of Union Membership’. Australian Journal of Labour Economics 8, 
no. 1 (2005): 1–24.
24  For example, Paul F.M. Grimes, ‘The Determinants of Trade Union Membership: Evidence from 
Two Australian Surveys’ (Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, 
1994).
25  For example, David G. Blanchflower, ‘Changes over Time in Union Relative Wage Effects 
in Great Britain and the United States’. In The History and Practice of Economics: Essays in Honor 
of Bernard Corry and Maurice Preston, ed. Sami Daniel, Philip Arestis, and John Grahl (Edward 
Elgar, 1999); Andrew Jackson and Grant Schellenberg, Unions, Collective Bargaining and Labour 
Market Outcomes for Canadian Working Women: Past Gains and Future Challenges. Research Report 11 
(Canadian Labour Congress, 1999).
26  Data from International Labour Organization, Statistics of Trade Union Membership (Geneva: 
ILO Bureau of Statistics, 2006); United Nations, ‘Human Development Report 2004: Statistics’ 
(UN, 2005).
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less likely to be aware of their rights under antidiscrimination or equal 
opportunity legislation. The greater the practical ‘distance’ of employees 
from regulation, by definition, the less affected their situation will be by it. 
Low ‘regulation distance’ implies rules or behaviours are in place that will 
reduce the gender wage gap, provided that the content of the regulation 
is itself more favourable for women than the norms of those in positions 
of power that they override.27 However, the outcome will depend on the 
interaction with labour market segmentation, the focus of the later part 
of this chapter.
Organisational policies and practices
How gender interacts with work is also influenced within the workplace, 
by organisational policies and practices, and by interactions with trade 
unions in the workplace. Two organisations within the same industry and 
region may sometimes have quite different gender patterns of employment 
and pay, depending on the characteristics of the organisation and its 
management. 
For example, whether gender segmentation (more about that shortly) is 
eased or exacerbated in the workplace depends on such matters as: policies 
and practices for handling harassment; mechanisms to ensure that policies 
and procedures are ‘gender neutral’; whether individual managers endorse 
and propagate such values; whether there are systems in place to ensure 
that equity issues are taken into account in employment relations practices; 
the ability of organisations to ensure that ‘discretionary’ decision-making 
is gender neutral (e.g. the provision of ‘market loadings’ in salaries); the 
level of transparency in pay (a female supervisor testified that she only 
discovered she was being paid less than her male subordinates when the 
company went bankrupt and the pay details emerged in court);28 and 
the existence, content and quality of training of line managers, and how 
it is followed up. 
As you can infer from the above, policy is one thing, practice may be 
another, and the values and behaviour of individual managers are often 
critical within a particular work area. Policies will constrain behaviour 
27  Peetz and Murray, Varieties of Gender Gaps.
28  Lisa M. Maatz, ‘The Awful Truth Behind the Gender Pay Gap’. ForbesWoman, 7 April 2014.
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but they can rarely cover every possible aspect of behaviour, and so 
organisational culture becomes as important as the formal rules—though 
of course culture is itself influenced by the rules and policies in place.
The intertwining of policy and culture was highlighted in The Handmaid’s 
Tale, where harassment and discrimination were so institutionalised that 
a specific practice of rape was ritualised. This may seem such a fictional 
world as to be irrelevant, but in many male-dominated institutions (such 
as the military) analogous behaviours were accepted,29 sometimes as part 
of initiation (‘hazing’) ceremonies. There is a long history of rape being 
used by military forces as a weapon of war.30 The cultural embeddedness 
of sexist or violent practices is why more enlightened military leaders have 
encountered great resistance to banning them.31 
Norms of negotiation within organisations
The experiences of women in any workplace will be influenced by the 
form wage negotiation takes, as this has a particular impact on women. 
A number of studies indicate that women tend to be overrepresented in 
occupations and industries with relatively weak bargaining power.32 
In collective bargaining situations, women generally have similar power 
and militancy to men. But in individualised employment relations, where 
women are expected to ‘negotiate’ their pay and conditions, they are 
especially disadvantaged.
Studies have shown that women and men negotiate differently, 
particularly in relation to money, meaning that—if negotiations take 
place at all—women are likely to undersell themselves, relative to men, 
in individual contract negotiations (or, more accurately, men are more 
29  ABC News, ‘Family Says Cadet Raped, Told to “Suck It Up”’. ABC News, 7 April 2011, www.
abc.net.au/news/2011-04-07/family-says-cadet-raped-told-to-suck-it-up/2626738?site=news; Simon 
Santow, ‘Defence Lobby Returns Fire over Cadet Sex Claims’. ABC News, 17 April 2011, www.abc.
net.au/news/2011-04-07/defence-lobby-returns-fire-over-cadet-sex-claims/2624172?site=news.
30  Susan. A. Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1975).
31  Anne Summers, ‘The Education of David Morrison’. Anne Summers Reports 11 (2015): 22–34; 
David Wroe, ‘Defence Boss Blasts “Stalking Horse” Critics of Australian of the Year David Morrison’. 
Sydney Morning Herald, 24 February 2016, www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/defence-boss-blasts-
stalking-horse-critics-of-australian-of-the-year-david-morrison-20160224-gn2swe.html.
32  See, for example, Glenda Strachan and John Burgess, ‘Employment Restructuring, Enterprise 
Bargaining and Employment Conditions for Women Workers’. Paper presented at the Current 
Research in Industrial Relations conference, AIRAANZ, Brisbane, 1997, 321–29.
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likely to exaggerate their abilities).33 An implication claimed by one 
writer is that ‘manifestations of hubris—often masked as charisma or 
charm—are commonly mistaken for leadership potential, and that these 
occur much  more frequently in men than in women’; in other words, 
a disproportionate number of incompetent men become managers.34 That 
said, it is questionable how much, if any, of the blame for a gender gap 
should be placed at the feet of women’s agency, as much of this behavioural 
difference is likely a structural effect, arising from socialisation processes, 
not just before the workplace but within and outside it. The media, for 
example, focus on female CEOs’ gender, family and personal life when 
writing stories about them, but not when writing about male CEOs.35 
Their colleagues do likewise and look for an ‘ideal manager’ who is free of 
encumbrances, able to adopt masculinist, warlike rhetoric and make the 
‘hard decisions’.36
A related concept is that of ‘unconscious bias’, whereby decision-makers 
favour characteristics associated with males rather than females and in 
negotiations will favour a male over a similarly qualified female without 
realising they are doing so. Organisational responses to this have included 
ensuring that women are represented on all selection panels (or even on 
panels in conferences, where people often network and attain recognition), 
and providing training on recognising and offsetting unconscious bias to 
managers. The latter is controversial in some instances: one critic wonders 
how managers can detect something of which they are not conscious,37 
though it probably helps promote good practice in other instances. Often 
the bigger problem is that women are not appearing as candidates for 
33  David Peetz, ‘Collateral Damage: Women and the Workchoices Battlefield’. Hecate 33, no. 1 
(2007): 61–80; Linda Babcock and Sara Laschever, Women Don’t Ask: Negotiation and the Gender 
Divide (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); Lisa A. Barron, ‘Ask and You Shall Receive? 
Gender Differences in Negotiators’ Beliefs and Requests for a Higher Salary’. Human Relations 56, 
no. 6 (2003): 635–62; Rosabeth Kanter, Men and Women of the Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 
1977); Muriel Niederle and Lise Vesterlund, Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do Men Compete 
Too Much? NBER Working Paper No. 11474 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, July 2005).
34  Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic, ‘Why Do So Many Incompetent Men Become Leaders?’. Harvard 
Business Review blog (22 August 2013).
35  Rockefeller Foundation and Global Strategy Group, CEOs & Gender: A Media Analysis (New 
York: Rockefeller Foundation, 26 October 2016), www.rockefellerfoundation.org/report/infographic-
media-influence-perceive-women-leadership/.
36  David Peetz, Georgina Murray, and Mahan Poorhosseinzadeh, ‘Why Do Women at the Top of 
Organizations Do Worse?’. In Women, Labor Segmentation and Regulation: Varieties of Gender Gaps, 
ed. David Peetz and Georgina Murray (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
37  Mike Noon, ‘Pointless Diversity Training: Unconscious Bias, New Racism and Agency’. Work, 
Employment and Society 32, no. 1 (2018): 198–209.
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consideration by selection panels anyway, and responses to that often 
require examining the structural issues behind this. ‘Unconscious bias’ 
seems, however, to go further than favouring characteristics associated 
with men. Women who demonstrate some ‘male’ characteristics, such as 
assertiveness—even hubris—appear to be penalised for the same things 
men are rewarded for.38 The social construction of charisma appears 
highly gendered, not only helping incompetent men to become leaders, 
even CEOs, but also keeping women away from those positions.39 
Labour market segmentation
Labour market segmentation is also critical to understanding the situation 
of women. Institutions and markets interact to produce the phenomenon 
of labour market segmentation. It is well recognised that there are ‘female-
dominated’ and ‘male-dominated’ jobs, and the extent to which jobs can 
be characterised as ‘male’ or ‘female’ (or ‘Turkish’, ‘Vietnamese’, etc.) is 
what people are talking about when they refer to labour segmentation. 
Through labour market segmentation, labour markets are effectively 
divided into groups with different bargaining power and status, enabling 
workers with similar productivity to be paid differently according to their 
place in the labour market hierarchy.40 
Labour market segmentation divides male and female jobs; it also segments 
employees from non–English speaking backgrounds, intermittently 
unemployed people, Indigenous Australians and people with disabilities. 
For certain jobs, employers prefer to hire from the less advantaged segments 
of the labour force, because the lack of choice means that workers there 
are prepared to work for less and to accept worse conditions. In segmented 
labour markets, skills associated with marginal groups are given less value 
than those associated with more powerful groups of employees.41
38  Julie E. Phelan and Laurie A. Rudman, ‘Prejudice toward Female Leaders: Backlash Effects and 
Women’s Impression Management Dilemma’. Social and Personality Psychology Compass 4, no. 10 
(2010): 807–20.
39  On the role of charisma in selecting CEOs, see Peter Bloom and Carl Rhodes, CEO Society: 
The Corporate Takeover of Everyday Life (London: Zed, 2018).
40  Peter Brosnan, ‘Labour Markets and Social Deprivation’. Labour and Industry 7, no. 2 (1996): 
3–34.
41  Ibid.
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There are several sources of gender segmentation of labour markets,42 
several of which have been indicated already. Some jobs are socially 
defined as ‘women’s jobs’. There is male resistance to female employment 
in ‘men’s jobs’. Women’s jobs are seen as possessing less skill content than 
men’s jobs. Women may experience difficulties balancing paid work and 
domestic work. Employers may discriminate against women in terms 
of hiring, pay and promotion, for example due to a belief that women 
would be likely to leave a job to have children. In addition, a high rate 
of casualisation of part-time work means a lack of career paths for many 
women. In the USA, labour segmentation has been declining, though at 
a diminishing rate, since the 1970s (i.e. segmentation reduced quite a bit 
in the 1970s, but very little over the 2000s).43 Segmentation also appears 
to have declined a little in Australia, and current forecasts suggest it will 
also decline in the future.44 The pattern in most industrialised countries 
is that the female share of total employment has risen over the past two 
decades, leading to a growth in the female employment share in most 
industries and occupations, regardless of whether they were male- or 
female-dominated; the exceptions are mainly in some male-dominated 
industries or occupations, for example computing in many industrialised 
countries.45
The forms gender gaps take and the ways in which they are created is 
influenced by what labour market segments you are looking at (is  it 
male-dominated, female-dominated or mixed?) and the extent of 
‘regulation distance’ (is work in this industry heavily or lightly regulated, 
or unregulated?).46 For example, where work is female-dominated, the 
main issue affecting pay is undervaluation, which results from either 
longstanding norms (where regulation distance is high) or the incorporation 
of norms into formal rules such as statutes, awards and agreements (where 
regulation distance is low). Where work is male-dominated, individual 
42  Margaret Power, ‘Woman’s Work Is Never Done—by Men: A Socio-Economic Model of Sex 
Typing in Occupations’. Journal of Industrial Relations 17, no. 3 (September 1975): 225–39.
43  Francine D. Blau, Peter Brummund, and Albert Yung-Hsu Liu, Trends in Occupational 
Segregation by Gender 1970–2009: Adjusting for the Impact of Changes in the Occupational Coding 
System. IZA Discussion Paper No. 6490 (Bonn: Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit, 2012).
44  David Peetz and Georgina Murray, ‘Women’s Employment, Segregation and Skills in the Future 
of Work’. Labour and Industry 29, no. 1 (2019): 132–48.
45  Bernard Keane, ‘The Looming Crisis for Women in Oz Tech’. Crikey, 16 March 2016; Bernard 
Keane, ‘What’s Driving Women out of Tech Industries?’. Crikey, 17 March 2016; Bernard Keane, 
‘Rape Fears and Harassment, but Bright Spots for Women in Tech, Too’. Crikey, 18 March 2016.
46  David Peetz, ‘Regulation Distance, Labour Segmentation & Gender Gaps’. Cambridge Journal 
of Economics 39, no. 2 (2015): 345–62.
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women may be disadvantaged by pay discrimination (where regulation 
distance is high) or by career barriers or sex-based harassment (where 
regulation distance is low).47
The experiences of women in female-dominated work, and in male-
dominated work, show two quite different aspects of the problems  of 
gender  at work. That is what we look at in the rest of this section. 
Of course, as we have already seen, women also face issues in workplaces 
where they are neither tokens nor the ‘dominant’ group. So labour 
segmentation does not explain everything about women’s situation at 
work, but it still plays an important role.
Women in female-dominated work
‘Female-dominated work’ might refer to an industry (what the employer 
makes or does) or an occupation (what the employee does in their job) 
where female employees predominate. Examples of female-dominated 
industries include residential care services, social assistance services, 
library services and private households employing staff. On the other 
hand, some examples of female-dominated occupations include aged-care 
workers, childcare workers, librarians, primary school teachers, nurses, 
dental assistants, laundry workers, receptionists and hairdressers.
A common feature of many female-dominated jobs is undervaluation. 
At  the heart of undervaluation of women’s wages are gender-based 
notions of skill. Segmented ‘men’s’ and ‘women’s’ jobs involve different 
skills and attributes. Women’s jobs are likely to involve personal and social 
relationships—common in service-industry jobs. There is a tendency 
to downgrade the skills of these jobs because they are associated with 
‘female’ skills: gender differences in skill content of jobs appear to have 
been considerably less than gender differences in pay.48 This relates to 
some aspects of emotional labour, discussed below. This undervaluation 
of female skill is particularly evident where the job is part-time—often 
reflecting the perception that part-time work is not a ‘real’ job.
47  Peetz and Murray, Varieties of Gender Gaps.
48  Sara Horrell, Jill Rubery, and Brendan Burchell, ‘Unequal Jobs or Unequal Pay?’. Social Change 
and Economic Life Initiative Working Paper No. 6 (Oxford: Economic and Social Research Council, 
January 1989).
The ReALITIeS AnD FuTuReS oF WoRk
226
On average, women’s wages are lower than men’s wages.49 Research 
indicates that women experience lower earnings quite early in their 
career. Women tend to have lower returns for education and training 
(but see later). Still, the gender wage gap cannot be explained by women’s 
interruptions to labour force participation due to child rearing.50 While 
the gap between men’s and women’s earnings is partly due to factors 
such as the higher proportion of women working part-time, the lower 
level of overtime earnings among women and the underrepresentation of 
women in higher paid (e.g. managerial) occupations, part of it is also due 
to the undervaluation of skills associated with ‘women’s work’. The skills 
associated with women’s work may be undervalued not only by employers, 
unions and male employees but also by women themselves.
A number of female-dominated jobs are characterised not only by low 
wages but also by poor working conditions. This is especially the case 
where gender and other forms of disadvantage intersect, as we shall see 
later. In addition, anything that widens the distribution of income overall 
will tend to widen income inequality between men and women. This may 
offset the effects of other actions aimed at reducing gender pay gaps.51
Emotional labour and emotion work
Many female-dominated jobs have links back to the domestic sphere. 
Many of those require emotional labour, as do many female-dominated 
jobs that do not relate to the domestic sphere. Emotional labour is 
expended when an employee must manage and at times modify their own 
emotions (i.e. to induce or suppress their own feelings), while considering 
and quite often attempting to manage the emotions of the customer or 
client. This concept derives much from the path-breaking work of Arlie 
Hochschild and subsequently Sue Bolton.52 
49  See footnote 3 in this chapter. But note that many of those studies control for occupation and/or 
industry. This means that they may understate the genuine gender pay gap, as controlling for industry 
and occupation removes much of that part of the gap that is due to labour market segregation, and 
instead mainly measures the impact of direct discrimination between men and women doing the 
similar work for different rates of pay. 
50  Russell Rimmer and Sheila Rimmer, More Brilliant Careers (Canberra: AGPS, 1994).
51  Gillian Whitehouse, ‘Recent Trends in Pay Equity: Beyond the Aggregate Statistics’, Journal of 
Industrial Relations 43, no. 1 (2001): 66–75.
52  Arlie Hochschild, The Managed Heart (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1983); Sharon C. Bolton and Carol Boyd, ‘Trolley Dolly or Skilled Emotion Manager? Moving on 
from Hochschild’s Managed Heart’. Work, Employment & Society 17, no. 2 (2003): 289–308.
227
8 . WoMen AnD SegMenTATIon
In earlier chapters two divergent trends in the management of employees 
were discussed: increased reliance on supervision and tight management 
of employees; and increased reliance on the discretion of employees. 
These affect several different modes of work: rule-driven work, which 
increasingly includes work driven by mathematical algorithms; emotion 
work; and creative work.
The technological changes discussed earlier provide some examples of the 
tendency towards the first (rule-driven work).53 Perhaps technological 
changes will also place greater value on workers with the capacity to 
undertake the second (emotion work) and the third (creative work). While 
rule-driven work features the tightening of direct managerial supervision, 
and creative work features the contrasting widening of employee discretion 
(a loosening of direct managerial supervision), emotion work often faces 
increased demands through a combination of both rules and discretion 
(e.g. for airline stewards, care workers or call-centre operators).
Emotional labour is typically exerted by women because of their common 
situation in ‘caring’ occupations. Such occupations are often not afforded 
the same status as those with male-defined ‘skills’. Sometimes the ability to 
undertake emotional labour is defined not as a ‘skill’ but as an ‘attribute’, 
for which rewards are often not forthcoming. Yet it may require training 
and be performed in difficult circumstances.54
Some authors (including Hochschild) draw a distinction between 
‘emotional labour’ and ‘emotion work’. Emotion work ‘requires one to 
induce or suppress feelings in order to sustain the outward countenance 
that produces the proper state of mind in others’.55 Both emotional labour 
and emotion work involve an attempt to invoke a particular emotional 
reaction in another person. The difference is that emotional labour means 
you are trying to get a particular emotional response in a customer or 
client, while in emotion work that could be anyone, including your 
coworkers. So, one way of looking at the distinction between the two is to 
see emotional labour as demanded by the employer, while emotion work 
53  See also Cathy O’Neill, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and 
Threatens Democracy (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2016).
54  Mike Noon and Paul Blyton, The Realities of Work: Experiencing Work and Employment in 
Contemporary Society (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
55  Hochschild, Managed Heart, 7.
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is what is necessary to get by in one’s job, including through interactions 
with customers, supervisors and perhaps staff. By this schema, emotional 
labour is a subset of emotion work. 
The use of emotion work is particularly common among women with 
chronic illness. Emotion work can be a consequence of the stigma and 
stress that women with chronic illness suffer. One of the main issues they 
have to consider is whether or not to disclose their illness. To decide not to 
disclose their illness means that these women need to constantly be aware 
of their appearance or symptoms to limit the suggestion that something 
is not quite right. Of course, for some this is not an issue if their illness 
is visible (in which case it is often labelled a  ‘disability’).56 The  issue of 
disclosure can also have implications for power in the workplace.57 Other 
‘equity groups’ face similar challenges; for instance, people who have 
suffered from mental illness.
Rules and discretion
So how is it that, as I said above, emotion work is often linked to increased 
demands through a combination of both rules and discretion? On the one 
hand, organisations may seek to put in place rules about the emotions that 
staff must display, from Capro’s smile campaign mentioned in Chapter 5 
to the requirements on airline staff, waiters or care workers. On the other 
hand, organisations cannot directly control and quantify how staff express 
or internalise emotions; they can try, but this is even more difficult than 
trying to control the effort that workers put into their jobs. Employee 
discretion determines how and how much emotion work is expressed.
Moreover, rules often produce outcomes that require employees to come 
up with ways of managing the emotions of clients. One of the repeated 
funny scenes in Little Britain concerns a travel agent who invariably 
responds ‘computer says “no”’ after customers try to make a booking, and 
the humour lies partly in the agent’s steadfast unwillingness to emote in 
any way. For a deadly serious contrast, watch Ken Loach’s I, Daniel Blake, 
and the UK scenes in the shopfronts of the public agency responsible for 
social security and employment, where the rules under which staff work 
56  Shalene Werth, ‘Stigma, Stress and Emotional Labour: Experiences of Women with Chronic 
Illness at Work’. Paper presented at 25th AIRAANZ Conference, Auckland, February 2011. Yes, it’s 
worth reading Werth.
57  Shalene Werth, David Peetz, and Kaye Broadbent, ‘Issues of Power and Disclosure for Women 
with Chronic Illness in Their Places of Work’. In Work and  Identity: Contemporary Perspectives on 
Workplace Diversity, ed. Shalene Werth and Charlotte Brownlow (New York: Palgrave, 2018).
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require them to impose penalties and hardship on low-income earners on 
benefits. They also have to manage the emotions of those clients to avoid 
distress, despair or even violence. The staff appear heartless but they are 
engaging in emotional labour. Some staff try to find a workaround for 
their clients, some internalise the values of the system, some just try to 
survive. It would be similar for Centrelink staff in Australia, trying to 
deal with the repercussions of the thousands of false invoices issued under 
what became known as ‘Robo-debt’.58 
Ironically, even as computers and algorithms increasingly take the role 
of humans as decision makers,59 there is no let-up in the importance of 
emotional labour, and the growing importance of ‘service’ work makes 
emotional labour even more central. It is not easy to measure emotional 
content, but it is easy to measure other aspects of the work of emotional 
labourers, and it will become easier with technological change. Employers 
can (and do) count how long a call-centre worker takes on a break, or how 
many clients a care worker sees in a defined period. But this may be counter 
to the stated function of the organisation and the norms of the employees. 
The latter may resist, as in a study of Norwegian health and social services 
occupations, where researchers found that employees rejected some of the 
standards of their employers, who in turn had standardised ‘neo-Taylorist’ 
service agreements with public agencies. Employees provided additional 
services in accordance with their own standards. Employees ‘misbehaved’, 
obstructing management control of their work and its attempts to 
increase efficiency.60 These conflicts are likely to become more common as 
micromeasurement spreads.
Future employment of women and female-dominated work
Discussion of the future of work has focused a lot on the type of jobs that 
new technology will create or destroy and, to a lesser extent, the nature of 
employment or contracting relationships related to the growth of platform 
technologies. Little consideration has been given to how gender fits into 
this (aside from occasional consideration of the gender aspects of the types 
58  Mike Steketee, ‘Government by Algorithm’. Inside Story, 5 April 2018; Doug Dingwall, 
‘Centrelink Accused of Intimidating Clients with AFP Letters’. Australian Financial Review, 4 August 
2017; Terry Carney, ‘The New Digital Future for Welfare: Debts without Legal Proofs or Moral 
Authority?’. UNSW Law Journal Forum 41, no. 1 (2018): 1–16.
59  O’Neill, Weapons of Math Destruction.
60  Jörg W. Kirchhoff and Jan C. Karlsson, ‘Expansion of Output: Organizational Misbehaviour in 
Public Enterprises’. Economic and Industrial Democracy 34, no. 1 (2013): 107–22.
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of jobs that will be created or destroyed), nor to the long-term effects 
of changing technology on the digital–biological interface, and how this 
affects gender and work. 
One way of looking at it is to ask: who will be better suited by the jobs 
of the future—men or women? The correct answer is ‘there will be no 
difference’ in that both sexes can do just about all jobs equally well, but, 
to the extent that there are socially constructed ‘men’s jobs’ and ‘women’s 
jobs’, it is important to investigate whether ‘men’s jobs’ or ‘women’s jobs’ 
will grow more rapidly. One way to examine this is to look at the jobs 
that are forecast to grow and decline over the next decade (the type of 
issue examined in Chapter 4), and whether ‘men’s jobs’ or ‘women’s jobs’ 
are forecast to grow by more. Using occupational projections by the US 
Bureau of Labor Statistics for the decade 2016–2026,61 and separate 
data on the percentage of female employment in occupations, it appears 
projected US employment growth will be slightly higher in ‘women’s jobs’ 
than in ‘men’s jobs’.62 Likewise, if the female proportion of employment 
in each occupation remained unchanged, and the employment in 
each industry grew (or shrank) as projected, female employment as 
a proportion of total employment would grow slightly. This should not be 
a surprise. As mentioned in Chapter 4, some of the biggest employment 
growth is likely to be in care-related jobs, like aides and carers and health 
professionals, which have higher rates of female employment than many 
manual jobs.
A second approach is to ask: will men’s jobs or women’s jobs be more 
affected by technological change? That is, will ‘women’s jobs’ be replaced 
more or less readily than ‘men’s jobs’? Using as a starting point the work 
of Frey and Osborne (F&O) of the relative susceptibility to automation 
of different types of jobs, especially ‘male’ versus ‘female’ jobs,63 and 
considering the gender composition of occupational employment, it 
appears that the gender differences in automation effects are not big, 
and if anything men’s jobs are slightly more likely to be automated than 
women’s jobs.64 Jobs held by women appear slightly less likely than jobs 
61  Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table 1.7 Occupational projections, 2016–26, and worker 
characteristics, 2016 (Numbers in thousands), www.bls.gov/emp/ind-occ-matrix/occupation.xlsx; 
and Table 11, Employed persons by detailed occupation, sex, race, and Hispanic or Latino ethnicity, 
www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11.htm.
62  Peetz and Murray, ‘Women’s Employment’.
63  Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs 
to Computerisation? (Oxford: Department of Engineering Science, University of Oxford, 2013).
64  Peetz and Murray, ‘Women’s Employment’.
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held by men to be replaced by technology. This was most likely because 
many female jobs (especially those in ‘large’ occupations) have a high 
‘caring’ element. 
This was consistent with an attitudinal study by University of Sydney 
researchers, who surveyed 2,000 Australians and found that, overall, women 
were more optimistic than men about automation and their jobs. Men 
were over 10 percentage points more likely than women to be somewhat 
or very concerned about potentially losing their job because of machines or 
computer programs replacing human workers, about losing their job due to 
their industry shrinking, or about losing it because of being unable to keep 
up with the technical skills required. Yet only two in five women currently 
working felt they could access free or affordable training, equipping them 
for better jobs. For the authors, addressing existing gendered inequities in 
employment were important issues for the future.65
Women in male-dominated work
The jobs in male-dominated occupations are not undervalued in the 
way that jobs in female-dominated occupations are. But the workplace 
experiences of women in male-dominated work are often problematic 
for other reasons.
One of the path-breaking studies on women in male-dominated work 
was undertaken in the 1970s by Rosabeth Moss Kanter.66 She identified 
issues associated with women’s vulnerability when they are ‘tokens within 
a skewed group’. A ‘token’ group is a group that represents less than 
15 per  cent of a workforce and is overwhelmingly outnumbered by a 
‘dominant’ group. Although Kanter wrote about women as a token group, 
she pointed out that related issues arise for token groups along other 
dimensions—for example, ‘racial’ minorities within a workplace. She 
studied the experience of female salespeople in a workplace dominated by 
men, and identified a series of problems including:
• high visibility, leading to high pressures on performance; 
• polarisation (differences between ‘tokens’ and ‘dominants’ are 
exaggerated), which leads dominants to heighten the group boundaries 
between themselves and the token group; 
65  Marian Baird et al., Women and the Future of Work (Sydney: Australian Women’s Working 
Futures project, University of Sydney Business School, 2018).
66  Rosabeth Moss Kanter, ‘Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life: Skewed Sex Ratios and 
Responses to Token Women’. American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 5 (1977): 695–990.
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• assimilation of women into ‘traditional’ female roles (e.g. female 
salespeople ending up always making the tea), which leads to ‘role 
entrapment’.
Emerging out of her work was the concept of ‘critical mass’; that is, 
women (or other minorities) needed to represent more than 15 per cent 
of a work group in order to be able to have any effect. (The term ‘critical 
mass’ actually developed in the political science literature in response to 
Kanter’s work, though she did not use the term herself.)67 Subsequent 
writers have spoken of the insufficiency of ‘critical mass’ as a criterion for 
change and point to the importance of critical actors and critical acts.68
Eveline and Booth looked exactly at that issue: at women working in the 
traditional male preserve of mining, and the sexual politics of employing 
women in precious-gem mining in Western Australia, including how 
women mobilised against systemic male dominance.69 The company 
sought to hire women at this new mine in the 1980s, in part for public 
relations reasons in the context of new antidiscrimination laws, and in part 
because women workers, it was thought, would ‘civilise’ the men. This 
was quite an important consideration in a fly-in fly-out (FIFO) operation, 
in which workers would be flown in from Perth and stay for two weeks at 
a time in company camps, as the company had no intention of establishing 
a township to service the mine. Moreover, it wanted to recruit ‘greenfields’ 
(untrained or ‘cleanskin’) recruits as operators—a practice identified in 
Chapter 5 as being associated with culturism—and used psychological 
and attitudinal testing to choose employees. It wanted a workforce that 
would not be inclined towards unionism (though, as we saw earlier, 
women are not really less union-oriented than men).
Eventually, despite all public relations efforts, female employment at 
the mine fell. When the mining company won a second award for its 
achievements in promoting equal employment opportunity, three women 
67  Drude Dahlerup, ‘The Story of the Theory of Critical Mass’. Gender and Politics 2, no. 4 
(2006): 511–22; Sarah Childs and Mona Lena Krook, ‘Should Feminists Give up on Critical Mass? 
A Contingent Yes’. Gender and Politics 2, no. 4 (2006): 522–30.
68  Childs and Krook, ‘Should Feminists’; S. Grey, ‘Does Size Matter? Critical Mass in New 
Zealand’s Women MPs’. Parliamentary Affairs 55, no. 1 (2002): 19–29; Karen Beckwith, ‘Numbers 
and Newness: The Descriptive and Substantive Representation of Women’. Canadian Journal of 
Political Science 44, no. 2 (2007): 27–49; Karen Beckwith and Kimberly Cowell-Meyers, ‘Sheer 
Numbers: Critical Representation Thresholds and Women’s Political Representation’. Perspectives on 
Politics 5, no. 3 (2007): 553–65.
69  Joan Eveline and Michael Booth, ‘Gender and Sexuality in Discourses of Managerial Control: 
The Case of Women Miners’. Gender, Work and Organisation 9, no. 5 (2002): 556–78.
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allegedly left in disgust, including at the way in which the company 
had failed to replace women who had left. The women at Emsite were 
sometimes denied information about dangers on the job and were 
subjected to ‘practical jokes’ and pornographic ‘pin-ups’, and some felt 
continually ‘on trial’ or began organising resistance. Since then, many 
things have changed but many things have also not, if a study of women 
working in the Queensland coal mines two decades later is anything to 
go by.70 This harassment of and discrimination against women is not just 
a blue-collar phenomenon. We see it reported among economists and 
CEOs, very prestigious white-collar occupations.71
Discrimination and harassment are not restricted to male-dominated 
work (which, after all, only accounts for a minority of working women). 
The key distinction is that in any workplace, women might be subjected to 
harassment or discrimination by individual coworkers or bosses, whereas 
in workplaces where women are a token group,72 negative attitudes 
and harassment may take a more collective form, reflecting the male-
dominated culture of the workplace, especially if implicitly sanctioned 
by management.73 In ‘mixed’ gender occupations, males are not 
numerically large enough to sustain a dominant culture of collective sex-
based harassment, especially as norms opposed to sex-based harassment 
have become much more widespread in recent years. There, sex-based 
harassment seems more likely both to be individual and to be ‘called out’. 
Indeed, many other aspects of male culture are also likely to be weakened, 
such as male-focused notions about ‘ideal’ workers.
Emotion work in male-dominated occupations?
Male-dominated occupations have not been considered a domain 
for emotion work. But this is not necessarily a fair depiction. For 
example, in the miners’ studies just referred to, women often engaged in 
‘presentational emotion management’74 to appear mainstream. That is, 
70  Georgina Murray and David Peetz, Women of the Coal Rushes (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2010), 
Chapter 6.
71  Justin Wolfers, ‘Even Famous Female Economists Get No Respect’. New York Times, 11 November 
2015; Alice H. Wu, ‘Gender Stereotyping in Academia: Evidence from Economics Job Market Rumors 
Forum’. SSRN, August 2017, pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5eb3/f36b34a 9d6379a4de6923 ceed 99a 9bc 
22a77.pdf?_ga=2.156327803.1957153287.1567424486-1023833107.1567424486; Ben Casselman 
and Jim Tankersley, ‘Women in Economics Report Rampant Sexual Assault and Bias’. New York Times, 
18 March 2019;. Peetz, Murray, and Poorhosseinzadeh, ‘Women at the Top’.
72  Kanter, ‘Some Effects of Proportions’.
73  Peetz, ‘Regulation Distance’.
74  The term was defined in Bolton and Boyd, ‘Trolley Dolly’, 291.
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they often engaged in emotion work.75 Assuming the language and norms 
of ‘the boys’ may be a strategy commonly used by the women, a form of 
‘assimilation’ into male culture—a different use of the word to that by 
Kanter.76 For some women, this emotion work may be ‘deep acting’;77 
that is, the women’s emotional state adapts to match that of the men in 
their work environment. For others it may be ‘surface acting’, when the 
employee’s internal feelings and the external portrayal of feelings are not 
consistent. Putting a ‘brave face’ on things may be a form of emotion work 
used to deal with harassment. In such a situation, surface acting can be 
more stressful for women than deep acting. The presentational emotion 
work performed by many women in male-dominated occupations is 
aimed, explicitly or implicitly, at precluding gender-based discrimination 
or harassment in those situations. If you fit in, you are less likely to be 
a target, the reasoning goes.
The biggest problems for many women at work—certainly the problems 
causing the most emotional distress—relate to discrimination and 
harassment, which, as mentioned, are not restricted to male-dominated 
work. Women devise multiple strategies to deal with these, many of which 
involve some form of emotion work.
The gap at the top
In Chapter 2 we looked at power, resource dependency and labour 
market power. The women with the greatest labour market power are 
those with the greatest command over resources; that is, they are those in 
senior managerial and senior executive positions. Yet here is an interesting 
paradox: gender inequality in pay appears to increase as women move 
higher up the ladder.78 The relative power disadvantage experienced by 
women vis-à-vis men appears worst for those women at the top end of 
the labour market—those with the greatest power. This is the ‘powerful 
women’s paradox’.
75  Georgina Murray, David Peetz, and Olav Muurlink, ‘Structuring Gender Relations among Coal 
Mine Workers’. In Women at Work: Labor Segmentation and Regulation, ed. D. Peetz and G. Murray 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 119–36.
76  Kanter, ‘Some Effects of Proportions’.
77  Hochschild, Managed Heart.
78  See, for example, Association of Professional Engineers, Scientists and Managers Australia, Women in 
the Professions Survey Report 2007 (Melbourne: APESMA, 2007); Peetz, Murray, and Poorhosseinzadeh, 
‘Women at the Top’.
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At senior levels of companies, the Australian Government’s Equal 
Opportunity in the Workplace Agency (EOWA) census of large firms 
found that, in 2010, women held only 8 per cent of executive key-
manager positions among the top 200 companies on the Australian stock 
exchange (the ASX200), as did 12 per cent in the UK, 14 per cent in 
the USA, 17 per cent in Canada and 19 per cent in South Africa. Only 
38  per  cent of ASX200 companies had at least one female executive 
manager, as did 61 per cent of UK, 68 per cent of Canadian, 71 per cent 
of US and 77 per cent of South African firms. Women held 8 per cent 
of Australian board directorships, as did 9 per cent of New Zealand, 9 
per cent of UK, 14 per cent of Canadian, 15 per cent of US and 17 per 
cent of South African firms.79 Earlier, in relation to remuneration, the 
EOWA had found that in 2008 the overall median pay for Australian 
senior women was 58 per cent of the overall median pay for men; female 
chief financial officers and chief operating officers earned half the wage of 
their male equivalents; and in CEO positions women earned two-thirds 
the salary of their male counterparts.80
What explains this ‘powerful women’s paradox’?81 One feature in the 
determination of senior-level pay is the greater discretion over pay at 
more senior levels and the greater importance of individual negotiation 
at those levels than below. In the absence of meaningful regulation over 
pay at that level (i.e. in the context of high ‘regulation distance’), the 
issue in this male-dominated group is not so much gender differences in 
individual negotiation styles (discussed earlier) as gendered norms about 
what makes for an ‘ideal manager’ and the critical role those norms play in 
determining who is allowed to become a senior manager and how much 
they will be paid.82
It is possible, but not certain, that this is changing. Whether this 
might be due to highly paid women’s awareness of and willingness to 
use antidiscrimination law, their ability to use the media, the innate 
newsworthiness of high-profile actions or something else is unclear, and 
79  Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Agency, 2010 Australian Census of Women in 
Leadership (Sydney: EOWA, 2010).
80  Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Agency, Gender Income Distribution of Top 
Earners in ASX200 Companies: 2006 EOWA Census of Women in Leadership (Sydney: EOWA, 2008).
81  David Peetz and Georgina Murray, ‘The “Powerful Women Paradox”: Why Women at the Top 
Still Miss Out’. In Macht Und Employment Relations. Festschrift Für Werner Nienhüser, ed. H. Hossfeld 
and R. Ortlieb (Mering, Bayern: Rainer Hampp Verlag, 2013), 181–86.
82  Peetz, Murray, and Poorhosseinzadeh, ‘Women at the Top’.
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the barriers remain substantial. Little wonder that most women think that 
self-driving cars will be a normal mode of transportation before women 
will make up half of the CEOs at Fortune 500 companies.83
The future employment of women and male-dominated work
I earlier pointed out that the overall prospects for women’s employment 
were relatively positive, in that female-dominated jobs appeared less likely 
to be automated than male-dominated jobs. Perhaps the bigger issue for 
women is what role they will have in the key jobs of the future that will be 
most influential, when many of those jobs are male-dominated.
Men dominate in managerial jobs. They dominate in jobs related to 
engineering, computing and ICT (information and communication 
technology).84 In most industries and occupations in most developed 
countries the female share of employment has risen over the past two 
decades. Rising female labour-force participation rates mean that female 
employment has grown faster than male employment. Yet in computing 
and IT, the reverse has happened. In most developed countries (the data 
in Table 8.1 relate to Europe), the female share of IT occupations has 
fallen. In Australia, the female share in computer system design and 
services virtually halved between 1985 and 2015, a remarkable shift. 
Internationally, this is an employment area that is not welcoming of 
women. Recent scandals such as ‘gamergate’ and mistreatment or sexual 
harassment in some high-tech companies focused attention on the poor 
situation of women in this cluster.85 The ‘Google Walkout’ was prompted 
83  Rockefeller Foundation and Global Strategy Group, Women in Leadership: Why It Matters (New 
York: Rockefeller Foundation, 12 May 2016), www.rockefellerfoundation.org/report/infographic-
media-influence-perceive-women-leadership/.
84  For engineering, see M. Teresa Cardador and Brianna Caza, ‘The Subtle Stressors Making 
Women Want to Leave Engineering’. Harvard Business Review, 23 November 2018, hbr.org/2018/11/
the-subtle-stressors-making-women-want-to-leave-engineering?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium= 
social&utm_campaign=hbr.
85  Eliana Dockterman, ‘What Is #Gamergate and Why Are Women Being Threatened About 
Video Games?’. Time, 16 October 2014, time.com/3510381/gamergate-faq/; John Naughton, ‘Want 
to Succeed in Tech? Try Not to Be a Woman …’ Guardian, 11 June 2017; Sam Levin, ‘Accused of 
Underpaying Women, Google Says It’s Too Expensive to Get Wage Data’. Guardian, 27 May 2017; 
Valentina Zarya, ‘Female Programmers Make Nearly 30% Less Than Their Male Counterparts’. 
Fortune.com, 16 November 2016; Sarah Kessler, ‘Tech’s Big Gender Diversity Push, One Year In’. 
Fast Company, 2015, www.fastcompany.com/3052877/techs-big-gender-diversity-push-one-year-in; 
Keane, ‘Looming Crisis’; Keane, ‘What’s Driving Women’; Keane, ‘Rape Fears and Harassment’. 
See also footnotes 1 and 2 in Chapter 7.
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by the handling of sexual harassment by that company.86 This was once 
a female-dominated occupation—the women who did almost all the 
computational work to get men into space, highlighted in the movie 
Hidden Figures, were called computers. This flipped to a seriously male-
dominated occupation as its prestige and pay increased and senior men 
erected hegemonic barriers to women entering at any levels.87 Now, 
male-dominated groups still operate with norms that privilege males and 
male behaviour at the expense of females. High regulation distance88 has 
minimised any constraints.
Table 8.1: Share of females in employment, employed ICT specialists, 
2005 and 2015, European countries
Female employment share in ICT specialists (%)
2005 2015 Change
Iceland 22 .5 22 .6 0 .1
netherlands 14 13 –1 .0
Switzerland 15 .8 14 .6 –1 .2
belgium 16 .3 15 .1 –1 .2
Finland 24 22 .4 –1 .6
Portugal 17 .1 15 .3 –1 .8
France 18 .4 16 .6 –1 .8
Italy 15 .7 13 .8 –1 .9
Spain 19 .3 17 .4 –1 .9
norway 19 .2 17 –2 .2
Sweden 21 .2 18 .9 –2 .3
bulgaria 30 .4 27 .7 –2 .7
Denmark 21 .4 18 .5 –2 .9
germany 19 .6 16 .3 –3 .3
croatia 21 .2 16 .5 –4 .7
Cyprus 22 .8 17 .1 –5 .7
Austria 20 .6 14 .2 –6 .4
86  Daisuke Wakabayashi and Katie Benner, ‘How Google Has Protected Its Elite Men’. New 
York Times, 25 October 2018; Bryan Menegus, ‘Google Agreed to Pay Execs Accused of Sexual 
Harassment $135 Million’. Gizmodo, 11 March 2019, gizmodo.com/google-agreed-to-pay-execs-
accused-of-sexual-harassment-1833214767.
87  Marie Hicks, Programmed Inequality: How Britain Discarded Women Technologists and Lost Its Edge 
in Computing (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017); Nathan Ensmenger, The Computer Boys Take Over: 
Computers, Programmers, and the Politics of Technical Expertise (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010). 
88  Peetz and Murray, Varieties of Gender Gaps.
The ReALITIeS AnD FuTuReS oF WoRk
238
Female employment share in ICT specialists (%)
2005 2015 Change
united kingdom 22 .9 16 .2 –6 .7
Romania 34 .9 27 .2 –7 .7
Ireland 29 .8 18 .6 –11 .2
greece 25 .3 13 .2 –12 .1
Luxembourg 24 .9 12 .6 –12 .3
Lithuania 32 .5 20 .1 –12 .4
Slovenia 30 .4 16 –14 .4
Poland 32 .8 13 .5 –19 .3
Czech Republic 29 .3 9 .9 –19 .4
Slovakia 32 .4 11 .4 –21 .0
Latvia 46 .2 24 .7 –21 .5
hungary 37 .8 11 .9 –25 .9
estonia 48 .7 20 .3 –28 .4
eu (28) 22 .2 16 .1 –6 .1
Source: Eurostat ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database
Only when their gender is masked online are the high capabilities of 
female  coders acknowledged.89 But the mask of anonymity online for 
commenters makes women the target of a disproportionately high amount 
of online abuse,90 often perpetrated by ‘well-organised international 
syndicates’ of online ‘trolls’.91 So it is little wonder that women now avoid 
working in IT.
89  Josh Terrell, Andrew Kofink, Justin Middleton, Clarissa Rainear, Emerson Murphy-Hill, Chris 
Parnin, and Jon Stallings, ‘Gender Bias in Open Source: Pull Request Acceptance of Women Versus 
Men’. Peer Journal of Computer Science 3, no.1 (May 2017).
90  Becky Gardiner,  Mahana Mansfield,  Ian Anderson,  Josh Holder,  Daan Louter  and  Monica 
Ulmanu, ‘The Dark Side of Guardian Comments’. The Guardian, April 12, 2016, www.theguardian.
com/technology/2016/apr/12/the-dark-side-of-guardian-comments.
91  Ginger Gorman, ‘Internet Trolls Are Not Who I Thought—They’re Even Scarier’. ABC News, 
1 February 2019, www.abc.net.au/news/2019-02-02/internet-trolls-arent-who-i-thought-ginger-
gorman-troll-hunting/10767690.
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Segmentation and intersections between ethnicity 
and gender
The concept of ‘intersectionality theory’, within sociology, recognises 
diverse identities and therefore diverse interests of ‘membership groups’ 
(e.g. women, young workers, ethnic minorities). Intersectionality is a term 
coined in the 1980s to explain the interacting effects of disadvantage.92 
The core idea is that disadvantage is not just ‘additive’ but ‘multiplicative’. 
Economists call this an ‘interaction effect’. Psychologists call this 
a  ‘moderator’. But intersectionality theory has a very specific focus on 
forms of disadvantage.
When examining the intersection between ethnicity and gender at 
workplaces, the key differences are between those who do and do not 
fluently speak the dominant language in the host society—within 
Anglophone countries, between migrants from non–English speaking 
background (NESB) and other employees. This represents the boundary 
along which segmentation is established. 
An example of intersectionality is that NESB women migrants face barriers 
by virtue of gender, race/ethnicity and related issues such as dress or first 
language, and family responsibilities. The net impact may be that even 
skilled women migrants may become unemployed or underemployed, 
when compared to the general population.
To look more at the special circumstances of migrant women, we must 
first mention some general issues concerning ethnicity. Many stories of 
exploitation through underpayment of workers (e.g. in agriculture, in 
franchises) concern migrant workers. The most commonly exploited have 
been migrants on temporary work visas.93 For example, in Australia it 
was reported that franchisees in the 7-Eleven chain deliberately chose 
a particular type of temporary migrant to facilitate exploitation.94 Three 
particular sources of disadvantage (low power for employees) in some of 
these recent cases have been language issues, reluctance to report breaches 
92  Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection’.
93  Stephen Clibborn, ‘Why Undocumented Immigrant Workers Should Have Workplace Rights’. 
Economic and Labour Relations Review 28, no. 3 (2015): 465–73.
94  See Chapter 10.
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due to employer threats to deport by informing immigration authorities, 
and lack of knowledge of the industrial relations system. There is more 
about migrants and disadvantage in enforcing their rights in Chapter 10.
Although migrants may receive higher pay, on average, than other 
employees, this is because they have, on average, considerably higher 
skills. Indeed, they are disadvantaged in terms of the pay appropriate 
for their level of skill and experience, probably in part because of 
a higher probability of experiencing unemployment, problems in locally 
recognising overseas qualifications, discrimination, and intra-household 
decisions taken in the context of the above.95 While temporary migrants 
may be concentrated in hospitality and agriculture, longer-term NESB 
migrants had historically been concentrated in manufacturing,96 which 
is now in long-term decline in most industrialised countries and many 
newly industrialising ones.97 This creates some particular issues regarding 
handling structural adjustment in the economy.
NESB migrants have overall been no less supportive of unionism than 
other workers. While ethnic differences can be used by employers to 
divide employees and dampen unionism, ethnicity can also be used by 
unions to mobilise worker support around common interests. Unions can 
95  Thorsten Stromback, The Earnings of Migrants in Australia. Conference Paper No. 46 (Canberra: 
Bureau of Labour Market Research, 1984); Christina Ho and Caroline Alcorso, ‘Migrants and 
Employment: Challenging the Success Story’. Journal of Sociology 40, no. 3 (2004): 237–59; Prem J. 
Thapa, ‘On the Risk of Unemployment: A Comparative Assessment of the Labour Market Success of 
Migrants in Australia’. Australian Journal of Labour Economics 7, no. 2 (2004): 199–229; Sue Ressia, 
‘Starting from Scratch: Skilled Dual Career Migrant Couples and Their Search for Employment in 
South East Queensland’. International Journal of Employment Studies 18, no. 1 (2010): 63–88; Yvonne 
Riaño and Nadia Baghdadi, ‘Understanding the Labour Market Participation of Skilled Immigrant 
Women in Switzerland: The Interplay of Class, Ethnicity, and Gender’. International Migration and 
Integration 8, no. 2 (2007): 163–83; John Rynderman and Catherine Flynn, ‘“We Didn’t Bring 
the Treasure of Pharaoh”: Skilled Migrants’ Experiences of Employment Seeking and Settling in 
Australia’. International Social Work 59, no. 2 (2016): 266–83.
96  The Industrial Relations of Migrant Employment (Canberra: Bureau of Immigration and Population 
Research/AGPS, 1993).
97  For OECD countries, see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Chapter 
1. Knowledge Economies: Trends and Features. OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 
2015 (Paris: OECD, 2015). For declines between the 2000s and 2010s in manufacturing’s share 
in  economies such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South 
Africa, see International Labour Organization, ‘Employment by Sex and Economic Activity 
(Thousands)’ (ILOSTAT, ILO, 2019), www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/oracle/webcenter/portalapp/page 
hierarchy/ Page27.jspx. 
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also create notions of common interest that straddle ethnic divisions.98 
That said, some key problems for migrants in collective bargaining relate 
to consultation and communication.99
Turning to migrant women, there has been high segmentation of NESB 
women, their being overrepresented in blue-collar occupations and with 
lower access to external and in-house training.100 In relation to pay, female 
NESB migrants appear more disadvantaged than male migrants.101 Other 
key issues for NESB women have included occupational health and safety, 
harassment, traditional narrow job structures (especially in the textiles 
clothing and footwear (TCF) industry) leading to major barriers to career 
opportunities, and outwork.102 
Recalling the concept of labour flexibility (Chapter 6), the starkest example 
of disadvantage facing migrant women comes in the form of clothing 
outworkers.103 Migrant women have been disproportionately represented 
in the ‘outworker’ sector of TCF, where pay and conditions are among the 
98  Santina Bertone and Gerry Griffin, Immigrant Workers and Their Unions (Canberra: AGPS, 
1992); also Jock Collins, Migrant Hands in a Distant Land: Australia’s Post-War Immigration (Sydney: 
Pluto, 1988); Constance Lever-Tracy and Michael Quinlan, A Divided Working Class (New York: 
RKP, 1988); Callus and Knox, The Industrial Relations of Migrant Employment.
99  EMD Workforce Development, Migrants and Workplace Bargaining: Australian Case Studies. 
Industrial Relations Research Series No. 11, Workplace Bargaining Research Project (Canberra: 
Department of Industrial Relations, AGPS, 1994); Department of Industrial Relations, Enterprise 
Bargaining in Australia: 1994 Annual Report (Canberra: AGPS, 1995); Department of Industrial 
Relations, Enterprise Bargaining in Australia: 1995 Annual Report (Canberra: AGPS, 1996); Santina 
Bertone, Enterprise Bargaining and Employees from a Non-English Speaking Background. Report to 
DIR for 1994 Enterprise Bargaining Report (Canberra: Department of Industrial Relations, 1995); 
Caroline Alcorso, The Effects of Enterprise Bargaining on Employees from NESB. Report to DIR for 
1995 Enterprise Bargaining Report (Canberra: Department of Industrial Relations, 1996).
100  Caroline Alcorso and Graham Harrison, Blue Collar and Beyond: The Experiences of Non-English 
Speaking Background Women in the Australian Labour Force (Canberra: Commonwealth State Council 
on Non-English Speaking Background Women’s Issues, Office of Women’s Affairs/AGPS, 1993).
101  Stromback, The Earnings of Migrants in Australia; Jawad Syed and Peter A. Murray, ‘Combating 
the English Language Deficit: The Labour Market Experiences of Migrant Women in Australia’. 
Human Resource Management Journal 19, no. 4 (2009): 413–32; Uzi Rebhun, ‘A Double Disadvantage? 
Immigration, Gender, and Employment Status in Israel’. European Journal of Population, 24, no. 1 
(2008): 8–113. 
102  Alcorso and Harrison, Blue Collar and Beyond; see also D. Storer and K. Hargreaves, ‘Migrant 
Women in Industry’. In Social Policy and Problems of the Workforce, Vol. 1, ed. S. Staats (Melbourne: 
Social Welfare Unit, Australian Council of Trade Unions, 1976), 39–104.
103  Mindy Thorpe, ‘Outworkers’. In Pay Equity in Queensland, ed. David Peetz and Rosemary 
Hunter (Brisbane: Centre for Research on Employment and Work and Socio Legal Research Centre, 
Report to Department of Employment, Training and Industrial Relations, Queensland Government 
Submission, Pay Equity Inquiry, Queensland Industrial Relations Commission, No. B1568, 2000), 
99–114; see also Annie Delaney, ‘A Comparison of Australian and Indian Women Garment and 
Footwear Homeworkers’. In Women, Labor Segmentation and Regulation: Varieties of Gender Gaps, ed. 
David Peetz and Georgina Murray (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 193–210.
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worst, if not absolutely the worst, in labour markets in many industrialised 
countries. They represent a classic ‘periphery’ workforce comprising 
people who are typically classed not as employees but as contractors. Their 
situation has been so stark that, at times, special regulatory arrangements 
have been put in place to cover these outworkers.104 Disadvantage is not 
restricted to industrialised countries. Women in the Indian footwear 
industry seem ‘invisibilised’ out of the sight of protective regulation 
or unionism.105
Gender and ethnicity also intersect for women in dual-career migrant 
couples. Sue Ressia found that couples negotiated between each other in 
order to decide who would pursue their chosen career ahead of the other. 
The difficulties for women migrants in leaving the home and entering 
the workforce were shown in several cases where women’s decisions 
were based on perceived family needs. Migrant families encountered 
financial difficulties and problems in managing childcare. There were 
migrant women who set aside careers for which they were well qualified, 
either to take lower-status jobs or leave the labour force, as a result 
of their husbands’ perceived career needs, problems with recognition of 
overseas qualifications, or problems with childcare.106 So even though 
the worst examples of people being exploited through the intersection of 
gender and ethnicity occur in female-dominated occupations (the TCF 
industries), the problems of the intersectionality of gender and ethnicity 
are not restricted to female-dominated occupations. Issues such as setting 
aside careers to take lower-status jobs or leave the labour force can affect 
migrant women in many fields, including even some well-paid professions 
dominated by men. 
If large-scale labour migrations were a major feature of the globe through 
the twentieth century, the pressure for such migrations is likely to be even 
greater through the remainder of the twenty-first century. Globalisation 
increases awareness of life outside the village, and the relative circumstances 
of the lowest income earners globally have deteriorated, even if, for those 
in the middle, there has been a major improvement. More importantly, 
climate change (which will be discussed more in the next chapter) will 
create large populations of tens or hundreds of millions, whose housing 
104  Igor Nossar et al., ‘Protective Legal Regulation for Home-Based Workers in Australian Textile, 
Clothing and Footwear Supply Chains’. Journal of Industrial Relations 57, no. 4 (2015): 585–603.
105  Delaney, ‘Australian and Indian’.
106  Ressia, ‘Starting from Scratch’.
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becomes uninhabitable due to droughts, extreme temperatures or wildfires 
or rising sea levels.107 The first three causes might, in certain circumstances, 
be temporary but the last, in this context, is very permanent. Climate 
change disproportionally affects poor rural populations, who have the 
least resources to leave their home but will be the most needy if they do.108 
The stronger is resistance to action to deal with climate change, the greater 
will be the size of displaced populations. The effects of large-scale refugee 
migrations on recipient countries are controversial and beyond the scope 
of this book, but the issues include what impact will this have on economic 
activity (possibly up?), wages, especially of the low-skilled (possibly down?), 
and the introduction of labour-saving technology (possibly slowing it?). 
One likely effect could be to intensify the segmentation of labour within 
recipient societies, with migrant women still most disadvantaged, and put 
pressure on regulators and interest groups seeking to maintain equity and 
fair pay and conditions for all.
Conclusion
Today’s matchstick girls are found across societies. Women have 
enthusiastically participated in marches to boost carer’s wages in New 
Zealand, to protest President Trump in the USA, or to support a living 
wage in a number of countries. They have demonstrated and struck as 
nurses, as apparel workers, as teachers, as electronics assemblers and 
even as building and construction workers. Working conditions are less 
oppressive for women than they were 130 years ago, but there still is, and 
will be, a lot for women to talk about, protest about and strike about. 
Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. 
Gender is a major fracture line in workplaces. It separates occupations 
and industries from each other, and defines the different ways in which 
people will experience work. The domestic sphere is a central factor 
in gender segmentation of the labour force. Social norms and values 
play a critical role not only in shaping the domestic sphere but also in 
influencing laws that affect the gendered nature of work. Just as attitudes 
107  The New York Times Editorial, Climate Refugees: How Global Change Is Displacing Millions 
(New York: New York Times, 2017). This book (a collection of NYT stories) opens with the sentence: 
‘There will be 50 million of them by 2050—or 200 million, depending on which expert you ask.’
108  Etienne Piguet, Antoine Pécoud, and Paul de Guchteneire, ‘Migration and Climate Change: 
An Overview’. Refugee Survey Quarterly 33, no. 3 (2011): 1–23.
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vary hugely between societies, so too does the legal framework. Regulation 
distance interacts with labour segmentation to create different forms 
of disadvantage for women and migrants in different occupations and 
industries. The experiences of women in female-dominated work, and in 
male-dominated work, show two quite different aspects of the problems 
of gender at work. A common feature of many female-dominated jobs 
is undervaluation of women’s wages arising from gender-based notions 
of skill. Undervaluation is especially severe for women in female-
dominated migrant work. The jobs in male-dominated occupations are 
not undervalued in the way that female-dominated occupations are. But 
the workplace experiences of women in male-dominated work are often 
characterised by problems such as visibility, polarisation and, potentially, 
assimilation of women into ‘traditional’ female roles.
While the experiences of women in ‘token’ or male-dominated work 
have specific problems attached, they also face issues in work where 
they are neither tokens nor the ‘dominant’ group. Discrimination and 
harassment are not restricted to male-dominated work. In any workplace, 
women might be subjected to harassment or discrimination by individual 
coworkers or bosses; whereas in workplaces where women are a token 
group, negative attitudes and harassment may take a more collective form, 
reflecting the male-dominated culture of the workplace, especially if 
implicitly sanctioned by management.
The relative power disadvantage experienced by women vis-à-vis men 
appears to worsen as women rise up the labour market and further away 
from regulation and as they get further from adolescence and more 
disadvantaged by the lingering effects of the household division of labour. 
Male hubris, often disguised as charisma, enables some men to be greatly 
overrewarded, especially at senior levels in organisations. Unionisation 
appears positively linked to gender equity and women appear no less 
inclined towards unionism than men. 
Gender and ethnicity intersect to produce heightened disadvantage, both 
through what happens in the workplace (locating migrant women in some 
of the worst, lowest paid jobs) and in the domestic sphere (where decisions 
about women’s labour force advancement will be heavily constrained by 
sometimes traditional family considerations). The prospect for future 
large-scale climate-related migrations is unlikely to ease this disadvantage.
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Women appear less likely than men to be adversely affected by automation 
and AI. Yet women are a declining minority in ICT, where behavioural 
and attitudinal norms in this male-dominated sector force many women 
out, prevent others from entering an industry characterised by harassment 
(including by anonymous trolls) and undervaluation of women’s work 
(unless anonymity makes gender invisible). It seems that, as the status 
of the industry and occupation have changed, men have sought to 
‘control’ it and make it valued ‘men’s’ work. Meanwhile women have been 
discouraged from entering it by a misogynistic culture created by men. 
The toxic phosphorus of matchsticks has been replaced by the poison of 
online harassment and discrimination.
While the future of work might give slight advantage to women, it is 
likely to still be men making the key decisions that shape what work 
looks like. So the key challenges for women are not about ‘Who gets 
replaced by machines?’ but about ‘Who has power as machines increase 
the scope for capital accumulation?’ That is, the gender problem in future 
employment is not addressed by changing the technology of production, 
but by changing the power relations in production. This is going to be 
a site of contestation for a long time. But no one can be complacent: the 
world Margaret Atwood constructed in The Handmaid’s Tale reminds us 
of the fragility of women’s gains, when they have not colonised the sources 
of power. It is not just in postrevolutionary Iran that women experience 
major setbacks. As I write this, the USA is contemplating reconsidering 
Roe v Wade109 and many states either are preparing, or already have in 
place, legislation that would restrict women’s rights if that decision of 
almost half a century ago were overturned.110 Such reversals remain 
possible for decades to come.
109  Roe v Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the major case establishing women’s right to an abortion, by 
considering constitutional validity of laws that criminalised or restricted access to abortions.
110  Julia Jacobs and Matt Stevens, ‘With Abortion in Spotlight, States Seek to Pass New Laws’. 




Sustainability, ethics  
and work
It is October 2004. Over 2,000 mostly unionised forestry workers from 
across Tasmania, Australia, have travelled to Launceston to welcome and 
cheer a political announcement. Some 250 trucks are parked on the edge 
of the small city. Wearing blue overalls and bright yellow safety gear, 
workers crowd into a large hall. Others overflow into a nearby park. The 
announcement they cheer is one made by a conservative prime minister, 
who is promising to allow timber companies to cut down trees that 
environmentalists want to save, saving jobs in the forestry industry instead. 
The unionists wave signs and banners criticising, as lies, the policies of the 
Labor Party, a party that had been established by the unions a century 
earlier.1 At the election weeks later, the government will be returned.
Fast forward 13 years, to the other side of the world. A ‘people’s climate 
march’ is underway in a number of American cities. The rallies protest 
government policies dismantling environmental protections and 
moratoriums on coal leases on public land. Central to organising the 
marches have been a number of unions. One union had issued a press 
release warning that ‘Working families disproportionately experience high 
pollution levels by being exposed to environmental hazards both at home 
and at work’.2 
1  Annie Guest, ‘CFMEU Approves of Howard’s Forest Policy’. PM, Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation, 6 October 2004.
2  Larry Rubin, ‘Unions Are All in for People’s Climate March, April 29’. People’s World, 10 April 
2017, www.peoplesworld.org/article/unions-are-all-in-for-peoples-climate-march-april-29/.
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The contrast with the Tasmanian union’s action of 2004 could hardly 
be starker. The Tasmanian unions’ actions in prioritising jobs over the 
environment had been quite characteristic of unions in such times and 
earlier. By the time of the American marches, demonstrations about 
climate with heavy union involvement could also be seen in Canada, 
Australia and across Europe as unions called for a ‘just transition’ to a low-
emission society.3 By no means has it been a universal transformation 
across the union movement. In 2019, a key committee of the American 
peak union body, the AFL-CIO, lobbied against the ‘Green New Deal’ 
proposed for debate in the US House of Representatives.4 Still, there 
has been a remarkable change in the perspectives key players held about 
the relationship between jobs and the environment, and about the 
sustainability and indeed the ethics of previously longstanding practices.
This chapter investigates the meanings of sustainability and ethics. In part, 
it considers one of the ‘mega-drivers of change’ in the world of work: climate 
change. However, the issues of ethics and sustainability go beyond this. 
This chapter brings together many of the issues we have discussed, under 
the broad banner of ethics and sustainability. We start with definitions of 
the concepts, and consider the ways in which the two concepts are related. 
We then identify several of the ethical issues that are raised by matters 
we have discussed previously. We look at sustainability issues at the 
micro, societal and systemic levels. We discuss barriers to sustainability. 
We consider the nature of the matters that would be addressed by firms 
and employees adopting sustainable approaches to employment relations 
within the workplace. We also discuss matters relating to corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). In doing this we ask, among other things: what are 
the future effects of climate change on work and productivity? What are 
the future demands for sustainability and responses to climate change? 
How are they affecting, and how will they affect, employees?
3  Martin Lukacs, ‘“Historic” Toronto Climate March Calls for New Economic Vision’. Guardian, 
7 July 2015, www.theguardian.com/environment/true-north/2015/jul/06/historic-toronto-climate-
march-calls-for-new-economic-vision; Ben Doherty and Shalailah Medhora, ‘Climate Change Protests 
across Australia—Tens of Thousands March’. Guardian, 29 November 2015, www.theguardian.
com/environment/2015/nov/29/climate-change-marches-australia-sydney-canberra-perth-weekend-
of-protest; European Trade Union Congress, ETUC Declaration on the Paris Agreement on Climate 
Change (Brussels: ETUC, 15 January 2016), www.etuc.org/en/document/etuc-declaration-paris-
agreement-climate-change.
4  Colby Itkowitz, Dino Grandoni, and Jeff Stein, ‘AFL-CIO Criticizes Green New Deal, Calling 
It “Not Achievable or Realistic”’. Washington Post, 12 March 2019.
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Definitions, timeframes and externalities
Sustainability
Sustainability, it was said, is ‘economic development that meets the needs 
of the present generation without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs’.5 This definition originated with the 
United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development 
(known as the Brundtland Commission) and was later refined by the 1992 
UN Commission on Environment and Development.6 As a definition it 
is obviously broad, concerning economies as a whole, but the concept 
of sustainability also relates to individual businesses and can be seen as 
extending beyond solely environmental considerations. So another way of 
looking at sustainability of individual activities is to adjust this definition 
slightly, to indicate it refers to economic activity that meets present needs 
without compromising the ability to meet future needs.
In this context, we also need to remember a point made by Frances 
Flanagan: ‘the process of “sustaining” requires human labour. It means 
more than simply saying “no” to damaging acts of consumption; it also 
means saying “yes” to … activities that are positively necessary’.7 In other 
words, we should not just ask whether a particular activity is compatible 
with sustainability, but also what other activities are needed to make 
for a sustainable society. In the end, the societal-level definition of the 
Brundtland Commission is the most relevant.
Timeframes and externalities in sustainability
Fundamentally there are two key conflicts that affect questions of 
sustainability. They relate to timeframes and externalities of actions.
The first is the competition between two logics: that of short-termism versus 
that of long-termism. Sustainability requires that actions be undertaken 
with a focus on the long term, not just the short term. This is fairly self-
evident: if actions are undertaken with net short-term benefits to the 
parties but net long-term costs, then those actions cannot be sustained.
5  Gro Harlem Brundtland, Our Common Future: The World Commission on Environment and 
Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
6  William R. Blackburn, The Sustainability Handbook: The Complete Management Guide to 
Achieving Social, Economic and Environmental Responsibility (Washington DC: Earthscan, 2007).
7  Frances Flanagan, ‘Climate Change and the New Work Order’. Inside Story, 28 February 2019, 
insidestory.org.au/climate-change-and-the-new-work-order/.
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But there is more to it than this. The second aspect is the extent to which 
costs and benefits are internalised or externalised. Sustainability requires 
that the costs of transactions be internalised to the parties—that is, the 
party creating a cost bears the cost, not making someone else incur it—
and that the benefits to each party exceed the costs. If this does not occur, 
and instead some component of costs is externalised (passed onto another, 
third, party), then overproduction (at least, overproduction of costs) will 
occur. In response, those external parties who are bearing the externalised 
costs (the third parties) will eventually seek to reimpose costs onto the 
transacting parties, making the original arrangement unsustained. 
Depending on the issue there may ultimately be the potential for 
systemic collapse.
Not all externalities are negative. Sometimes there may be positive 
externalities (benefits) from private transactions. For example, if there are 
societal benefits of higher education—in the form of say greater mutual 
understanding and social cohesion—then the total benefits may exceed 
the private benefits, and a positive externality has arisen. If this is the case, 
then some public subsidy may be warranted (though this is not the only 
rationale for public subsidy). Our interest for this chapter, however, is in 
the externalising of costs.
Ethics and sustainability
Ethics means different things to different people. A dictionary will say it is 
‘of or pertaining to morality’ and ‘the moral principles by which a person 
[or group] is guided’, while ‘moral’ in turn refers to matters ‘pertaining 
to the distinction between right and wrong’.8 Clearly, different people will 
have different views as to what is right and what is wrong, and most people 
will find ways to define their own actions as constituting ‘right’. Still, that 
does not downplay the importance of identifying ethical considerations 
in work and organisations.
Liberal market economists often define ethics out of existence by taking 
the outcome of any free market as ethical and any deviation from that 
as, by comparison, unethical. It justifies the status quo, or at least 
8  Compact Oxford English Dictionary, 1991, 534, 1114, emphasis added, cited in Joanne B. 
Ciulla, ‘Ethics and Leadership Effectiveness’. In The Nature of Leadership, ed. John. Antonakis, Anna 
T. Cianciolo, and Robert J. Sternberg (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2004).
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neo-liberalism. Yet, by most readings, many of the consequences of neo-
liberalism9 (such as poverty and environmental degradation) are unethical. 
Conscious choices are to be made about what is right and what is wrong.
There is probably no ethical framework that everybody will agree upon, 
because of differences in interests (rich people will have a different view 
of what is ‘right’ from poor people) and personality (authoritarians will 
have a different view of what is ‘right’ from people with more ‘open’ 
personalities).10 If you have read this far in the book, however, you 
probably agree that an ethical society is one that is sustainable and that 
has some fair distribution of income and opportunity.
While sustainability may not immediately be conceived of as an ethical 
issue, and these concepts are not the same, a few thoughts will show 
strong ties.
For one thing, it is simple to argue that it is unethical behaviour to impose 
costs upon a third party that does not benefit (by an amount greater than 
the costs) from the action concerned. For example, a truck operator who, 
presumably to save costs, dumped a truckload of asbestos in a street outside 
childcare centres in an inner city suburb in Sydney11—internalising the 
financial benefits from clearing the rubbish away from a building site, but 
externalising the substantial costs almost wholly onto the residents and 
schoolchildren of that suburb—was acting unethically by any standards.
Similarly, focusing on the short term rather than the long term has major 
implications for intergenerational equity. For example, depleting or 
polluting a resource, making it unable to be used by future generations, 
is ethically dubious, especially as it is unlikely that future generations 
will be compensated for this. In other words, unsustainable behaviour 
is unethical.
9  See, for example, Chapter 2.
10  Openness is a term from the psychological literature, and the scale of ‘openness’, part of the 
‘five factor model’ that has dominated personality research, is a measure of the degree to which 
a person leans towards or away from authoritarian characteristics. Andrew J. Cooper, Luke D. Smillie, 
and Philip J. Corr, ‘A Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Mini-IPIP Five-Factor Model Personality 
Scale’. Personality and Individual Differences 48, no. 5 (2010): 688–91; Stephen A. Woods and Sarah 
E. Hampson, ‘Measuring the Big Five with Single Items Using a Bipolar Response Scale’. European 
Journal of Personality 19 (2005): 373–90.
11  Leesha McKenny, ‘“Absolute Disgrace”: Asbestos Dumped Outside Childcare Centres’. Sydney 
Morning Herald, 19 March 2013.
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The second aspect of the link between ethics and sustainability is that 
ongoing relations between parties depend upon trust between the 
parties, which in turn requires a perception by each party that the other 
will behave ethically towards them. If employees feel that they can no 
longer trust management to behave ethically, or management believes 
that the employees’ negotiators cannot be trusted, then it is much 
more difficult to negotiate an agreement between the two sides, and 
much more difficult to sustain an ongoing relationship. Resistance, and 
subsequent overt and covert conflict, are much more likely to occur.12 
In other words, unethical behaviour is usually unsustainable. Usually—
but not always. In the extremes, it need not be the case. Paying workers 
the highest wages may be ethical but, in terms of surviving market 
competition, not economically sustainable. Insisting that all economic 
activities involving carbon emissions immediately halt may be sustainable 
but not ethical, at least in the eyes of the current generation of workers 
who could feel it unethical that they suddenly lose their jobs. But such 
extremes are rare; for example, few proposals for addressing climate 
change involve immediate halts to carbon emissions—and the push for 
zero net emissions of carbon by 2050 does not require such immediate 
halts. (As  long ago as 2013 the Australian Energy Market Operator 
found it would be feasible to operate the Australian energy market with 
100  per  cent renewable energy.)13 So ethics and sustainability usually 
overlap a lot, but they are not the same thing.
Hence, one of the well-used definitions of the principles of sustainability 
performance by corporations has, as the first of nine items, ‘ethics’.14 
Another refers to employment practices that promote personal and 
professional employee development, diversity and empowerment. 
In Chapter 4 we saw how ethical issues have arisen and been handled 
in relation to artificial intelligence. That chapter highlighted both the 
importance of ethical considerations and the problems of leaving ethical 
matters to be resolved voluntarily through consideration by individuals: 
12  This argument was first made by Keshena de Silva in 2014.
13  Tristan Edis, ‘100% Renewables Is Feasible: AEMO’. The Australian (Climate Spectator), 
29 April 2013, www.theaustralian.com.au/business/business-spectator/100-renewables-is-feasible-
aemo/ news-story/4a4df3b317ea8bcb6b594926977d1f0c.
14  Marc J. Epstein and Marie-Josée Roy, ‘Improving Sustainability Performance: Specifying, 
Implementing and Measuring Key Principles’. Journal of General Management 29, no. 1 (2003): 
15–31, cited in Marc J. Epstein, Making Sustainability Work: Best Practices in Managing and Measuring 
Corporate Social, Environmental and Economic Impacts (Sheffield: Greenleaf, 2008).
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there is an important role for regulation as well. It is not just about AI, 
however. Ethical issues extend into almost all aspects of current and future 
work canvassed in this book, even if their ethical implications have been 
only implied, but not necessarily considered explicitly, in these chapters. 
For example:
• When management adopts a ‘low-trust’ or ‘high-trust’ approach 
towards employees, is either approach ethically superior to the other?
• Is it ethically appropriate for firms to seek to individualise employment-
relations practices when some or many employees would prefer to 
belong to a trade union?
• Is it ethically correct to seek to impose a monoculture upon employees 
within an organisation—or should diversity in views and behaviours 
be permitted or even encouraged?
• Is it ethically correct to make employees behave in ways that go 
against their personal beliefs, in order to maximise the profits of the 
corporation?
• What are the ethical dimensions of the use of power? Is it right for 
a corporation to use its bargaining power against employees? Is it right 
for employees to combine together into a union and threaten to—
or even actually—withdraw their labour from the corporation?
• Is it right that women are paid, on average, less than men, even when 
hours and qualifications are taken into account? Is it right, or wrong, 
to seek to change this?
• Is it right that discrimination or even harassment may occur on the 
basis of gender, ethnicity, disability, chronic illness, age or other 
matters?
• Is it right that technological change might result in some workers 
losing their jobs, even if society as a whole has higher living standards? 
What would constitute fair treatment of them?
• Is it right that nonunion members can free ride on the benefits obtained 
by unionists? Alternatively, would it be right for nonunionists to be 
forced to join a union in workplaces where the majority of employees 
are unionists? How, ethically, can such contradictions be resolved?15
15  Examples of efforts to deal with this conundrum are at David Peetz, ‘Co-operative Values, 
Institutions and Free Riding in Australia: Can It Learn from Canada?’. Relations industrielles/Industrial 
Relations 60, no. 4 (2005): 709–36; and Mark Harcourt et al., ‘How a Default Union Membership 
Could Help Reduce Income Inequality’. The Conversation, 21 January 2019, theconversation.com/
how-a-default-union-membership-could-help-reduce-income-inequality-110021.
The ReALITIeS AnD FuTuReS oF WoRk
254
• Is it right that democracy often stops when you walk inside the 
workplace gate? Should employees have a say and, if so, how much 
of a say in the running of their workplace? Should it be their decision 
as to whether they resist collectively against managerial decisions they 
do not like?
• Is it right that employees have to engage in emotional labour? Should 
they be made to engage in surface acting, ‘pretending’ certain emotions? 
Should they be made to in effect change their emotions through deep 
acting? If so, should they be compensated and, if so, by how much?
• Is it right if employees can be hired and fired ‘at will’?
• Is it right to differentiate in pay between different workers according 
to some ‘objective’ measure of performance? Or according to some 
‘subjective’ measure of performance? 
• How much allowance should employers ethically make for the personal 
needs of employees? How much allowance should employees make for 
the profit needs of their employer?
Those are just some of the ethical issues we have encountered here. 
Some of them are matters on which there would probably be little 
disagreement between readers. For example, few would say that it is 
acceptable to discriminate in pay on the grounds of gender or to allow 
harassment at work. Some are matters on which Ethics Committees 
(which all universities have) would have very clear views (e.g. on the 
matter of making employees behave in ways that go against their personal 
beliefs). For example, it is clear that no modern university would give 
its imprimatur to the Milgram experiments of the 1960s,16 as they 
would be considered deeply unethical. Yet as recently as 2010 a French 
documentary team recreated a related scenario, Le jeu de la mort (or ‘The 
Game of Death’), in which TV contestants thought they were applying 
electric shocks to other contestants, and audience members cheered them 
on.17 So, ethical standards vary hugely between universities and the mass 
media. It is no wonder that a globally popular ‘reality’ TV show based on 
24-hour surveillance of contestants was named Big Brother, evoking the 
alleged evil mastermind in Nineteen Eighty-Four.18 Perhaps that repeated 
implicit messaging in turn conditioned the seemingly muted response to 
16  Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).
17  Telegraph, ‘French Contestants Torture Each Other on TV Game of Death’. Telegraph (UK), 
17 March 2010 2010.
18  George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four: A Novel (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1949; repr., 1976).
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revelations about mass electronic surveillance by the US National Security 
Agency. If so, it would illustrate something we saw in Chapter 5, that the 
extent of ethical responsiveness to dissenting ideas is in part a function of 
exposure to content in the media.
Some other ethical questions raised above, however, are likely to generate 
more explicit disagreement—for example, positions on performance pay, 
employee participation or trade unionism. Some of this may be based 
simply on whether people sympathise with employees or management, 
or in particular whether their work location directs their sympathies 
towards one or the other. People’s moral frameworks tend to adjust to 
suit the circumstances in which they find themselves, otherwise they may 
experience cognitive dissonance.19 That is, people often have beliefs that 
are convenient for their situation.
So, many of the above are significant in their own right as ethical issues. But 
ethical considerations may also affect the success of workplace relations, 
for example in shaping productivity and sustainable performance. A sense 
of fairness in the distribution of benefits or power is critical to work.
Forms of sustainability
There are several different forms of sustainability—in effect, sustainability 
at different levels within social systems. We consider each of these.
Microlevel sustainability: Employees and firms
In workplace relations, the microlevel is normally the level most focused 
on. The issues here are manyfold. A simple example is that of personal 
health. Earlier we saw the growth of rotating 12-hour shifts and of drive-in 
drive-out and fly-in fly-out working arrangements in the mining industry. 
The Australian Coal and Energy Survey (ACES) indicated the presence of 
long hours, work–life balance problems and the transfer of the burden of 
housework onto mineworkers’ partners (i.e. costs were being externalised 
to the partner). That survey additionally showed short-term illnesses were 
higher among workers who reported no say in their working hours and 
had a desire to work fewer hours, as well as among those who felt unsafe 
for various reasons including working night shifts, those who slept badly, 
19  Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957).
The ReALITIeS AnD FuTuReS oF WoRk
256
and those who were dissatisfied with how much free time they had. There 
were also indications of psychological illness among those who reported 
no say in their working hours and had a desire to work fewer hours, and 
among partners who reported that their mineworker spouses were too 
tired or emotionally exhausted from work.20 
This tells us that, in examining sustainability at this and other levels, one 
thing we should consider is the extent to which the costs and benefits 
are internalised or externalised. Are the benefits of the transaction (the 
selling of mineral products) being shared principally between the firm 
and the customer, while the costs are disproportionately imposed on 
employees? If employees are experiencing adverse health effects, and firms 
are not engaged in the investment necessary to prevent these adverse 
health effects, then some of the costs are being externalised to employees. 
The history of the mining industry is full of examples where inadequate 
investment in OHS meant that employees paid with their lives—the 
ultimate form of cost externalisation. We saw this in three successive 
mine disasters in the central Queensland town of Moura, in 1976, 1984 
and 1995, in which 36 people were killed.21 We saw it more recently in 
a coal mine explosion, in which 301 miners were killed, in Turkey—a 
country where each year one in 10 workers in mining and quarrying have 
an ‘occupational accident’.22 The death toll from coal mining in China is 
even worse, resulting in the closure of many mines in recent years.23
Another recent and tragic example of this approach in a different industry 
was the collapse in April 2013 of a building containing garment factories 
(the Rana Plaza) in Bangladesh, leading to the death of 1,127 workers. 
Eighty per cent of Bangladeshi garment workers are female. The costs of 
cheap clothing were externalised onto employees, who were ordered to 
work that day on threat of dismissal (and, in some cases, beatings), despite 
20  David Peetz, Georgina Murray, and Olav Muurlink, Work and Hours Amongst Mining and 
Energy Workers (Brisbane: Centre for Work, Organisation and Wellbeing, Griffith University, 2012). 
21  Georgina Murray and David Peetz, Women of the Coal Rushes (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2010), 
Chapter 3.
22  Mustafa Sönmez, ‘Mining: The Sector with Low Added Value, High Loss of Life’. Hurriyet 
Daily News, 26 May 2014, www.hurriyetdailynews.com/mining-the-sector-with-low-added-value-
high-loss-of-life.aspx?PageID=238&NID=66933&NewsCatID=347.
23  Wang Ming-Xiao et al., ‘Analysis of National Coal-Mining Accident Data in China, 2001–2008’. 
Public Health Reports 126, no. 2 (2011): 270–75; Reuters, ‘China to Speed up Closing Small-Scale 
Coal Mines to Improve Safety’. Reuters, 12 June 2017.
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cracks having previously appeared in the building walls.24 The benefits 
were gained by the factory owners and managers, and corporations and 
customers in the West (possibly including you). Two weeks later, under 
considerable pressure, the government agreed to let employees establish 
a trade union without the employer’s permission.25 This may not sound 
like much of an accomplishment, but previously workers were not 
permitted to form a trade union without approval of management, and 
union activists had been beaten and tortured. We return to this incident 
later on.
A colleague of mine who often travels to Bangladesh says he was very 
worried about what would happen if a significant earth tremor hit Dhaka. 
Hundreds of earlier deaths in Bangladesh have been caused by workers 
being locked behind closed doors in factories that caught fire. One 
unionist I spoke to told me of a woman who had jumped from a burning 
factory building, not to save her life (she did not expect to live) but to 
save her body, so that her family would be able to identify, and bury, her. 
Astonishingly, she survived. After that fire, labour activists faced the grim 
task of searching through the wreckage—for labels and receipts, which 
they found—as otherwise the clothing chains would deny they had ever 
made use of this building, in a classic case of ‘not there’ employment.
A high-profile employer in the Third World is Foxconn, with huge 
factories in China, producing parts for smartphones (probably including 
the one in your purse or pocket). It plays a key part in the ‘not there’ 
employment supply chains of several large phone companies that enable 
Apple to directly employ barely a tenth of the workers in its supply chain. 
Foxconn has been characterised by strict management, low wages, worker 
discontent, explosions and numerous suicides.26 There are continuing 
questions as to whether employment conditions in Apple’s supply chain 
are at all improving, and whether factories are being robotised anyway 
24  Human Rights Watch, ‘“Whoever Raises Their Head Suffers the Most”: Workers’ Rights in 
Bangladesh’s Garment Factories’. Human Rights Watch, www.hrw.org/report/2015/04/22/whoever-
raises-their-head-suffers-most/workers-rights-bangladeshs-garment.
25  Jason Burke, ‘Bangladesh Eases Trade Union Laws after Factory Building Collapse’. Guardian, 
13 May 2013, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/may/13/bangladesh-trade-union-laws.
26  Mark Anner, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Freedom of Association Rights: The Precarious 
Quest for Legitimacy and Control in Global Supply Chains’. Politics and Society 40, no.  4 (2012): 
609–44; Charles Duhigg and David Barboza, ‘In China, Human Costs Are Built into an Ipad’. New 
York Times, 25 January 2012.
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and thousands of workers sacked.27 These questions are asked alongside 
debates in several countries over the tax paid by large corporations such as 
Apple.28 These all raise some interesting ethical issues.
Microlevel costs are not only felt by employees. As suggested, it is not 
sustainable for employees to continue working in situations that damage 
their personal lives or physical or psychological health, or maybe that 
of their partners. As a result, employees resist, and firms will face high 
labour turnover costs where working arrangements are not sustainable. 
The Australian mining industry, where firms face unusually high labour 
turnover despite very high wages, is an example of this individualised 
resistance to unsustainable employment practices.29
Sustainability at the firm level requires other things: for example, the firm 
must be capable of making a profit, and there must be a ‘fair’ distribution 
of benefits. On the former, it is interesting to note that a recent Harvard 
Business School study indicated that firms that explicitly focused on ‘short 
termism’ faced greater risks and financial problems than companies that 
focused on creating long-term value. Short-termism was measured by 
researchers’ analysing the content of transcripts of company conference 
calls, and the risks included a higher cost of capital and a lower return on 
assets. They were also more likely to report very small positive earnings, and 
to violate loan covenants. One reason was that their investors also adopted 
like-minded approaches, which led to higher stock-price volatility.30 
27  Duncan Jefferies, ‘Is Apple Cleaning up Its Act on Labour Rights?’. Guardian, 5 March 2014, 
www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/apple-act-on-labour-right; Jane Wakefield, ‘Foxconn 
Replaces 60,000 Factory Workers with Robots’. BBC News, 25 May 2016, www.bbc.com/news/
technology-36376966. Thomas Clarke and Martijn Boersma, The Governance of Global Value 
Chains: Unresolved Human Rights, Environmental and Ethical Dilemmas in the Apple Supply 
Chain. Journal of Business Ethics 143 (2017): 111–31.
28  Lee Sheppard, ‘How Does Apple Avoid Taxes?’. Forbes, 28 May 2013, www.forbes.com/sites/
leesheppard/2013/05/28/how-does-apple-avoid-taxes/; Simon Santow, ‘Google, Apple and Microsoft 
Deny Tax Avoidance at Senate Inquiry, Labor Says Australians Don’t Accept Their Practices Are 
“Genuine”’. ABC News Online, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 8 April 2015, www.abc.net.
au/news/2015-04-08/google-apple-microsoft-deny-tax-avoidance-senate-inquiry/6379024; Michael 
West, ‘Multinationals’ Brazen Tax Avoidance’. Saturday Paper, 13–19 May 2017.
29  David Peetz and Georgina Murray, ‘“You Get Really Old, Really Quick”: Involuntary Long 
Hours in the Mining Industry’. Journal of Industrial Relations 53, no. 1 (2011): 13–29.
30  Harvard Business School, ‘How a Short-Term Strategy Can Backfire’. Strategy + Business, 
Harvard Business School, 2012, www.strategy-business.com/article/re00191?pg=all, citing Francois 
Brochet, Maria Loumioti, and George Serafeim, Short-Termism, Investor Clientele, and Firm Risk. 
Harvard Business School Accounting & Management Unit Working Paper No. 12-072 (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard Business School, 2012), papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1999484.
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So, short-term focus in profits is inconsistent with long-term growth. Mind 
you, executive pay schemes that emphasise short-term incentives—and 
there are many31—help drive this behaviour.
It is also plausible (indeed likely) that short-termism among company 
boards is driven by short-termism among investors—that is, 
within  important parts of finance capital. Regardless of whose short-
termism drove the behaviour, it seems that, in the long run, short-termism 
undermines sustainable profitability.
Societal-level sustainability
Ethical income distributions affect economic sustainability at the societal 
level. In cross-national analysis, researchers from the International 
Monetary Fund (an institution long known for its strong support for liberal 
market policies) in recent years have commented that ‘more inequality 
seems to spell less sustained growth’.32 They found that reductions in 
inequality were more important than any other factor (e.g. trade openness 
or external debt, the latter being of minimal importance) in explaining 
the duration (i.e. the sustainability) of growth periods.
Aspects of workplace policy also affect sustainability at that level. Incentive 
schemes in the financial sector were a significant element in the global 
financial crisis, because of their distorting effect on behaviour.33 The use 
of incentive schemes for managers was identified as a reason why the 
economic performance in Iceland experienced unsustainable procyclical 
extremes of boom and bust before and during the global financial crisis.34 
This should not surprise us. Incentive schemes in Australia drove a raft 
of financial misbehaviour so bad that a conservative government was 
forced to hold a royal commission that disclosed widespread deceit and 
31  Ann Tenbrunsel and Jordan Thomas, The Street, the Bull and the Crisis: A Survey of the US & UK 
Financial Services Industry (New York: The University of Notre Dame and Labaton Sucharow LLP, 
May 2015), www.secwhistlebloweradvocate.com/pdf/Labaton-2015-Survey-report_12.pdf; see also 
Johnson interviewed in Andrew Robertson, ‘ASIC Is Waving a Big Stick at Directors’. The Business 
(Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2016), 15 April, www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-15/asic-is-
waving-a-big-stick-at-directors/7331522, at 4’23” (link expired).
32  Andrew G. Berg and Jonathan D. Ostry, ‘Equality and Efficiency: Is There a Trade-Off between 
the Two or Do They Go Hand in Hand?’. Finance and Development 48, no. 3 (2011): 12–15.
33  David Peetz, Stephane Le Queux, and Ann Frost, ‘The Global Financial Crisis and Employment 
Relations’. In The Future of Employment Relations: New Paradigms, New Approaches, ed. Adrian 
Wilkinson and Keith Townsend (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 193–214.
34  Robert H. Wade and Silla Sigurgeirsdottir, ‘Iceland’s Rise, Fall, Stabilisation and Beyond’. 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 36 (2012): 127–44.
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exploitation of customers and of barely functioning regulators.35 While 
incentive payments are often accepted as a matter of faith, particularly 
in market liberal economics, as promoting good behaviour, in practice 
they often produce counterproductive results in a wide range of areas 
including, for example, occupational health and safety.36 
Systemic sustainability
The biggest and most important level at which sustainability can be 
considered is the systemic level—the system (often referred to as the global 
ecosystem) within which society and economy exist. In earlier times we 
thought about how the actions of firms, in dumping pollution into the 
environment, were engaged in classic externalising of costs onto local 
ecosystems and communities. In The Handmaid’s Tale, there is frequent 
reference to the ‘Colonies’, unidentified distant toxic dumps with labour 
camps to which noncompliant women were sent. Since that was written, 
concern has grown to cover the impact of rising carbon dioxide emissions 
upon the global environment and global society. It is not just people in 
former colonies who are threatened by the toxicity of those emissions to 
the planet.
The peer-reviewed evidence overwhelmingly shows that growing carbon 
dioxide emissions are leading to dangerously rising sea levels and severe 
consequences for ecosystems, forestry, agriculture, energy consumption, 
water resources and human mortality unless major changes occur in 
economic behaviour.37 If anything, the situation is worse than previously 
35  Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking Superannuation and Financial Services 
Industry, Final Report (Canberra: Australian Government, February 2019).
36  Andrew Hopkins and Sarah Maslen, Risky Rewards: How Company Bonuses Affect Safety (Farnham, 
UK: Ashgate, 2015), 28. They cite Richard E. Fairfax (Deputy Assistant Secretary), ‘Employer Safety 
Incentive and Disincentive Policies and Practices’. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 
Memorandum for Regional Administrators, Whistleblower Program Administrators (Washington 
DC: US Department of Labor, 2012), 12 March. See also Michael Quinlan, Philip Bohle, and Felicity 
Lamm, Managing Occupational Health and Safety: A Multidisciplinary Approach (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010).
37  M. Diesendorf, ‘Climate Change and the Economy’. In Readings in Political Economy: Economics 
as a Social Science, ed. George Arygous and Frank Stilwell (Melbourne: Pluto Press, 2010), 15–18; 
Derek S. Arndt, Molly O. Baringer, and Michael R. Johnson, ‘State of the Climate in 2009’. Bulletin 
of the American Meteorological Society 91, no. 7 (2010): S1–S224; Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, ‘Summary for Policymakers’. In Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report 
on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse 
gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate 
change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty, edited by V. Masson-Delmotte 
et al. (Geneva: World Meteorological Organization, 2018).
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thought, because scientists appear to have a ‘bias towards underestimation’ 
of the effects of climate change on sea levels, the polar caps and methane 
emissions from thawing permafrost and lakes.38 What seemed like alarmist 
predictions at the time turned out to be overly cautious.
Apart from the above implications for the societies in which corporations 
trade, there are also more direct implications for employment relations. 
For example, as labour productivity is reduced during periods of high 
humidity, research published in Nature Climate Change indicates that 
labour productivity will be damaged in many countries as a result of 
climate change.39 The impact on productivity, for people not experiencing 
the increasingly expensive benefits of air-conditioning, will be quite 
substantial, especially for people in warmer or mid-latitude climates. This 
is one of many indicators that it is much cheaper to deal with climate 
change now than to wait until some date in the future.
It is largely in response to these global threats, and to other related 
concerns, that corporate literature and rhetoric increasingly refers to 
sustainable development, to the need for a ‘green firm’ responding to 
the ‘sustainability imperative’, and to a ‘triple bottom line’ encompassing 
social, environmental and financial matters.40 
Barriers to sustainability
Why isn’t more happening? The fundamental barrier to sustainability 
is the logic of the economic system. Liberal market economist Milton 
Friedman claimed that the firm has no social responsibilities other than 
38  Katharine Hayhoe and Robert E. Kopp, ‘What Surprises Lurk within the Climate System?’. 
Environmental Research Letters 11, no. 12 (2016): 1–3; Martin Wik et al., ‘Biased Sampling of 
Methane Release from Northern Lakes: A Problem for Extrapolation’. Geophysical Research Letters 43, 
no. 3 (2016): 1256–62; Chris Hope and Kevin Schaefer, ‘Economic Impacts of Carbon Dioxide and 
Methane Released from Thawing Permafrost’. Nature Climate Change 6 (2016): 56–9.
39  Charis Palmer and Sunanda Creagh, ‘Climate Change Linked to Declines in Labour 
Productivity’. The Conversation, 25 February 2013, theconversation.com/climate-change-linked-
to-declines-in-labour-productivity-12407, citing John P. Dunne, Ronald J. Stouffer, and Jasmin G. 
John, ‘Reductions in Labour Capacity from Heat Stress under Climate Warming’. Nature Climate 
Change 3 (2013): 563–6.
40  Dallas M. Cowan et al., ‘A Cross-Sectoral Analysis of Reported Corporate Environmental and 
Sustainability Practices’. Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology 58, no. 3 (2010): 524–38; David A. 
Lubin and Daniel C. Esty, ‘The Big Idea: The Sustainability Imperative’. Harvard Business Review, 
May 2010, 42–50, hbr.org/2010/05/the-sustainability-imperative; Daniel C. Esty and Andrew 
Winstone, Green to Gold: How Smart Companies Use Environmental Strategy to Innovate, Create Value 
and Build Competitive Advantage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).
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to itself: ‘the  social responsibility of business is to increase its profits’.41 
As  Joel  Bakan argued in The Corporation, corporate decision-makers 
must always: 
act in the best interests of the corporation, and hence its owners. 
The law forbids any other motivation for their actions, whether to 
assist workers, improve the environment or help consumers save 
money … As corporate officials … they have no legal authority 
to pursue such goals as ends in themselves—only as means to 
serve the corporation’s own interests, which generally means 
to maximise the wealth of its shareholders.42 
Both writers, posed at opposite ends of the political spectrum, echo 
Marx’s view that the actions of a capitalist do not ‘depend on the good 
or ill will of the individual’, because ‘competition brings out the inherent 
laws of capitalist production’ as if they were ‘external coercive laws having 
power over every individual capitalist’.43 Bakan, as a lawyer, focuses on 
the situation regarding formal legal obligations, which may vary between 
jurisdictions, and maximising profit need not be seen as always acting in 
the best interests of shareholders. As a comment on the logic of capital, 
however, his remarks have considerable validity. In The Corporation, 
Bakan seeks to point to numerous examples, from the failure of Enron 
to the privatisation of water in Bolivia, where corporations, in pursuing a 
single, profit-maximising objective, have shown callous unconcern for the 
feelings of others, incapacity to maintain existing relationships, reckless 
disregard for the safety of others, deceitfulness, incapacity to experience 
guilt and failure to conform to social norms regarding lawful behaviour. 
He argues that, if the corporation were a natural person, these attributes 
would (on a standard World Health Organization personality checklist) 
lead to that person being diagnosed as a ‘psychopath’. This is a very different 
image to that of the utopian free market in which buyers and sellers, 
individually pursuing self-interest, collectively produce the best possible 
outcome. But it does better to explain why, around three decades after the 
Bhopal disaster in India, Dow Chemical, the owner of the corporation 
whose factory exploded and killed over 10,000 people with hundreds of 
thousands harmed, still declined to clean up the area contaminated by the 
41  Milton Friedman, ‘The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits’. New York 
Times Magazine, 13 September 1970.
42  Joel Bakan, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (London: Constable & 
Robertson, 2004).
43  Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 1 (London: The Electric Book Company, 1887; repr., 1998), 389.
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explosion.44 For all we know, the vast majority of shareholders in Dow 
may believe this to be a tragic situation, but the corporation does not 
behave as if it does.45 Thus the corporation is to Bakan ‘an externalising 
machine’,46 something that is inherently incompatible with sustainability. 
Added to this, since the 1980s, have been the effects of financialisation, 
which ‘transforms the functioning of economic systems at both the 
macro and micro levels’.47 Ownership of large corporations has shifted 
from families and individuals to finance capital.48 Finance capital is 
more mobile and the costs of entry and exit are lower than for family 
capitalists. This has implications for workplace relations, more so when 
there are alternative opportunities for finance capital to make high profits 
via ‘accumulation by dispossession’.49 Economic blogger Peter Dorman 
recently commented:
One consequence of a longer-term orientation is an incentive for 
greater investment, and an important venue for this investment 
is the enterprise’s workforce. A high-investment personnel 
strategy is one in which more resources are devoted to cultivating 
human capital and worker attachment to the firm. The latter is 
fostered through internal labor markets, rent-sharing and a more 
favorable, or at least less resistant, attitude toward worker voice … 
Financialization is linked to inequality and greater precariousness 
of work because there is little incentive to expend resources in the 
present to capture the return to investments in the workforce that 
materialize (uncertainly) well into the future.50
44  Amnesty International, 28 Years Later, Women in Bhopal Still Waiting for Justice (New York: 
3 December 2012), www.amnestyusa.org/news/news-item/28-years-later-women-in-bhopal-still-
waiting-for-justice.
45  David Peetz, Brave New Workplace: How Individual Contracts Are Changing Our Jobs (Sydney: 
Allen & Unwin, 2006).
46  Bakan, Corporation, Chapter 3.
47  Thomas I. Palley, ‘Financialization: What It Is and Why It Matters’. Working Paper No. 525 
(Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: Levy Economics Institute, 2007), papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1077923.
48  David Peetz and Georgina Murray, ‘The Financialisation of Global Corporate Ownership’. 
In Financial Elites and Transnational Business: Who Rules the World?, ed. Georgina Murray and John 
Scott (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012).
49  Discussed in Chapter 2. See David Harvey, ‘The “New” Imperialism: Accumulation by 
Dispossession’, Socialist Register 40 (2004): 63–87; David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003).
50  Peter Dorman, ‘Financialization and the Incredible Shrinking Time Horizon’. Econospeak, 
2013, econospeak.blogspot.com.au/2013/05/financialization-and-incredible.html.
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This also has implications for global sustainability. The climate crisis should 
be seen in the context of conflicting capitalist visions; between, on the one 
hand, those focusing on short-term profit, increasingly associated with 
the ‘financialisation’ of modern economies, and, on the other hand, those 
focusing on long-term considerations, accounting for sustainability.51 
There are other barriers to global sustainability of course. Lobbyists, using 
the same tactics (and partly the same personnel) that tobacco companies 
used to confuse or discredit the science on smoking,52 along with some 
major media corporations and a spread of blog sites, give the impression 
that there is debate within the scientific community on the existence 
of anthropogenic global warming. In fact, over 97 per cent of climate 
scientists recognise the reality of human-made climate change.53 Studies 
have used a variety of methodologies to come to similar conclusions about 
the climate. Yet the muddying of the water has affected public opinion 
and severely restricted governments’ willingness to take action. Among 
the broader public, understanding is hampered by people’s unfamiliarity 
with the studies, frequent exposure to counter-ideas from those with an 
interest in continuing carbon emissions, and the cognitive dissonance that 
leads people to often reject evidence that runs counter to their own theories 
and ideologies and to welcome evidence that supports their belief systems. 
In the case of climate change, where the evidence is overwhelming, the 
selective use of evidence and failure to take account of the totality of 
the evidence is known as ‘cherry-picking’. As one mistruth is exposed, 
another rises to take its place. (It was common, for example, for climate 
51  David Peetz and Georgina Murray, Global Wellbeing and Climate-Interested Investors’ Motives. 
Working Paper (Brisbane: Centre for Work, Organisation and Wellbeing, Griffith University, 2013), 
www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0012/569559/Global-wellbeing-and-investors-motives-
Peetz,-Murray.pdf.
52  Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the 
Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming (London: Bloomsbury, 2010).
53  John Cook et al., ‘Quantifying the Consensus on Anthropogenic Global Warming in the Scientific 
Literature’. Environmental Research Letters 8, no. 2 (2013), iopscience.iop.org/article/ 10.1088/1748-
9326/8/2/024024/pdf; see also Kyle Hill, ‘The Overwhelming Odds of Climate Change’. Scientific 
American: Blogs (20 May 2013), blogs.scientificamerican.com/overthinking-it/ 2013/05/20/the-over 
whelming-odds-of-climate-change/; James Powell, ‘The State of Climate Science: A Thorough Review 
of the Scientific Literature on Global Warming’ (Science Progress, Center for American Progress, 2012), 
scienceprogress.org/2012/11/27479/.
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denialists to argue that the world has been cooling since 1998.54 Now the 
nine hottest years in recorded history have been since 2004,55 so this myth 
has been put away, and others created to take its place.)56
There is, however, an important difference between achieving consensus on 
action on global sustainability and action on sustainability in employment 
relations. In the long run, it is not in the interests of capital—even finance 
capital—to create an uninhabitable planet. So in essence the conflict is one 
between those parts of capital and the state with a short-term perspective, 
and those with a long-term perspective (‘patient capital’). The former are, 
in effect, extracting value from the latter. On this matter, the interests of 
labour are not in conflict with those of the latter group. 
On employment relations, though, the conflict of interest between labour 
and capital—over how the benefits will be distributed—is fundamental 
and in some ways irreconcilable. Yet at the same time, as we know, 
there are also core overlaps in interest—each needs the other to survive. 
So achieving sustainability in employment relations will always be a form 
of compromise, and one in which the parameters will likely never be 
fully resolved.
Corporate social responsibility
A concept closely related to questions of ethics and sustainability is that 
of ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR). It is an idea that prompted 
Friedman’s riposte mentioned above, that the only social responsibility 
a corporation has is to its profits. There are a wide range of definitions and 
concepts behind this label, making a single definition controversial but ‘at 
the heart of many of the differing definitions of CSR is a commitment 
from companies to produce some sort of social or environmental benefit, 
54  Michael Mann, The Hockey Stick and the Climate Wars: Dispatches from the Front Lines (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2012).
55  Climate Central, ‘The 10 Hottest Global Years on Record’, Climate Central, 6 February 2019, 
www.climatecentral.org/gallery/graphics/the-10-hottest-global-years-on-record.
56  Skeptical Science, ‘Global Warming and Climate Change Myths’, Skeptical Science, 2019, 
skepticalscience.com/argument.php.
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which goes beyond merely the basic compliance with the law’.57 Citing 
Blowfield and Frynas,58 Burchell refers to three key aspects of this 
‘umbrella’ approach, being that corporations have responsibilities:
• for their impact on society and the natural environment, beyond 
compliance with the law;
• for behaviour of those with whom they deal (e.g. within supply chains);
• to manage their relations to wider society, either to add value to the 
business or to society.
The proposition that corporations would engage in CSR activities for 
reasons other than adding value to the business runs counter to the idea 
that profit maximisation is the sole purpose of the corporation (seen as 
embedded in the law in some countries, and in the writings of Friedman 
and Bakan). There are two possible ways for observers and policy-makers 
to reconcile these perspectives.
The first is to believe that the form of corporate behaviour varies 
according to their institutional environment and that these differ between 
nation states. There is a literature based around the notion of ‘varieties 
of capitalism’,59 which distinguishes between ‘liberal market economies’ 
(LMEs) such as the USA and UK and ‘coordinated market economies’ 
(CMEs) such as those in Scandinavian countries, Germany and Japan. 
In addition, patterns of corporate ownership appear to differ between 
these ‘varieties’. For example, in many large German companies the 
largest, dominant shareholdings are by individuals, families or other 
small groupings, whereas in the USA the largest shareholdings are by 
banks and other forms of finance capital.60 Thus financialisation is much 
more important, to date, in the USA than in Germany. Financialisation 
in turn emphasises maximisation of short-term returns. It encourages 
profit as the sole criterion for corporate behaviour and promotes short-
termism. Inequality is higher in the USA: American firms on average are 
less sympathetic to employee interests and unions than European-based 
57  Jon Burchell, ‘Just What Should Business Be Responsible For? Understanding the Concept of 
CSR’. In The Corporate Social Responsibility Reader, ed. Jon Burchell (Oxford: Routledge, 2008).
58  Michael Blowfield and Jedrzej George Frynas, ‘Setting New Agendas: Critical Perspectives on 
Corporate Social Responsibility in the Developing World’. International Affairs 81, no. 3 (2005): 
499–513.
59  Peter A. Hall and David W. Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
60  David Peetz, Georgina Murray, and Werner Nienhüser, ‘The New Structuring of Corporate 
Ownership’. Globalizations 10, no. 5 (2013): 711–30.
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firms (union density in the USA is among the lowest in the OECD), and 
European firms tend to show greater willingness to adopt sustainability 
principles in relation to the environment.61 So, perhaps the Bakan/
Friedman perspective is more about LMEs than CMEs. Perhaps.
The alternative response is to believe that the profit-maximising objective is 
not just a result of any nation’s particular corporate laws but is fundamental 
to the nature of the corporation as a collective of capital. That is, the logic 
of capitalism means that capitalists behave this way as if the law made 
them do so.62 If this is the case, then as firms seek to maximise profit the 
only way to ensure that firms engage in socially responsible behaviour 
is to change the legal/institutional framework to make it mandatory. 
If  there are differences between how corporations behave in LMEs and 
CMEs, it is because the laws force them to behave differently. In the short 
term, a CEO or senior manager of a corporation, acting individually or as 
a group, may exercise agency and be able to pursue some CSR objectives; 
but in the long run this runs up against the financialised logic of capital 
and is only sustainable if the law requires them to act this way.
Companies engaged in CSR will typically produce voluntary reports on 
their CSR activities. Most large corporations will do this, for the public 
relations benefits. Some may have deeper, more genuine engagements. 
These reports take many formats, but the Netherlands-based Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) provides a common framework. One recent 
critique argued that ‘sustainability reporting does not currently meet the 
needs of stakeholders interested in the labour practices performance of 
Australian companies’.63
Finance and industry associations
The United Nations (UN) became directly involved in attempting to 
promote CSR, and several years ago helped set up, through seed funding, 
the UN Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI). This was a UN-
backed (but member-financed) ‘network of international investors’ and 
other corporations willing to agree to six key principles on environmental, 
61  Asset Owners Disclosure Project, AODP Global Climate 500 Asset Owners Index 2017 
(Sydney: AODP, 2017), aodproject.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/AODP-GLOBAL-INDEX-
REPORT-2017_FINAL_VIEW.pdf.
62  Marx, Capital, Volume 1, 389.
63  Banarra Consulting, 2010 Labour Practices in Sustainability Reporting—a Review (Sydney: Report 
for the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union, Mining and Energy Division, 2010).
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social and governance (ESG) issues. It aimed ‘to help investors integrate 
the consideration [of ESG] issues into investment decision-making 
and ownership practices, and thereby improve long-term returns to 
beneficiaries’.64 Based in London, it promoted ‘evidence that ESG issues 
can be material to performance of portfolios, particularly over the long 
term’. It had 1,484 signatories who were either investors or asset managers 
in May 2017, plus 223 ‘professional service partner’ signatories.
There are several other privately established institutions designed to 
promote investment more specifically in climate-friendly activities. 
It appears that, even in a financialising world, climate-interested (long-
term focused) investors are able to successfully pressure large transnational 
corporations to adopt at least some carbon-friendly actions,65 so it is 
possible that pressure on corporations to engage in CSR behaviours may 
arise not only from workers and NGOs but also from elements of finance 
capital focused on longer-term issues (i.e. ‘patient’ capital).
On the other hand, industry associations may act in the opposite 
direction. Data drawn from Influence Map (a UK-based nonprofit 
organisation) suggest major discrepancies between the positions of target 
corporations, and of industry or trade associations representing them.66 
This is also evident within specific industries, such as oil.67 Perhaps this is 
because the associations’ behaviour becomes responsive to and dominated 
by the target corporations with the most to lose from responding to the 
climate crisis; or they take on an ideological role within capital; or the 
behaviour of the industry or trade associations is a better reflection of 
the genuine interests and preferences of target corporations (whose public 
statements might not be taken at face value). There are major benefits for 
64  United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment, ‘FAQs’ (UNPRI, 2013), www.unpri.org/
about-pri/faqs/ (site discontinued).
65  David Peetz and Georgina Murray, ‘Financialization of Corporate Ownership and Implications 
for the Potential for Climate Action’. In Institutional Investors’ Power to Change Corporate Behavior: 
International Perspectives, Critical Studies on Corporate Responsibility, Governance and Sustainability, 
ed. Suzanne Young and Stephen Gates (Bingley, UK: Emerald, 2013), 99–125.
66  David Peetz et al., Corporations, Their Associations, and Climate Action (Canberra: Association of 
Industrial Relations Academics of Australia and New Zealand/SSRN, 2017), papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=589529.
67  Ibid.; Elysse Morgan, ‘Woodside Boss Peter Coleman Calls for Australia to Introduce a Carbon 
Price’. ABC News, 13 November 2018, www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-14/woodside-ceo-peter-
coleman-argues-for-carbon-price/10494026.
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corporations in ‘distancing’ accountability68—it is the same philosophy 
behind the ‘not there’ employment model. Interesting comparisons can 
also be drawn with employer associations in industrial relations.69
Pressures from finance capital are more likely to relate to climate 
sustainability issues than to labour issues, as the latter still tend to throw 
up questions about the conflict of interest between labour and capital, 
whereas the long-term survival of the planet is in the interests of both. 
That said, managers of workers’ pension funds70 have been criticised for 
themselves adopting too short-term a focus.71 Yet short-term financial 
returns in one year typically do not correlate with returns the next year 
anyway.72 To the extent that pension funds represent the interests of 
(retired or retiring) workers, a sustained longer-term focus by them may 
have implications for corporate labour relations behaviour as well. Others 
argue that workers’ pension funds should not concern themselves with 
these issues, and indeed that worker involvement in pension fund boards 
reduces returns to members. However, evidence indicates institutionalised 
workers’ pressure probably increases financial returns, most likely because 
it reduces opportunities for rent-seeking behaviour by financiers involved 
in pension funds.73
Indeed, it is possible that the ‘tide is turning’. A recent report by the Asset 
Owners Disclosure Project (AODP) described ‘a fundamental power shift 
… from short-termers to long-termers’.74 That the financial industry has 
been slow, even reluctant, to fund the Adani Carmichael mine in central 
68  David Peetz, ‘Why Establish Non-Representative Organisations? Rethinking the Role, Form 
and Target of Think Tanks’. In Think Tanks: Key Spaces in the Global Structure of Power, ed. Alejandra 
Salas-Porras and Georgina Murray (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
69  Peetz et al., Corporations, Their Associations, and Climate Action.
70  The equivalent in Australia is superannuation funds.
71  Trades Union Congress, Investment Chains: Addressing Corporate and Investor Short-Termism 
(London: TUC, 2006).
72  Daniel Kahneman, ‘The Surety of Fools (Don’t Blink! The Hazards of Confidence)’. New York 
Times, 19 October 2011, MM30; Christopher B. Philips, ‘The Case for Indexing’. Vanguard Research 
(Valley Forge, PA: The Vanguard Group, 2011), personal.vanguard.com/pdf/icrpi.pdf; Richard E. 
Ferri, The Power of Passive Investing (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2010).
73  David Peetz, The Relationship between Collective Representation and National Pension Fund 
Outcomes (Melbourne: Industry Super, January 2019).
74  Asset Owners Disclosure Project, Active Ownership (Sydney: AODP, 2017), aodproject.net/
active-ownership/.
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Queensland is possibly one example of that phenomenon.75 It also seems 
from anecdotal discussions that the interest of Australian superannuation 
funds in these issues is increasing,76 but there is still a long way to go before 
workers’ pension funds give primacy to the long-term sustainability of the 
planet on which all economic activity occurs.
There are several potential reasons for this shift, besides the changing 
economics of renewable technology, the worsening climate outlook and 
shifting policies in countries like China and India. New tools are being 
developed to enable investors to quantify the impact of climate on their 
investments. In financial circles, the more things can be counted, the 
more they count. Pension funds need to invest over long periods of time, 
and so are now forced to invest with climate change in mind. They cannot 
afford to have ‘stranded assets’ on their books. There is a rational reason, 
within the logic of finance capital, for this rethinking. 
Reinsurers—essentially large firms that provide insurance for insurance 
companies—face the same issue. They need to minimise exposure 
to extreme weather events, which are increasingly influenced by climate 
change. Indeed one, Munich Re, funded the early climate change 
research.77 Some worry that, after 2050, extreme weather events could 
become so abrupt and severe as to be ‘uninsurable’.78 Fund managers 
are  creating financial products  to enable investment in climate change 
adaptation. And some investors are  taking more control  over their 
investments, rather than leaving them in the hands of fund managers, so 
they can give appropriate priority to climate issues.79
75  David Peetz and Georgina Murray, ‘The Government Is Swimming against the Tide on Westpac’s 
Adani Decision’. The Conversation, 3 May 2017, theconversation.com/the-government-is-swimming-
against-the-tide-on-westpacs-adani-decision-76950. At time of writing, the proposed project had been 
reduced to less than half the announced size and was to be ‘self-financed’ (as still no financial institution 
would support it), if it ever goes ahead. John Quiggin, ‘Adani’s Rail Line Cut Shows Project Is on 
Life Support but Still a Threat to Climate’. Guardian, 15 September 2018, www.theguardian.com/
environment/commentisfree/2018/sep/16/adanis-rail-line-cut-shows-project-is-on-life-support-but-
still-a-threat-to-climate.
76  From discussions with the author.
77  Jeffrey Ball, ‘Who Will Pay for Climate Change?’. New Republic, 3 November 2015, newrepublic.
com/article/123212/who-will-pay-climate-change.
78  Ibid.; Jason Murphy, ‘Climate Change Could Make the World “Uninsurable”’. Crikey, 14 March 
2019, www.crikey.com.au/2019/03/14/climate-change-could-make-the-world-uninsurable/.
79  Asset Owners Disclosure Project, Active Ownership; Georgina Murray and David Peetz, ‘Financial 
Markets, Climate Change, and Paradoxes of Coordination and Intervention’. Perspectives on Global 
Development and Technology 15, no. 5 (2016): 455–79; Celine Herweijer, N. Patmore, and R. 
Muir-Wood, ‘Catastrophe Risk Models as a New Tool to Investigate the Financial Risks Associated 
with Climate Change Impacts and Cost-Benefits of Adaptation’. IOP Conference Series: Earth and 
Environmental Science 6 (2009), doi.org/10.1088/1755-1307/6/9/392021; Glenn W. Laper, ‘Lombard 
Odier Launches Climate Bond Fund with AIM’. NordSIP (Nordic Sustainable Investment Platform), 
6 March 2017, nordsip.com/2017/03/06/lombard-odier-launches-climate-bond-fund-with-aim/.
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This is not to say that financiers around the world are responding 
uniformly to climate issues. Nor has finance uniformly abandoned short-
termism. ‘Climate-interested investors’ currently account for no more 
than a third of the ownership of the world’s very large corporations, 
and quite a bit less than that using stricter definitions.80 However, as 
renewable energy becomes cheaper, inexorably widening the gap with the 
cost of carbon-fuelled energy, and the externalities of the latter become 
priced into costs faced by producers, financiers will increasingly behave as 
if they cared about sustainability. Whether that is enough for the planet 
is, however, another matter—without widespread carbon pricing, it is 
almost certainly not.
Workers, sustainability and a ‘just transition’
Some environmental groups seek negative economic growth to resolve the 
conflict between the economy and the environment. Yet this is a politically 
and probably a socially impossible approach: there is no currently known 
economic system in which negative growth would lead to anything 
but higher unemployment. Negative growth could not be achieved by 
a reduction in labour productivity, as the logic of technological change is to 
increase labour productivity. The only possible route to lower productivity 
would be substantial reductions in hourly wages, so that capital-intensive 
technology is discarded in favour of less productive, labour-intensive 
technology. Such large wage cuts or job losses—that is, a recession—would 
be unacceptable to trade unions and to voters. They would likely also lead 
to a right-wing backlash, potentially violent, targeting migrants or other 
minorities for taking some of the few jobs that remain, and dismantling 
the prospects of sustained action on climate change. Nor would negative 
financial returns be accepted by finance capital.
An alternative to wage cuts or job losses would be major cuts in working 
hours while hourly wages were kept stable. This, too, would lead to major 
reductions in weekly incomes and hence major resistance. Moreover, while 
the idea that we could reduce working hours to share the burden may be 
noble, it fails to account for how the capitalist economy works. As we saw in 
Chapter 3, reduced working hours did not happen following the expected 
wave of technological change after the 1970s, counter to predictions from 
80  Peetz and Murray, ‘Financialization of Corporate Ownership’.
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that decade.81 Perhaps over the very long term a social compromise can be 
reached in which slower or negative growth is accepted in return for cuts 
in working hours and weekly incomes, and for the regulated imposition of 
a maximum number of working hours for all people—perhaps with state-
guaranteed minimum incomes and state-enforced maximum incomes. 
There is debate about moving from a ‘linear’ to a ‘circular economy’, in 
which there is a lower level of activity and resources are not ultimately 
wasted but systematically reused.82 However, we are a long way from that 
point and the planet does not have enough time to wait.
In the meantime, can a compromise be found between environmental 
and labour interests—between the planet and jobs? If carbon emissions 
are not to be minimised through a reduction in gross domestic product, 
then it requires a very large reduction in carbon intensity (the amount of 
carbon emissions used in producing a unit of GDP). Recycling, enforced 
by regulation (not just individual voluntary decisions) is a step towards 
that, but just a small one.
Large changes in relative prices are central to achieving a major change 
in carbon intensity. Some of these have already happened: the price 
of solar panels, at US$101.65 per watt in 1975, was just US$0.61 in 
2015; so annual global installations of solar capacity rose from 2 MW 
in 1975 to 64,892 MW in 2015.83 Wind energy prices have also fallen, 
while battery storage has recently moved from a theoretical nicety to 
economic viability, with a large 2017 battery installation in South 
Australia rendering irrelevant most of the debate about the intermittency 
of renewable electricity.84 Favourable shifts in prices have been assisted by 
technological developments that have responded to well-known needs, 
but not all new technologies are helpful: because of the electricity used 
in complex calculations across multiple high-end computers, the trade in 
Bitcoin, a speculative cryptocurrency reliant on blockchain technology, 
consumes approximately as much energy as Ireland.85 
81  See Chapter 3.
82  Teresa Domenech, ‘Explainer: What Is a Circular Economy?’. The Conversation, 25 July 2014, 
theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-a-circular-economy-29666.
83  Michael Graham Richard, ‘This Striking Chart Shows Why Solar Power Will Take over the 
World’. Treehugger, 15 April 2015, www.treehugger.com/renewable-energy/striking-chart-showing-
solar-power-will-take-over-world.html.
84  Kyree Leary, ‘Elon Musk’s Huge Battery in South Australia Made $1 Million in Profit in Just 
a Few Days’. Science Alert, 25 January 2018, www.sciencealert.com/south-australia-tesla-battery-earns-
million-neoen-company.
85  The Economist, ‘Why Bitcoin Uses So Much Energy’. The Economist, 9 July 2018, www.economist.
com/the-economist-explains/2018/07/09/why-bitcoin-uses-so-much-energy.
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While changes in market prices make new coal-fired power plants 
economically unviable, we cannot expect the market to solve the climate 
crisis. After all, the failure of the market over two centuries to incorporate 
externalities into resource pricing caused the crisis in the first place. A high 
carbon price—some have suggested over US$100 per tonne86—will also 
be needed to drive a redirection of economic activity to low-emission 
behaviour. Perhaps ideally, a scientifically informed estimate would be 
made of what level of carbon the environment can absorb, and the market 
would then set a price for that quantity. This was the theory behind an 
emissions trading scheme (‘cap and trade’), which operates in a number 
of jurisdictions, though various exemptions or special arrangements can 
undermine the policy logic.
Government intervention need not be restricted to the pricing of 
externalities. Most governments seek to actively subsidise certain forms 
of renewable energy or recycling. Although, in terms of economic 
theory, a pure model of emissions trading would render such subsidies 
unnecessary, in practice emissions trading has been far from pure and 
carbon pricing would be well supplemented by such interventions anyway. 
Carbon pricing leads to higher consumer prices, including of electricity, 
but the Australian Government’s attempts to offset these higher prices 
through fiscal compensation reaped little in the way of political benefits. 
Polls suggested that voters preferred the revenue raised by carbon pricing 
be used to subsidise renewable energy anyway,87 and supported action 
to address climate change.88 It seems that the best way of dealing with 
political opposition to carbon pricing is not to offer compensation but to 
address the core issues, gaining the support of unions, many workers and 
parts of capital.
In practice, setting a carbon price may be administratively cleaner than 
setting a quantity. In discussions with climate-interested investors within 
finance capital, carbon pricing seems more of a focus for action than the 
tradability of emissions. While both carbon pricing and emissions trading 
are unambiguously liberal market solutions to a clear market failure, 
86  In an interview with the author.
87  Matthew J. Kotchen, Zachary M. Turk, and Anthony A. Leiserowitz, ‘Public Willingness to Pay 
for a US Carbon Tax and Preferences for Spending the Revenue’. Environmental Research Letters 12, 
no. 9 (2017), iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aa822a/pdf.
88  David Peetz and Georgina Murray, ‘Class, Attitudes and Climate Change’. In Public Opinion, 
Campaign Politics and Media Audiences: New Perspectives on Australian Politics, ed. Bridget Griffen-
Foley and Sean R. Scalmer (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2017).
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probably the strongest opposition has come from those associated with 
the party of capital in the most neo-liberal industrialised economy in the 
world (the USA), illustrating the limits of market liberal ideals amidst 
the reality of neo-liberal policy regimes.
As mentioned, major changes in economic structures can lead to major 
problems of structural unemployment, and hence a need for substantial 
structural adjustment89 programs, enabling retraining, creation of 
new jobs, subsidisation of new technologies and income maintenance 
for displaced workers. An adjustment program and subsidies could be 
financed at least in part through carbon price revenue—though it is not 
clear whether that would be enough.
As hinted at the beginning of this chapter, one of the important work-
related features of this area is the changing role of trade unions. Once 
focused almost exclusively within nation-state borders, as a locale for 
influencing their ability to regulate workplace behaviour, they are 
increasingly turning to transnational action. They are doing this through 
such mechanisms as negotiating codes of conduct, in an effort to regulate 
workplace behaviour in multiple locations, as what happens in one 
workplace may ultimately affect those on the other side of the globe. 
(Employers being able to reduce costs by cutting corners on safety in 
Third World countries makes it harder for unions to organise, or even 
maintain employment, in factories elsewhere.) There is more on codes of 
conduct in Chapter 10.
Union roles on environmental sustainability are also changing. Whereas 
once they could be relied on to ‘defend jobs’ regardless of environmental 
implications, an increasingly sophisticated approach to environmental 
and climate change issues is becoming apparent, in some but not all 
unions, including some where this would be quite unexpected—probably 
a result of increasing awareness of long-term implications for their 
membership.90 In the end, though, it is the nature of trade unions that 
environmental and climate issues will be secondary to matters regarding 
the direct employment relationship. Where unions have had a dominant 
role in labour supply (such as at the time of Sydney’s ‘Green Bans’ in the 
89  The meaning of ‘structural adjustment’ here is totally different to that used by the IMF.
90  Ray Markey, Joseph McIvor, and Chris F. Wright, Climate Change and the Australian Workplace: 
Final Report for the Australian Department of Industry on State of Knowledge on Climate Change, Work 
and Employment (Sydney: Macquarie University, 2014).
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1970s),91 placing the environment first has not been at the significant 
expense of employment. It is harder when unions lack such power over 
labour supply. It is especially hard since, as discussed in Chapter 4, the 
composition of future labour demand—the jobs of the future—is hard 
to predict. 
Most of the focus of trade union action in recent years has been not in 
opposing action on climate change but in achieving a ‘just transition’. The 
term means different things to different participants, but typically involves 
some combination of improvements for workers and communities, at the 
same time as the issue of climate change is addressed.92 So a representative 
set of elements in a just transition is environmental remediation, energy 
‘democracy’, ‘green’ jobs, worker retraining, revitalisation or diversification 
of energy sources for local communities, and community agency. As the 
climate warms, heat stress becomes a more important occupational health 
and safety issue for union action, and plays an increasingly important role 
in building standards.
Just transition is not a concept that is easy to attain. For example, wages 
in ‘green’ jobs (jobs in renewable energy industries or in sectors of the 
manufacturing or service sectors where production assists in the reduction 
of greenhouse gases) are typically lower than in coal. This is the case even 
if renewables are installed where coal extraction or burning was previously 
located. More commonly, though, green jobs are in different locations to 
the old coal jobs, so in the absence of effective state intervention there 
are not enough jobs for those displaced as the market moves from high-
emissions to renewable energy production. Nor is it inherently the case 
that they will be ‘good’ jobs.93
Unions in different countries think of just transition in different ways. The 
issues vary between developed and developing countries. A just transition 
for German coal unions, seeking to move their members into green jobs 
as carbon-emitting technology is phased out, may be seen as injustice by 
worker representatives in developing countries who supply raw materials 
91  Meredith Burgmann and Verity Burgmann, Green Bans (Sydney: UNSW Press, 1998); Greg 
Mallory, Uncharted Waters: Social Responsibility in Australian Trade Unions (Brisbane: Boolarong Press, 
2005).
92  An example is ACTRAV Bureau for Workers’ Activities, Just Transition Towards Environmentally 
Sustainable Economies and Societies for All (Geneva: International Labour Organization, ILO 
ACTRAV Policy Brief, 2018). 
93  Helen Masterman-Smith, ‘Green Collaring a Capital Crisis?’. Labour and Industry 20, no. 3 
(2010): 317–30.
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or components to old works. In many nations, particularly but not 
exclusively in the developing world, worker representative organisations 
may be ill-equipped to deal with just transition issues, whether because 
they are too poorly organised, too locally focused or ignored by national 
governments. Other civil society groups may be prominent in promoting 
low-carbon development but with possibly quite different perspectives.
So the concept of ‘just transition’ raises a number of questions identified 
by researchers.94 What policy mechanisms are needed to make retraining 
for fossil fuel workers and green jobs a viable reality? Is it possible for 
communities to have more control over economic redevelopment planning 
without transferring financial responsibility away from corporations? 
How can the urgency of decarbonisation be balanced with the long-
term goal of democratising the grid? What about communities that are 
not agitated to advocate for themselves amid energy transitions? Bigger 
than these, however, are some fundamental questions about resolving 
the contradiction between the need for employment and the need for 
a move to zero-emission economic activity, discussed above. And there is 
the big political question, about how to garner the political constituency 
necessary to respond to the issue. This seems to relate in some way to 
making use of the potential for common interests between unions, many 
environmental groups and parts of industrial and finance capital.
Conclusions
Two key conflicts on the capital side affect questions of sustainability: the 
competition between the two logics of short-termism or long-termism; 
and the extent to which costs and benefits are internalised or externalised. 
On the labour side, there is a conflict between the needs for employment 
and for a sustainability built on production methods with low carbon 
intensity, and there are contradictions in building consensus for a just 
transition.
Many aspects of work have ethical dimensions, and ethics have implications 
for workplace relations, organisational commitment and turnover. What 
should we do about climate change? What can we do?
94  For example, at the International Sociological Association’s world congress in Toronto, July 2018.
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In analysing issues of ethics and sustainability, we need to take account of 
the role of regulation in bringing about sustainable and ethical behaviour, 
and how effective corporate social responsibility really is or can be. We 
saw a bit of that in the last part of Chapter 4, and for more on that we 
will turn to Chapter 10. Some changes are inevitable including, centrally, 
changes in prices that will make some old industries uneconomic and new 
ones prosper. Still, sustainability, particularly environmental sustainability, 
is the area where some of the biggest choices are to be made, and where 
the difference between making the right choice and the wrong choice is 
literally a matter of life and death for many. And regulation is not just 
about the critical matter of pricing: it goes to issues like the uses permitted 
for water, for rural land, for native forests and for urban space; the types 
of mines or other carbon-relevant economic activities that are enabled; the 
levels, locations and types of pollution that are allowed and the fees that 
society charges to permit such pollution; and obligations on producers, 
retailers and consumers for recycling, waste, obsolescence and reparability.
While the toxic wastelands used for labour camps depicted in 
The Handmaid’s Tale may not seem such a likely scenario, the general point 
it draws is valid: those without power will most suffer the consequences of 
environmental degradation, and those with high power will avoid them. 
The elite will have the resources to maintain their relative standard of 
living, whether it be through building walls, new communities or private 
armies. For most workers, though, the prospects of climate change are 
serious and negative. We looked in general at the downwards transfer of 
risk in Chapter 6. The exposure of the world’s poor to the dangers of 
climate change, while the rich seek to insulate themselves from it, would 
be the starkest and most serious manifestation of the transfer of risk, 
without commensurate returns, from an elite within capital to a mass 
of labour.
In the meantime, we can also expect some major changes in the world 
of work. There are obvious ones like the loss of jobs in coal mines, oil 
wells, coal-fired power plants, manufacture and distribution of petrol cars 
and the like; and the growth of jobs in the manufacture, construction or 
maintenance of wind turbines, solar panels, electric cars, public transit 
and seawalls. Other changes will affect how work is done. Energy systems 
may become more decentralised and possibly less controlled by large 
corporations. Ways will need to be found: to undertake work, particularly 
outdoor work, in a hotter climate; to produce food (predominantly 
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vegetable-based rather than animal-based) from less arable lands and 
from oceans with declining fish stocks and growing numbers of jellyfish;95 
and to accommodate, often in industrialised nations, untold numbers 
of climate refugees from countries that have not been a major source of 
migrants until now. Those migration flows might produce the biggest 
unpredictable impact of climate change on work.
95  Lisa-Ann Gerschwin, Stung! On Jellyfish Blooms and the Future of the Ocean (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2013).
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Regulation and the 
futures of work
In the movie Sliding Doors, the life of the main character changes radically 
according to which of the two seemingly innocuous scenarios takes 
place at the beginning: either she gets onto the train before the carriage 
doors close behind her, or they close in time to prevent her boarding. 
A seemingly random event shapes how the rest of her life plays out. And 
it is true that much of what eventually happens to us—more than we 
like to imagine—is shaped by random events outside our control.1 But it 
would be false to think that everything is outside our control. Although 
the sliding doors in that movie were outside the control of the protagonist, 
much of what happens in the future is not. It is much more like the scene 
in The Circle, where Mae has the opportunity to reveal and confront the 
true nature of the organisation, and consciously chooses not to, than that 
at the beginning of Sliding Doors. Critical junctures2 shape futures, and 
these are a result of conscious decisions by one or more parties. 
As the world has become more complex and ‘globalised’, private and 
public policy-makers have felt more like events are outside their control. 
Public policy has always had a problem of translating ideas into practice, 
1  Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011). See also 
Chapter 5 of this book.
2  Ruth Berins Collier and J. David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the 
Labour Movement and Regional Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1991).
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and many fine aims have been frustrated in implementation.3 But now 
the problems are intensified by the seeming power of the market, and the 
reconstruction of transnational capital, in neo-liberal times. Regulation 
has appeared increasingly difficult—to some, hopeless. Some have 
sought innovative approaches by new means of regulation, either public 
or private. Others have had to deal with the difficulty of implementing 
regulations that presently exist. 
In this chapter we look at regulatory responses to changes in the world 
of work, particularly those arising from the shift towards ‘not there’ 
employment discussed in Chapter 6. ‘Not there’ employment has 
several effects. 
One is that it redefines the formal protections applying to workers. Some 
workers end up excluded from the formal protection of labour law because 
they are no longer defined as employees—typically as contractors. Other 
workers end up still covered by labour law but working under the terms of 
an agreement with or policies administered by a different organisation—
typically as ‘labour hire’ (the term used in Australia) or ‘temporary agency’ 
workers (the term used in Europe where, if sent to another EU country, 
they are ‘posted’ workers). This almost never means better conditions 
and usually means inferior conditions. 
A second effect is that, within the host country of capital, ‘not there’ 
employment encourages noncompliance with laws on minimum pay and 
conditions, because it puts responsibility for employment onto that part 
of capital which is least knowledgeable about those laws and which is 
most tempted, or encouraged, by the logic of cost-minimising market 
competition to circumvent those laws anyway. 
A third effect is that ‘not there’ employment encourages both 
noncompliance with and exclusion from labour law protections by use of 
global supply chains, where much of the work is undertaken in developing 
countries by entities that are technically and often practically separate 
from the organisation at the top of the capital chain. 
3  Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington 
Are Dashed in Oakland; or Why It’s Amazing That Federal Programs Work at All, This Being a Saga of the 
Economic Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build Morals on 
a Foundation of Ruined Hopes (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).
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Some of the effects mentioned above interact with changes in technology. 
For example, the emergence of platform-based ‘gig’ work is naturally 
dependent on the development of relevant platform technology. In turn, 
it enables a particular form of ‘not there’ employment that allows a shift 
in worker status from employee to purported independent contractor, 
because of the particular form of control that platform technology allows. 
On a larger scale, the emergence of global supply chains has already 
been facilitated by technological developments that have enabled rapid 
transportation, almost instantaneous communication, efficient record-
keeping and hence coordination on a global scale.
So in this chapter we look at the above aspects as case studies of the 
challenges facing regulation in the future of work, and of the policy 
choices to be made. We examine the challenges posed by future types of 
work, including through the gig economy. We investigate the problem of 
noncompliance (sometimes referred to as ‘wages theft’), the factors that 
promote it and the changing methods used in enforcement. And we peer 
into the maintenance of labour standards in global value chains or global 
production networks. Before that, we contextualise it by considering the 
purpose of regulation, the different forms of regulation by the state (such as 
the laws of employment and work, the welfare state, trade agreements and 
international law), which leads into discussion of innovation in regulation 
(e.g. through international codes of conduct applied to transnational 
firms) and the potential of and limitations on those innovations, drawing 
on the example of the response to the Rana Plaza collapse in Bangladesh. 
How can and will parties respond to increasing pressures for codes of 
conduct and corporate social responsibility? While technology has posed 
challenges for regulation, we will also make brief mention of some of the 
technologies that will assist in regulation.
Purpose and forms of regulation
The aim of regulation, put crudely, is to bring about outcomes different 
to those that would occur in its absence. In effect, this means outcomes 
different to those that would be delivered by a market.
It would be noble to say that this was in order to create outcomes that 
alleviated inequality in opportunities and power and improved the lot of 
the vulnerable. In practice, much regulation is for a different purpose: 
frequently, to strengthen or entrench the position of those in power. 
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Those with the most resources have the greatest capacity to influence 
government, and the wealthy and large corporations have the greatest 
financial resources. In The Circle, the corporation used its power ruthlessly 
to ensure that no regulation adversely affected it. A body of literature 
in the Marxist tradition argues that it is inevitable that the state will 
act in the interests of capital, either because the state is dominated by 
members of the ruling class or people with close ties to it, or because the 
structure of economic power ensures that, in the end, the state will act 
for capital.4 Divisions within the ruling class complicate but do not in 
themselves refute this interpretation.5 Many instances can be cited of the 
state acting to serve interests of the wealthy and large corporations with 
great financial resources.6 
However, workers and other groups outside the ruling class also mobilise 
and put pressure on the state to act in their interests. If the pressure is strong 
enough, particularly if those in the state feel their legitimacy and claim 
to power is threatened, the state responds by making concessions. So it 
is that improvements in workers’ conditions—ranging from reductions 
in the working week, improved leave or higher minimum wages—are 
achieved. Indeed, we theorised in Chapter 8 that one factor (not the 
only one) that may reduce gender gaps is the proximity of an occupation 
to regulation, as regulation reduced the capacity for the norms of those 
with power to determine the distribution of power and rewards.7 Policy-
makers in the state vary in their ideological perspectives and orientations, 
4  Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, and Socialism. Translated by Patrick Camiller (London: Verso, 
1980); Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (New York: Basic, 1969); Nicos Poulantzas 
and Ralph Miliband, ‘The Problem of the Capitalist State’. In Ideology in Social Science: Readings in 
Critical Social Theory, ed. R. Blackburn (New York: Pantheon Books), 238–62.
5  For example, conflicts between mining and non-mining capital, between financial and industrial 
capital, or between national and transnational capital. See references in previous footnote plus 
William Carroll, ‘The Corporate Elite and the Transformation of Finance Capital: A View from 
Canada’. Sociological Review 56, no. s1 (2008): 44–63; William Carroll, The Making of a Transnational 
Capitalist Class (London: Zed Books, 2010); Richard Deeg and Iain Hardie, ‘What Is Patient Capital 
and Who Supplies It?’. Socio-Economic Review 14, no. 4 (2016): 627–45; Georgina Murray, Capitalist 
Networks and Social Power in Australia and New Zealand (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006); Jean Philippe 
Sapinski, ‘Climate Capitalism and the Global Corporate Elite Network’. Environmental Sociology 1, 
no. 4 (2015): 268–79.
6  For example, Thomas Stratmann, ‘The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of 
Contributions Everything?’. Journal of Law and Economics. 41, no. 1 (1998): 85–114; Allan Holmes 
et al., Did Billionaires Pay Off Republicans for Passing the Trump Tax Bill? (Washington DC: Centre 
for Public Integrity, 7 February 2019), publicintegrity.org/business/taxes/trumps-tax-cuts/did-
billionaires-pay-off-republicans-for-passing-the-trump-tax-bill/.
7  David Peetz and Georgina Murray, Women, Labor Segmentation and Regulation: Varieties of Gender 
Gaps (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
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and some enter that arena specifically to advance the interests of those 
they see as underprivileged, though in most developed countries most are 
constrained in what they can do by political possibilities.
One problem facing policy-makers, especially politicians, from both left 
and right is that it may sometimes undermine their legitimacy (especially 
with voters or commentators linked to the other side) if others see them 
as being driven by ideological or interest-driven objectives. So policies will 
often be advanced in terms of the purported benefit they produce for the 
greater, public good—often by claims of boosts to productivity growth, 
which provide the potential for increases in living standards (a potential 
that, of course, is not always realised).8 So the true purpose of policies will 
often be obfuscated.
This chapter, however, does not focus on the prevarications of politicians. 
Rather, it looks at some specific aspects of the regulation of work that, in 
particular, attempt to use regulation to overcome some of the problems 
identified in earlier chapters. That is the purpose of the type of regulation 
of interest here.
Regulation takes a number of forms. The obvious way in which work 
is affected by regulation is through employment law or labour law. 
Employment law may focus on collective issues: what happens when an 
employer plans to or takes action to retrench or otherwise dismiss a group 
of employees; what collective rights to information do employees have; 
what happens when employees have a collective grievance; when they 
want to strike and when they do strike; when an employer takes industrial 
action, and so on. Employment law may also focus on individual issues: 
what happens when an individual is dismissed, what happens when 
discrimination against a particular employee has occurred, and so on. Over 
recent decades, this ‘individual’ employment law has generally expanded 
in developed countries, but (on average) little has happened to expand 
collective employment law, and in some countries collective employment 
law has been in retreat.9 That said, there is little empirical reason to 
believe that, in the developed world outside Australia, there has been any 
8  David Peetz, ‘Does Industrial Relations Policy Affect Productivity?’. Australian Bulletin of Labour 
38, no. 4 (2012): 268–92.
9  Alan Bogg and Tonia Novitz, ‘Links between Individual Employment Law and Collective Labour 
Law: Their Implications for Migrant Workers’. In Migrants at Work: Immigration and Vulnerability in 
Labour Law, ed. Cathryn Costello and Mark Freedland (Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online, 2014).
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reduction in the right to strike available to employees.10 If anything, most 
shifts have been in the opposite direction (mainly through improvements 
in the rights of Easter European workers), though the most common 
pattern is of stability in the broad nature of the law on the right to strike. 
However, a number of governments, in Anglophone countries especially, 
have passed laws that make it easier for employers to bypass unions and 
have undertaken administrative action to weaken unions.11
State regulation affecting work is not restricted to employment or labour 
law. Welfare or social security law affects work, by influencing the incentives 
on people to enter the labour force, find work, return to work after 
pregnancy, work longer or shorter hours and in some cases to undertake 
industrial action. The provision of social services affects the availability of 
people to undertake work (e.g. through availability of childcare). Indeed, 
as we saw in the opening chapters, the range of liberal market regulations 
that affect the operation of product and financial markets without any 
obvious relationship to labour markets can nonetheless have a major 
impact on work. These latter areas—those associated with product and 
financial markets—might have had a greater impact on work and workers 
than employment law itself. 
International law, through conventions of the International Labour 
Organization, the United Nations, the World Trade Organization or other 
bodies, affects numerous aspects of work. Trade agreements may affect the 
capacity of nation-states to regulate employment, and the extent to which 
workers in one country are seen to be in competition with workers from 
another country.
Although regulation is something normally seen as being associated with 
the state, other actors may also seek to regulate work. As mentioned 
in Chapter 8, unions aim to regulate work through the making of 
collective agreements with employers, even if those agreements might 
not be formalised or have the full force of the law. Employers, especially 
larger ones, establish rules and procedures to make sure that managers 
10  David Peetz, ‘Industrial Action, the Right to Strike, Ballots and the Fair Work Act in International 
Context’. Australian Journal of Labour Law 29 (2016): 133–53, using data from Jelle Visser, ‘Data 
Base on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social 
Pacts, 1960–2011 (ICTWSS), Version 4.0’ (Amsterdam: Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour 
Studies, University of Amsterdam, 2013).
11  David Peetz, Unions in a Contrary World: The Future of the Australian Trade Union Movement 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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and supervisors do things in ways that are consistent with the aims of 
the employer. This is often referred to as ‘internal regulation’, and so 
the shift to ‘deregulation’ is often analysed as instead being a shift from 
external to internal regulation.12 Governments may sometimes seek to 
encourage or ‘incentivise’ particular behaviours from employers, rather 
than passing laws requiring or prohibiting particular behaviours, and so 
this is sometimes referred to as ‘soft’ regulation, in contrast with the more 
traditional form of ‘hard’ regulation—that is, laws that require or prohibit 
something.13
The challenges arising from changes in corporate organisation, state 
regulation and work itself have made traditional employment law more 
difficult, including by challenging the traditional conception of employee 
or traditional forms of accountability in employment, and these have led 
to various attempts to find new ways of regulating in ways that affect 
work. They are the focus of the rest of this chapter.
New forms of work and workers
As discussed in earlier chapters, there has been a lot of recent controversy 
about the use of ‘independent contractors’ in place of employees, 
something potentially encouraged by the expansion of ‘not there’ 
employment.14 ‘Independent contractors’ may be subject to protection 
through workplace health and safety legislation, for example in Australia 
and some other countries, but are not entitled to other employee benefits 
such as minimum wages or workers’ compensation. There is considerable 
international evidence that workplace health and safety outcomes are 
poorer for contractors than for employees.15 Indeed, a related effect arises 
12  For example, John Buchanan and Ron Callus, ‘Efficiency and Equity at Work: The Need for 
Labour Market Regulation in Australia’. Journal of Industrial Relations 35, no. 4 (1993): 515–37.
13  Keith Sisson and Paul Marginson, ‘Soft Regulation’—Travesty of the Real Thing or New Dimension? 
ESRC ‘One Europe or Several’ Programme, Working Paper 32/01 (Brighton: University of Sussex, 
Sussex European Institute, 2001).
14  Some of the material in this section first appeared in David Peetz, The Operation of the Queensland 
Workers’ Compensation Scheme. Report of the Second Five Yearly Review of the Scheme (Brisbane: 
Parliament of Queensland, June 2018).
15  Michael Quinlan, The Effects of Non-Standard Forms of Employment on Worker Health and Safety. 
Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 67 (Geneva: International Labour Office, Inclusive 
Labour Markets, Labour Relations and Working Conditions Branch, December 2015).
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with labour-hire workers: workplace health and safety outcomes are 
poorer for labour-hire workers—often referred to as ‘temporary agency 
workers’ in the literature—than for conventional employees.16
So questions arise as to whether particular people should be classed as 
employees rather than independent contractors under employment law, 
and therefore be treated as employees not only for workers’ compensation 
purposes but also for purposes of minimum hourly wages and other 
entitlements under employment law. Criteria (or ‘indicia’) have been 
developed by tribunals, the courts and even the taxation authorities to 
determine whether workers are employees or independent contractors. 
When firms portray people who are clearly employees as independent 
contractors, and thereby withhold from them one or more of their 
employee entitlements (such as minimum hourly wages, leave or 
superannuation), they may be prosecuted for engaging in what is termed 
‘sham contracting’ in Australia. 
Often the indicia lead to ambiguous outcomes, at least in the eyes of 
lawyers, so cases contesting whether particular people are employees or 
independent contractors still end up before the tribunals or courts.
One recent development in case law occurred in the California Supreme 
Court. It broadened the meaning of ‘employee’ there, redefining the test 
used in determining whether a worker was an employee or independent 
contractor by replacing an assessment against various indicia with an 
‘ABC test’. Under the ABC test, a worker is assumed to be an employee 
unless the employer can prove all of three criteria: 
1. The worker is free from direction and control in the performance 
of the service, both under the contract of hire and in fact;  
2. The worker’s services must be performed either:
i. outside the usual course of the employer’s business; or 
ii. outside all the employer’s places of business (e.g. a firm engaging 
seamstresses to make clothing could not call them independent 
contractors);  
16  Ibid.; Anthony Forsyth, Victorian Inquiry into the Labour Hire Industry and Insecure Work: Final 
Report (Melbourne: Industrial Relations Victoria, Department of Economic Development, Jobs, 
Transport & Resources, 2016). 
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3. The worker must be customarily engaged in an independently 
established trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same 
nature as the service being provided.17 
The ABC test brings more workers under the definition of ‘employee’ 
than do most other indicia. It has the advantage of covering most groups 
of workers who would be thought as being under the ‘employ’ of a more 
powerful organisation. At time of writing, the ABC test applied in three US 
states for aspects of workers’ compensation or unemployment insurance. 
However, law in these states does not normally set precedent in other 
countries. Still, an option available to policy-makers is to legislate the 
ABC test or some variant of it.18 It would have the advantage of bringing 
within the scope of employment law a wider group of workers who could 
be seen to be vulnerable to exploitation by more powerful organisations, 
those engaging in ‘not there’ employment. Doing this might, however, 
reducing certainty for some other workers as to whether they are covered 
by employment law.
A related matter is the question of who is responsible for the welfare of 
labour-hire employees, who are in a ‘triangular relationship’ with the 
host employer and the labour-hire firm that is their employer at law. For 
example, in Québec, Canada, premiums for workers’ compensation are 
the responsibility of whichever, out of the host employer or the labour-
hire firm, is considered to have the greater control over the employee.19 
While ideal at a theoretical level, the practical impact is to lead to 
a substantial amount of litigation over who is responsible for premiums, 
and it becomes almost a case-by-case issue for determining who pays. It is 
17  Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court, discussed in Michael S. Kun and Kevin 
D. Sullivan, ‘California Supreme Court Adopts “ABC Test” for Independent Contractors’. Wage 
and Hour Defense Blog, Epstein Becker Green, 30 April 2018, www.wagehourblog.com/; Todd 
Lebowitz, ‘California’s Top Court Creates New Test for Independent Contractor vs. Employee, 
Re-Interprets 102-Year Old Definition’. Who Is My Employee?, Baker Hostetler LLP, 30 April 2018, 
whoismyemployee.com/.
18  The Dynamex decision formed the model for Bill AB5 in California. An example of a variant is 
that applied by Justice Bromberg in Australia, though this is probably less likely to see people defined 
as independent contractors, rather than employees, than the ABC text. On Call Interpreters and 
Translators Agency Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 3) (2011) 214 FCR 82, discussed in 
Andrew Stewart et al., Creighton & Stewart’s Labour Law, 5th ed. (Sydney: Federation Press, 2016). 
Other cases cited there were FWO v. Quest South Perth Holdings Pty Ltd (2015) 228 FCR 346, 
Fenwick v. World of Maths [2012] FMCA 131, FWO v. Metro Northern Enterprises Pty Ltd [2013] 
FCCA 216 and Predl v. DMC Plastering Pty Ltd [2014] FCCA 1066. 
19  Katherine Lippel et al., ‘Legal Protections Governing the Occupational Safety and Health and 
Workers’ Compensation of Temporary Employment Agency Workers in Canada: Reflections on 
Regulatory Effectiveness’. Policy and Practice in Health and Safety 9, no. 2 (2011): 69–90.
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hardly, then, a satisfactory solution. One option for other jurisdictions 
might be to have the premiums still paid by the labour hire firm but 
the experience rating (i.e. the discount or addition to premium liabilities, 
based on claims paid) of the host employer to also partially include the 
effects of injuries incurred by labour-hire workers while on the premises 
of or working for such a firm (i.e. the effects would be at least shared 
between the host employer and the labour-hire firm).
What about ‘gig economy’ workers? The issue of whether platform 
economy workers are employees or independent contractors has been 
tested in courts, tribunals and administrative bodies in a number of 
jurisdictions. The end result has been far from conclusive. On the one 
hand, a number of cases have led or could lead to some workers in platform 
industries being classed as employees. This includes several cases in the 
UK;20 France;21 one in New York City, USA;22 a ruling in the European 
Court of Justice, which held that Uber was a transportation company, 
not a technology company, raising questions about whether its workers 
would be treated as employees;23 and a case about Foodora in Australia—
though the local offshoot went into voluntary administration, enabling 
the international firm to avoid its employment-related liabilities.24
20  Gregor Gall, ‘Is Uber Ruling the Beginning of the End for Bogus Self-Employment?’. The 
Conversation, 5 November 2016; Robert Booth, ‘UK Government Delays Possible Reforms to Gig 
Economy Practices’. Guardian, 6 December 2017; Natasha Bernal, ‘Uber Heads for Supreme 
Court after Losing Appeal on Worker Rights’. Telegraph, 19 December 2018, www.telegraph.co.uk/
technology/2018/12/19/uber-heads-supreme-court-losing-appeal-worker-rights/; BBC, ‘Bike Courier 
Wins “Gig” Economy Employment Rights Case’. BBC News, 7 January 2017; Ben Chapman, ‘Gig 
Economy Ruling: Couriers Carrying Blood for NHS Win Right to Collective Bargaining’. Independent, 
1 March 2018, www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/nhs-gig-economy-couriers-blood-
transfusions-union-recognition-the-doctors-laboratory-a8235446.html; Robert Booth, ‘Addison Lee 
Wrongly Classed Drivers as Self-Employed, Tribunal Rules’. Guardian, 26 December 2017; Jamie 
Grierson and Rob Davies, ‘Pimlico Plumber Loses Appeal against Self-employed Status’. Guardian, 
11 February 2017.
21  Laura Kayali, ‘French Court: Uber and Drivers Tied by “Work Contract”. Politico, 11 January 
2019, www.politico.eu/article/french-court-uber-and-drivers-tied-by-work-contract/.
22  Matt Hamilton, ‘Judge Finds NYC Uber Drivers to Be Employees; Upstate Impact Debated’. 
Timesunion, 12 September 2016, www.timesunion.com/allwcm/article/Judge-finds-NYC-Uber-
drivers-to-be-employees-11220139.php.
23  Zeeshan Aleem, ‘Europe’s Top Court Just Said Uber Isn’t a Tech Company—It’s a Cab 
Company’. Vox, 20 December 2017, www.vox.com/world/2017/12/20/16800476/uber-eu-europe-
taxi-regulation.
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On the other hand, different cases have led, in effect, to their being classed 
as nonemployees. This included cases in the USA25—though one judge 
commented that Uber and Lyft ‘present a novel form of business that did 
not exist at all ten years ago’ and added, ‘With time, these businesses may 
give rise to new conceptions of employment status’26—plus the UK27 and 
Australia.28 In one of the Australian cases, however, the tribunal observed 
it might be that notions about what was necessary for an employment 
relationship to be established ‘are outmoded in some senses and are no 
longer reflective of our current economic circumstances’.29 The comments 
coming out of some cases, and the variety of outcomes, suggest the law is 
far from settled and changes in statute law may yet be forthcoming. 
Among mainstream employers, organisational control of employees’ 
working time has become less important over recent decades than 
organisational control of the product employees generate for the employer. 
It is an aspect of the two paths towards increased hours or work intensity 
identified in earlier chapters: yes, one involves tighter direct control over 
employees’ hours, but the other involves a loosening of direct control 
of hours and tasks and replacing it with internalisation of the need to 
work longer hours to ‘get the job done’.30 Yet control of working time 
remains one of the indicia used to determine whether someone is an 
employee or a contractor. The Philadelphia US District Court decision 
acknowledged that Uber could terminate a driver’s access to the Uber app; 
deactivate a driver for cancelling trips, failing its background check policy, 
falling short of the minimum required 4.7-star driver rating, or soliciting 
payments outside of the Uber app; make deductions against a driver’s 
25  Lawrence J. Hanley, ‘Inside Uber’s Latest Move to Exploit Its Drivers and Hide Behind the 
Court’. Huffington Post, 6 April 2017.
26  Razak v. Uber Technologies Inc., U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
Case No. 2:16-cv-00573, p. 25.
27  Sarah Butler, ‘Deliveroo Wins Right Not to Give Riders Minimum Wage or Holiday Pay’. 
Guardian, 15 November 2017.
28  Kaseris v. Rasier Pacific V.O.F [2017] FWC 6610 (21 December 2017); Pallage v. Rasier Pacific 
[2018] FWC 2579 (11 May 2018); [2019] FWC 4807 (12 July 2019).
29  [2017] FWC 6610 (21 December 2017), at [66].
30  Mentioned in Chapters 3, 5 and 7 of this book. See Griffith Work Time Project, Working Time 
Transformations and Effects (Brisbane: Queensland Department of Industrial Relations, 2003); David 
Peetz et al., ‘Race against Time: Extended Hours in Australia’. Australian Bulletin of Labour 29, no. 2 
(2003): 126–42; David Peetz, Cameron Allan, and Michael O’Donnell, ‘Are Australians Really 
Unhappier with Their Bosses Because They’re Working Harder? Perspiration and Persuasion in Modern 
Work’. Paper presented at Rethinking Institutions for Work and Employment, Selected Papers from the 
XXXVIIIth Annual Canadian Industrial Relations Association Conference, Quebec, 26–28 May 2001.
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earnings; and limit the number of consecutive hours that a driver may 
work. Yet against the more traditional indicia, Uber was not considered 
an employer and its drivers were independent contractors.31
Perhaps the best indication of who holds power in the relationship between 
Uber and its drivers lies in the pay the drivers receive. The rates of pay and 
conditions many ‘gig economy’ workers receive would be illegal were they 
treated as employees,32 and for some at least the means by which they are 
classified as contractors rather than employees appears to have an element 
of contrivance about it. Thus, for example, Uber’s declaration that it is not 
in the business of passenger transport, it is merely a technology company 
acting as a client to drivers,33 appears to defy commonsense understandings 
of what Uber does—why would it be competing with taxi companies and 
testing driverless cars if it was not involved in transport?—and designed 
to enable a particular definition of its workers.34 
There may also be flow-on effects that affect many other workers. If firms 
that provide substandard pay and conditions outcompete those providing 
standard pay and conditions, then the latter group will be forced to 
match the former or go out of business (leading to greater noncompliance 
with laws). If the latter go out of business, the former group would be 
able to raise prices as its market share increases. This appears to be the 
strategy of some platform firms—for example, Uber has never made 
a  profit despite undercutting competitors,35 but appears to anticipate 
profitability when it has achieved sufficient market share. (We’ll come 
back, in Chapter 11, to what ‘market’ is relevant here.) The strategy of 
increasing market shares, to achieve dominance, appears to be gaining 
traction. Dominant firms now appear to embody a lower labour share in 
income than other firms. Increasing concentration in product markets 
within industries is associated with greater declines in the labour share in 
31  Razak v. Uber Technologies Inc., 27–8.
32  See Chapter 6.
33  Tom Brant, ‘Uber to European Court: We’re Not a Transportation Company’. PCMag, 29 November 
2016, www.pcmag.com/news/349940/uber-to-european-court-were-not-a-transportation-company.
34  For example, Caspar, ‘Sydneysiders Have Spoken—and They Choose Ridesharing!’. Uber 
Newsroom, Uber, 10 October 2015, www.uber.com/en-AU/newsroom/sydney-has-spoken/.
35  Ryan Felton, ‘Uber Is Doomed’. Jalopnik (2017), 24 February, jalopnik.com/uber-is-
doomed-1792634203; Andrew J. Hawkins, ‘Uber Reportedly Lost $1.27 Billion in Just Six Months’. 
The Verge, 25 August 2016, www.theverge.com/2016/8/25/12647814/uber-loss-billion-2016-travis-
kalanick-lyft.
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those industries.36 The implications of that for other firms’ labour shares 
would be significant. Many people working for firms in those sectors 
could be low paid and vulnerable. 
The distinction between workers who do ‘crowdwork’ and those who do 
‘work on-demand via apps’ is important from both an analytical and policy 
perspective.37 Most of the policy possibilities focus on extending coverage 
to those who do ‘work on-demand via apps’. This includes platforms like 
Deliveroo, Foodora, Uber, Uber Eats and Airtasker. This is because of 
the greater difficulties in providing coverage for crowdwork, when much 
crowdwork is undertaken across borders internationally. For example, an 
American app may facilitate an Indian crowdworker performing work for 
a client organisation or individual in, say, the UK one hour and Spain the 
next. By contrast, for those platform workers doing work on-demand via 
apps, the worker and the client are located near each other, regardless of 
where the app is owned, and this occurs through multiple uses of the app. 
This commonality of location is crucial for the potential of regulation.
An example of what is possible in labour regulation, and the complexities 
of it, for ‘gig economy’ workers is in the area of workers’ compensation. 
The development of the technologies that enable the development of 
platform work, and more importantly enable the platform intermediaries 
to command a portion of the payment to the worker, provide an 
opportunity for regulatory intervention. If payment can be deducted for 
the intermediary, it can also be deducted for other purposes. A platform 
that controls ‘contractors’ provides a more accessible mechanism for 
regulation of the work and conditions of ‘contractors’ (whether by the 
state or by unions) than would be the case if workers were fragmented 
through thousands of unrelated contracts.38 That said, the treatment of 
gig economy workers in terms of other aspects of labour law (such as those 
relating to minimum wages) is more complex. 
Various people have called for a set of protections, including in some 
cases a minimum wage, to apply to all workers predominantly dependent 
on one organisation for earnings, regardless of whether they are 
employees or contractors. The difficulty with a minimum wage rate is 
36  David Autor et al., ‘Concentrating on the Fall of the Labor Share’. American Economic Review 
107, no. 5 (2017): 180–85.
37  Defined in Chapter 6 of this book.
38  Chris Burns, ‘Can a New Nordic Online Portal Help Protect Digital Economy Workers?’. Equal 
Times, 13 July 2017, www.equaltimes.org/can-a-new-nordic-online-portal?lang=en#.XHiuPdhKhvd.
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that payments for many contractors are based on completion of the task 
rather than the time it takes. New York City sought to deal with this 
issue for drivers for ‘rideshare’ firms (Uber, Lyft and the like) by using 
a standardised ‘utilisation rate’ to convert piece rates to hourly pay.39 This 
was immediately challenged by Lyft, but not by Uber, probably because 
both saw the former would be disadvantaged in competition with the 
latter due to Lyft’s lower utilisation rate. For Uber, removing competition 
may be more important here than obtaining the cheapest possible labour. 
The lesson is that, if we are to apply minimum standards outside the 
employment relationship, we need to be creative as it may be difficult to 
draft a single, comprehensive law. One option for a national government 
might be to declare a national minimum wage—and that it applies to 
a wide range of workers, not just employees—but establish a tribunal 
to determine how it is to be implemented, in each sector, outside the 
traditional employment relationship. It would make determinations 
on application from interested parties who would lodge proposals on 
how implementation in their sector should occur. Implementation of 
a  minimum wage on each section would not rely on new legislation 
being passed, just a new tribunal decision. Naturally, parties and tribunals 
would learn from the successful and failed experiences of other sectors 
and countries.
The same principle could be applied to other types of minimum standards, 
not just minimum hourly wages. 
Noncompliance
An apparently growing issue for regulators of employment is the problem 
of noncompliance—referred to by Australian unions as ‘wage theft’ as it 
concerns money that rightfully belongs to the employees after they have 
worked the requisite hours. It has implications not just for those workers 
directly affected: if one group of workers can be paid well below the legal 
minimum, that opens opportunities for employers to apply pressure to 
other workers, using the implicit or explicit threat of replacing them with 
39  Grace Dobush, ‘Lyft Claims That NYC’s New Driver Minimum Wage Makes It Even Harder 
to Compete with Uber’. Fortune, 31 January 2019, fortune.com/2019/01/31/lyft-uber-nyc-driver-
minimum-wage-lawsuit/.
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lower-paid workers. This section mainly focuses on Australian examples, 
but the observations about the factors facilitating underpayment have 
international application.40
There are many ways in which this specific type of exploitation can 
occur. Examples include being underpaid for regular hours; not receiving 
premiums for work at unsocial times on nights or weekends (penalty rates); 
unpaid working hours or overtime; unpaid trials or internships; failing 
to receive entitlements like pension contributions (superannuation); 
having illegal deductions made from pay for alleged poor performance or 
breakages; being sexually harassed; being unlawfully or unfairly dismissed; 
inadequate breaks; mistreatment or excessive control; or being exposed to 
danger. Only some are caught in published statistics.
One group often not defined as employees are interns. These are people—
usually young—who work for an employer for a defined period of time 
without payment. Interns, like other people on ‘work experience’ or 
‘volunteers’, would be unlikely to be categorised as employees by an ABC 
test or anything similar because of the absence of a beneficial contract (i.e. 
a contract that involves payment to the volunteer or intern). Internships 
and work experience have long been part of the educational experience 
and often formalised into the curricula of educational institutions. 
Volunteering has been around for as long as society. The group of concern 
here, though, is that affected by the newly emerging trend in labour 
markets: the growth of ‘work experience’ without pay in commercial 
organisations, as a way of gaining entry into the labour market for that 
particular industry. Sometimes interns are promised that there would be 
an educational or training component that does not eventuate, and they 
end up doing menial tasks; other times they end up doing work that more 
directly generates surplus for the organisation. Shorter-term arrangements 
might be referred to as ‘trials’.
This is a relatively recent phenomenon, and reflects changes in labour 
markets as underemployment and credentialism have grown, especially 
among young workers. Such internships are seen as a way by which 
individuals can gain a competitive edge in the labour market. However, 
as corporations increasingly take advantage of the opportunity provided 
by free labour through such internships, and demand ‘experience’ in the 
40  Some of the material in this section was originally published in David Peetz, ‘Debt in Paradise: 
On the Ground with Wage Theft’. Griffith Review 61 (2018): 185–91.
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industry as a prerequisite for entry-level paying jobs—as already occurs in 
some industries (e.g. broadcast and print media)41—the competitive edge 
largely disappears. The factor that was once a ‘competitive edge’ becomes 
a new (higher) standard—an example itself of credentialism.42 There is 
reason to believe that ‘a growing number of businesses are choosing to 
engage unpaid interns to perform work that might otherwise be done 
by paid employees’.43 The legality of unpaid commercial internships is 
highly dubious.
Some groups of employees are disproportionately likely to be underpaid. 
Those most vulnerable are those most likely to be afraid or tolerant of 
mistreatment, and least likely to complain. They include workers with 
temporary migration visas, where the employer has the upper hand in 
making it not worthwhile to complain. People on a backpacker’s visa 
in Australia, for example, need to work 88 days in their first year to be 
entitled to an extra year in Australia. Those days are certified by their 
employer. So underpaid workers are unlikely to complain to an authority. 
Many workers worry about losing their jobs if they complain.44
The outcomes affect others working in retail or hospitality, including 
students (for whom it is often their only source of income), sole parents 
or single-income earners working full-time.45 
Some examples from Australia show how it works. One study that 
interviewed 21 international students in Melbourne cafes and restaurants 
found all were in casual jobs, all were underpaid and some did work 
for which they weren’t paid at all.46 Ashleigh Mounser, a student at the 
University of Wollongong, starting with a university chat room, compiled 
a list of 60 underpaying employers near that university. Many paid 
either $10 or $15 per hour, well below the legal minimum.47 Newspaper 
41  Andrew Stewart and Rosemary Owen, Experience or Exploitation? The Nature, Prevalence and 
Regulation of Unpaid Work Experience, Internships and Trial Periods in Australia. Report for the Fair 
Work Ombudsman (Adelaide: University of Adelaide, 2013), 245.
42  See Chapters 1 and 4.
43  Stewart and Owen, Experience or Exploitation?, 245.
44  Others may find alternative redress. See the film 88 Days, made by a British backpacker in 
Australia who experienced this sort of treatment: www.88daysdocumentary.com/.
45  David Peetz, The Impact of the Penalty Rates Decision on Australian and Victorian Workers in Retail 
and Hospitality Industries (Melbourne: Department of Economic Development, Jobs Transport and 
Resources Commissioned Research Report, 2017).
46  Iain Campbell, Martina Boese, and Joo-Cheong Tham, ‘Inhospitable Workplaces? International 
Students and Paid Work in Food Services’. Australian Journal of Social Issues 51, no. 3 (2016): 279–98.
47  Anna Patty, ‘The Great Student Swindle’. Sydney Morning Herald, 9 December 2016.
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stories contain repeated variations on this theme: a special investigation 
of underpayments of Vietnamese students and migrants, with some staff 
paid as little as $6 per hour;48 an Indian family who were threatened with 
deportation after their ‘sponsor’ demanded $30,000 for the visa and 
insisted on free labour for over two years;49 or 90 Korean backpackers 
underpaid thousands for work on a farm.50 Underpayments became so 
common among restaurateurs that when one was caught the excuse was 
that underpayment is ‘normal’.51 Hence a tour operator told an online 
newsletter that unpaid work in exchange for accommodation, meals or 
experiences were not uncommon there, ‘not because businesses up here 
are greedy capitalist pigs but because it’s necessary to survive in this 
socialist Australian economy’.52 Some businesses treat ‘wage theft’ as 
legitimate business practice in the face of tight competition. In January 
2014, the chief executive of a major employer body was reported as saying 
that thousands of retailers and restaurants were paying workers in cash 
and reaching illegal private agreements about conditions, to avoid award 
minimums.53 It was an attempt to persuade policy-makers to cut those 
award minimums. But it was also an admission of illegal behaviour by 
thousands of his constituents.
Migrant workers—especially temporary migrant workers—lack power. 
Language limitations mean that many do not know their rights, are not 
confident to enforce them, or find there are very few places where they are 
wanted. They work in industries where workers are easily replaced, where 
unfair dismissal is hard to prove and with few meaningful remedies, and 
collective organisation is difficult. An agent or employer with the same 
48  Olivia Nguyen and Trinh Nguyen, ‘Exclusive: Exploitation of Vietnamese Students Rampant 
among Melbourne Businesses’. SBS Vietnamese (Special Broadcasting Service), 20 April 2017, 
melbourne today.net/exclusive-exploitation-of-vietnamese-students-rampant-among-melbourne-
businesses/.
49  Adele Ferguson, ‘Blackmail, Extortion and Slavery at a Restaurant near You’. Sydney Morning 
Herald, 25 March 2017.
50  Felicity Caldwell, ‘Korean Backpackers Underpaid Thousands of Dollars on Qld Farm’. Canberra 
Times, 11 September 2016.
51  David Marin-Guzman, ‘Popular Restaurant Chain Caught in Underpayments Scandal’. 
Workplace Insight (Thomson Reuters, 2016), 19 January.
52  Travel Today, ‘Qld Tour Operator Hits Back at “Enemies”’. Travel Weekly, 6 January 2015, www.
travel weekly.com.au/article/qld-tourism-operator-hits-back-at-enemies/.
53  John Lehman, ‘Businesses Forced to Pay Workers in Cash and Strike Black Market Labour Deals 
to Survive Workplace Laws’. Daily Telegraph, 22 January 2014.
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background (‘co-ethnicity’) may seem like their best opportunity, maybe 
the one person they can trust, someone who will make them an offer they 
cannot refuse. So a common theme in exploitation is co-ethnicity.54
Visa conditions give employers considerable power. In countries like 
Australia, international students can only work a certain number of hours 
per week, but with low wages this is often not enough. An employer can 
then threaten to disclose actual hours worked to immigration authorities. 
This not only affects migrant workers from non–English speaking 
backgrounds. It is not as if most of these temporary migrants do not know 
their rights. One online survey of temporary migrants showed a majority 
knew they were receiving less than the minimum wage.55 More important 
was the power imbalance. 
Franchisees of 7-Eleven—an Australian franchise that was the focus 
of some major media investigations—commonly hired international 
students, because of these visa restrictions. At times, they worked twice 
the allowed hours, and received half the award pay. The business model of 
the head firm made it almost inevitable that franchisees had to underpay 
staff, or they would go bust.56 This is the logic of franchising in ‘not there’ 
employment. Similarly, oil company Caltex,57 also the subject of a major 
investigation for underpayment of workers, was able to put the blame 
back onto franchisees: it set up a $20 million compensation scheme for 
workers, but four months later no worker had been paid out while 116 
stores had been thrown out of the franchise. Allan Fels, formerly in charge 
of 7-Eleven’s compensation scheme until that company found a better way 
to accommodate its corporate objectives, described Caltex’s compensation 
fund as a ‘public relations stunt’.58 
54  Workplace Express, ‘Ombudsman Cautions against Exploitation of Overseas Workers by Their 
Own’. Workplace Express, 7 February 2017; Selvaraj Velayutham, ‘Precarious Experiences of Indians in 
Australia on 457 Temporary Work Visas’. Economic and Labour Relations Review 24, no. 3 (2013): 340–
61; YaoTai Li, ‘Constituting Coethnic Exploitation: The Economic and Cultural Meanings of Cash in 
Hand Jobs for Ethnic Chinese Migrants in Australia’. Critical Sociology 43 no. 6 (2017): 919–32.
55  Laurie Berg and Bassina Farbenblum, Wage Theft in Australia: Findings of the National Temporary 
Migrant Work Survey (Sydney: Migrant Worker Justice Initiative, 2017).
56  Adele Ferguson and Klaus Toft, ‘7-Eleven: The Price of Convenience’. Four Corners, ABC, 
30 September 2015, www.abc.net.au/4corners/7-eleven-promo/6729716.
57  Until 2015, Chevron was a 50 per cent shareholder in Caltex.
58  Mario Christodoulou, ‘Caltex Announces $20m Compensation Fund but Admits No Liability 
for Underpaid Workers’. Sydney Morning Herald, 1 May 2017; Adele Ferguson, ‘Caltex Cleans up in 
Worker Compo “Hoax”’. Newcastle Herald, 16 September 2017.
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And yet, for all the cases brought against employers, it remains a viable 
option for employers to underpay workers as part of their business 
model. It is rare for a prosecution to occur, when weighed against the 
number of underpayment cases that come to the inspectorate’s attention. 
If an employer gets caught, but then provides back-pay, they normally 
escape prosecution; or they might be asked to commit to an ‘enforceable 
undertaking’ to back-pay staff. Some firms doing that have been 
simultaneously underpaying other workers.
The responses of policy-makers vary between jurisdictions, influenced by 
the choices and strategies of policy-makers and also the extensiveness of 
the legal safety net. Some issues apply across a number of jurisdictions, 
including the limited level of resources available to labour inspectorates in 
the context of public sector cutbacks, a tendency for inspectorates to focus 
on educating and cooperating with employers rather than prosecuting 
lawbreakers, except for the most recalcitrant, and the reluctance of policy-
makers to change the provisions in temporary migration schemes to 
minimise the incentive to give or accept underpayment. Some other issues 
are more specific to jurisdictions. For example, in Australia some states 
have introduced legislation to license labour-hire operators, excluding 
from licenses those who have a record of underpaying employees. Federal 
‘vulnerable workers’ legislation introduced in 2017 imposes some liability 
on franchisors for the behaviour of their franchisees, but there are 
loopholes if the franchisor did not ‘know’ that breaches were occurring.
A major problem in Australia is conflicting interests: the main labour 
inspectorate (the Fair Work Ombudsman) is also responsible for regulating 
unions and enforcing their compliance with industrial procedures. 
Its record of kid-glove treatment of corporate offenders is such that it 
would likely be better to abolish it and start again with a new, focused 
and untainted labour inspectorate. The problems of labour inspection are 
not unique to Australia. They cause concern in many countries. Many 
years ago, when I was doing a report on minimum wages in a developing 
country, the local labour inspectorate cheerfully took me to talk with an 
employer that they said was paying below the minimum wage. In some 
places, labour laws are seen as targets, not requirements. In many, labour 
inspectors develop a cosy relationship with the people they have to deal 
with, the employers, and whom they do not want to send out of business. 
If regulators took the same approach to product safety or chemicals there 
would be more employers in business and fewer live workers. A reason 
unions in Australia campaign with the rhetoric of ‘wage theft’ is to confront 
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this idea that financial crimes against workers are not really crimes, not 
in the same league as financial crimes against others—or financial crimes 
by workers. It is why that hospitality employer body was happy to report 
that thousands of retailers and restaurants were acting illegally:59 it was 
defining and defending the legitimate, if not necessarily legal, interests 
of capital.
Unions in many countries, including Australia, usually cannot take action 
against underpayment because the workers affected are not members. 
They also have less power in contemporary times, due to changes in 
labour and product markets, legislation and declining membership. 
Under earlier legislative regimes, unions could inspect workplace records 
to seek out underpayments, but that is no longer permitted in Australia. 
Another approach taken by unions has been to try to put pressure on the 
value chain (supply chain). In the textiles, clothing and footwear (TCF) 
industries, over two decades unions sought to persuade governments to 
treat outworkers (technically independent contractors) as employees. 
They achieved some success in this, with New South Wales the first to pass 
laws that in effect deemed TCF outworkers as employees.60 In building 
cleaning, Australian unions sought to achieve supply-chain regulation by 
the state and by lead companies (initially building owners), most recently 
through the Cleaning Accounting Framework.61 This built on David 
Weil’s concept of ‘strategic enforcement’ in the face of limited resources 
and the fissuring of employment.62 That same idea is evident in attempts 
by unions to achieve regulation of international supply chains, discussed 
in the next section.
59  Lehman, ‘Businesses Forced’.
60  Igor Nossar et al., ‘Protective Legal Regulation for Home-Based Workers in Australian Textile, 
Clothing and Footwear Supply Chains’. Journal of Industrial Relations 57, no. 4 (2015): 585–603; 
Igor Nossar, Richard Johnstone, and Michael Quinlan, ‘Regulating Supply Chains to Address the 
Occupational Health and Safety Problems Associated with Precarious Employment: The Case of 
Home-Based Clothing Workers in Australia’. Australian Journal of Labour Law 17 (2004): 137–64.
61  Sarah Kaine, Emmanuel Josserand, and Martijn Boersma, ‘How to Stop Businesses Stealing 
from Their Employees’. The Conversation, 8 September 2017.
62  David Weil, ‘Creating a Strategic Enforcement Approach to Address Wage Theft: One Academic’s 
Journey in Organizational Change’. Journal of Industrial Relations 60, no. 3 (2018): 437–60.
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Codes of conduct and beyond
As we saw in earlier chapters, the growth of international trade has 
enabled corporations to externalised damage to the community while 
internalising profits.63 In recent decades the externalising of harm 
has attracted substantial criticism and has led to the emergence of the 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) movement. The CSR movement 
pressures corporations to reject the pure form of the shareholder primacy 
model of corporate governance in favour of an approach that factors 
in the community’s interests as well as profits. CSR pressure demands 
that transnational corporations (TNCs) ensure labour standards are 
upheld in their supply chains. Supply chains include procurement of raw 
materials, manufacturing, distribution, marketing and sales. Under this 
business model, use of separate, often unrelated legal entities reduces legal 
obligations and costs.64 Sitting at the top of the supply chain are often 
retailers or large brand names. Suppliers—unrelated corporate entities—
often in turn further outsource eventually to factories where workers are 
employed.65 The cost savings and distancing benefits to lead corporations 
are substantial but they also affect the conditions of employment of 
workers, and resistance to this puts pressure on head corporations to 
demonstrate some CSR.
As part of the emergence of CSR, discussed in Chapter 9, recent years 
have seen the substantial growth in codes of conduct for corporations. 
These typically apply to large TNCs and encompass their supply chains, 
as many points on the supply chain are subcontracted rather than owned 
by TNCs, a common form of ‘not there’ employment. They usually relate 
63  Joel Bakan, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (London: Constable 
& Robertson, 2004).
64  Paul Harpur, ‘Labour Rights as Human Rights: Workers’ Safety at Work in Australian-Based 
Supply Chains’ (Queensland University of Technology, 2009), citing Lisa M. Fairfax, ‘The Impact of 
Stakeholder Rhetoric on Corporate Norms’. University of Iowa Journal of Corporation Law 31 (2006): 
675–8; Jedrzej Frynas, Scott Pegg, and J. George Frynas, eds, Transnational Corporations and Human 
Rights (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 53–78; Benita Beamon, ‘Measuring Supply Chain 
Performance’. International Journal of Operations and Production Management 19 (1999): 275–92; 
Richard Johnstone and Therese Wilson, ‘Take Me to Your Employer: The Organizational Reach of 
Occupational Health and Safety Regulation’. Australian Journal of Labour Law 19 (2006): 3–26; Paul 
Harpur, ‘Clothing Manufacturing Supply Chains, Contractual Layers and Hold Harmless Clauses: 
How OHS Duties Can Be Imposed over Retailers’. Australian Journal of Labor Law 21, no. 3 (2008): 
316–39.
65  Nossar, Johnstone, and Quinlan, ‘Regulating Supply Chains’; Paul Harpur, ‘Regulating Multi-
National Corporations through State-Based Laws: Problems with Enforcing Human Rights under the 
Alien Tort Statute’. Australian International Law Journal 13 (2006): 233–46.
The ReALITIeS AnD FuTuReS oF WoRk
300
to employment matters—though they can also cover environmental or 
other social issues. The codes may require that employees have certain 
rights (e.g. to organise) or require certain safety standards be enforced. 
While in practice corporations are being pressured through the CSR 
movement to uphold human rights and general values, corporations 
are not legally bound to adhere to such standards.66 Corporations are 
pressured to be seen to uphold such values arguably due to a threat to 
their corporate image and profits.67 
Corporations may respond to CSR pressure by targeting those areas that 
give them the most kudos for the least cost. Walmart, for example, focuses 
on building up its reputation on environmental CSR and downplaying 
the significance of labour standards. Its drive for environmentally friendly 
practices extends to Walmart seeking to purchase its products from 
suppliers who are environmentally friendly. Walmart claims it ‘helped’ 
one of its suppliers adopt more environmentally friendly manufacturing 
practices.68 Walmart links this focus on environmental concerns back to 
its drive for profits, claiming that caring for the environment makes ‘good 
business sense’.69 In relation to labour practices, Walmart has a far poorer 
record. It shows little sign of ensuring labour conditions in its supplier 
factories are protected70 and actively suppresses its own employees’ labour 
rights. Managers were told, ‘you are our first line of defense against 
unionization’71 and provided with a Manager’s Toolbox to Remaining Union 
Free. There was a union-busting team of staff to fly into any Walmart 
outlet which attempted to unionise.72 It appears Walmart was attempting 
to minimise the negative media attention of their violations of employees’ 
labour rights through promoting their high ethical standards in relation 
to the environment and focusing upon their low consumer prices. This 
might succeed, as some researchers claimed customers only altered their 
66  Harpur, ‘Regulating Multi-Nationals’.
67  Michael K. Addo, ‘Symposium: Human Rights Perspectives of Corporate Groups’. Connecticut 
Law Review 37 (2005): 667–89.
68  Wal-Mart, ‘Home Page’ (2008), Wal-Martstores.com/GlobalWMStoresWeb/navigate.do? catg 
=217 (site discontinued).
69  Ibid.
70  Charles Kernaghan et al., Making Barbie, Thomas & Friends, and Other Toys for Wal-Mart: 
The Xin Yi Factory in China (National Labor Committee (USA), 2007).
71  Wal-Mart Stores Inc., ‘A Manager’s Toolbox to Remaining Union Free’ (unpublished company 
document, 1997).
72  Benedict Sheehy, ‘Corporations and Social Costs: The Wal-Mart Case Study’. University of 
Pittsburgh Journal of Law and Commerce 24 (2004): 1–39.
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purchasing practices if they felt unethical conduct may impact upon 
them.73 The abuse of workers may not affect many customers, while 
environmental degradation affects the survival of the planet. This means 
customers may react negatively to environmental abuse, but may have 
a lesser reaction to labour abuses. 
True, corporations have recognised that adverse publicity could hurt their 
profits.74 In response to the media attention, some corporations have 
made a public show of improving working conditions in their supplier 
factories.75 As the main motivator of corporations is negative publicity, 
most corporations engage in socially responsible conduct primarily as 
a marketing strategy.76 
So a common criticism of codes of conduct is that they are often more 
show than substance, providing a public relations front for a company but 
without bringing about genuine change.77 In response, pressure may be 
applied to TNCs to sign agreements to make their codes enforceable and 
in particular to expose them to independent audit (e.g. a factory visit by 
an agreed team of inspectors who are independent of the company, rather 
than appointed by it). These agreements typically are made where the net 
costs of signing up are less than the net costs to the firm of not signing 
up. This occurs when workers in the home (usually developed) country of 
the TNC have sufficient bargaining power and motivation to do this; or 
where the brand name of the company is sufficiently well known that it is 
susceptible to brand damage from campaigns waged against it. 
73  Jeffrey Mercer, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Its Importance to Consumers’ 
(The Claremont Graduate University, 2003).
74  Adrian Barnes, ‘Do They Have to Buy from Burma? A Pre-Emption Analysis of Local Anti-
Sweatshop Procurement Laws’. Columbia Law Review 107 (2007): 426–56.
75  Ibid.; Wang Chuanli and Dong Gang, ‘Social Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations’. 
Frontiers of Law in China 2, no. 3 (2007): 378–402.
76  Peter Jones, Daphne Comfort, and David Hillier, ‘What’s in Store? Retail Marketing and 
Corporate Social Responsibility’. Marketing Intelligence & Planning 25, no. 1 (2007): 17–30; Jack 
Yan, ‘Corporate Responsibility and the Brands of Tomorrow’. Brand Management 10, no. 4–5 (2003): 
290–302.
77  Naomi Klein, No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies (New York: Picador, 2000); Duncan 
Pruett, Looking for a Quick Fix: How Weak Social Auditing Is Keeping Workers in Sweatshops 
(Amsterdam: Clean Clothes Campaign, 2005). 
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Unions in many industries thus establish global union federations and 
seek to negotiate ‘international framework agreements’ with TNCs.78 
Some activist campaigns are directed at large, developed-nation brand-
name retailers who stock products made in Third World countries.
Action along these lines began to emerge in response to the Rana Plaza 
collapse in Bangladesh, through demands on retailers and label owners to 
sign a five-year commitment to conduct independent safety inspections of 
factories and pay up to $500,000 per year toward safety improvements.79 
The local and international unions were able to use the publicity arising 
from the building collapse to pressure the brand corporations. Many had 
initially denied any involvement with the factory, but activists were able 
to provide proof—labels and invoices—gathered from the rubble.
Eventually two competing models emerged there. The first was the 
Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, signed by 10 union 
federations and 163 garment manufacturing and retail corporations 
from 20 countries. It provided for independent inspections of factories, 
obligations to pay for safety repairs and renovations, and protections 
for the right to refuse dangerous work or to enter dangerous buildings. 
Importantly, there was legal enforceability of these rights in the home 
country of the brand corporation (i.e. if the brand corporation did not 
force its suppliers to take the above action, it in turn could be sued in its 
home country). The International Labour Organization (ILO) provided 
the independent chair of the governing body.80
The second model, in response to concerns by corporations like Walmart 
and Gap that they did not want to face the higher costs the Accord 
might imply, was the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, signed 
by 26 corporations (mostly from North America) but no unions, with 
corporate-controlled factory inspections, no guarantees of safety repairs 
or renovations, no guaranteed rights to refuse dangerous work or to enter 
78  For example, Ruth Barton and Peter Fairbrother, ‘The Local Is Now Global: Building a Union 
Coalition in the International Transport and Logistics Sector’. Relations Industrielles 64, no. 4 (2009): 
685–703; Elizabeth Cotton and Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick, ‘Global Unions as Imperfect 
Multilateral Organizations: An International Relations Perspective’. Economic and Industrial 
Democracy 33, no. 4 (2012): 707–28.
79  Huff Post Business, ‘Bangladesh Factory Safety Accord: At Least 14 Major North American 
Retailers Decline to Sign’. Huffington Post, 17 May 2013, www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/17/
bangladesh-factory-safety-accord_n_3286430.html.
80  bangladeshaccord.org/; Clean Clothes Campaign, ‘Comparison: The Accord on Fire and 
Building Safety in Bangladesh and the Gap/Walmart Scheme’. 4 July 2013, www.cleanclothes.org/
resources/background/.
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dangerous buildings, and no legal enforceability (other than the payment 
by manufacturers of fees to the Alliance.81 The Alliance is therefore seen 
by labour activists as an attempt by corporations to give the appearance 
of action (its website claims it is the ‘driving force for creating a safer 
garment industry for all factory workers’) in a highly emotive area without 
actually doing anything.
The difference between the two approaches is critical. The Accord had 
around 50 staff, including engineers who undertook safety audits. 
Under the Accord, some 1,104 factory inspections were undertaken 
up to September 2014, finding a total of 80,000 safety breaches. Only 
two factories were closed, but all factories had at least one major safety 
problem. These had to be remedied. For example, if a worker activist 
showed an inspector around a factory and was sacked the next day for 
doing so, under the Accord he or she had to be reinstated or the brand 
corporation must sever its ties with that factory. Under the Alliance, by 
contrast, the factory owner would get a letter.82 I imagine it would go into 
the round file.83 
Many relevant Australian corporate groups are covered by the Accord 
(Cotton On Group, Forever New, Kmart, Pacific Brands, Pretty Girl 
Fashion Group, Speciality Fashions, Australia’s Target and Woolworths), 
as are many international brands (including Esprit, H&M, Zara, C&A, 
Adidas, Loblaw, Tesco, Benetton and Mango). However, the Just Group 
(chaired by Solomon Lew, with CEO Mark McInnes, a controversial 
hire from David Jones,84 and which owns the brands Just Jeans, Jay Jays, 
Jacqui E, Portmans, Dotti, Peter Alexander and Smiggle) joined Walmart 
and Gap’s Alliance (along with companies like Macy’s, US Target, The 
Warehouse, Costco, Canadian Tire and a number of North American 
employer associations).
81  Ibid.; www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/en.
82  Juliane Reinecke and Jimmy Donaghey, ‘After Rana Plaza: Building Coalitional Power for Labour 
Rights between Unions and (Consumption-Based) Social Movement Organisations’. Organization 
22, no. 5 (2015): 720–40.
83  The bin.
84  John Durie, ‘David Jones CEO Mark McInnes Resigns after Sexual Harassment Complaint’. 
The Australian, 18 June 2010; Stephen Mayne, ‘McInnes is back, but is Lew’s blokey board ready for 
backlash?’, Crikey, 25 March 2011, www.crikey.com.au/2011/03/25/mcinnes-is-back-but-is-lew%e 
2% 80%99s-blokey-board-ready-for-the-backlash/.
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Bangladeshi labour activists said, in effect, ‘don’t stop buying garments 
made in Bangladesh, but put pressure on the labels’ to guarantee safety 
and working conditions. The extent to which this is successful depends on 
which of these two ‘models’ succeeds. The difficulty for consumers who 
have not read this book, and hence for this form of action, is knowing 
which code of conduct has substance and which is a facade.
The Accord and its successor led to restructuring of the Bangladeshi 
garment industry, with a number of city-based small manufacturers 
closing as production for the West is increasingly concentrated in larger 
factories on urban fringes. Ties with over 500 factories were terminated 
for non-compliance.85 Still, much of the industry was not affected, as 
significant exports also went to China, which did not engage in such 
processes. That said, it is a model that might find salience in other 
countries (e.g. corporations that are willing to abide by good practice find 
it less costly to go through the Accord inspection processes than to have 
multiple audit teams from different organisations inspecting at different 
times, even if the former have legal enforceability). 
What happens after the initial five-year Accord expired in 2018 will be 
important but is, at time of writing, uncertain. Bodies like Human Rights 
Watch and other activists and unions wanted the Accord to stay in place; 
the government and especially local employers wanted it terminated or at 
least replaced by something with less independence. There was support 
from overseas to maintain the Accord. The matter was to be heard by the 
Bangladesh Supreme Court in mid-2019,86 with much concern focused 
on the need to build local institutions to enable effective labour regulation 
in light of what some saw as the ‘“shocking unreadiness” by Bangladeshi 
regulators to oversee the ready-made garment industry’.87 There was 
no such problem for Walmart and Gap’s Alliance. The public relations 
crisis having passed, as always planned, the Alliance ceased to exist in 
December 2018.88 
85  BDApparel News Desk, ‘Bangladesh’s Factories Must Never Become Death Traps Again: HRW’. 
BDApparel News, 5 February 2019, www.bdapparelnews.com/Bangladeshs-factories-must-never-
become-death-traps-again-HRW/270.
86  Ibid.
87  UNI global union, ‘Six Years after Rana Plaza: Remembering What was Lost and Protecting the 
Progress That Has Been Made’. News, 24 April 2019, www.uniglobalunion.org/news/six-years-after-
rana-plaza-remembering-what-was-lost-and-protecting-progress-has-been-made.
88  ‘The Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety has ceased operations as planned on December 31, 
2018. All email directed to the Alliance will not be received.’ www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/.
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Alternative grievance mechanisms
A different approach that has been taken to international regulation of 
TNCs is the grievance mechanisms established through the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) guidelines on 
TNCs. These enable interested parties (including individual unions or 
global union federations) to raise complaints with ‘national contact points’ 
(usually a bureaucrat in a government department) in home countries of 
the TNCs. These differ from codes of conduct in an important respect: 
rather than the question of engagement being up to the company, they 
are up to the national government of the country in which the company 
is domiciled, and a company can be dragged into the process even where 
it does not wish to be, if the government is determined to participate.89 
Not all countries participate with equal enthusiasm, and in the USA, 
for example, it appears that if a TNC does not wish to participate then 
the home government does not push it. Analysis by Ford and Gillan 
suggests that roughly three-fifths of complaints get accepted as being able 
to be heard, and of those about half produce positive outcomes for the 
complainant.90 While the process has many problems, its existence shows 
that there are multiple avenues available for those seeking to regulate the 
labour activities of transnational capital.
Conclusions
The state still has a key role to play in creating and enforcing the rights 
associated with workplace citizenship, the rights applying under codes of 
conduct, and the management of social and systemic sustainability via 
such issues as the redistribution of income, wealth and power, the pricing 
of externalities such as carbon and the way in which financial regulation 
affects the focus on short- and long-term rates of return.
Yet regulation is increasingly difficult as the effects of globalisation spread 
and render nation-states less powerful, and as neo-liberalism renders 
the state less willing to intervene anyway. Developments in technology 
provide additional challenges.
89  Michelle Ford and Michael Gillan, ‘The OECD Guidelines as a Supranational Mechanism of 
Labor Conflict Resolution’. Paper presented at Conflict and its Resolution in the Changing World 
of Work: A Conference and Special Issue Honoring David B. Lipsky (DigitalCommons@ILR, 2017).
90  Ibid.
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This chapter shows three ways in which parties have responded, and can 
respond, to changes in the economic environment and labour market that 
provide regulatory challenges.
On the first issue (the definition of workers), it appears that changes in the 
labour market, including those driven by new technology and the growing 
emphasis on ‘not there’ employment, have run ahead of both statutory 
law and judge-made law. The judiciary tries to respond but appears at 
times to be waiting for legislators to catch up. There are opportunities 
for legislators to do that, by expanding the reach of employment law and 
(perhaps in different ways) of particular aspects of labour law (such  as 
in workers’ compensation). This includes revisiting the definition of 
a ‘worker’ or at least the possibility of some minimum standards applying 
to all employees, and thinking innovatively about how such aims might 
be achieved. A good approach seems to be to establish general minimums 
at law, while leaving it to specialised bodies to determine the detail in 
areas where employment status is not demonstrable. 
On the second issue (noncompliance), inspectorate compliance action 
appears increasingly inadequate, and hampered in Australia and elsewhere 
by inadequate resources and/or conflicting responsibilities for the 
inspectorate. Unions, largely now locked out of active labour inspection 
in Australia, have sought to achieve supply-chain regulation through 
pressuring the state and corporations.
On the third issue (international value chains), states are reluctant to act 
for fear of losing investment, but unions use leverage where they can to 
force accountable regulation across the value chain, under the auspices 
of the lead company that heads the value chain. In this context, we need 
to take account of the role of regulation in bringing about sustainable 
and ethical behaviour. There are genuine doubts about the efficacy of 
‘internal’ regulation by corporations, due to the nature of the logic of 
the corporation (typically profit-maximisation). Some campaigns (such 
as those promoting codes of conduct) seek to affect or shape internal 
regulation and even the internal logic of corporations. Some researchers 
see this as a new form of regulation that may supplant state regulation in 
an era where the state is in retreat. But there is considerable evidence that 
it matters a great deal whether any internal codes of conduct are ultimately 
enforceable. If they remain within the control of the corporation, with no 
external enforceability under law, then there is genuine doubt as to their 
longevity—their sustainability. An example is the differences between 
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the ‘Accord’ and the now defunct ‘Alliance’ on Bangladesh worker safety, 
the former imposing legal rights and obligations and being the subject of 
continuing contestation between capital, labour and the state, while the 
latter was a classic example of something ephemeral established as public 
relations crisis management. To the extent that it succeeds in undermining 
the imposition of legal rights and obligations, public relations crisis 
management threatens workers’ lives.
All of these are about different, but related, aspects of labour regulation. 
Labour regulators are finding it increasingly difficult to respond to the 
critical issues in today’s labour markets. But as discussed in early chapters, 
labour regulation is not the only aspect of regulation that affects labour. 
There are broader questions about other types of regulation, of society and 
the economy that are also highly relevant to labour. And there are major 
issues about how the regulatory environment responds to climate change 
and what this means for the future of work. We looked at some of that 
in Chapter 9, and we turn to broader issues of responding to the world 




In conclusion—on realities and 
futures outside the workplace
This book began with two Sliding Doors scenarios for the future—one 
not quite utopian, one not quite dystopian.1 Through the rest of this 
book, we have seen what the realities of work presently look like, and how 
the choices that we make will determine which futures of work we end 
up with.
The present realities and choices
The present realities of work can be summarised like this: shaped by 
over three decades of financialisation and the broadly neo-liberal policy 
frameworks that have accompanied, facilitated and been encouraged by 
financialisation, employers and workers have been increasingly operating 
in an environment that is driven more by financial considerations and less 
by the personal preferences, benevolent or otherwise, of wealthy families 
or individual industrialists.2 It is the logic of money, not the emotions 
of moguls, that have increasingly determined what happens. (Moguls 
are not dead—witness News Corporation’s Rupert Murdoch3—but, as 
sole owners of large corporations, they are less common these days.)4 
1  See Chapter 1 of this book.
2  Chapter 2.
3  Jane Mayer, ‘The Making of the Fox News White House’. New Yorker, 11 March 2019, www.new 
yorker.com/magazine/2019/03/11/the-making-of-the-fox-news-white-house.
4  G. Murray and D. Peetz, ‘The Financialisation of Global Corporate Ownership’. In Financial 
Elites and Transnational Business: Who Rules the World?, ed. G. Murray and J. Scott (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2012).
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The phenomenon of globalisation has also accompanied these changes, 
and it makes a difference, but it is often given attribution for things that 
are not of its doing. Blame those South Americans or Asians for taking 
your jobs? No, it’s really the beancounters who did it—if you can blame 
any individuals at all. One of the great things about the developments 
of the last three decades, at least from the point of view of those who 
benefit, is that so much of what happens can be said to be inevitable. 
‘Sorry you lost your job, but that’s economics.’ Or that’s the market. 
Or that’s globalisation. Or that’s just the way it is. More flexibility and 
more uncertainty are inevitable, we are told.5 This depersonalisation of 
accountability takes power away from individual workers and it makes 
them feel that even organising collectively no longer gives them the power 
they used to have. Over three decades of financialisation and neo-liberalism 
have seen union density decline in most countries, sometimes quite 
dramatically, even though attitudes are quite stable, and people still want 
unions, on average, as much as they used to.6 
So with developments in the economy and society seemingly taking an 
inevitable turn, we also look to the effects of technology with a sense of 
inevitability. Artificial intelligence is coming, cloud computing is coming, 
3D printing and big data and new biotechnologies are coming, and they 
will have ‘these’ effects (whatever ‘these’ are) and nothing can be done 
about it, as it is all inevitable.7
Agency and variability
Yet despite the greater influence of ‘the market’, individuals still have 
agency, and quite a lot of it. Managers who run companies or units within 
companies do so with a wide range of styles and strategies.8 They do this 
partly because no one has really worked out what the magic formula 
is (though many people make a lot of money telling you what that 
formula is), partly because they find themselves in different industries or 
circumstances that promote particular styles, and partly because managers 
really are individuals with individual differences and psychological urges 
that vary in their intensity. Some want their employees to prosper, some 
want to be able to exercise control, or at least to demonstrate control. 
5  Chapter 6.
6  Chapters 2 and 7.
7  Chapter 4.
8  Chapter 5.
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Some like rules and procedures, some don’t. Some have their favourites 
and dislikes, some act without fear or favour. Some believe their workers 
have rights to organise or act collectively or to act on their own beliefs, 
some don’t and seek to exercise cultural control over their workforce. 
Some read widely, some don’t. Some are influenced by the ideas of their 
peers in other firms or other units or employer organisations, some are 
not. Most want to advance in the organisation (otherwise, why would 
they become managers?) and so they will adopt the ideals of profit 
maximisation and seek to curry favour with their superiors or the 
shareholders’ representatives, but they still have quite diverse views, and 
operationalise them in diverse ways, on how to maximise that profit and 
gain support from their superiors. 
Even finance capitalists vary in their preferences and behaviour. Some look 
to the short term, some to the long term. Some genuinely are concerned 
for the planet, some couldn’t care less. They vary hugely in their tolerance 
or welcoming of risk. Always, their behaviour is constrained by what looks 
to them like a good or a bad investment, so they all believe in market 
solutions ahead of collective action, but they may behave quite differently 
in similar situations because of those individual differences.9
Likewise, workers as well as officials in worker organisations have agency 
and differ greatly in their choices, preferences and actions. Therefore 
workers and worker organisations vary substantially across space and time 
in how they respond to particular situations.10
So it may be fair to say that, one day, someone somewhere will invent X, 
where X is some new technology that has certain capabilities. But predicting 
what will happen after X is invented is another matter altogether, because 
it depends on who owns X; the actions of managers, capitalists, financiers, 
workers, worker organisations and governments after X is invented; and 
the structures that have been put in place up until the time when X was 
invented. All those predictions from the 1970s that new technology would 
reduce working hours and create a leisure society were off-beam because 
they failed to take accurate account of the social and economic context in 
which technological change was occurring.11
9  Chapter 9.
10  Chapter 7.
11  Chapter 3.
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Current directions
What, then, does the immediate future hold? At present, under the 
influence of financialisation and neo-liberal policy frameworks, industrial 
capital is reorganising as core firms seek to minimise costs, risks and, 
importantly, accountability, by outsourcing, spinning off subsidiaries, 
setting up franchises, or using contracting firms, labour hire or contract 
workers themselves—in other words, ‘not there’ employment.12 Again, 
a great advantage is that accountability is depersonalised: you no longer 
lose your conditions, or your job, or your hand, because of some action or 
inaction by a well-known global firm. You lose them because ‘that’s what 
we have to do in order to survive in the modern marketplace’. It boils 
down to simple economics. Large firms take up, on average, a growing 
share of activity in product markets, but with less responsibility.
Yet this process of fragmentation, precaritisation and risk-shifting has 
limits, and frequently reaches them, because in order to maintain control 
over their products firms need to maintain control over labour. Managers 
seek ways to exercise control of labour, sometimes helped by developments 
in technology. In the end, though, the employment relationship is critical 
to maintaining managerial control over labour. Without the employment 
relationship, capital cannot seek to exercise cultural control over workers. 
Even when large firms use outsourcing, spinoffs, labour hire or franchises 
to avoid accountability, in the end the workers in those firms are usually 
hired as employees, because that’s the only way even peripheral capital can 
maintain the necessary control over labour. The causes of the limits to the 
spread of market relations into every sphere of life are two-fold: resistance 
by workers, civil society and the state—what Polanyi called the ‘double 
movement’ involving marketisation and push-back13—and the internal 
logic of capital itself.
The latest developments in work-related technology, in the form of online 
or mobile ‘gig’ platforms, provide an opportunity to get around this lacuna 
by creating a new form of control: control via the rating and tracking 
systems of the ‘app’ rather than control via a human supervisor. But even 
this has its limits, as this form of control is not a perfect substitute for 
human supervision, and even if it was it runs up against resistance arising 
12  Chapter 6.
13  K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1944).
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from that contradiction: between having very low labour costs and having 
a product with the quality that the market will accept. Hence many 
platform firms fail to make a profit, and some go bust.
That conflict between lowering labour costs and maintaining product 
quality and workforce stability is not unique to the platform economy, 
of course. Throughout the economy, workers resist reductions in pay and 
conditions and, where conditions facilitate it, often act collectively to 
improve them. Institutional changes driven by financialisation and neo-
liberal frameworks have reduced opportunities for collective mobilisation 
and hence reduced union density, though the actions of individual unions 
also influence the extent of decline or revival of unionism.
The past and future development of the system is based on, and creates, 
great inequalities. The most obvious inequalities are of class, as our mode 
of production is based on class divisions, but there are other important 
inequalities as well. Prominent among them are gender inequalities.14 
While these have origins in the gendered household division of labour, 
the evolution of the economic system has reinforced some and created 
new ones, with gaps in pay between men and women doing similar jobs 
or between male-dominated and female-dominated occupations that 
otherwise generate similar economic value. Various devices (including 
‘merit’-based selection and sex-based harassment) are used to exclude 
women from positions of power. In recent decades some factors have 
reduced gender gaps—particularly more progressive values that in turn 
are reflected in less regulatory tolerance of unequal treatment—but other 
factors have worked in the opposite direction: reduced external regulation, 
through neo-liberalism, and changing norms about what sort of behaviour 
is acceptable. ‘Race’ and ethnicity have been used to segregate vulnerable 
people into the lowest-paid jobs in an economy and to often render them 
liable to exploitation through payment of low wages or provision of 
conditions below regulated minimums. 
If we cannot predict with accuracy what changes will flow from 
developments in technology, we can predict, with some uncertainty as 
to the details, what will happen if nothing changes—most obviously, 
with the state of the planet. Absent changes in direction, global warming 
will bring about catastrophic changes to the environment.15 Anticipating 
14  Chapter 8.
15  Chapter 9.
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this, research and development focuses on ameliorative technologies 
with the effect of changing the relative prices and returns on particular 
investments—for example, new coal-fuelled energy is no longer economic 
compared to renewable energy. Some types of work will become more 
difficult, some redundant, some newly attractive. It is unlikely, however, 
that these changes will be sufficient to prevent catastrophic change unless 
and until the costs of externalities are effectively priced into production 
decisions, and other state interventions are likely to be essential.
Potential futures
It would seem there are several potential futures that we could face.
Neo-democracy
One potential future is a more egalitarian one: a new ‘social democratic’ 
or ‘democratic socialist’ future, characterised by a resurgence of labour, 
reduced inequality and more extensive and new forms of regulation 
offsetting the failures of neo-liberal approaches. Those new forms of 
regulation might include some of the more recent, innovative approaches 
referred to in Chapter 10. Resistance happens, and choices are made. 
We have already seen how employees want voice at work and they want 
power to exercise some control over their working lives. Employees learn 
to cope with or resist insecurity in their jobs and in their pay through 
unorganised or organised means. Unions have sought to reorganise 
themselves, devoting more resources to the workplace and sometimes 
to the formal and informal training of delegates, and greater internal 
democracy, with varying degrees of enthusiasm and success.16
We may see new ways of doing things and of thinking about things: a new 
vision and new approaches to policy. Unions, other social movements 
representing women, the underprivileged, community groups and the 
environment, and intellectuals could be drawn together into a major 
conversation aimed at developing, articulating and implementing a new 
vision. In Australia, for example, the almost forgotten Accord between 
unions and the government of the 1980s was many things, some of which 
are now irrelevant, but most importantly it was an alternative vision of 
16  David Peetz and Janis Bailey, ‘Dancing Alone: The Australian Union Movement over Three 
Decades’. Journal of Industrial Relations 54, no. 4 (2012): 524–41.
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the economy, a challenge to the liberal market orthodoxy of government 
departments of the day. These days, the prominence given to Thomas 
Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Century17 is not so much a reflection of a great 
new revelation as it is a reflection of the way the book ‘suits the mood 
of the times’.18 
Exactly what that more egalitarian, neo-democratic world would look like 
is hard to say, but later in this chapter I provide some ideas. From the 
historical examples we have seen so far it would be more like Norway 
than New Zealand, more like Scandinavia than the Soviet Union. That is, 
in order to be sustainable it would have both a high level of democracy 
and a high level of state involvement in the economy, avoiding both the 
discredited market extremism of 1980s New Zealand and the discredited 
totalitarian centralism of the former Eastern Bloc countries. 
Neo-neoliberalism
A second future may appear to be an even more market-based system than 
exists at present, characterised by further state retreats from markets and 
greater embeddedness of market ideals into each aspect of human activity, 
as ostensibly advocated by many political parties, lobbyists and think-
tanks—a new (‘neo’) neo-liberalism. The hegemony of neo-liberalism 
seems incompatible with survival of the planet in its present form. 
However, there is no doubt that neo-liberalism has been resilient in the 
face of challenges. When the global financial crisis pushed millions out 
of work globally, the rationale for market liberal policies was demolished. 
The opaqueness of complex multilayered financial instruments, and the 
perverse incentives created by reward systems in the finance sector, both 
results of financialisation, directly created the crisis. Governments and 
central banks in Europe, the USA and Australia were forced to rescue 
financial institutions from their own folly. As economist John Quiggin 
pointed out, the credibility of the economic theories underpinning these 
policies was destroyed.19
17  Robert H. Wade, ‘The Piketty Phenomenon and the Future of Inequality’. Real-World Economics 
Review 69 (2014): 2–17.
18  John Quiggin, ‘How Thomas Piketty Found a Mass Audience, and What It Means for Public 
Policy’. Inside Story, 30 May 2014.
19  John Quiggin, Zombie Economics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010).
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Yet the ideas persisted. Remarkably, within two years Europe was plunged 
into a new crisis—a crisis of austerity politics—as enthusiasts for market 
liberal ideas successfully persuaded policy-makers that governments, not 
banks, were to blame and that workers, not the beneficiaries, needed to 
endure years of austerity to pay for the fiscal mess that others had created. 
But does it follow that neo-liberalism will maintain its hegemony in public 
policy circles? We must wonder whether ‘free’ markets are themselves just 
a passing phase, as markets become replaced by monopoly capital. The 
tendency for capital to seek concentration of markets has been noted 
by writers since Marx20 and can be seen in the increasing concentration 
within industries over the past quarter century.21 The emergence of digital 
technology has enabled the concentration of retailing in the hands of 
Amazon whose owner was, at the time of writing, the richest man in the 
world,22 despite substantial losses for Amazon in early years.23 Amazon 
is, in many ways, replacing the market, as a single website becomes the 
mechanism by which an increasing number of consumers conduct most 
of their shopping.24 The localised interplay between supply and demand 
becomes replaced by the decisions of Amazon administrators to give or 
decline prominence in online listings to particular suppliers, on the basis 
of whatever criteria Amazon determines at the time.25 
Similarly, it is hard to explain the actions of Uber’s investors in continuing 
to finance a firm that has made billions of dollars in losses, if we see it 
as simply a firm engaged in a marketplace for rideshare services.26 Those 
20  Karl Marx and Fredrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto. Collected Works (Moscow: Progress 
publishers, 1848; repr., 1977); Raewyn Connell and Terry Irving, Class Structure in Australian 
History: Poverty and Progress (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1992); Michael Gilding, ‘Superwealth 
in Australia: Entrepreneurs, Accumulation and the Capitalist Class’. Journal of Sociology 35, no. 2 
(1999): 169–71; G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America? Politics and Social Change (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 2006); Georgina Murray, Capitalist Networks and Social Power in Australia and New 
Zealand (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).
21  See Chapter 6.
22  Rebecca Marston, ‘Amazon Raises Wages Amid Criticism’. BBC News, 2 October 2018, www.
bbc.com/news/business-45717768.
23  George Packer, ‘Cheap Words’. New Yorker, 17 February 2014, www.newyorker.com/magazine/ 
2014/02/17/cheap-words; Alison Griswold and Jason Karaian, ‘It Took Amazon 14 Years to Make 
as Much in Net Profit as It Did Last Quarter’. Quartz, 1 February 2018, qz.com/1196256/it-took-
amazon-amzn-14-years-to-make-as-much-net-profit-as-it-did-in-the-fourth-quarter-of-2017/.
24  Stacy Mitchell, ‘Amazon Doesn’t Just Want to Dominate the Market—It Wants to Become the 
Market’. The Nation, 15 February 2018.
25  Ibid.; Julia Angwin and Surya Mattu, ‘Amazon Says It Puts Customers First. But Its Pricing 
Algorithm Doesn’t’. ProPublica, 20 September 2016, www.propublica.org/article/amazon-says-it-puts-
customers-first-but-its-pricing-algorithm-doesnt.
26  Yves Smith, ‘Uber Is Headed for a Crash’. Intelligencer, New York Magazine, 4 December 2018, 
nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/12/will-uber-survive-the-next-decade.html.
317
11 . In concLuSIon—on ReALITIeS AnD FuTuReS ouTSIDe The WoRkPLAce
loss-making investments would be warranted, however, if Uber were to 
ultimately become a monopoly platform for transport services, replacing 
taxis and short-haul bus services, and integrated into previously existing 
train or subway services with which it enters into joint ventures that 
provide a quarantined revenue stream to Uber.27 That is, the future of 
Uber is that of monopoly capital, not of a competing market participant. 
A free market–driven future seems a mirage, not a genuine option.
Indeed, the idea of a market liberal ideal has never been truly realised 
and likely never will be.28 The closest any nation-state has come to it was 
probably the USA in the late twentieth century, under Reagan, Bush 
and Bush Jnr, but even then there were many market imperfections and 
instances of intervention and authoritarian behaviour by the state. And it 
led, of course, to the very illiberal Trump regime. Indeed, the success of 
the 2016 Trump campaign and, in the same year, of the Brexit campaign, 
both point to popular rejection of neo-liberal claims to prosperity and 
the political consequences of working-class reaction to their failure. This 
is not to say that neo-liberalism ever held popular sway—opinion polls 
have long held several tenets of neo-liberalism to be unpopular29—but 
now that unpopularity has demonstrable political consequences. Yet the 
reaction to market neo-liberalism has not led to a resurgence of social 
democracy. Indeed, social democratic parties in many countries have been 
in decline over the past two decades, perhaps because their embrace of 
some aspects of market neo-liberalism has prevented them from offering 
an adequate critique and allowed them to be at least partly blamed for the 
problems that have followed.
Instead, the political beneficiaries in many countries of the failure of 
neo-liberalism have been the extreme right. Brexit was championed by 
the xenophobic UK Independence Party and gave the latter a legitimacy 
it never previously enjoyed. Trump’s election has seen some far-right 
figures move into his circle of advisers (at least on a visiting basis) and the 
re-energising of far-right groups. Far-right parties in national elections in 
27  Sara Salinas, ‘Uber and Lyft Are Racing to Own Every Mode of Transportation—They’re 
Getting Close’. MSNBC Tech, 9 June 2018.
28  Quiggin, Zombie Economics.
29  See Chapter 1.
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Europe have achieved votes not seen since World War II.30 Totalitarian 
tendencies can be seen in governments in countries such as India, the 
Philippines, Turkey, Egypt, Brazil, Russia, Hungary, Poland and even 
Japan.31 The future portends no neo-neoliberal hegemony.
Neo-totalitarianism
The third potential scenario, then, is of a more totalitarian future, in which 
inequality is increased, ruling elites are strengthened and suppression 
of  dissent is intensified. It is a spectre of which American sociologist 
William Robinson warns us.32 There is no doubt that developments in 
technology would enhance the potential for state surveillance in such 
a society. The social futures that we were warned about in Nineteen Eighty-
Four and The Handmaid’s Tale are feasible manifestations of this scenario. 
Inside the workplace, the more immediate future depicted in The Circle 
may be the  sugar coating we need to enable the system to reproduce 
itself; or it just might be a transitory phase to the longer-term misery 
of Nineteen Eighty-Four and The Handmaid’s Tale.33 This third scenario 
seems much more likely than a market ascendancy, because of the very 
apparent failures of market liberalism and the already evident political 
manifestations of that failure.
The Trump years were characterised by extensive repudiations of market 
policies, alongside redistribution to the rich and entrenchment of the 
power of those already with power. The policies were enthusiastically 
endorsed by almost all congressional members and most members and 
supporters of the previously free-market Republican Party. While at the 
time of writing the prospects for Trump being re-elected seemed less than 
even, the remarkable thing was that, despite everything that he did in his 
first two years in office, his approval level through this period bounced 
30  BBC News, ‘Europe and Nationalism: A Country-by-Country Guide’. BBC News, 10 September 
2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006; Karoline Postel-Vinay, ‘How Neo-Nationalism 
Went Global’. The Conversation, 14 March 2017, theconversation.com/how-neo-nationalism-went-
global-74095; Bernard E. Harcourt, ‘How Trump Fuels the Fascist Right’. New York Review of Books, 
29 November 2018, www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/11/29/how-trump-fuels-the-fascist-right/.
31  Postel-Vinay, ‘How Neo-Nationalism Went Global’.
32  William I. Robinson, ‘Global Capitalism: Crisis of Humanity and the Specter of 21st Century 
Fascism’. The World Financial Review, 27 May 2014, www.worldfinancialreview.com/global-capitalism-
crisis-humanity-specter-21st-century-fascism/.
33  See Chapter 3 of this book.
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around about two-fifths of voters.34 While this was one of the poorest 
approval ratings for first-term modern presidents, none others had 
behaved in ways that remotely resembled Trump.
I must confess that I was personally surprised by what happened in the 
Trump years in the USA: not by the behaviour of Trump himself, which 
could be predicted by his behaviour before being elected, but by the lack 
of resistance to his approach from within the Republican Party once he 
became President (and indeed, once he became the official campaign 
nominee). Seeming adherents to free-market beliefs enthusiastically 
endorsed or occasionally quietly acquiesced to his regime. On the surface, 
Trump’s mainstream Republican supporters appear to be demonstrating 
what Orwell in Nineteen Eighty-Four called doublethink—the power 
to simultaneously hold two contradictory views. It is slightly more 
complicated than that, as the rationalising of support for Trump appears 
to mean that the contradiction is resolved, but in a way that we might not, 
as rational beings, have expected.
Leon Festinger and colleagues came up with a term to describe the process 
a decade after Nineteen Eighty-Four was published: cognitive dissonance. 
This was first observed in the 1950s, when researchers infiltrated a group 
of doomsday cultists. The researchers were curious to know how the cultists 
would react when the world did not end on the anointed doomsday. 
But instead of rethinking their beliefs as they waited on that hilltop, the 
cultists rationalised the non-end of the world in ways that were consistent 
with their cult’s beliefs (God has saved the world because we did those 
things He wanted us to do). If anything, their adherence to the cult’s 
belief system was strengthened.35 The conflict between their belief system 
and reality was resolved by reinterpreting reality. It is the sort of process 
we see Mae go through in The Circle, whereby her initial objections to 
invasions of privacy by the corporation are overwhelmed by her support 
for the objectives of the corporation, in which she has a job that she enjoys 
immensely. The contradiction between her concern for privacy and her 
support for the organisation that provides her job was eventually resolved 
in favour of the latter.
34  Nate Silver, ‘How Popular Is Donald Trump?’. Five Thirty Eight, 14 February 2019, fivethirty 
eight.com/trump-approval-ratings/.
35  Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957).
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In being surprised by the persistence of support for Trump in the face of 
his actual behaviour, I had failed to appreciate the strength of cognitive 
dissonance. To many Republican identifiers, Trump represented conflicts 
between several of their beliefs. This was resolved by either recasting some 
of those beliefs, with less important values subordinated to priority values, 
or reinterpreting what had happened. Thus ‘pussy-grabbing’ was mere 
locker-room talk, free-market ideals became the disparaged techniques of 
‘elites’ from the Washington ‘swamp’, and Trump’s regular lies (averaging 
15 per day in 2018)36 were accepted as truths. Any principles regarding 
the importance of free markets, gender equity,37 democracy, ethics or 
honesty were subordinated to values relating in one way or another to the 
importance of power and entitlements for those with whom Republican 
voters identified. If a new conflict arose—some new revelation that 
commentators thought finally signalled the end for Trump—his 
supporters would almost instinctively dismiss it, not unlike the process 
of crimestop described by Orwell that prevented heretical thoughts from 
being held. While much has been made of Trump’s alleged appeal to white 
working-class males, this group was arithmetically less important in his 
total support than the ‘traditional’ Republican voters whom Trump mostly 
retained: the average income of 2016 Trump voters was higher than that 
of Clinton voters.38 For those who recast their subordinate values and 
perceptions of reality along these lines, a stream of falsehoods creates an 
alternative reality39—a postmodern, parallel universe—that seems to bear 
no relation to actual reality. Unfortunately, this parallel universe has little 
room for a sustainable planet earth in its future.
The fragility of democracy
Some time after Margaret Atwood wrote The Handmaid’s Tale, she said 
she did it as a warning of what might happen, not as a prediction of 
what would happen. Yet in women’s marches in the USA, some groups 
of women have adopted the garments and mannerisms (head bowed, 
36  Glenn Kessler, ‘A Year of Unprecedented Deception: Trump Averaged 15 False Claims a Day in 
2015’. Washington Post, 30 December 2018. See also Bella DePaulo, ‘I Study Liars. I’ve Never Seen 
One Like President Trump’. Washington Post, 9 December 2017.
37  Jonathan Martin, ‘Some in G.O.P. Who Deserted Donald Trump over Lewd Tape Are 
Returning’. New York Times, 12 October 2016.
38  Nicholas Carnes and Noam Lupu, ‘It’s Time to Bust the Myth: Most Trump Voters Were Not 
Working Class’. Washington Post, 5 June 2017.
39  Denise Clifton, ‘A Chilling Theory on Trump’s Nonstop Lies’. Mother Jones, 3 August 2017.
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disengaged) of the handmaids as a protest against the sorts of policies they 
see the Trump administration pursuing regarding women. The making of 
the TV series, 30 years after the book was written, was probably accidental 
in its timing but was seized upon as very prescient by opponents of the 
administration. That book’s depiction of the advances of women in the 
1960s and 1970s as being fragile while women remained excluded from 
positions of power remains relevant, especially as women’s share of elected 
national representatives in the US Republican Party or the Liberal Party 
of Australia has barely improved in decades.40
We like to think of democratic principles as being part of the logic of 
humanity, and democratic governance as the manifestation of higher 
civilisation. No democratic country, we are sometimes told, has ever 
gone to war with another democratic country—though that claim relies 
entirely on very restrictive definitions of both democracy and war.41 But it 
is not just in the USA that political behaviour makes us question whether 
democratic ideals are supreme. Governments described by various observers 
as ‘extreme right’ or ‘fascistic’ were elected (not installed by military juntas) 
in the late 2010s in countries such as Brazil, Hungary, Poland and the 
Philippines. Although large-scale migrations have been blamed by some 
for a shift ‘to the right’ in Europe—and such migrations are something we 
will see more of in the future, due to climate change—this hardly explains 
developments in Poland or Hungary, where there were comparatively few 
migrants and very few Moslems at the time of  writing,42 let alone the 
Philippines or Brazil.43
40  RMIT ABC Fact Check, ‘Fact Check: Is the Level of Liberal Women in Parliament Lower Now 
Than It Was in 1996?’. ABC News, 6 September 2018, www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-06/fact-check-
liberal-women-in-parliament/9796976. The number of Republican women elected to the US House 
of Representatives was 13 in both 1988 and 2018: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women_in_the_United_
States_House_of_Representatives. 
41  James Lee Ray, ‘Wars between Democracies: Rare or Nonexistent?’. International Interactions 18, 
no. 3 (1993): 251–76.
42  Anne Applebaum, ‘A Warning from Europe: The Worst Is yet to Come’. The Atlantic, October 
2018, www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/10/poland-polarization/568324/. In 2016, 0.4 per 
cent of the Hungarian population, and less than 0.1 per cent of the Polish population, was Moslem 
(compared to 4.9 per cent across Europe). Pew Research Center, ‘Europe’s Growing Muslim Population’ 
(Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures project, Pew Research Center, 29 November 2017), www.
pewforum.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2017/11/FULL-REPORT-FOR-WEB-POSTING.pdf.
43  Travis Waldron, ‘Brazil Is About to Show the World How a Modern Democracy Collapses’. 
Huffington Post, 1 January 2019, www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/brazil-jair-bolsonaro-democracy-
threat _us_5c2a30c5e4b08aaf7a929cbb.
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A common element in all far-right successes, however, is the ability 
to blame ‘the other’ for ills, most of which ultimately arise from the 
perverse operation of capitalism. The ‘other’ might be migrants, but 
they might also be Jews, blacks, Moslems, poor people, or some other 
existing or imaginary group that constitutes a minority in the country 
concerned. Fear can be not only beneficial for some politicians but has 
also been a profitable business model for some media.44 An ‘in’ group 
that is persuaded to see itself under siege (say, because of a declining 
share of the population) may seek to protect the status quo in any way 
possible, reverting to ‘traditional’ behaviour or norms, and feel more 
negatively toward the ‘other’.45 Thus Lukes referred to ‘identity-related’ or 
‘recognitional’ domination, where the dominant group ‘in control of the 
means of interpretation and communication, project their own experience 
and culture as the norm, rendering invisible the perspective of those they 
dominate, while simultaneously stereotyping them and making them out 
as “other”’.46 Yale philosopher Jason Staney explains how ‘fascist politics is 
about identifying enemies, appealing to the in-group (usually the majority 
group), and smashing truth and replacing it with power’.47
Parts of the ‘other’ are reimagined to become an elite that really controls 
things—hence conspiracy theories abound on the right.48 This acts 
to obscure the role of the ruling class. Even people at the core of the 
ruling class (like Trump himself ) become defined as outside the ‘elite’ 
and excoriate the redefined elite for their corruption of society. The real 
or alleged existence of corruption in a previous regime is usually a key 
part of a fascist strategy, and used to justify radical measures and the 
weakening or destruction of institutions that protected democracy. Earlier 
incidents of corruption or violence make it easier to justify widespread 
violence by the new state. So an authoritarian future may be one in which 
44  Mayer, ‘Fox News White House’.
45  Olar Khazan, ‘People Voted for Trump Because They Were Anxious, Not Poor’. The Atlantic, 
23  April 2018, www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/04/existential-anxiety-not-poverty-
motivates-trump-support/558674/.
46  Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 2nd ed. (London: Palgrave, 2005), 120.
47  Interviewed in Sean Illing, ‘How Fascism Works’. Vox, 19 September 2018, www.vox.com/ 
2018/9/19/17847110/how-fascism-works-donald-trump-jason-stanley.
48  For example, Stephan Lewandowsky, Klaus Oberauer, and Gilles E. Gignac, ‘Motivated 
Rejection of Science: NASA Faked the Moon Landing—Therefore (Climate) Science Is a Hoax: 
An Anatomy of the Motivated Rejection of Science’. Psychological Science 24, no. 5 (2013): 622–33; 
Stephan Lewandowsky, John Cook, Klaus Oberauer, Scott Brophy, Elisabeth A. Lloyd, and Michael 
Marriott. ‘Recurrent fury: Conspiratorial discourse in the blogosphere triggered by research on the 
role of conspiracist ideation in climate denial’. Journal of Social and Political Psychology 3, no. 1 
(2015): 142–78.
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domination is achieved initially through seemingly market or democratic 
means. Democratic rhetoric may then be used to justify antidemocratic 
intrusions into dissenting groups (as was said in The Circle: ‘if you aren’t 
transparent, what are you hiding?’),49 just as the rhetoric of fighting 
corruption may be used now by those who are themselves corrupt. As 
dissenting voices—inside the corporation or through the body politic—
are increasingly delegitimised and excluded, the capacity for immiseration 
of those at the bottom increases.
In modern far-right movements, misogyny is a core element, as women, 
particularly ‘feminists’, are part of the ‘other’. Antifeminist trolling, 
usually far better organised than observers believe,50 is a persistent feature 
of right-wing online activity. But in most scenarios, a violent attack on 
half the population, challenging the loyalties of all men in heterosexual 
relationships, would be unsustainable. Hence other ‘others’—nonwhites 
of varying types—must be identified to recruit women, albeit always 
in minority, to the crusade, so that disrespect towards women can be 
dismissed as ‘locker room talk’ and overcome by cognitive dissonance. 
A counter-scenario is the one posited in The Handmaid’s Tale, in which 
women are targeted for subjugation but in which, critically, only 
a  subset—feminists, abortionists and the like—are victimised as the 
‘other’, the elite that secretly controlled things and had to be violently 
suppressed (including through executions). Although this depiction was 
more ambitious than most modern fascist movements, elements of this 
scenario (the subjugation of women) were played out in the period after 
the Iranian revolution of the 1970s.51 It evokes substantial resistance;52 
whether that is enough to emulate the fictional fall of Gilead is unknown. 
In Nineteen Eighty-Four and, to a lesser extent The Handmaid’s Tale, state 
power is maintained by a combination of state violence and sophisticated, 
coordinated systems of surveillance and ideological reproduction that 
together constitute hegemonic control. By contrast, Trump’s America 
showed a distinct lack of coordination or sophistication. Nor would 
any future quasi-fascist state be dependent on high coordination or 
49  Dave Eggers, The Circle (New York: Vintage, 2013), 241. 
50  Ginger Gorman, ‘Internet Trolls Are Not Who I Thought — They’re Even Scarier’. ABC News, 
1 February 2019, www.abc.net.au/news/2019-02-02/internet-trolls-arent-who-i-thought-ginger-
gorman-troll-hunting/10767690.
51  Homa Hoodfar, ‘Iranian Women Risk Arrest: Daughters of the Revolution’. The Conversation, 
6 March 2018, theconversation.com/iranian-women-risk-arrest-daughters-of-the-revolution-92880.
52  Ibid.
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sophistication. It would instead rely on the weaknesses of human character 
that allow oppressive regimes to be built and prosper in the first place. 
We see this most clearly in The Circle’s depiction of cognitive processes 
that were foreshadowed over half a century earlier in Nineteen Eighty-
Four’s concept of doublethink. And unlike in Nineteen Eighty-Four and 
The Handmaid’s Tale, the people in charge of The Circle are not, by and 
large, malevolent or sinister megalomaniacs; they are just mostly people 
who think they are doing the right thing and progressing ever forwards, 
but without any dissenting checks or balances against them. One is 
reminded again, as per Hannah Arendt half a century ago, of the banality 
of evil.53
While the surveillance regimes in Orwell’s Oceania are what commentators 
most commonly allude to, rightly, when warning of state infringements 
of civil liberties, and the violence of the Ministry of Love is what disturbs 
us most after seeing a movie or play of Orwell’s work, it is Orwell’s 
depictions of the fallibilities of human psychology in the face of a 
consensus that brooks no dissent that should sound the loudest warnings 
as we contemplate the future. In the context of force plus hegemony that 
Gramsci talks of,54 our focus should be on what happens to both, but 
ultimately hegemony is the more powerful tool.
If the state in the future may not be the coordinated, sophisticated 
monolith  of Nineteen Eighty-Four or The Handmaid’s Tale (albeit with 
access to very advanced technology that could enable widespread 
surveillance), the same need not be true of future corporations—or at least 
some of them. ‘Tech giants’ increasingly dominate the corporate world 
and The Circle paints a grim view of the way coordination, technology and 
culturism combine in that corporation of the near future. It is a world in 
which employees are both happy and complicit in their own subjugation, 
in which dissent is performance-managed out of the organisation, much as 
depicted for the real world by Diane Van den Broek and Hugh Willmott 
over two decades ago.55
53  Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Viking, 
1963).
54  Antonio Gramsci, Selection from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (New York: Lawrence 
and Wishart, 1971).
55  Diane Van den Broek, ‘Human Resource Management, Workforce Control and Union 
Avoidance: An Australian Case Study’. Journal of Industrial Relations 39, no. 3 (1997): 332–48; Hugh 
Willmott, ‘Strength Is Ignorance; Slavery Is Freedom: Managing Culture in Modern Organizations’. 
The Journal of Management Studies 30, no. 4 (1993): 515–52.
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If policy-makers do not overcome the divisive forces of modern 
capitalism, one cannot rule out a violent revolt—but on the basis of what 
we have seen so far, it seems more likely to be a revolt of the far-right 
than the far-left. The violent demonstrations of the 2010s decade were 
mostly demonstrations of the right, not the left.56 That is why I have 
given scant attention here to a theoretically fourth alternative future: 
that of a revolution-driven socialist world. It seems the least probable of 
any of the outcomes discussed here. While large-scale demonstrations 
or mobilisations might become part of some neo-democratic political 
movement and transition, large-scale violence would favour the 
opposite side.
In the end, it is probably one of two worlds that the Sliding Doors of 
our current choices will eventually open up to: a more egalitarian, neo-
democratic one; or an eventually neo-totalitarian one in which the rich 
prosper at the expense of the rest of the population—possibly (but not with 
certainty) able to insulate themselves, and only themselves, from the worst 
effects of catastrophic climate change, transferring the most serious risk in 
history to the rest of the populace. The space I have devoted here to the 
neo-totalitarian possibility should not be seen as indicating it is inevitable. 
It is certainly possible to develop more equal, democratic societies than 
we presently have. The huge differences in the levels of inequality and 
other social pathologies between the Scandinavian countries and the 
Anglophone ones, epitomised by the USA, illustrate the wide range of 
possibilities that exist—and these are not the only possibilities. What they 
show is that nothing is inevitable, be it in technology or social organisation. 
If social and political outcomes were inevitable, every country now would 
have the same system of government and the same social order, but in 
practice they differ widely.
56  An exception might be France, but the situation of the yellow vests is complex, and ‘the gilets 
jaunes seem more likely to become the French face of Trumpism … than of a more tolerant future’. 
Adam Gopnik, ‘The Yellow Vests and Why There Are So Many Street Protests in France’. New Yorker, 
6 December 2018, www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-yellow-vests-and-why-there-are-so-
many-street-protests-in-france. 
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An agenda for a liveable future
What, then, are the characteristics of the alternative to authoritarianism, 
of more equal, ethical and democratic societies in which a feasible and 
liveable world of work could exist? To be precise, what are the policy 
choices that need to be made? In Chapter 10, I have already mentioned 
three innovative angles that can and need to be taken to policy issues in 
the face of the changing world of work. Here, I discuss some more.
An ethical economy and polity
The institutions that promote democracy need defending, and faux 
democratic rationales for undermining citizen protections need to be 
resisted. Ethical considerations should be built into the design of society, 
of technology (no easy feat) and of the processes of decision-making—
something that has already been canvassed here regarding several areas.57 
Is it really ethical that a particular process or outcome is in place? This 
is not the same as giving ‘equal time’ or ‘equal space’ to good and evil, 
in much the same way as many media currently provide ‘false balance’ 
by giving a platform to those who deny the scientific reality of climate 
change.58 Nor is it the same as ‘cooperating’ with the powerful after a long 
period in which they have failed to cooperate with the weak—for example, 
by ‘stacking’ ostensibly independent institutions with their own acolytes. 
Game theory tells us that continuing to cooperate, when the other side 
does not cooperate, merely reinforces the strength of the other side, and 
that the only feasible way to avoid ‘the suckers’ play’ is to abandon such 
cooperation (until the other side credibly agrees to cooperate).59
Still, there is an important difference between not providing additional 
platforms for those who hold power, and suppressing those without 
power. Often, however, the distinction is lost. It is too easy for progressive 
governments to slide into repression, perhaps genuinely seeing or, 
at a minimum, widely portraying the other side as the ‘elite’, and using that 
57  See Chapter 9 and ‘Technology and ethics’ near the end of Chapter 4.
58  Peter Ellerton, ‘The Problem of False Balance When Reporting on Science’. The Conversation, 
16 July 2014, theconversation.com/the-problem-of-false-balance-when-reporting-on-science-29077.
59  Bernard Keane, ‘What Game Theory Says About Labor’s Woes’. Crikey, 15 August 2011, www.
crikey.com.au/2011/08/15/what-game-theory-says-about-labors-woes/.
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to rationalise its own excesses. Avoiding ‘false balance’ does not prevent 
that from happening. What is required are institutional arrangements that 
actively prevent slides into authoritarianism from occurring.
These include methods of genuinely separating powers, of giving elected 
parliaments supremacy over Executives (presidents, prime ministers, 
and ministers of state),60 of ensuring continued democratic input into 
decisions, of limiting donations to election campaigns, of tight auditing 
and guaranteeing those in positions of power do not financially benefit 
from any decisions they make, and of placing irrevocable limits on the 
terms of people in positions of power in an Executive—terms that should 
be quite short. One- or two-year terms for any Executive would meet 
these requirements, but would leave much power in the hands of the 
bureaucratic experts reporting to the Executive. Tim Dunlop’s radical 
solution—sortition (randomly selecting citizens to serve on a  rotating 
Executive for short terms)—needs consideration.61 Short of that, 
however, parliamentary systems that have genuinely open elections and 
have vigorous constraints on the potential for representatives to lose their 
idealism and be ‘bought’ by well-resourced interests, as per the intent 
of the above ideas, are essential. Restrictions on the number of terms 
served should apply to members of parliament, though terms themselves 
(i.e. the periods between elections) also need to be fairly short—contrary to 
the frequently expressed wishes of politicians and bureaucrats themselves, 
who see long terms and sparse elections as necessary to ensure ‘serious’ 
policy can be made, to be swamped or otherwise forgotten at the next 
election.62 Neo-liberal and progressive politicians both pine for longer 
terms to enable their reform vision to be implemented, each ignoring 
the capacity of the other side to do so and the diminution of democracy 
that follows.
60  A large study showed that presidential regimes are associated with less favourable economic 
outcomes, including worse inequality, than parliamentary regimes—likely reflecting the different 
ways parliamentary and presidential systems shape how competing interests are reflected in 
institutions. Richard McManus and Gulcin Ozkan, ‘Who Does Better for the Economy? Presidents 
versus Parliamentary Democracies’. Public Choice 176, no. 6 (2018): 361–87.
61  Tim Dunlop, The Future of Everything: Big Audacious Ideas for a Better World (Sydney: New South 
Books, 2018).
62  Michelle Grattan, ‘Shorten and Turnbull to Talk on Four-Year Terms’. The Conversation, 23 July 
2017, theconversation.com/shorten-and-turnbull-to-talk-on-four-year-terms-81454.
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Technology for the public good
Often the people who are in the best position to regulate specific 
technologies are the people directly affected. So consultation rights on 
the introduction of technology at work are important, as is establishing, 
reinstating or strengthening employees’ ability to genuinely negotiate. This 
would force employers to consider the social implications of their actions. 
But it would not kill progress. Most employees are cluey enough to know 
that it is not a good idea to make their own organisation uncompetitive. 
In German manufacturing, where employees have an institutionalised say 
in the introduction of technological change through works councils, it 
appears that ‘exposure’ to robots is associated with an increased probability 
that an employee will keep their job.63 And the better are opportunities 
for retraining and redeployment, including through public agencies, the 
greater will be employee acceptance of new technology.
In addition, protections for employees, and for citizens, against surveillance 
need strength and codification. While in general there are advantages 
to the state being neutral on the choice of technology for productivity 
advances, the state has a major role in ensuring that technologies do not 
have adverse consequences for people. Government innovation policy 
can have a large impact, especially in smaller economies.64 We should 
not pretend that the state has no role in enabling productivity-enhancing 
technology: you might still be communicating through a phone tethered 
to a wall with copper wire if it were not for state-funded advances in 
technology.65
While we need to control technological futures, some commonly 
discussed policies may do more harm than good. This especially applies 
to generic solutions that assign to technology, such as the ‘robot tax’ 
some talk about, which might be used to fund adjustment packages or 
63  Wolfgang Dauth et al., ‘The Rise of Robots in the German Labour Market’. Vox, 19 September 
2017.
64  Roy Green and Göran Roos, Australia’s Manufacturing Future (Canberra: Discussion paper 
prepared for the Prime Minister’s Manufacturing Taskforce, 2012).
65  Mariana Mazzucato, ‘Taxpayers Helped Apple, but Apple Won’t Help Them’. Harvard Business 
Review, 8 March 2013, hbr.org/2013/03/taxpayers-helped-apple-but-app; Rutger Bregman, ‘Look at the 
Phone in Your Hand—You Can Thank the State for That’. Guardian, 12 July 2017, www.the guardian.
com/ commentisfree/2017/jul/12/phone-state-private-sector-products-investment-innovation.
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other policies aimed at ameliorating the effects of technological change.66 
A robot tax would simply increase the labour intensity of production at 
the margins and lower productivity growth. It would not fundamentally 
affect who benefited from or who controlled technology. It is possibly the 
worst proposed response.
That does not mean funds need not be raised. But value attributed to 
robots is no more valid a source of state revenue than value from other 
sources. It is indeed very important to put resources, and lots of them, into 
reskilling and retraining workers. There will be large numbers of workers 
who will be made redundant from existing industries, and experience tells 
us they will find it hard to get a new job—this is especially the case for 
older workers, who often face discrimination in seeking reemployment. 
Since much of technical education and training in Australia has been 
essentially privatised, with sometimes disastrous consequences, effectively 
regearing for reskilling this would actually require quite a lot of effort 
from government there. Australia in particular has not done it properly 
in the past, and recommendations in the 1990s to develop or implement 
even a code of practice on labour adjustment were not seriously pursued.67
There is a strong geographic dimension to this. Whole regions will be 
affected by the loss of jobs while the new jobs will often be elsewhere. 
Substantial resources need to go to these regions to stop people there from 
being those who pay for others’ rising living standards. This will be a huge 
task for regions that are not part of major urban centres. It adds a regional 
aspect to any state innovation policy.
Rethinking revenue
If general revenue does not provide enough resources, then there are 
other options—better than a robot tax—that, instead of penalising 
new technology, could be used to redistribute income. Some have been 
canvassed in contemporary political debate, such as (in Australia) ending 
66  Malcolm James, ‘Could Bill Gates’ Plan to Tax Robots Really Lead to a Brighter Future for All?’. 
The Conversation, 10 March 2017, theconversation.com/could-bill-gates-plan-to-tax-robots-really-
lead-to-a-brighter-future-for-all-73395.
67  John Buchanan et al., Facing Retrenchments: Strategies and Alternatives for Enterprises (Canberra: 
Department of Education, Employment and Training, 1992). In the context of Accord VII some work 
in this regard was commenced by the Office of Labour Market Adjustment and the Department of 
Industrial Relations, but it was set aside during political controversy surrounding unrelated legislation 
on unfair dismissals.
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‘negative gearing’,68 removing the discount for capital gains tax69 or even 
amending marginal tax rates.70 In almost all countries, the top marginal 
tax rates (i.e. the tax paid on additional income by the highest income 
earners) were higher in earlier decades than they are now.71 Low marginal 
tax rates for top executives not only widen inequality in their own right, 
they also increase the returns to rent-seekers who cut pay and conditions. 
Other ideas receive less discussion, such as inheritance taxes. These 
currently operate in 16 OECD countries72 and once existed throughout 
Australia until Queensland Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen abolished them; 
he was quickly followed by the other states, fearful of people moving to 
Queensland to die, and, inexplicably, by the Commonwealth. Yet one 
estimate is that, over the quarter century to 2050, $30 trillion will be 
passed on as inheritances in the USA. Small wonder that advisers to 
wealth managers, if not governments, recognise that ‘the scale of [this] 
transfer … raises the stakes significantly’.73 
Other options include reviving taxation of net wealth (inheritance taxes 
are a subset of this), which in the early 1990s was being taxed in a dozen 
OECD countries, but now only in three.74 Wealth is not presently taxed 
in Australia (despite positive opinion-poll results, when it has been 
tested)75 or the USA (where it is currently popular and political candidates 
have started to support it).76 Taxing net total wealth is more efficient and 
equitable, and potentially raises much more revenue, than taxing gross 
68  Enabling owners of rental properties to obtain deductions against tax on other income for 
interest costs on borrowings associated with the rental properties.
69  Allowing part of a capital gain in buying then selling a property to be ignored for taxation purposes.
70  Louis Jacobson, ‘Explaining Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s 70 Percent Marginal Tax Rate 
Idea’. Politifact, 8 January 2019, www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2019/jan/08/explaining-
alexandria-ocasio-cortezs-70-percent-ta/.
71  For example, Paul Krugman, ‘The Twinkie Manifesto’. New York Times, 19 November 2012, 
www.nytimes.com/2012/11/19/opinion/krugman-the-twinkie-manifesto.html.
72  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Revenue Statistics: Comparative 
tables’, OECD Tax Statistics (database) (Paris: OECD, 2019), doi.org/10.1787/data-00262-en.
73  Alex Pigliucci, Kendra Thompson, and Mark Halverson, The ‘Greater’ Wealth Transfer: 
Capitalizing on the Intergenerational Shift in Wealth. Wealth and Asset Management Services, Point 
of View (Arlington, VA: Accenture, 2015), 1.
74  Martin Sandbu, ‘The Curious Case of the Missing Wealth Taxes’. Financial Times, 6 February 
2019, www.businesstelegraph.co.uk/the-curious-case-of-the-missing-wealth-taxes/.
75  In 1984 a wealth tax had been more popular in Australian opinion polling than the capital gains 
tax that subsequently was introduced. Bulletin, 4 December 1984, 25.
76  Matthew Yglesias, ‘Taxing the Rich Is Extremely Popular’. Vox, 4 February 2019, www.vox.com/ 
2019/2/4/18210370/warren-wealth-tax-poll.
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land wealth, which persists in many countries.77 While there are issues 
of evasion of total wealth taxes, natural experimental data suggest ways 
to minimise this.78 Another option, if enough countries can cooperate, 
is a ‘Tobin tax’ on financial transactions, which would raise potentially 
significant revenue and/or reduce volatility in financial markets.79
There are certainly valid arguments for a more generously redistributive 
tax-transfer system. Thomas Piketty is likely correct in arguing that the 
great increase in inequality from the late twentieth century, in particular 
through the increased share going to the very wealthy at the expense of the 
rest of society, originated with the reduction in top marginal tax rates.80 
Globally, there is widespread agreement (except by those who benefit 
from the status quo) of the need to take concerted collective action to 
seriously attack enrichment of the wealthy through tax havens.81 Credible 
threats, let alone actions, in this area have a genuine impact on revenue.82 
The ‘Overton window’—the range of feasible policy options evident at 
a particular time—has been shifting back towards such policies for some 
time, with recent evidence suggesting wide support for such measures.83
Expenditure for the common wealth
The money that could be raised by such mechanisms is more than would 
be needed for labour retraining, but more is needed for other reasons. 
Branko Milanovic rightly argues for widespread, accessible quality 
77  In Australia, these exist as local government ‘rates’. Sandbu, ‘Curious Case’; Martin Sandbu, 
‘The Wonderful World of Net Wealth Taxes (Where They Still Exist)’. Financial Times, 8 February 
2019, www.ft.com/content/c8437204-2adb-11e9-a5ab-ff8ef2b976c7?sharetype=blocked.
78  Juliana Londoño-Vélez and Javier Avila, Can Wealth Taxation Work in Developing Countries? Quasi-




79  James Tobin, ‘A Proposal for International Monetary Reform’. Eastern Economic Journal 4, 
no. 3–4 (1978): 153–59. This is referred to in some circles as the ‘Robin Hood’ tax.
80  Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2014).
81  Facundo Alvaredo et al., World Inequality Report 2018 (World Inequality Lab/WID.world, 
2018); Thomas Piketty, ‘Panama Papers: Act Now. Don’t Wait for Another Crisis’. Guardian, 10 April 
2016; David Mistead, ‘The Double-Edged Sword of Corporate Tax Avoidance’. Globe and Mail, 
8 April 2016, www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/investment-ideas/panama-papers-scandal-
highlights-corporate-tax-avoidance/article29576260/.
82  Londoño-Vélez and Avila, Can Wealth Taxation Work.
83  Yglesias, ‘Taxing the Rich’.
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education, as it makes high-skilled labour more plentiful and  reduces 
income gaps between skilled and unskilled labour. He contrasts it to the 
current opposite trend of ever-stronger private education.84
Many argue for a universal basic income (UBI),85 which would provide 
a living income to everyone in society, regardless of whether or not they 
were working or even looking for work. There is a lot to be said for this 
policy, and some jurisdictions have experimented with various limited 
versions of it. Official evaluation of the Finnish UBI experiment indicates 
that it does not have adverse effects on employment or employment 
incentives, but it does improve health and wellbeing outcomes.86 
However, to be effective as a basic income, it could be very expensive.87 
If set at a level that was high enough to provide a good level of income, 
it would require a level of taxes that was, on average, above what most 
taxpayers (or at least, most politicians) are presently willing to accept, 
and if set at a level that was ‘affordable’ it would likely be either too 
low to provide a decent income or simply substitute for existing welfare 
programs. The bigger problem, though, is that in itself this does not deal 
with the inequality problem or the structural adjustment problem that 
are at the heart of ensuring the benefits of new technology do not lead to 
net job destruction. A UBI alone would not stop the remarkable growth 
in incomes at the very top of society that led to Citigroup economists 
claiming that the spending behaviour of the rich ‘overwhelms that of the 
“average” consumer’,88 nor the underinvestment in structural adjustment, 
which between them would stop an adequate level of new job-creation 
from occurring. In other words, an adequate response to the employment 
and distributional problems arising from future technologies requires 
means of redistributing income and wealth away from the richest, which 
requires consideration of the taxation side of the ledger. A UBI may 
84  Branko Milanovic, ‘Inequality in the Age of Globalization’. Paper presented at ECFIN’s Annual 
Research Conference, Fostering Inclusive Growth: Inequality and Fairness in Integrated Markets, 
Lecture in Honor of Anthony A. Atkinson, Brussels, 20 November 2017; Branko Milanovic, Global 
Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2016).
85  Philippe Van Parijs and Yannick Vanderborght, Basic Income: A Radical Proposal for a Free Society 
and a Sane Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017).
86  Olli Kangas et al., The Basic Income Experiment 2017–2018 in Finland. Preliminary Results. 
Reports and Memorandums of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 2019:9 (Helsinki: Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Health, 8 February 2019), urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-00-4035-2.
87  Gerhard Bosch, ‘Can a Universal Basic Income Resolve Future Income Security Challenges?’ 
Paper presented at Regulating Decent Work conference, Geneva, 2017.
88  Ajay Kapur et al., ‘The Plutonomy Symposium—Rising Tides Lifting Yachts’. The Global 
Investigator (Equity Research Global: Equity Strategy), 29 September 2006, 7–19.
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well be a good idea, but not because of the robots. As it would not, in 
itself, solve the problem of workers and low-income earners having too 
little power, it cannot be seen as the overarching solution to problems of 
inequality. If designed in certain ways, though, it could redress poverty and 
the financial and physical ill health brought about by underemployment, 
precarious employment, unemployment and administratively forced 
employment. 
At the same time, useless or counterproductive expenditures must 
be stopped. The International Monetary Fund (a major neo-liberal 
institution) estimated energy subsidies at an enormous 6.5 per cent of 
global GDP in 2015.89 That said, the bulk of these subsidies come not 
from financial transfers, or from tax concessions (though both these are 
significant) but from failing to properly charge for the environmental 
damage (air pollution and global warming, but also congestion and 
accidents) that is caused by the activities.90 In places like Australia, 
these subsidies represent several times expenditure on matters like early 
childhood education and care.91 As the IMF points out, this ‘crowd[s] 
out … potentially productive public spending (for example, on health, 
education, and infrastructure)’ creating ‘a drag on economic growth’ and 
‘premature deaths’ while ‘most of the benefits from energy subsidies are 
typically captured by rich households’.92
Organisational misbehaviour
Alongside rethinking the regulatory arrangements for technology, we 
should seriously reconsider the legal privileges afforded the owners and 
beneficiaries of capital through use of the corporate veil. In particular, 
crimes committed by corporations typically lead only to fines, despite 
high rates of recidivism among corporate criminals.93 Unless engaged in 
fraud,94 hardly any CEOs or directors ever go to jail or face other personal 
punishment for misdeeds conducted under their direct or implied 
89  David Coady et al., How Large Are Global Energy Subsidies? IMF Working Paper WP/15/105 
(Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2015).
90  Ibid.
91  Frances Flanagan, ‘Climate Change and the New Work Order’. Inside Story, 28 February 2019, 
insidestory.org.au/climate-change-and-the-new-work-order/.
92  Coady et al., Energy Subsidies, 4.
93  Joel Bakan, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (London: Constable 
& Robertson, 2004).
94  An exception, in a small number of jurisdictions, is where directors can be held personally 
responsible for egregious corporate breaches of occupational health and safety laws.
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instruction, in part because of reluctance by corporate regulators,95 while 
whistleblowers are harassed into submission.96 This in turn skews financial 
incentives, as the disincentives to breaking the law are minimised while the 
incentives in place favour self-aggrandisement by CEOs and directors.97 
Lawbreaking enables ‘accumulation by dispossession’98 and this in turn 
increases pressure on other corporate executives to compete by cutting 
labour conditions faster and further and to set aside any concerns about 
sustainability. Australian sociologist Andrew Hopkins has suggested that 
we ‘hold top executives and even directors personally and criminally liable 
when companies fail to take proper account of the interests of consumers, 
customers, and employees’.99 Although made in the context of widespread 
misbehaviour by local banks in the period after the global financial 
crisis, this proposal has broader applicability. Rethinking punishments 
for corporate misbehaviour is part of a broader project of rethinking 
the privileges that are given to the corporation.100 This also frequently 
requires rethinking the institutional arrangements for regulating corporate 
behaviour. Boosting the powers of ineffectual institutions may not make 
any difference if their ineffectiveness is due to industry capture; better 
(as with some labour compliance institutions) to start again.101
State inhibitions on market concentration have faltered since the great 
antitrust legislation of the USA in the early twentieth century, and these 
must be revived if citizen power is to have any chance or if worker-
cooperatives (as an alternative to capitalist work organisation) are to have 
any prospects. When Frank Pasquale said, ‘Imagine, say, the merger of 
95  Jesse Eisinger, The Chickenshit Club: Why the Justice Department Fails to Prosecute Executives 
(New  York: Simon & Schuster, 2017); Bernard Keane, ‘The Need for a Strong Financial System 
Justifies ASIC’s “Softly Softly” Approach’. Crikey, 31 May 2018, www.crikey.com.au/2018/05/31/
need-for-strong-financial-system-asics-justification-for-softly-softly/.
96  For example, Adele Ferguson, ‘ATO Whistleblower Faces Six Life Sentences, Roughly the Same 
as Ivan Milat’. Sydney Morning Herald, 27 February 2019, www.smh.com.au/business/small-business/
ato-whistleblower-faces-six-life-sentences-roughly-the-same-as-ivan-milat-20190226-p510d2.html.
97  David Peetz, ‘An Institutional Analysis of the Growth of Executive Remuneration’. Journal 
of Industrial Relations 57, no. 5 (2015): 707–25.
98  David Harvey, ‘The “New” Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession’, Socialist Register 40 
(2004): 63–87; David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
99  Andrew Hopkins, ‘What Banking Regulators Can Learn from Deepwater Horizon and Other 
Industrial Catastrophes’. The Conversation, 31 January 2019, theconversation.com/what-banking-
regulators-can-learn-from-deepwater-horizon-and-other-industrial-catastrophes-108989.
100  Bakan, Corporation.
101  Vogel uses the concept of ‘deregulatory capture’ to describe the success of the finance industry 
in achieving deregulation. Steven K. Vogel, ‘Rethinking Stigler’s Theory of Regulation: Regulatory 
Capture or Deregulatory Capture?’. Pro-Market 2018, promarket.org/rethinking-stiglers-theory-
regulation-regulatory-capture-deregulatory-capture/.
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Microsoft, Apple, Google, and Amazon into one huge company (MAGA), 
ready to convert the last remnants of the sharing economy into a “taking 
economy.” Such a firm could exercise enormous power: with unprecedented 
access to consumers, it would be a must-have marketplace, and could use 
this powerful position to drive very hard bargains with companies’,102 he 
was inadvertently talking about the world envisaged in The Circle. But 
he was also alluding to the huge advantages monopoly capital already 
possesses in the country that produced Trumpism and celebrated its 
slogans. There can be a symbiotic relationship between concentrating 
political and economic power. Powerful governments grant concessions 
to large corporations that increase the latter’s power and they, in turn, 
provide donations and political support to entrench the position of their 
allies in government, or even jobs for them after they leave government.103 
In the end, even a seemingly democratically elected government may do 
nothing to constrain monopoly power, regardless of whether part of it 
wishes to. This was very much the world of The Circle. The potential for 
gaining profit through the exercise of monopoly power should not be 
underestimated. The mass of value obtained from all activities is more 
important to a corporation than the rate at which it is extracted from 
one worker.104 
We also need to develop responses to the great freedoms that have 
been given to financial capital over the past three-plus decades in most 
industrialised countries. They have clearly helped shift the balance of 
power in the economy, and the global financial crisis demonstrated that 
they have not produced net benefits for society. It may seem slightly 
removed to be talking about regulating the financial sector in response 
to issues about the future of work; but the key issues about the future 
of work more concern inequality and power than simply displacement 
by technology (the latter being a function of inequality and power). 
Addressing the role of finance is central to addressing inequalities of 
power. Clearly, more ambitious changes are needed than the piecemeal 
102  Frank Pasquale, ‘Will Amazon Take over the World?’. Boston Review, 20 July 2017, bostonreview.
net/class-inequality/frank-pasquale-will-amazon-take-over-world.
103  In Australia, a good source for tracking such events is www.michaelwest.com.au. See also Allan 
Holmes et al., Did Billionaires Pay Off Republicans for Passing the Trump Tax Bill? (Washington DC: 
Centre for Public Integrity, 7 February 2019), publicintegrity.org/business/taxes/trumps-tax-cuts/
did-billionaires-pay-off-republicans-for-passing-the-trump-tax-bill/; Cameron Murray and Paul 
Frijters, Game of Mates: How Favours Bleed the Nation (Publicious, 2017).
104  Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 1 (London: The Electric Book Company, 1887; repr., 1998), 
Chapter XI.
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reforms that have been considered to date. For example, financial markets 
themselves were extremely pleased with the relatively small impact on 
profits likely to arise from the recommendations of a Royal Commission 
into misconduct in the sector in Australia, despite numerous revelations 
of extraordinary corporate misbehaviour.105
Laws for the workplace
In the workplace, it is easy to get distracted by technological determinism 
or by talk of the rise of the ‘gig economy’ or the disappearance of work. 
But work will continue, people will be employed (to the extent that 
education and resources are deployed to cope with restructuring) and 
the employment relationship will persist. So, too, if we do not address 
it, will the power imbalance in workplaces between labour and capital 
and the consequences that has for work.106 The danger technology poses 
to workers through increased algorithmic management and ‘not there’ 
employment is arguably greater than the danger of technological job 
loss.107 Much of that must be addressed by broader social and economic 
policies, as mentioned, but some relates to the specific workplace factors 
that influence workers’ power.
There are changes in several countries needed to the legal and institutional 
framework for bargaining that affect workers’ ability to gain from higher 
productivity. In Australia, such changes are probably needed more than in 
most other countries, given the extent of imbalance in the framework in 
the 2010s; these include enabling multiemployer bargaining, reforming 
procedures for terminating agreements and industrial action, and indeed 
reforming the concept of the right to take collective action.108 Australia 
clearly needs a new approach to the enforcement of minimum standards, 
as discussed in Chapter 10. In all countries, core capital—be it in the 
105  Crikey reported that, in early trading after the release of the Commission’s report, the value 
of NAB shares rose 3.5 per cent, while ‘Commonwealth Bank shares rose 4% … and ANZ’s 5%. 
Westpac rose nearly 6%, AMP surged 8% and IOOF 10%.’ Glenn Dyer and Bernard Keane, 
‘Investors Give Banks a Tick in Wake of Royal Commission’. Crikey, 5 February 2019.
106  Referred to by Paul Thompson as not the ‘bullshit jobs’ but ‘the bullshit in the jobs (the insecure 
contracts, the excessive work demands)’. Paul Thompson, ‘If There Are So Many “Bullshit Jobs”, 
Should Labour Fight for the Future of Work?’. Labourlist, 22 February 2019, labourlist.org/2019/02/
if-there-are-so-many-bullshit-jobs-should-labour-fight-for-the-future-of-work/.
107  Brishen Rogers, Beyond Automation: The Law & Political Economy of Workplace Technological 
Change (SSRN, 4 February 2019), ssrn.com/abstract=3327608 or dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3327608.
108  Tess Hardy, Jim Stanford, and Andrew Stewart, eds, The Wages Crisis in Australia: What It Is and 
What to Do About It (Adelaide: University of Adelaide Press, 2018).
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form of franchisors, large brand names or head contractors—needs to 
be held accountable for underpayment of labour or other law-breaking 
within the chain. Neither employment law nor competition law should 
obstruct labour from bargaining with entities other than the direct 
employer, since ‘not there’ employment is often used not just to reduce 
pay and conditions but as a ruse to prevent adequate bargaining. Indeed, 
competition law should aim to promote the wellbeing of society, and not 
be a barrier that prevents civil society, including unions, from seeking to 
improve that wellbeing through putting pressure on the market.
Better regulation of the framework of work is also important for 
redressing gender imbalances. The more freedom that capital and 
individual managers have to allocate risk and rewards as they see fit, 
the more that women, migrants, people of colour and other groups are 
disadvantaged. Regulation, if designed well, and proximity to it can 
especially benefit those groups. The gains for many women, for example, 
in antidiscrimination law over the past three decades (and gains arising 
from more progressive attitudes towards women’s roles) have been largely 
offset by greater regulation distance through neo-liberalism and weakened 
collective power, as well as by the greater leniency of permitted behaviours 
in some countries through the rise of neo-totalitarian forces.109
Self-organisation
The above changes may alter the degree of inequality and the imbalance of 
power, but in the end unions and other civil-society organisations must, 
as discussed in Chapter 7, create within themselves strong organisational 
capacity. More than anything else, the events that followed the global 
financial crisis (or Great Recession) of 2008 demonstrated the failure of 
civil society—in particular, unions, women’s groups and other bodies 
representing workers, children, the environment and the poor—to 
develop and articulate an alternative policy vision to challenge the failed 
market-liberal paradigm. This failure raises doubt about the plausibility of 
the first alternative future mentioned above—a more egalitarian one that 
matches the very first Sliding Doors scenario laid out in Chapter 1.
109  David Peetz and Georgina Murray, ‘The Persistence of Gender Gaps’. In Women, Labor Segmentation 
and Regulation: Varieties of Gender Gaps, ed. David Peetz and Georgina Murray (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2017), 235–55.
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Without a growth of organisational capacity in civil society, including 
trade  unions and nongovernment organisations, workers will lack 
the power to defend their working conditions or to make fissuring 
unprofitable, and dissenting voices will lack the power to force change in 
norms, regulation and the distribution of income and wealth. Dissent is 
delegitimised in The Circle, and when Mae faces critical choices something 
serious is missing: the collective power of workers to act on informed 
choices. Yet even in large, nonunionised high-tech firms, workers have 
shown they will act collectively if sufficiently provoked.110 Dissent is 
disorganised and violently suppressed in Nineteen Eighty-Four, while in 
The Handmaid’s Tale it is violently suppressed but organised and covert. 
In the very long run, in that last-mentioned book, the malevolent state 
is overthrown. Unless dissent is organised, however, power ultimately 
reproduces itself, regardless of the contradictions it creates.
A new citizenship
The issues canvassed in this book are not matters that can be put off. 
Technological change is going to continue relentlessly. Researchers, in 
universities and private corporations such as Elon Musk’s Neuralink, are 
working on technology that will enable digital hardware to be implanted 
within the human body, linking the brain wirelessly with computer 
networks of the world. It is not a question of if this can be done, it is 
when.111 Already there is talk of a shift to a new form of capitalism—
‘cognitive capitalism’—based on knowledge as the basic source of value.112 
This would take that process much further. The implications for inequality 
of opportunity, productivity, income and power could be enormous. 
Nearly two centuries ago, Percy Shelley wrote of how ‘the rich have become 
richer, and the poor have become poorer’.113 It is a thought repeated many 
times—even in a line in a Leonard Cohen song114—but one that would 
barely describe the outcome in the absence of change. If we do not reform 
110  Shirin Ghaffary and Eric Johnson, ‘After 20,000 Workers Walked out, Google Said It Got the 
Message. The Workers Disagree’. Recode, 21 November 2018, www.recode.net/2018/11/21/18105719/
google-walkout-real-change-organizers-protest-discrimination-kara-swisher-recode-decode-podcast.
111  David Peetz and Georgina Murray, ‘I, Cyborg: The Life and Work of Digital Humans’. Griffith 
Review 64 (online content) (2019). Watch out for a book on this topic.
112  Yann Moulier Boutang. Cognitive Capitalism (Translated by Ed Emery, Cambridge: Polity, 2011).
113  Percy Bysshe Shelley, ‘A Defence of Poetry’. In Charles W. Eliot, English Essays: Sidney to 
Macaulay, Vol. XXVII. The Harvard Classics. New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1909–14; repr. Bartleby.
com, 2001, www.bartleby.com/br/02701.html.
114  You can find the idea repeated in Leonard Cohen and Sharon Robinson, Everybody Knows, Sony/
ATV Music Publishing LLC, 1988.
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society’s rules now in anticipation of the future, the consequences for the 
great majority of working people could be devastating, notwithstanding 
the potentially fantastic improvements that could feasibly be made to 
many other aspects of people’s lives. 
With that in mind, our concerns should not be focused on the potential 
evil that technology might bring and the jobs it might destroy or 
fundamentally change in the future. Our concern should rather be about 
what uses can be made of technology in the absence of changes to the 
distribution of wealth and power, and what needs to be done to ensure 
that the benefits are not restricted to a few, potentially making the lives 
of many people worse than they presently are, but are instead accessible 
to all. 
Organisations think of ‘organisational citizenship’ as depicting ‘good’ 
behaviour by employees towards the organisation—doing things not in 
their job description that make life easier for their fellow workers, their 
managers or their customers, and that in the end help boost profits. 
But citizens also have rights, not just responsibilities. We need to think 
and talk about treating people as citizens at work, people with a right to 
respect, rest, job security, income security and a voice. It means people 
have a  right to decent work. And it can be done, if we make the right 
choices. As leading Canadian jurist Harry Arthurs said, it is not a question 
of going back to twentieth-century labour law, as the problems for workers 
stem from wider forces that ‘also adversely affect all citizens in their non-
working lives as consumers, borrowers, tenants, and recipients of social 
goods’.115 The project is one of restoring the primacy of democratic values 
and processes over markets and capital. It can be done, but time is not on 
our side.
115  Harry Arthurs, ‘Rethinking Citizenship at Work: Where Do We Go from Here?’ Paper presented 
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